Report on Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

Executive Summary of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

            At present, security crisis exists in the area and the governments of Niger, Mali, and Faso are not equipped well to confront it in an effective manner. It would not be wrong to say that their approach to these hurdles and issues has been counterproductive and insufficient. Meanwhile, in contrast to Niger and Faso, the political class of Mali is doing only a little to respond to these issues and the raging conflict. In January 2013, troops were deployed to Mali after the capital Bamako was threatened by Jihadists. French soldiers, in an operation referred to as Serval, changes the Jihadists from various northern cities. However, they did not succeed in dislodging them from their strongholds. The lack of political will of Mali and the counterproductive responses of the broader region have given an advantage to various extremist groups. JNIM and ISGS, due to it, have seemingly exploited the mistakes of government, increased their impact, and have stoked tensions to perform and initiate coordinated attacks. The conflict in the Sahel has resulted in thousands of casualties including both commoners and soldiers. In addition to just deaths, it has also resulted in people leaving and immigrating to other nations. Unprecedented violence levels were experienced by the countries in the Sahel in 2018. Particularly, this is the case for Faso and Mali, both of which seemingly registered the highest death tolls related to conflict in years. They have actually experienced four times the fatalities which were experienced in 2012. 62 percent of all these deaths were concentrated in Mali.

The international community must consult and coordinate both private and public messaging with important regional acts for insisting that leaders of Mali address the issues underlying the violence. Security assistance should be continued by the international community. The government should replicate its inclusive and innovative approach towards its Tuareg population and applying the same or best practices to Fulani populations as well. The government should move resources towards improving the livelihoods of vulnerable people. Investments should be made by the government in restoring local and national negotiation. The government must disrupt inter-communal disputes’ political manipulation. Lastly, development and humanitarian investments are important in public goods and broader regions.

Introduction of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

The Sahel stretches from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Red Sea and it is a semiarid corridor spanning a large number of countries including Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Senegal. In the Sahel region, various countries have been struggling and facing difficulties with drastic climate shifts which have resulted in adverse effects and droughts on the already damaged and vulnerable people living in the area. Actually, in recent years, a fireball of conflict has put Western Sahel in a spotlight and this conflict involves military campaigns by international partners, national armies, and various armed groups. Due to it, the security situation has deteriorated and it is adversely influencing both civilians and soldiers. In this paper, this problem will be analysed in detail (Lacher, 2012).

Problem in Sahel Region of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

            In recent years of Sahel, a period of political instability began in 2003. This occurred when the Salafist GSPC or Group for Preaching and Combat kidnapped around thirty tourists from Western countries in the Algerian desert. At present, security crisis exists in the area and the governments of Niger, Mali, and Faso are not equipped well to confront it in an effective manner. It would not be wrong to say that their approach to these hurdles and issues has been counterproductive and insufficient. Meanwhile, in contrast to Niger and Faso, the political class of Mali is doing only a little to respond to these issues and the raging conflict. Even though the government faces domestic pressure for addressing insecurity, the government might consider there is an unacceptable cost in doing more and investing more efforts.

            With this spiralling crisis, the international community has stopped. Antonio Guterres, the Secretary General of United Nations exclaimed in September 2019 stated “we are actually losing group because of violence.” In Niger, Mali, and Faso, extremist attacks have expanded significantly. The rate of expansion is more than twice and there has also been a significant rise in displaced persons. For instance, in Faso, there has been a displacement of 486,000 people in 2019, according to the United Nation. In the Sahel, the deteriorating situation and its implications for corruption, criminality, migration, and security have adversely influenced the Gulf States, European capitals, and the United States. In addition to it, this has caused some governments of West Africa to throw development experts, diplomats, and soldiers at the issue (Raleigh, 2010).

            Actually, a missing part of the international attention has been a focus on Sahel’s domestic violence. The hub of violence is Mali and there have been significant political barriers in the area to supporting foreign engagement for the re-establishment of security in different areas. One US scholar has determined that in Mali, the real issue is generally the segregation of political class which is ruling the rest of the country along with Mali. In Mali, the politicians are not responding to the crisis in an effective manner. Additionally, civil society and the political opposition in Mali have seemingly failed to pressure the government adequately to address the violence. In recent months, some protests have been mounted by domestic activists and political costs are perceived by the government of Mali to expanding the services of government and shifting resources in the troubled central and northern regions.

Manifestation of Conflict of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

As explained above, the conflict in the Sahel began with the eruption of Tuareg rebellion in 2012 in Mali. It served to seize and obtain much of the north of the nation and declared independence. Gradually, Jihadists drove out separatists and took control of several regions and towns even when they were allied with the separatists at first. In January 2013, troops were deployed to Mali after the capital Bamako was threatened by Jihadists. French soldiers, in an operation referred to as Serval, changes the Jihadists from various northern cities. However, they did not succeed in dislodging them from their strongholds. Ever since then, the activity of Jihadists has grown to central Mali. It has further expanded into east and north of Faso along with western Niger. Due to it, there have been thousands of casualties including both militants and civilians. In the meantime, numerous people have left their homes just to avoid being the victims of attacks (Thébaud & Batterbury, 2001).

The Effect of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

 Actually, it is in Sudan, the main source and cause of regional violence. Approximately half of the victims in the area seemingly died due to the violence incurred by the State of Sudan, Darfur's armed groups, and its allied militia. In both the south and east, there is actually a cross-border dimension which is reflected in the influx of refugees to other nations. Meanwhile, regional conflict's second source is present in Nigeria. From the year of 2010, three different forms of violence were experienced. They accounted for approximately one-quarter of the military and civilian victims in the region. Some of the other sources of violence are actually present in northern Sahara. Over the period of the fall of Colonel Gaddafi, 15,500 deaths have been resulted in Libya. 

            The lack of political will of Mali and the counterproductive responses of the broader region have given an advantage to various extremist groups. JNIM and ISGS, due to it, have seemingly exploited the mistakes of government, increased their impact, and have stoked tensions to perform and initiate coordinated attacks. Both of these groups operate directly across the central Sahel and they have initiated various attacks including the storming of resort town and kidnapping in 2019. The reach of JNIM has been expanded rapidly by it by provoking issues between different communal groups and have offered to protect the victim groups, a service which the government has not been providing. The extremists, at the same time, have seemingly established themselves across the region in communities, not in villages but within Bambara, Mossi, and Dozo areas  (Raleigh & Dowd, 2013).

 JNIM has also benefitted from the abusive and heavy-handed security responses by recruiting all those civilians who are hostages to both of the sides. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the actions of governments have only fuelled and benefited the extremist groups. If the Malian government does not show the political will of addressing the root causes and main reasons for conflict, foreign countries will continue to deploy soldiers and resources with only little and limited effect. 

            For instance, billions of dollars have been embarked and invested by the international community in the military and economic aid for responding to the conflict. In general, the founding members and developers of the Sahel Alliance include the UNDP, African Development Bank, World Bank, the European Union, Germany, and France have been joined by the UK, Spain, and Italy in committing to provide 6 billion dollars in different projects (Muggah & Cabrera, 2019).

Those Affected of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

The conflict in the Sahel has resulted in thousands of casualties including both commoners and soldiers. In addition to just deaths, it has also resulted in people leaving and immigrating to other nations. Unprecedented violence levels were experienced by the countries in the Sahel in 2018. Particularly, this is the case for Faso and Mali, both of which seemingly registered the highest death tolls related to the conflict in years. They have actually experienced four times the fatalities which were experienced in 2012. 62 percent of all these deaths were concentrated in Mali. In 2018, approximately 5 million people experienced displacement internally or across borders. In addition to it, 24 million individuals needed food assistance across the Sahel.

            In 2018, Mali became a regional hotspot and it experienced an increase in violence against normal citizens. In general, this was largely the result of increasing inter-communal issues between farmers and herders. However, the changing tactics and strategies of jihadist groups also contributed to it as they worked in the north and centre of the nation. In accordance with Armed Conflict and Event Location Dataset, there was a minimum of 882 civilian casualties in the previous year which was over eight times the 2012 figure. A sharp increase was witnessed by Faso as well in 2018 in Jihadist attacks, which was over four times the number which was identified and recorded in 2017. In fact, a tripling of riots and protests was registered by Niger and waves of unrest were sparked by spiralling living costs and a new law of tax. In accordance with ACLED, thirty protests had occurred in 2018 which is more than the double of what was recorded in 2017 (CSIS Briefs, 2019).

            At the moment, the middle belt of Niger is experiencing significant difficulties. The violence of farmer-herder is a lot deadlier than the destruction and havoc which was wreaked and caused by Boko Haram. A violent escalation has been documented by ACLED in Nasawara, Taraba, and Plateau along with electoral cycles. All of these are the results of issues and conflict in the Sahel.

 It would not be wrong to say that for hundreds of years, herdsmen headed south across the Sahel during the hot and long dry season. Typically, farmers welcomed them as their goals and cattle seemed to fertilise the depleted cropland. On one hand, farmers and herders competed over different resources on a daily basis. On the other hand, swift mediation from leaders and customary arrangements were responsible for restraining the raging violence. However, this arrangement is not working anymore. Instead of it, thousands of people in Nigeria, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Faso are killed on yearly basis in inter-communal violence. In fact, many more people are caught up in the overlapping conflicts which are not being controlled (Zyck & Muggah, 2013).

Causes of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

Changes in climate are partly to blame. It is estimated by the United Nations that 80 percent of the farmland of the Sahel in degraded. In the area, temperatures are increasing half a time rather than the temperature in the rest of the world. Due to it, floods and droughts are growing longer and they are also becoming more frequent. Due to it, food production is being undermined. In general, approximately 50 million individuals in the area of Sahel seem to depend on livestock for surviving in the area. However, the land which is available to pastoralists is reducing significantly. The increasing population is aggravating it and it is causing farmers to go north to cultivate and harvest more crops. And although poor conditions of climate are increasing violence, no-go areas are also being created by proliferating jihadi insurgencies. It is only worsening the already bad situation (Benjaminsen, 2016).

Metastasizing violence, food insecurity, and climate risks are all aimed to become worse in the western Sahel. It is believed by climate scientists that by 2025, temperatures would be 3-5C warmer there. In these areas, there is no specific pattern of rainfall and it is erratic. There is a reduction in wet seasons. Decreasing food production and grain are pushing pastoralists to find places where they can find fertile pasture. Obviously, when herders seem to stay too long or arrive too early, it is followed by violence.

            An important reason why there are violent conflicts in the area is because national borders are not guarded properly and they are porous as well. In addition to it, they are generally criss-crossed with cattle herders and enterprising merchants, with sinister criminal and extremist networks which are trafficking weapons, drugs, and toxic ideologies. In one country, insurgencies often seem to spill across borders. It is similar to the case when issues and conflict seemingly spread to Central Mali from North Mali and into Eastern and North Faso. It also reached south-western Niger. Moreover, manipulated by business elites and the government, all marginalised pastoralists become the foot soldiers of the interlocking conflicts of Sahel. It would not be wrong to say that they are already recruits because of social exclusion and non-existing livelihood options (McGovern, 2012).

            Foothold has been established by political militia and jihadi groups in Sahel’s remote parts. Actually, they are thriving because of a combination of abundance of firearms and weak state authority. A team of recruits is also being developed by them from different nomadic communities like Fulani, Dossaak, and Tuareg. Numerous counter-terrorism operations supported by foreign nations have seemingly made some positive results but they are not efficient and sufficient enough to contain the whole violence in the area.

            Actually, the signals have become red after a combination of pasture shortages, livestock losses, and poor rainfall contributed to food insecurity. In general, the combination of violence, transhumance, spiking migration, inflation, depreciation of local currencies, degradation of local economies, and poor governance are the actual cause of conflict which has been covering the Sahel.

Strategies

            The regional strategies have been negligible because as it has been explained above, governments believe that the corrective measures are costly and shifting resources is not possible. Even if efforts are made to shift resources, it would be overly costly for governments. Other than regional efforts and programmes, foreign nations have seemingly funded billions of dollars in the management of food insecurities and ensuring that issues related to violence are resolved. For instance, in 2012, the WFP or World Food Programme seemingly gave food to approximately 6 million individuals on a monthly basis through food security and nutrition programme. In addition to it, the FAO or Food and Agriculture Organisation assisted over 5.2 million individuals through support to crop and food production in the off-season. The programme also contributed to desert locust monitoring and control and water and soil rehabilitation projects. With its partners, the OCHA or Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also assisted communities and mobilised resources (ESSOUNGOU, 2013).

            As it has been explained above, strong climatic variations characterise the Sahel. This serves to pose a significant obstacle to poverty reduction and food security in the region. Among other things, the officials of the United Nations have urged regional cooperation for defusing conflicts and tensions between regional countries and reducing the risk of environmentally inducted migration and increased conflict. Actually, the countries of Sahel have been plagued by political stability for years. The military coup, in Mali, brought a sudden stop to twenty years of stable democracy. Terrorists, in its aftermath, who had occupied the northern region began to head south with the objective of taking control of the whole nation. The humanitarian and security crisis was compounded by the conflict which caused food shortages and disrupted supply routes.

            An agreement was developed by UNODC among Algeria, Chad, Faso, Burkina, Niger, Morocco, and Mali in addressing the problems and issues caused by organised terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking. The deployment of a detailed peacekeeping mission was authorised by the UN Security Council for assisting Mali in achieving stability. It was believed by the World Bank that irrigation could enable the agriculture of Sahel to overcome the issues and challenges which were created by a hostile environment and produce more food for the people. Therefore, funds were transferred to ensure that food needs were met. These are the efforts which have been invested by the United Nations throughout the years to ensure that issues and conflicts in Sahel are resolved in an effective manner.

Outcomes of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

            As it has been explained above, in Niger, Mali, and Faso, extremist attacks have expanded significantly. In fact, the rate of expansion is more than twice and there has also been a significant rise in displaced person. In addition to it, the rate of displacement has also increased significantly. All the issues and problems in the Sahel, specifically corruption, crime, and terrorist attacks have seemingly adversely influenced surrounding nations. For instance, it has adversely influenced the US and they have also caused various nations to invest a large amount of money just to ensure that issues in the area are resolved in an effective manner. These conditions have only worsened because soldiers have been thrown into the whole situation by various neighbouring governments.

            An important thing to note is that even though various initiatives have been implemented and various foreign nations have focused on the resolution of issues, in 2019, the casualties only increased as more and more civilians have died because of terrorist attacks and battle against soldiers (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013).

Recommendations of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

            Overall, it can be said that regardless of the fact that foreign investments have been made and regional policies have been made, there are still raging conflicts in Sahel. One of the major factors which obstruct the success of these policies is the inability and lack of focus of governments to really resolve the issues. The region’s approach has been counterproductive. Following are the recommendations that can be considered for resolving the issues:

·         The international community must consult and coordinate both private and public messaging with important regional acts for insisting that leaders of Mali address the issues underlying the violence.

·         Security assistance should be continued by the international community.

·         The government should replicate its inclusive and innovative approach towards its Tuareg population and applying the same or best practices to Fulani populations as well.

·         The government should move resources towards improving the livelihoods of vulnerable people.

·         Investments should be made by the government in restoring local and national negotiation.

·         The government must disrupt inter-communal disputes’ political manipulation.

·         Lastly, development and humanitarian investments are important in public goods and broader regions.

References of Deteriorating Security in the Sahel

Benjaminsen, T. A., 2016. Does Climate Change Lead to Conflicts in the Sahel?. In: The End of Desertification?. s.l.:Springer, pp. 99-116.

CSIS Briefs, 2019. Politics at the Heart of the Crisis in the Sahel. [Online]
Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/politics-heart-crisis-sahel

ESSOUNGOU, A.-M., 2013. The Sahel: One region, many crises. [Online]
Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/sahel-one-region-many-crises

Hendrix, C. & Brinkman, H.-J., 2013. Food insecurity and conflict dynamics: Causal linkages and complex feedbacks. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2).

Lacher, W., 2012. Organized crime and conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region. s.l.:Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

McGovern, M., 2012. Understanding conflict drivers and resilience factors in the Sahel: Desk study.

Muggah, R. & Cabrera, J. L., 2019. The Sahel is engulfed by violence. Climate change, food insecurity and extremists are largely to blame. [Online]
Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/

Raleigh, C., 2010. Political marginalization, climate change, and conflict in African Sahel states. International studies review, 12(1), pp. 69-86.

Raleigh, C. & Dowd, C., 2013. Governance and conflict in the Sahel’s ‘ungoverned space’. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2).

Thébaud, B. & Batterbury, S., 2001. Sahel pastoralists: opportunism, struggle, conflict and negotiation. A case study from eastern Niger. Global environmental change, 11(1), pp. 69-78.

Zyck, S. & Muggah, R., 2013. Conflicts colliding in Mali and the Sahel. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2).