Much might be learned regarding the nature of economic
development of China by observing the city, Shanghai, created in 1842 in its
modern form when it was opened to the international trade, that nonetheless
moved quickly to the forefront of commercial Asian centres, with massive trade
and manufacturing, until it was closed in 1949 effectively by the communists,
who believed that imperialism or foreign trade was the reason of all ill of the
country. Therefore, visitors in nation in early 1980s and late 1970s found a
city that was frozen in time instead of a dynamic metropolis, where elderly
waiters and chefs were summoned from the retirement for preparing the Western
food that they knew how to make from the late 1930s.
Since then, it would seem that almost everything has been
altered. Shanghai at present is the showpiece of economic development of China
with an opera, a large museum, shopping malls, skyscrapers, and highways
intertwined for accommodating over 1million automobiles. Until the 1980s from
1950, Chinese communist government had devalued the cosmopolitanism
systematically which had been traditionally symbolized by the city. At the same
time, the formidable industrial establishment of the city had been run down by
the state, taking more in the profits from various nationalized taxes and
enterprises than what was returned in investments (Li, 2009).
Now, the hope of government is that Shanghai will be the
economy of Asia if not of the whole world. It would seem to be more or less on
track. Moreover, Shanghai and other provinces and coastal cities like it were
already starting to be connected into the routes for international trade by
1980s. And by the turn of a millennium, their affect and influence had become
quite strong, flooding the US with exports to create an immense deficit of
trade, increasing the prices of basic materials like iron ore and sole, as the
government of China collected stocks of international exchange which was 2nd in
size only to the one belonging to Japan. In double digits, reported rates of
growth were so high that government was contemplating about slowing down and
economic overheating by 2003. Then suddenly, exports to the country become
important for states like Taiwan and Japan that had depended on the US for a
long time. Fascinated by the prospect of endless growth of China, some of the
observed determine it as a locomotive for the economy of not only regions but
also the world.
However, if Shanghai serves as the showplace of the economic
development of China, it is also like an object less in the challenges and
contradictions of the approach of Shanghai to this development. For unlike the
very first leader of modernization of economy after 1978, Hong Kong and
Guangdong which depended for growth initially on the foreign and local
investment, and attempted to retain profits, Shanghai at present is a state
that exhibits excellence.
The impressive skyline of Shanghai today was not created by
merchants, relying on profits from investments, similar to its predecessor,
whose hotels, factories, and officers were all financed privately by businesses
that had been earning profits in China for years, but turned to architecture
only when flows of profit were established securely. What one realizes as one
observes the prospect of Shanghai at present is a large project of building,
completed with moey that was borrowed on the supposition of earnings in the
future and with the foreign direct investment which looks to the future balance
sheets for its clear rationale (Garnaut & Song,
2004).
The greater area of Hong Kong developed economically once
its habitants were permitted to engage in trade. Even today, the downtown
Canton cannot match the sheer magnificence of its neighbor in the North. By
contrast, recent resurrection of Shanghai was started by a stern political
decision and was underwritten with funds from the state. From an economic
perspective, this decision was wise. After all, considering the location of
Shanghai at the very mouth of Yangzi River, it is a logical centre for exports and
imports from a system of river that connects a population which is larger than
that of Europe. It made sense even from a political perspective, for
Cantonese’s speakers, the accent of far south, have actually been a strong
minded, and Beijing was concerned the least as Southerners became
self-sufficient politically and economically before drifting away.
For a connector, a political need existed. Therefore, a
large investment unfolded millions of dollars created the cityscape which one
now views with surprise and awe. No one seems to know the cost of all this to
central government, which has paid for it with loans from the banks of state (and
FDI or foreign direct investment).
However, in the August of 2004, it was reported by China
Daily that 335 billion dollars had been earmarked by the municipality for
investment in the growth and development of Shanghai over the period of next 3
years. Whether this investment lose or market money is an important question
for the future of China and one which is related directly to the regime’s
figure. After all, in Shanghai, it is the state that is investing in the
Chinese economic decisions.
They do this by the allocation of loans, drawn from Chinese
people’s savings in state banks. These go to enterprises which are owned by the
state: bankers predict that one percent of credit of banks goes to private
businessmen, and that five percent of economy of China at most is privately
held. Furthermore, the remaining is a complex amalgam of local, provincial, and
state enterprises, normally competing with each other. Foreign capital is
acquiring greater control over economy of China due to its greater efficient in
utilization of resources.
This type of economic development is not only beneficial to
China but also to the whole world. However, two caveats must be raised by one.
First of all, economy of China at present relies on exports to an unhealthy
degree and those exports are the product of global business using cheap Chinese
labor for value-adding and assembly operations. Therefore, a complete fifth
percent of exports of China is accounted for by international participated
organizations, and seventy percent its IT sector is owned by Taiwan. And as
long as state-owned organizations are favored by Beijing, global private
organizations and FDI will be the most effective uitlizers of production
factors in China, especially cheap labor. The outcome is clear, it will be an
unhealthy degree of international control over economy.
It is likely for a Marxist to grumble about the exploitation
of cheap labor by the global capital. What China is facing here is the problem
of investment decisions and capital utilization. At present, bank lending is
carried out by the state to its organizations. These firms utilize the money
for increasing their production, leading an oversupply of products and goods
for which, there is no demand, and a downward steady pressure on costs. The
money which is lent to these organizations is not recoverable for most of the
part. The issue of nonperforming loans seems to threaten the integrity of
entire system of banking, owned by the state.
This issue regarding the capital waste and gross
misallocation in a poor-capital nation, is maybe the most serious concern
facing the economy of China now. Growth on the basis of borrowing is not
similar to growth on the basis of profits and raising the efficiency. Nor even
the exports will produce sufficient money for raising living standards of the
vast majority of people in china, who seem to live on land. If growth is to be
sustained by China, then it has to start depending on the internal demand,
instead of exports.
China actually has a massive issue with the protection of
rights of intellectual property. Recently, various drug patents lifted by
Chinese government have been seen with GlaxoSmithKline, as a major player. The
company didn’t even decide to contest the decision as the opportunity of
success was nonexistent. General Motors, which has seemingly poured a vast amount
into its enterprises in the nation, it has been surprised to observe the
similarity of the mini-sedan Chery, produced by a Chinese organization to their
own Sparkle. However, no recourse is again used by the GM. On a small and large
scale, the same story takes place: from Zippo lighter to an automobile
technology. In China, Zippo is being counterfeited immensely in inefficient
quality imitation, which only serves to deny the market share of Zippo and ruin
the reputation of brand.
Lastly, there is a question of the sustainability at
long-term of the approach to different economics adopted by China. Economic
growth of China has been real but the government, for economic and political
reasons, shown a specific preference for holding companies and state enterprises,
and foreign investment, opposed to proper domestic entrepreneurship. It is
imagined by people that somehow China has become more like a capitalist or
market economy. This is not correct at all because partial control of large
industries is still present. If the government of China had wanted to
privatize, it would have done this years ago. However, it doesn’t want to.
Instead, the government seems to utilize financing of government together with
expertise and foreign investment as a therapy for creating a competitive
economy that is controlled by the state. Whether this is attainable or not, has
yet to be seen. However, it is quite certain that survival of a communist party
increasingly relies on the maintenance of a rapid rate of growth (Zhang,
2004).
Military Aspects
It has been already mentioned that Chinese policies of
growth, and growth itself highly depends on exports, and her diplomatic and
military policies, which are often irredentist and proactive, are certainly
self-contradictory. The question here is that whether one or the other will be
prevailed, or some type of stalemate will emerge. For just as the economy of
China has become influential on Asian and worldly economies, the same can be
said about its diplomatic and military policies as well. They are backed by
military which is transformed in its abilities for long-range general quality
and power projection. They are genuinely beginning to impact the decisions of
China’s neighboring countries. It is a mystery to just why China would devote
an amount to the military budget of the US.
Some believe that buildup of China is just a routinely
modernization which is true to an extent. It can be said that 1980s found the
nation with a soviet military style that was quite obsolete. Meanwhile, other
argue that the buildup of China is a response to provocations and threats, like
territorial disputes with its neighbors like Philippines and Japan, as well as
the consistent failure of Taiwanese to show a desire to be a part of China.
Military power of China over the last 15 years has grown significantly.
Began shortly after 1989’s Tiananmen massacre as in a part
of the political payoff to military, this military buildup has been real. It is
starting to bring massive changes to the power configuration in Asia, changes
which are now beginning to be understood. Japan, India, Russia are the 3 major
military powers affected by the current buildup of China. Each had transformed
immensely during the time of military modernization of China (Waldron, 2005).
In Central Europe and Russia, the communist system was
closed, beginning in the Tiananmen year and ending with the elimination of
Soviet Union along with the lowering of its flag over Kremlin. It has been an
important factor to influence the programme of Republic of China of people. The
basis of this programme is the maintenance of power of party regardless of the
cost. With the ending of USSR, a balance could no longer be maintained by India
between the US and itself. Nehruvian exceptionalism and neutrality started to
be ignored; a reformation in the economy started by Congress Party and BJP
continued it. Due to this, the state was lifted into a trajectory of
high-growth. This country also has started to react to the military buildup of
china which posted both an indirect (Supporting Pakistan’s nuclear programme) and
a direct threat.
Presiding over the rise of Germany to global power and
authority, Bismarck seemingly went out of is way for avoiding behavior which
was military-threatening and reassure all of his neighbors. China would appear
to be doing the opposite with respect to Japan. It seems that Beijing doesn’t
realize that Japan is not creating its military power not because it is unable
to do so, but due to the fact that she has made a choice not to go down this
path. Decisive responses of Japan to external challenges of security in both
the 20th and 19th centuries suggest that she will do anything to be safe in
this century as well.
The capability of Asian powers of targeting with the nuclear
missiles not only is forced by the US in Asia but also the continental US. The
meaning of this is that extended deterrence exhibited by Washington is not
credible anymore. Therefore, two possibilities are faced here. One is that
China and North Korea alter their policies of military, which will reassure
Japan that she will be safe even when she is resisting the development of
military. This seems very unlikely. The other one is that, realizing the new
risk and understand the US is not capable of handling it without any
assistance. Tokyo will be changing its constitution and develop a military
capability that is self-sufficient with great sophistication. Another approach
to prevent it is to support that if China stays on her military course,
capabilities will be developed by Japan comparable to Russia and India (Shambaugh,
2013).
Future direction of Russia still seems to be unclear.
However, it can be discussed that past is the worst. Communism has been
eliminated, mass media has been limited again after getting freedom, and
democratic politics have come to stay with statist tendencies and strong
authoritarian. The economy is actually recovering from the post-Soviet period.
Being a part of this massive process, Russian military is undergoing a
reformation. It can be said that a re-consolidation is important if Russia
wishes to survive and it will present another treat to china both on sea and
land.
Therefore, one of complex puzzles of the last ten years or
so is just why Russia has proved to be a willing weapon supplier to China.
Instead of having to manufacture systems of weapons form the start, China has
actually benefitted from two significant infusions of Russian or Soviet
technology of military. During the period between the Sino-Soviet split and
Korean War, the first came in the ending of 1950s. During it, the Soviet
technology of Missile was obtained by China together with a promise from Moscow
to transfer the technology of nuclear weapons as well. However, this promise
hasn’t been fulfilled.
The second one started as the government empowered the
Liberation Army of People in the wake of massacre of Tiananmen in 1989. It has
actually witnessed the transfer of finished technologies and weapons: missiles,
quiet submarines, and advanced jets. Assisted by other important transfers of
technology from the US, Israel, Ukraine, France, and UK, China has been capable
of modernizing her structure of force much faster than if China had relied on
only indigenous capabilities. Of course, the price is a high degree of reliance
on Soviet or Russia. The history suggests that Russia will not always be with
China. How can this paradoxical policy be explained?
First of all, money of China keeps the military of Russia
afloat. And indeed, some of it enters the pockets of individual military
experts of Russia. Secondly, China doesn’t enjoy any other source of such an
advanced formula and technology which cannot be developed by itself. Though,
just why China feels urgency for this capability is still a question. Thirdly,
sales to the country are quite controversial in Soviet or China. It is
suggested by reports that high command has tried ruling the export of advanced items
out and controlling the general situation. Still, the outcome of Russian
exports actually has been to convert the armament qualitatively of the most
advanced units of China First, Chinese money keeps Russian military research
afloat, and no doubt some of it finds its way into the pockets of individual
Russian military experts. Second, China has no other source for such advanced
technology which it cannot itself develop quickly – though why China should
feel so urgent a need for this capability is a hard question to answer. Third,
sales to China are controversial in Russia, and reports suggest that the high
command has attempted to rule out the export of the most advanced items and
generally bring the situation under control. Still, the net result of Russian
exports has been to transform qualitatively the armament of the most advanced
Chinese units.
The military rise of China is an unexpected and tremendous
improvement in its prowess that started after the massacre of Tiananmen in
1989. Actually, it is transforming the relations among great powers of Asia in
the ways which are not favorable to China all the time. it can be said that the
most unfavorable and drastic reaction has been military modernization of India
which creates a permanent second front in almost any issue.
Meanwhile, the most beneficial reaction would be Russia’s
which has seemingly transferred advanced weapon technology to China worth
billions of dollars. However, in a long-term, the most consequential reaction
to the military rise of China will be Japan’s. It is quite likely and is about
developing forces and military prowess of her own sufficient in offsetting the
military of China.
In other words, balancing is more likely to be the overall
effect of rise of China on her 3 most significant neighbors. Similar to the
situation during the Cold War, neither side gained an advantage, in spite of
spending billions of dollars on military. Thus, rearmament of China will lead
to Asia that will invest a lot more in its military forces than at present. It
will make war more costly than likely. In such situations, the danger indeed is
that a power will either sense a momentary advantage slipping and go after
pre-emption or overestimate its military prowess and initiate a war by just
miscalculation (Glaser, 2011).
References of Rise of China Economically and Militarily
Garnaut,
R., & Song, L. (2004). China's third economic transformation: The rise of
the private economy. Routledge.
Glaser, C. (2011). Will China's rise lead to war? Why
realism does not mean pessimism. Foreign Affairs, 80-91.
Li, M. (2009). The rise of China and the demise of the
capitalist world economy. NYU Press.
Shambaugh, D. L. (2013). China goes global: The partial
power (Vol. 111). Oxford University Press.
Waldron, A. (2005). The rise of China: military and
political implications. The rise of China: military and political implications,
31(4), Review of International Studies.
Zhang, W.-W. (2004). The implications of the rise of China. Foresight,
6(5), 223-226.