Sad Midis? Turkey’s Rapprochement with Russia and Its implication in Black Sea Security.

            Since Kuwait war in 1987, Turkey has been in search for its own “local and national” air security defense outside of and within NATO. Diversification and co-operation in the field of air and missile defense has been there inside of military officers, bureaucracy and policymaker’s agenda. So it is not new but now, relatively, Turkey has claims the air and missile defense has been in eminent vulnerable state.

            Taking the security development, paradigm shift in domestic politics sphere and thorny problems in its geopolitical proximity intensify this vulnerability therefore it needs to be addressed so the determent mechanism must be implemented, Turkey to look out for new opportunities in the market to procure sophisticated anti-aircraft armament to fortify and secure its land, air and seas. After all these years, fully aware of this sensitive environment and threats from the surrounding,  Turkey as a valuable member of NATO is procuring –done deal-  S 400 missile defense from its historical and geopolitical adversary Russia to protect and deter air threats. Turkey as of today received the first shipment of the Russian Missile Defense technologies.

            This direct rapprochement sent “reliable partner” deficiency signal to Western world, mainly the US and the historical relationship is getting sour in all aspect.

In the international system today, interacting of states is woven in complexities and uncertainties. It is more incidental, eventful and intertwined. Thus, foreign policy that shapes this web of interactions is multi-dimensional in its nature and diverse in its behaviors as same Russian and Turkey relationship. In macro-level of complexity or interaction of states encompassing crucial tools that need to be considered in order to asses and to explain politics internationally. Without these factors, the explanation and understanding of foreign policy may lead inefficiencies. There are many useful devices in glossary toolbox of international relations that generously offer us a hand and take us out of the complexity and uncertainty of two states’ affairs.  For this article, international system, state and individual will be our torch to shed the light on the current interaction of Turkey and Russia in global context.

Introduction of Sad Midis? Turkey’s Rapprochement with Russia and Its implication in Black Sea Security.

            When examining the characteristic of the relationship between Turkey and the West, especially the US, the current situation is way beyond the notion of “If Turkey is drifting away from the West.” As it is crystal clear that Turkey has already adapted an ideological “distance” from the West and a geographical “proximity” towards Russia. That is to say, Turkey is no longer a pro-western country. Especially, after the July 15, 2016 mysterious coup attempt, Turkey has withdrawn into searching a new state identity; Turkey EuroAsian (Shanghai 5) foreign affairs’ orientation. Moreover, Western orientation and sentiment in Turkey is in critical condition as demonstrated in recent reliable poll 2019 by academicians from Kadir Has University[1].

             Both at the elite and the mass level, Turkey’s once strong pro-Western sentiment is waning. This internal restructure emerged during JDP (Justice and Development Party Turkey) marraging with Russia nourishes anti-western sentiment and growing.

            To justify this divergent, Turkey as unitary actor, has right to have an independent foreign policy Turkey is independent state but equally deserves self- respect in international arena. The geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic challenges force to Turkey to refashion new foreign policy and search new alliances outside of 80 years long of marriage with west. According to policy makers of Turkey, this search and restructuring foreign policy is not derailment, abandonment or shift but it is a pragmatic need and a national interest. Turkey’s main argument that Iran, Syria, and Greece obtain state of art misile de securitize the region, so Turkey must compete and launch new development and research in defense industry. 

            This fraction between Turkey and the West push Turkey to navigate a foreign policy direction, mainly in ambivalence and elusive over the past decade. Just in recent years, Turkey’s strategic culture and national identity were both considered and defined traditional NATO-centric geostrategic orientations and EU- inclined geo-economic and geopolitical orientations. Now, Turkey’s leaving NATO and EU candidacy cards are discussed in Ankara among policy makers. The state level of analysis is in parallel with individual level of analysis, Turkey believes that it is high time to rebalance its relations with the US. Turkey and Russian relationship though seems more “leader to leader oriented” than national interests of Turkey, more benefiting Russia than Turkey. So, many scholars and experts believe that as long as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in power, there will be no compromise and tone down diplomacy towards United States as state behavior turn into a sole steering administration and dominant around individuals. Thus, Ankara seems unwilling in keeping pro-Western sentiment strong throughout Turkey and the leadership of Turkey intensified and benefitted for the upper hand in internal politics.  The “New Turkey” and its motto “Yerli ve Milli Turkiye (Local and National Turkey)” constitute the foundational theme of Turkey’s new executive presidential system, which puts President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s persona at the center of decision making process. He is the one and only power source in Turkey and, according to important state bureaucrat in Ankara, the man “who saved both the state and the nation on the night of the July 15, 2016 military uprising.” If one aims to make sense of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy shifts, the codes of the “New Turkey” should be read carefully through the lens of the Arab Spring outside Turkey and Erdogan’s culmination of one-man rule in Turkey. Within these 3 level of analysis, we ask one question in Georgian language, SAD MIDIS? Where is it going?

S400 vs. F35 Conundrum of Sad Midis? Turkey’s Rapprochement with Russia and Its implication in Black Sea Security.

                In the past couple of months, long endured relationship in its ebb and flow but this time it  have gone from ‘bad’ to ‘worse’ in S400 vs. F35 Conundrum that symbolizes current state of Turkey’s that is getting stuck between the Western security block and Russia. When the US senior military officials leaked to media that Turkey would be get out of F35 consortium if Ankara’s not giving up the dream of procuring the S400s. Reuters reported that the United States could soon freeze preparations for delivering F-35 fighter jets to Turkey. While no decision has been made, excluding Turkey from the F-35 program, in which it has been a long-time partner, would be a massive blow to already strained ties between Washington and Ankara. In following days a draft that might initiate whole process of Turkey’s getting out of F35 project has been passed to the US Congress, and with this move, the ‘massive blow’ is in making.

Seeing those serious steps taken by Washington DC, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, who had been postponing his trip to Ankara for almost two weeks despite Ankara’s call, suddenly visited Ankara;

-          to check if or not Ankara is still decisive to procure of S400s despite DC’s recent moves,

-          To assure/comfort Ankara that Kremlin is on her side and support Turkey if necessary.

            During the Lavrov-Cavusoglu press conference, Cavusoglu reiterated one more time that Turkey’s purchase of S400s is a ‘done deal.’ Cavusoglu also emphasized first time that Ankara has ruled out the possibility of transferring S-400s to a second country once purchased from Russia. This is a further blow to US because some people in Ankara and in DC were speculating this option (transfer of S400s to a third country like Qatar) as a solution to end  S-400 crisis.

Ankara has two arguments to justify buying a missile system from Russia rather than US:

Ankara says that Washington has been unwilling to transfer technology to Turkey—though Moscow has denied that its sale of S-400s would include a transfer of technology,

Ankara does not want its military inventory and procurement to be tied exclusively to its Western partners.

                Then there is the question of the F-35, which the US is supposed to give to Turkey. For the Americans as well as the many other NATO countries that have ordered the aircraft, maintaining the integrity & Electronic Intelligence Safety of the F-35 is vital since it will be NATO’s standard aircraft for decades. Therefore, any access by Russia to its electronic “signature” on S-400 radars is simply a no-go for NATO. Ankara’s counterarguments that Turkey would operate the S-400 system without Russian technical assistance (though Moscow has confirmed the system would come with Russian personnel), or would use them independently of its air defense architecture, seems for me unconvincing.

                Some experts have been speculating that Turkey could cancel the S-400 deal after the country’s March 31 municipal elections, which is unlikely for me. Please keep in mind  that this would mean Ankara’s heavily damaging its friendly relationship with Moscow. Conversely, if the S-400 system is delivered and activated, sanctions could be imposed by DC starting from excluding Turkey from its production chain.  

                In late May, my sources say that A Russian military&technical personnel will come to Turkey for the reconnaissance of some possible deployment locations of the S400 batteries such as Ankara Polatli Artillery School, some sites in Antalya and some in Gaziantep. This visit will be another blow for Western partners. My sources in Moscow also assert that Moscow is very eager to establish joint-operation centers in Turkey to run the ‘integrated S400 air defense shield’ over the airspace of Turkey and will permanently deploy Russian officers and technical personnel for the maintenance of the systems. The permanent deployment of the Russian officers & technical personnel into Ankara and possible deployment sites for operating the S400 systems and for their maintenance will for sure raise questions about how Ankara will keep those NATO cosmic secrets from Russians. Similarly, How could it keep critical U.S. and NATO assets deployed at three major Turkish bases—Incirlik, Konya, and Malatya, among others facilities—while having Russian assets deployed at other bases? This is very important question. More importantly, Going further, would the US ultimately want to reorganize its presence at Turkey’s Incirlik air force base, where several dozen nuclear warheads are prepositioned? Would a restructuring of NATO activities affect its forward operating base in Konya, where its E-3A AWACS help in the operations of the anti-ISIS coalition or what would be the impact of S400 deployments into Turkey on NATO’s very critical radar based in Kurecik/Malatya? More generally, would NATO countries have to rethink the role of their forward bases in the Mediterranean and the Middle East—both in EU countries such as Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, and in Turkey and Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Qatar—in order to take into account the uncertainties stemming from the S-400 deployment in Turkey? These are very critical questions.

                My sources also emphasize that, for almost 4 months, Turkish officers have been excluded from high level NATO meetings about the ballistic air defense systems & radar architecture, a grim development that shows that ‘trust deficiency’ between NATO member states and Turkey has already started. This deficiency would for sure turn into a big ‘trust gap’ in the due course.

            I think that, if the S-400s are eventually deployed, Turkey’s drift away from the West would become real case. The international consequences of this decision are potentially momentous. Beyond the changes in NATO policies, it would represent a big gain for Moscow’s muscle-flexing around Europe. It would also confirm that Turkey’s long-lasting, strategic European and Western anchor can not longer be taken for granted.

[1] Mustafa Aydın, Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, Mitat Çelikpala, Soli Özel, Cihan Dizdaroğlu and Mustafa Gokcan Kosen, “Research on Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy”, Center for Turkish Studies – Kadir Has University, 4 July 2019.