The traditional model of banking
business also modified because of Securitization, where until maturity the loans
kept by banks. It is a multifaceted economic method that allows banks to trade or
else illiquid loans to the investors. The sale proceeds are then help in the additional
finance lending and this sequence might be followed continually. In view of the
fact that the financial crisis of 2008, a lot of work has examine the securitization
unhelpful effects. There is overpowering confirmation that securitization augment
the banks credit risk [3].
It is also found from a lot of studies
that securitization can augment the opportunistic banks behavior, also. In the period
before 2008 crises, some of the banks active in securitization discarded applications of
the fewer loan and brokered mortgages of poor quality. The mortgages which
were more risky were possible to be securitized and banks also misreported
the underlying mortgages credit quality by providing unclear information
from shareholder [4]. Banks concentrated
their examining borrower’s efforts of securitized loans. In some of the larger
banks securitizations were approved rating favors by agencies of the credit
rating, in that way they also misguide the investors. They were not capable of
assessing the risk because of these assets complex structure and inappropriate information;
investors were provoked to depend on the credit ratings [3].
All of these securitization consequences
on bank behavior were less obvious in the European marketplace. Some of the
banks not likely to have securitized relaxed standards of lending or
low quality loans same like the US banks. In Europe, securities market was stronger.
In period before crisis, average defaults ranged of 0.6% and 1.5%, measure up
to 9.3% to 18.4% for securitizations in the US [3]. On the other hand,
the volume of securitization in European markets has undergone from crisis
evenly, but not more than the market of US. The European securitizations
increasing amount, deceptive as not all securities formed are essentially sold on
confidential investors. A great amount is preserve by issuing the banks and afterward
used as guarantee to protect the funding from central banks such as European
Central Bank. Other than, banks in the United Kingdom have augmented their levels
of issuance considerably relative to levels of pre- Brexit [5].
CDO
(collateralized Debt Obligation) of Financial Crisis
Backed by subprime mortgages on
CDOs were said to be the main reason of the 2008 financial crisis. The banks
had a catalog of CDOs junior tranches that they required to put up for sale.
The credit rating agencies also gave the good credit ratings junior tranches, although
they were also backed by subprime liability. As good credit ratings hold by junior
tranches, banks traded them to retirement fund and other investors of the institution.
These shareholders are normally allowed to spend in liability with the high
credit ratings and without high credit ratings not sold them. The organizations
and agencies wrongly unspecified that housing prices keep on rising [4].
The tranches were extremely diversified
from a perspective of the geographic locations. The banks also misguidedly consider
if housing prices were damage in one reign of the country, they might be counterbalance
by well-built housing markets in other areas. The banks were not likely to forecast
a crisis of nationwide housing. An enormous delinquencies tide and defaults weighed
down market, result in the CDOs defaults. The CDOs are building a response. In
the existing environment of the low interest rate, the CDOs recommend a highly give
way what is accessible on business or government debt. Investors looking for capitulate
are launching to spend in CDOs again. Issued in 2014, there were approximately
$20 billion in CDOs and in 2013 up from $5 billion [4].
Role
Credit Rating Agencies of Financial Crisis
During the financial crisis 2008
the credit-rating agencies made a classic error of thinking current financial
history is possible to duplicate. The Credit rating agencies are more careful
also. The Justice Department takes legal action against the Standard &
Poor's because of its role in 2008 financial crisis. In February 2015 the company
decided to resolve the legal action for $1.38 billion. The credit rating
agencies would be less expected to offer good credit ratings for uncertain CDOs
moving forward. The own debt at rest had a speculation grade score when it organize
for protection of the bankruptcy. The federal government arbitrates with the
bear streams do equivalence with the Lehman thing was mistakenly assumed by
investors.
The Bear Stearns was sold to
JPMorgan Chase in takeover of the management engineered that confined debt
holders of the Bear's. Some of the Investor gambling the same can be done with
Lehman might have a great loss [6].
The Credit-rating agencies are compensated
by debt issuing companies. This model can also produce a big inducement for these
agencies to "bend their standard to
gain business," Griffin says. Some of the structured debt goods were particularly
susceptible to inflation ratings for business. These goods might likely to fail
in case the economy short-circuited, permit the credit-rating agencies the aptitude
to say that the economic recession can also change the essentials for their
business [7].
References of What Role Did Securitization Play in the
2008 Financial Crisis?
[1]
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C. GALLANT,
"What is securitization?," 4 December 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/securitization.asp.
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[2]
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J. Gerard Caprio, A.
Demirgüç-Kunt and E. J. Kane, "The 2007 Meltdown in Structured
Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats," pp. 1-41, 2009.
|
[3]
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J. EDWARDS, "The
Return of CDOs After the 2008 Financial Crisis," 20 October 2015.
[Online]. Available:
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/102015/return-cdos-after-2008-financial-crisis.asp.
|
[4]
|
E. Szabáowska,
"The financial crisis and securitization," Journal of Education
Culture and Society, pp. 37-48, 2010.
|
[5]
|
T. J. Sinclair,
"Credit Rating Agencies and the Global Financial Crisis," Institute
for the Study of Societies, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 4-9, 2010.
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[6]
|
P. Marciniak,
"Impact of the Credit Rating Agencies on the Financial Crisis
2007–2009," Annales. Etyka w życiu gospodarczym, vol. 18, no. 4,
p. 99–110, 2015.
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[7]
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M. Krantz, "2008
crisis still hangs over credit-rating firms," 13 Septemeber 2013.
[Online]. Available:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/13/credit-rating-agencies-2008-financial-crisis-lehman/2759025/.
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