Introduction of the 2010 Deep Water Horizon Accident
The marine oil drilling history has
recorded various kinds of incidents, and one of the prominent incident happened
in 2010. Deepwater Horizon was an oil drilling rig located at the oilfield of
Macondo Prospect, which is actually part of the U.S Gulf of Mexico. It was 20th
of April in 2010, when a normal day at Deepwater Horizon proved to be a disastrous
one. First of all, the oil drilling rig exploded, and then it sank into the
water. In result of this horrific incident, 11 people working on the site faced
death. It is said that in marine oil drilling history, it is one of the largest
incident in terms of spill of oil. Once the Deepwater Horizon was exploded,
there was impossible to stop the flowing of oil from the site, and for next 87
days after the incident, more than 4m barrels of oil was spilled over or
flowed, which is a huge amount of oil, being wasted into the water. It took 87
days for the authorities to recover from this damage, and on 15th
July, they were finally able to cap this oil rigging site. The U.S Government
strongly believed that incident happened due to negligence of BP Exploration
& Production, so a case was filed against them and other alleged parties
for their irresponsible duty, which lead to this horrific incident, claiming 11
innocent lives (U.S Environmental Protection Agency, 2020)
Background of the Accident
It is important to dig out the facts
to show the background of this accident, which said to be one of the biggest
environmental hazard incidents in the history of the United States. It is a
well-known fact that when such large scale incidents occur, they don’t happen
in a minute or so, rather there are always some background reasons, while pile
up and then such incidents happen. Once the investigations were done, a variety
of elements were found, which led to this sad incident. A report was published
by BP in 2011, which revealed that the primary reason for this accident was the
failure of the well integrity. This aspect was followed by another issue, which
was losing control of the fluid’s pressure in the well. In such circumstances,
where something goes wrong, there are always safety measures and equipment in
place to stop the problem, before it turns out to be a disaster. In this oil
spill accident, a device named “blowout preventer” was installed to prevent the
issue of losing pressure control. But on that day, it was so unlucky to say
that the device was not able to perform, what it was supposed to perform. The
device was supposed to seal the relevant well automatically, but it could not
happen due to unknown reasons. So, when there was no one to stop the pressure,
the shot up the ratio of the hydrocarbons was uncontrollable, which was a
reason to ignite the well. As the result of this ignition, huge explosions were
observed, which totally destroyed the oil field. If this kind of problem would
have been identified earlier, or better safety measures would have been there,
then such incident might have been prevented (Bryant, 2011)
The Roles and Responsibilities of Safety Supervisors
and Employees
It is a fact that the Deepwater
Horizon incident was a question mark on the safety standards, as well as,
skills & capabilities of the workers and safety supervisors. There was
certain negligence on part of the employees and safety supervisors working on the
site. There were a variety of managerial and operational decisions, which were
incorrect, thus led to this accident. It was identified that the safety culture
of the Deepwater Horizon was not up to the mark, and that’s why it could not
prevent this huge mishap. It was found that safety culture at the site was
lacking so many required elements from the employees and supervisors. If all
the safety elements would have been followed to develop a better safety
culture; then things would have been different, what actually happened on the
ground. The other important thing to know in this regard is the lack of
adequate safety standards adopted by the firm, which was responsible to manage
the oil field at that time. It was said that if given safety practices and guidelines
would have been followed accordingly to develop a better and safe work
environment, and then the incident could have been prevented (Reader and Connor, 2013)
It
was found that the management and safety supervisors could not develop
operational steps to signal and identify any kind of issues in the process. The
communication and signaling process was also flawed. Even it was said that BP
was aware of the fault, which was contained by the blowout preventer. If it was
true, then it was such huge negligence on part of the management to ignore a
huge issue. If this kind of safety equipment is having faults, then it should
have been replaced with a new one, or it should have been repaired. But no such
effort was noticed in the past. The contingency plan was also having so many
faults, and that’s why the response to the incident was miscalculated and
flawed. A constant eye on the safety measures and equipment was needed to
ensure that everything is working fine, but every responsible worker was
involved in some kind of negligence, and that’s why this explosion happened. A
better safety work paradigm with focused involvement of safety supervisors
would have prevented this accident, or at least it would have minimized its
negative effects (Bryant, 2011)
Other Causes of the Accident
In the earlier discussion, a variety
of issues have been discussed, which played their part in this sad accident,
killing 11 people. There are few other causes as well, which should be looked
at to see how a series of causes led to this accident. One of the causes of
this incident was the dodgy cement used in the well. The cement used at the
borehole’s bottom was not up to the required standards, so it was not able to
prevent the leakage. If cement formulation has been strong, then leakage of the
oil and gas would have been impossible. The other cause of this incident was
the failure of the valve. The pipe’s bottom to the given surface had two kinds
of sealing; one sealing was done by filling it with the cement, and the other
sealing was 2 mechanical valves, which were there to make sure that oil and gas
flow is stopped from any kind of leakage. But the sad part of the incident is
that both cement and valves were failed to prevent the leakage (United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy
and Commerce. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2013)
It was also found that workers were
involved in testing the various pressures to see, if the well is sealed as per
safety standards, or it is having any issues. The results taken from these
tests were showing signs of worry, but workers were not able to interpret it
properly, which means that results were misinterpreted. So, it was assumed that
everything is fine, and well is not going to bear any kind of leakage, but this
result was wrong to make any assumptions. It is another story, whether the well
was good enough sealed or not, but once the leakage had happened, it should
have been spotted a lot earlier than the explosion had happened. There should
have been a close eye on the essence of leakage, and if any leakage would have
been spotted within time, the incident could have been stopped as well. It is
quite shocking to know that leakage continues for around 50 minutes, which is a
lot of time to detect any safety or leakage error before the explosion, but
safety supervisors were failed to detect this leakage even in 50 minutes' time.
Just a few minutes before the explosion, the workers have seen a mixture of gas
and mud, and they tried to use a blowout preventer to stop this flow, but this
valve was also failed to do its due task. There was no gas alarm installed at
the facility, which could have identified leakage, and alarms would have warned
the workers that something is wrong with the process (Mullins, 2010)
The Principles of Occupational Risk Assessment in the
Workplace
It is vital to know that the
workplace can have so many hazards and risks, which should be measured
accordingly so that any kind of incidents is prevented. If the stakeholders
would have made sure that principles of occupational risk assessment are
followed as per given guidelines, then this kind of huge disaster would never
have happened in the history of marine oil drilling. They should have policies
in place to assess risks and hazards. They should have also implemented a
variety of control and risk measures so that if one measure fails to perform,
the other one comes up with the indication. Moreover, all risk assessment
measures should also be checked and tested every now and then to see, if they
are working properly or not. If risk measures would have any issues, those
issues can be identified during the testing. These kinds of security measures
were needed at the workplace to prevent this incident and save valuable lives
of the workers (Khan, Mustaq and Tabassum, 2014)
References of the 2010 Deep Water Horizon
Accident
Bryant,
(2011) Deepwater Horizon and the Gulf oil spill - the key questions
answered, [Online], Available: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/20/deepwater-horizon-key-questions-answered [17 March
2020].
Khan, W., , Mustaq, and Tabassum, (2014) 'OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH, SAFETY AND RISK ANALYSIS', International Journal of Science,
Environment, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 1336 – 1346.
Mullins, (2010) The eight failures that caused the Gulf
oil spill, [Online], Available: https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19425-the-eight-failures-that-caused-the-gulf-oil-spill/ [17 March
2020].
Reader, , and Connor, , (2013) 'The Deepwater Horizon
explosion: Non-technical skills, safety culture, and system complexity', Journal
of Risk Research, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 405-424.
U.S Environmental Protection Agency (2020) Deepwater
Horizon – BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, [Online], Available: https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill [17 March
2020].
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and
Commerce. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (2013) The Role of
BP in the Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second
Session, June 17, 201, U.S. Government Printing Office.