978 0 87220 464 5

ARISTOTLE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Translated with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, by

TERENCE IRWIN

Second Edition

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis /Cambridge

Copyright© 1999 by Terence Irwin

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Aristotle.

[Nicomachean ethics. English] Nicomachean ethics I Aristotle : translated, with introduction,

notes, and glossary by Terence Irwin.-2nd ed. p. em.

Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-87220-465-0-ISBN 0-87220-464-2 (pbk.) 1. Ethics. I. Irwin, Terence. II. Title.

B430.A5N5313 1999 171 '.3-dc21

ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-465-2 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-464-5 (pbk.) Adobe PDF ebook ISBN: 978-1-60384-567-0

99-26709 CIP

N I COMAC H EAN ETH I CS Book I , Chapte r 4 §5

cated in that area, and the unqualifiedly good judge is the person edu- 1 095a cated in every area.

This is why a youth is not a suitable student of political science; for he lacks experience of the actions in life, which are the subject and premises of our arguments. §6 Moreover, since he tends to follow his feelings, his study will be futile and useless; for the end [of political science] is action, 5 not knowledge.* §7 It does not matter whether he is young in years or immature in character, since the deficiency does not depend on age, but results from following his feelings in his life and in a given pursuit; for an immature person, like an incontinent person, gets no benefit from his knowledge. But for those who accord with reason in forming their desires 10 and in their actions, knowledge of political science will be of great benefit.

§8 These are the preliminary points about the student, about the way our claims are to be accepted, and about what we propose to do.*

4

[Co m mon Be l iefs]

Let us, then, begin again.* Since every sort of knowledge and decision* pursues some good, what is the good that we say political science seeks? 15 What, [in other words,] is the highest of all the goods achievable in action?

§2 As far as its name goes, most people virtually agree; for both the many and the cultivated call it happiness, and they suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy.* But they disagree 20 about what happiness is, and the many do not give the same answer as the wise.*

§3 For the many think it is something obvious and evident-for instance, pleasure, wealth, or honor. Some take it to be one thing, others another. Indeed, the same person often changes his mind; for when he has fallen ill, he thinks happiness is health, and when he has fallen into pov­ erty, he thinks it is wealth. And when they are conscious of their own ignorance, they admire anyone who speaks of something grand and 25 above their heads. [Among the wise,] however, some used to think that besides these many goods there is some other good that exists in its own right and that causes all these goods to be goods.*

§4 Presumably, then, it is rather futile to examine all these beliefs, and it is enough to examine those that are most current or seem to have some 30 argument for them.

§5 We must notice, however, the difference between arguments from principles and arguments toward principles.* For indeed Plato was right to be puzzled about this, when he used to ask if [the argument] set out from the principles or led toward them*-just as on a race course the path 1095b may go from the starting line to the far end,* or back again. For we should

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Book I, Chapte r 4 §5 AR I STOT LE

1095b certainly begin from things known, but things are known in two ways;* for some are known to us, some known without qualification. Presum­ ably, then, we ought to begin from things known to us.

5 §6 That is why we need to have been brought up in fine habits if we are to be adequate students of fine and just things, and of political ques­ tions generally. §7 For we begin from the [belief] that [something is true]; if this is apparent enough to us, we can begin without also [know­ ing] why [it is true].* Someone who is well brought up has the begin­ nings, or can easily acquire them.* Someone who neither has them nor

10 can acquire them should listen to Hesiod:* 'He who grasps everything himself is best of all; he is noble also who listens to one who has spoken well; but he who neither grasps it himself nor takes to heart what he hears from another is a useless man.'

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[T he T h ree L ives]

But let us begin again from the point from which we digressed.* For, it would seem, people quite reasonably reach their conception of the good,

15 i.e., of happiness, from the lives [they lead]; §2 for there are roughly three most favored lives: the lives of gratification, of political activity, and, third, of study.*

The many, the most vulgar, would seem to conceive the good and hap­ piness as pleasure, and hence they also like the life of gratification.

20 §3 In this they appear completely slavish, since the life they decide on is a life for grazing animals.* Still, they have some argument in their defense, since many in positions of power feel as Sardanapallus* felt, [and also choose this life].

§4 The cultivated people, those active [in politics], conceive the good as honor, since this is more or less the end [normally pursued] in the political life. This, however, appears to be too superficial to be what we

25 are seeking;* for it seems to depend more on those who honor than on the one honored, whereas we intuitively believe that the good is something of our own and hard to take from us.* §5 Further, it would seem, they pursue honor to convince themselves that they are good; at any rate, they seek to be honored by prudent people, among people who know them,

30 and for virtue. It is clear, then, that-in their view at any rate-virtue is superior [to honor].

§6 Perhaps, indeed, one might conceive virtue more than honor to be the end of the political life. However, this also is apparently too incom­ plete [to be the good]. For it seems possible for someone to possess virtue

1096a but be asleep or inactive throughout his life, and, moreover, to suffer the worst evils and misfortunes. If this is the sort of life he leads, no one would count him happy, except to defend a philosopher 's paradox.*

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N I COMAC H EAN ETH I CS Book I , Chapte r 6 §4

Enough about this, since it has been adequately discussed in the popular 1 096a works* as well.

§7 The third life is the life of study, which we shall examine in what 5 follows.*

§8 The moneymaker 's life is in a way forced on him [not chosen for itself];* and clearly wealth is not the good we are seeking, since it is [merely] useful, [choiceworthy only] for some other end. Hence one would be more inclined to suppose that [any of] the goods mentioned earlier is the end, since they are liked for themselves. But apparently they are not [the end] either; and many arguments have been presented 10 against them.* Let us, then, dismiss them.

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[T he P lato n i c Form of the Good ]

Presumably, though, we had better examine the universal good, and puz­ zle out what is meant in speaking of it.* This sort of inquiry is, to be sure, unwelcome to us, because those who introduced the Forms were friends* of ours; still, it presumably seems better, indeed only right, to destroy 15 even what is close to us if that is the way to preserve truth. We must espe- cially do this as philosophers, [lovers of wisdom]; for though we love both the truth and our friends, reverence is due to the truth first.

§2 Those who introduced this view did not mean to produce an Idea for any [series] in which they spoke of prior and posterior [members];* that was why they did not mean to establish an Idea [of number] for [the series of] numbers. But the good is spoken of both in what-it-is [that is, 20 substance], and in quality and relative;* and what exists in its own right, that is, substance, is by nature prior to the relative,* since a relative would seem to be an appendage and coincident of being. And so there is no com- mon Idea over these.

§3 Further, good is spoken of in as many ways as being [is spoken of]:* in what-it-is, as god and mind;* in quality, as the virtues; in quantity, as the 25 measured amount; in relative, as the useful; in time, as the opportune moment; in place, as the [right] situation; and so on. Hence it is clear that the good cannot be some common and single universal; for if it were, it would be spoken of in only one [of the types of] predication, not in them all.

§4 Further, if a number of things have a single Idea, there is also a sin- 30 gle science of them; hence [if there were an Idea of good] there would also be some single science of all goods. But, in fact, there are many sciences even of the goods under one [type of] predication; for the science of the opportune moment, for instance, in war is generalship, in disease medi- cine. And similarly the science of the measured amount in food is medi- cine, in exertion gymnastics. [Hence there is no single science of the good, and so no Idea.]

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N I COMAC H EAN ETH I CS Book I , Chapte r 7 §4

§14 Perhaps, however, someone might think it is better to get to know 1096b the Idea with a view to the goods that we can possess and achieve in 1097a action; for [one might suppose that] if we have this as a sort of pattern, we shall also know better about the goods that are goods for us, and if we know about them, we shall hit on them. §15 This argument certainly has some plausibility, but it would seem to clash with the sciences. For 5 each of these, though it aims at some good and seeks to supply what is lacking, leaves out knowledge of the Idea; but if the Idea were such an important aid, surely it would not be reasonable for all craftsmen to know nothing about it and not even to look for it.

§16 Moreover, it is a puzzle to know what the weaver or carpenter will gain for his own craft from knowing this Good Itself, or how anyone 10 will be better at medicine or generalship from having gazed on the Idea Itself. For what the doctor appears to consider is not even health [univer- sally, let alone good universally], but human health, and presumably the health of this human being even more, since he treats one particular patient at a time.*

So much, then, for these questions.

7

[An Accoun t of the H u man G ood]

But let us return once again to the good we are looking for, and con- 15 sider just what it could be.* For it is apparently one thing in one action or craft, and another thing in another; for it is one thing in medicine, another in generalship, and so on for the rest. What, then, is the good of each action or craft? Surely it is that for the sake of which the other things are done; in medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in house-building 20 a house, in another case something else, but in every action and decision it is the end, since it is for the sake of the end that everyone does the other actions.* And so, if there is some end of everything achievable in action, the good achievable in action will be this end; if there are more ends than one, [the good achievable in action] will be these ends.*

§2 Our argument, then, has followed a different route to reach the same conclusion.* But we must try to make this still more perspicuous.* 25 §3 Since there are apparently many ends, and we choose some of them (for instance, wealth, flutes, and, in general, instruments) because of something else, it is clear that not all ends are complete.* But the best good is apparently something complete. And so, if only one end is com- plete, the good we are looking for will be this end; if more ends than one are complete, it will be the most complete end of these.* 30

§4 We say that an end pursued in its own right is more complete than an end pursued because of something else, and that an end that is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than ends that

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Book I, Chapte r 7 §4 AR I STOT LE

1 097a are choiceworthy both in their own right and because of this end. Hence an end that is always choiceworthy in its own right,* never because of something else, is complete without qualification.

§5 Now happiness, more than anything else, seems complete without 1097b qualification.* For we always choose it because of itself,* never because of

something else. Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we cer­ tainly choose because of themselves, since we would choose each of them even if it had no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of hap-

s piness, supposing that through them we shall be happy.* Happiness, by con­ trast, no one ever chooses for their sake, or for the sake of anything else at all.

§6 The same conclusion [that happiness is complete] also appears to follow from self-sufficiency. For the complete good seems to be self-suffi­ cient.* What we count as self-sufficient is not what suffices for a solitary

10 person by himself, living an isolated life, but what suffices also for par­ ents, children, wife, and, in general, for friends and fellow citizens, since a human being is a naturally political [animal].* §7 Here, however, we must impose some limit; for if we extend the good to parents' parents and children's children and to friends of friends, we shall go on without limit; but we must examine this another time.

15 Anyhow, we regard something as self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing; and that is what we think happiness does. §8 Moreover, we think happiness is most choicewor­ thy of all goods, [since] it is not counted as one good among many.* [If it were] counted as one among many,* then, clearly, we think it would be more choiceworthy if the smallest of goods were added; for the good that is added becomes an extra quantity of goods, and the larger of two goods

20 is always more choiceworthy.* Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient,

since it is the end of the things achievable in action.*

§9 But presumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently something [generally ] agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what the best good is.* §10 Perhaps, then, we shall find

25 this if we first grasp the function of a human being. For just as the good, i.e., [doing] well, for a flautist, a sculptor, and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function,* the same seems to be true for a human being, if a human being has some function.

30 §11 Then do the carpenter and the leather worker have their functions and actions, but has a human being no function?* Is he by nature idle, without any function?* Or, just as eye, hand, foot, and, in general, every [bodily] part apparently has its function, may we likewise ascribe to a human being some function apart from all of these?*

§12 What, then, could this be? For living is apparently shared with 1098a plants, but what we are looking for is the special function of a human

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N I COMAC H EAN ETH I CS Book I, Chapte r 7 §20

being; hence we should set aside the life of nutrition and growth.* The life 1 09Ba next in order is some sort of life of sense perception; but this too is appar- ently shared with horse, ox, and every animal.*

§13 The remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of action* of the [part of the soul] that has reason.* One [part] of it has reason as obey- ing reason; the other has it as itself having reason and thinking.* More- 5 over, life is also spoken of in two ways [as capacity and as activity], and we must take [a human being's special function to be] life as activity, since this seems to be called life more fully.* §14 We have found, then, that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason.*

Now we say that the function of a [kind of thing]-of a harpist, for instance-is the same in kind as the function of an excellent individual of the kind-of an excellent harpist, for instance. And the same is true with- 10 out qualification in every case, if we add to the function the superior achievement in accord with the virtue; for the function of a harpist is to play the harp, and the function of a good harpist is to play it well.* More- over, we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be activity and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function of the excellent man is to do this well and finely. 15

§15 Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord with the virtue proper [to that kind of thing].* And so the human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue,* and indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one.* §16 Moreover, in a complete life.* For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day ; nor, similarly, does one day or a short time 20 make us blessed and happy.

§17 This, then, is a sketch of the good; for, presumably, we must draw the outline first, and fill it in later.* If the sketch is good, anyone, it seems, can advance and articulate it, and in such cases time discovers more, or is a good partner in discovery. That is also how the crafts have improved, 25 since anyone can add what is lacking [in the outline].

§18 We must also remember our previous remarks, so that we do not look for the same degree of exactness in all areas, but the degree that accords with a given subject matter and is proper to a given line of inquiry.* §19 For the carpenter 's and the geometer 's inquiries about the 30 right angle are different also; the carpenter restricts himself to what helps his work, but the geometer inquires into what, or what sort* of thing, the right angle is, since he studies the truth. We must do the same, then, in other areas too, [seeking the proper degree of exactness], so that digres- sions do not overwhelm our main task.

§20 Nor should we make the same demand for an explanation in all 1098b cases. On the contrary, in some cases it is enough to prove rightly that [something is true, without also explaining why it is true]. This is so, for

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