A practical companion to ethics pdf free

Anthony Weston A Practical Companion To Ethics 2005.Pdf

Practical Companion to Ethics, Third Edition, is a concise and accessible intro-

duction to the basic attitudes and skills that make ethics work, like thinking

for oneself, creative and integrative problem-solving, and keeping an open mind.

This unique volume illuminates the broad kinds of practical intelligence required

in moral judgment, complementing the narrower theoretical considerations that

often dominate ethics courses. It offers practical instruction in problem-solving by

demonstrating how to frame an ethical problem and deal effectively with ethical

disagreements. The book also presents ethics as an ongoing learning experience,

helping students to deal with both the complexities of their individual lives and

with the larger issues that exist in the world around them.

The third edition retains the most popular features of the previous edition, includ-

ing challenging and relevant end-of-chapter exercises; brief text boxes that define

key terms and review core strategies; and short dialogues that illustrate ethical

dilemmas. The optimistic tone and brisk pace of the narrative provide an entertain-

ing and intelligent guide to "everyday" morality. The third edition includes a more

extensive treatment of ethics and religion (Chapter 2), which provides the frame-

work for a moral dialogue that reaches across sectarian divides. It also contains a

revised final chapter on the continuously unfolding nature of ethical understand-

ing and an expanded appendix that gives detailed advice on writing various types

of ethics papers. Ideal for introductory courses in ethics and applied ethics, A

Practical Companion to Ethics, Third Edition, can also be used in any course related

to critical thinking.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Anthony Weston is Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Elon University, North Carolina, where he also teaches environmental studies. He has written eight

other books, including the forthcoming Creative Problem-Solving in Ethics (OUP),

A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox (OUP, 2001), and A Rulebook for Arguments, Third

Edition (2001).

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A

PRACTICAL

COMPANION

TO

ETHICS

A

PRACTICAL

COMPANION

TO

ETHICS

THIRD EDITION

Anthony Weston Eton University

New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2006

Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford Univer- sity's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

Weston, Anthony, 1954- A practical companion to ethics / Anthony Weston.—3rd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references ISBN-13 978-0-19-518990-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 0-19-518990-6 (pbk : alk. paper) 1. Ethics. I. Title.

BJ1O25.W43 2006 170—dc22 2005051296

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE 1 HIRD EDITION

INTRODUCTION

1 GETTING STARTED

Who Needs Ethics?

The Dogmatist and the Rationalizer

Ethics and Diversity

For Practice and Thinking

Notes

2 ETHICS AND RELIGION

Coming to Terms

Let the Stories Be Stories

Thinking for Yourself

For Practice and Thinking

Notes

V l l

xi

1 1 4

8

12 14

17

17

20 22 26

29

CONTENTS

3 CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING

IN ETHICS 31

The Need for Inventiveness in Ethics 32

How to Expand Your Options 34

How to Reframe Problems 38

For Practice and Thinking 44

Notes 45

4 DON'T POLARIZE —CONNECT 41

"Right versus Right" 41

Pieces of the Puzzle 49

Going Ahead Together 51

For Practice and Thinking 59

Notes 61

5 THE ONGOING JOURNEY 65

Ethics as a Learning Experience 65

Looking Farther 61

The Expanding Circle 72

For Practice and Thinking 1 1

Notes 78

APPENDIX: WRITING AN ETHICS PAPER 81

Four Kinds of Writing in Ethics 81

Making a Case 85

Two Quick Examples 89

Resources 94

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

Ethics continues to need help. It is no news that we could use a stronger sense of values. Less widely recognized is that ethics also needs certain other practical skills and attitudes: more open-mindedness, for example; more creativity; more willing- ness to listen and to reach across seeming differences to con- nect and make change together. Indeed, the need for these skills and attitudes has never been more pressing. They are the concern of this book.

Companion remains a brief book, though—still modest, I hope; still companionate; still intended chiefly as a supple- mentary book for college ethics courses, complementing the theoretical considerations that often consume such courses. Some of my colleagues use it to set the ground rules by which an ethics class will operate, especially in difficult discussions. Others use Chapters 1 and 2 to introduce the subject of ethics as a whole, take up 3 and 4 when the class turns to specific controversies, and return to 5 for a fare-thee-well at the end.

viii PREFACE

Either way, or any way, this book is also intended to be self- sufficient. Students can mostly read it and understand it on their own; it need not require a lot of classtime in courses that already may be too full.

From second to third edition there are several major shifts. Chapter 2 now focuses on ethics and religion, hoping to speak better to a situation in which mutual mistrust is rising and moral dialogue may seem especially fragile. Chapter 5 is redi- rected to highlight the continuously unfolding nature of eth- ical understanding. The Appendix is entirely rewritten and somewhat expanded, at the suggestion of several readers, to offer more practical advice about a wider range of possible kinds of papers. There are other small changes throughout.

Several other books of mine may interest readers who find this one useful. Students who want more on all of Compan- ion's topics can turn to my A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox (Oxford, 2001). For an entire book dedicated to the theme of Companion's Chapter 3—creativity in ethics—see my new book Creative Problem-Solving in Ethics (Oxford, 2006). Teachers who want more on ethics and pedagogy should con- sult Toolbox's extensive Teacher's Appendix. For elaborations and defenses of some of the more philosophically controver- sial points, try my Toward Better Problems (Temple Univer- sity Press, 1992).

As the number of editions of this little book grows, so too does my indebtedness to many friends, colleagues, and re- viewers who have contributed advice, encouragement, and support. Though I did not always follow their advice, it was always appreciated. Peter Williams, Tom Birch, Nim Batchelor, and Scott Yost, along with Oxford's intrepid Robert Miller, helped shape and reshape the project from the beginning. Donald Becker, Earl Conee, Peter Markie, and several other philosophers served as publisher's reviewers for the first edi-

PREFACE ix

tion. David Boersma, David Detmer, Verna Gehring, and Ben Mulvey served in the same capacity for the second. For the third, my hat is off to Eric Dalton, Peter Dalton, Manyul Im, Robert Jensen, Elba Serrano, and Mark Smillie, with special appreciation to Joseph Cole, Douglas Groothuis, and Bob Kirkman. Thanks to you all! As always, I heartily welcome all readers' comments, criticisms, and suggestions.

AW. May 2005

INTRODUCTION

This book is an invitation to ethics. It is meant to fill the gap between the theoretical issues common in the ethics of philosophers and the practical questions of the doubter and the newcomer. One question is: who even needs ethics? Why think about values at all? Also, how do you come to terms with secular ethics if you've already got religion? These are real questions, and they need to be answered before the rest of ethics—its theories and its methods and its history—can speak to us.

This book also aims to bring out the connections between ethics and certain useful methods in practical thinking generally. For example, there is a large literature on creative problem-solving: on multiplying options and reframing prob- lems so that the original problem is transformed. There is an equally large literature on conflict resolution and compromise, crucial skills if we are to avoid polarizing values and the peo- ple who hold them. This book brings all of these skills into the spotlight.

xii A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

Finally, this book invites you to take up ethics in the spirit of an ongoing journey. Part of our task both practical and per- sonal is to keep ourselves open to the complexities of real lives and to the world's own hidden possibilities. A little open- ness can go a long way. Some of the most intriguing devel- opments in contemporary ethics begin right here. We could think of the emerging ethical awareness of other animals, for example, as one way in which the story of ethics continues to unfold in our own time.

This, then, is a practical companion to ethics. It is meant as an essential supplement to the usual first presentation of ethics, and an essential skill-book as one goes on in ethical practice. It invites, explains, improves, expands. It places ethics against a larger practical background, in order to clarify its role and its potential. It aims to uncover creative possibilities where we now seem to have only dilemmas and intractable conflicts. It seeks to open both our minds and our hearts.

It may seem odd that such book is necessary at all. Why can't the great theories of ethics, or the many textbooks and collected readings in ethics, explain ethics well enough by themselves?

The answer is complex—also controversial—and not some- thing we can expand upon here. I will say only this. A better invitation to ethics is necessary because most of the main works in ethics tend to take the need for ethics for granted. This is not exactly an objection—the main works in auto me- chanics and dance theory take the need for auto mechanics and dance theory for granted too—but it does leave gaps. A supplement can help. Otherwise ethics may seem too aca- demic, or too much trouble. Why think for yourself, and invite social disapproval and uncertainty, when you can just take the word of the dominant authority figures? Why think at all, when we can just act out our feelings? Really, why?

INTRODUCTION xiii

Standard ethics books also seldom discuss the "how-tos" of ethics: how to frame a problem so that it can be most effec- tively solved; or how to deal effectively, interpersonally or po- litically, with fundamental ethical disagreements; or why and how feelings matter. Many philosophers prefer to concentrate on ethics' unique intellectual challenges. But most people come to ethics to learn how to live. This is a far broader ques- tion. By concentrating on certain intellectual challenges unique to ethics, we may slight the practical (and creative, and imaginative) skills that are vital to ethics but not unique to it. So part of the aim of this book is to rejoin ethics to life skills—to put ethics into its rightful place.

This book therefore does not duplicate the many histories and applications of ethics already available. It hardly mentions the usual theories and their advantages and defects and applications—that's for elsewhere. Instead, our concern here is with the practical skills that make ethics work, day to day, and can help it work better. Maybe dramatically better. And that is quite enough already!

Some of the advice offered in this book may seem obvious. If it does, just remember that we are much better at giving advice to others than at recognizing when we need it our- selves. Actually, we need the advice too, sometimes even the simplest advice. We need the reminders. Moreover, even when a mistake is "obvious," how to carry on in a better way—how to avoid the mistake next time around—may not be obvious at all. It may take some time and care to develop the neces- sary skills. Give them the time and the care that they need. They will repay your efforts many times over.

A

PRACTICAL

COMPANION

TO

ETHICS

GETTING STARTED

WHO NEEDS ETHICS?

Why isn't it enough to follow our feelings, or "fly by instinct," when we are thinking about what we should do or how we should live?

Feelings are essential, of course. A life without love, ex- citement, and even pain is no life at all. No liveable ethic de- nies this. But feelings are not the whole story. They may be the beginning, but they are not the end. A certain kind of thinking must also be part of the story.

Take prejudice. To be prejudiced is to have a strong nega- tive feeling about someone who is of a different ethnicity or gender or age or social class (or .. . ) from yourself. If ethics were just a matter of feelings, there would be nothing to say against such prejudices. It would be perfectly moral to dis- criminate against people you don't like.

2 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

Instinct says yes. Ethics says no. Ethics instead may chal- lenge these very feelings. "Prejudice" literally means "pre- judgment": it is one way of not really paying attention. But we need to pay attention. We need to ask why we feel as we do, whether our beliefs and feelings are true or fair, how we would feel in the other person's shoes, and so on. In short, we need to ask whether our feelings are justified, and, when not, what alternative feelings ought to take their place.

So ethics asks us to think carefully, even about feelings that may be very strong. Ethics asks us to live mindfully: to take some care about how we act and even about how we feel.

Consider another contrast with "flying by instinct." Instincts and feelings may oversimplify complex situations. We want things to feel clear-cut even when they are not, and so we may persuade ourselves that they are. Mindful thinking, by contrast, is more patient. Where things are really unclear, in particular, feeling may even have to wait. Premature clarity is worse than confusion. We may have to live with some ques- tions a long time before we can decide how we ought to feel about them.

Our feelings are also easily manipulated. For instance, it is easy to be swayed either way by "loaded language," language that plays upon our emotional reactions. Define abortion as "baby-killing," and you create a negative feeling that closes the case against abortion before it really can even be opened. But a "fetus" is not a "baby" (look the words up). On the other hand, if you describe abortion as simply "minor surgery," you suggest that it is both unintrusive and even healthy. It isn't. Either way, we are led into a prepackaged emotional com- mitment without ever thinking it through. Habit and con- formity take over.

Mindful thinking, by contrast, is more complex and open- ended. It is in this spirit that ethics approaches controversial

GETTING STARTED

A FEW KEY TERMS

What is ethics, anyway? Philosophers and dictionaries often say something like this: ethics is the study of moral values; it consid- ers how best to think about moral values and how best to clarify, prioritize, and integrate them.

This definition in turn draws on several others. What is a value, for one thing? In this book, by "values" I will mean those things we care about; those things that matter to us; those goals or ideals we aspire to and measure ourselves or others or our society by.

When we speak of "moral" values, we are concerned with a spe- cific kind of values: those values that give voice to the needs and legitimate expectations of others as well as ourselves. "Legitimate expectations" may be of many sorts: we rightly expect to be treated with respect, for instance, and with honesty and care.

We often use the terms "ethics" and "morals" interchangeably. Still, it's often helpful to distinguish the moral values we happen to hold from the deliberate process of thinking them through, crit- icizing, and revising them. The term "ethics" has a more critical, self-conscious edge. Here we try to go beyond living out our val- ues to thinking them through.

issues of the day, like abortion or professional ethics or the status of other animals. We do care for other animals, for in- stance. But we also use many of them for food, shoes, chemi- cal tests, even as objects of sport. Should all of this stop? No? Well, should any of it stop? Probably. So what kinds of use of other animals should stop and what kinds should not? Why? How do you decide?

These questions cannot be adequately answered by just consulting your feelings. There are too many different possi- bilities, too many different "uses," too many different opinions and prejudices (on all sides) that need to be carefully sorted

4 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

out. Again, it takes some time and care. Maybe even some de- gree of compromise.

Every moral issue discussed in this book is another exam- ple. I will try to suggest that much more intelligent and cre- ative thinking is possible about these issues than we usually suspect. But the key word is "thinking." Ethics invites us to try.

THE DOGMATIST AND THE RATIONALIZER

Thinking is hard, though, and sometimes unpleasant. We may actually have to change our minds! As a result we have de- veloped some pretty effective ways to avoid it. To get started in ethics we need to be warned against some of them.

Why Listen?

We all know the kind of people who are so committed to their moral beliefs that they cannot see any other side, and cannot defend their own beliefs beyond simply asserting and reasserting them—more and more loudly, probably. This is dogmatism. They may appear to listen (or not), but they will not change their minds. Name "their" issue (or perhaps any issue), and they know the answer already.

To be clear: being committed to a certain set of values— living up to them, or trying to, and sticking up for them when we can—is a fine thing. And there are certain basic moral values that we all share that we are and should be un- shakeably committed to. Dogmatism is a problem because some people go much farther. They make no distinction be- tween the basic "givens" of our moral life and everyday moral opinions that are not at all so clear-cut. Every one of their value judgments, to them, has the same status as the Ten Commandments.

GETTING STARTED 5

Dogmatists tend to disagree about the actual issues, which in fact is a bit ironic. Dogmatists do agree, though, that care- ful and open-ended thinking about moral issues is not neces- sary. After all, if you already know the answer, there is no need to think about it. If you need to argue for your position, you admit that it needs defending, which is to say that people can legitimately have doubts. But that can't be true: you already know that your position is the only right one. Therefore, any reasoned argument for your position is unnecessary. And any reasoned argument against your position is obviously absurd. So, why listen?

Ethics, once again, paints a different picture. Despite the stereotypes, the point of ethics is generally not to moralize or to dictate what is to be done. The real point of ethics is to offer some constructive ways to think about difficult mat- ters, recognizing from the start—as the very rationale for ethics, in fact—that the world is seldom so simple or clear- cut. Struggle and uncertainty are part of ethics, as they are part of life.

It pays to adjust our language as well. Instead of categori- cal statements of dogmatic opinions, bumper sticker style ("Meat is Murder,""God is Pro-Life," etc., etc.), we need to try to speak in a way that is less categorical and final. Very few reasonable moral positions can be shoehorned into a bumper sticker or slogan, clever as they might be. Besides, this way of putting things polarizes views and makes the other side seem stupid and misled. Don't call names either ("You animal-rights fanatics .. .";"You Bible-thumpers . . . " ) . Avoid the easy labels ("Liberal," "Right-wing"... ) .

Speaking in a more open-ended way may help you begin to think in a more open-ended way too. At the very least it will create quite different conversations! Typically one dog- matic statement just provokes an equal and opposite dogmatic

6 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

statement. Speak differently and not only your mind but your discussions may open up differently, and more constructively too.

Offhand Self-Justification

I offer some view in a moral discussion. Someone challenges me. My natural first reaction is to defend whatever it was I just said, even if the challenge is exactly on target.

Call this "offhand self-justification." It is a kind of automatic excuse-making or defensiveness, or what we sometimes call "rationalizing." I may not even get to the point of asking if the challenge actually is on target. Indeed, that's the idea. I'd rather not. Self-defense is all that counts. I try to paper over my uncertainties (or insecurities, or half-knowledge, or wish- ful thinking) by grabbing for some excuse, and any excuse will do. "It's OK to cheat the phone company, because . . . because, well, everyone else does it too ... because the phone company cheats you . . . because . . . "

Asked for your reasons, you should give them. There is noth- ing wrong with trying to defend your view. The problem lies with the offhand or automatic spirit (or, more accurately, spir- itlessness) of the defense. Once again, it becomes an excuse for not really thinking.

S: Of course the death penalty deters murderers. It's a proven fact that murder rates are lower in states with the death penalty.

A: I'm not so sure about that. My understanding is that most states with the death penalty have higher murder rates.

S: Well, you can prove anything with numbers.

S initially appeals to "numbers"—comparative murder rates— to support her position. Challenged, though, she does not re-

GETTING STARTED 7

consider her position or explore other possibilities. She just dismisses any studies that disagree with what she believes, and in the process manages to dismiss the very "numbers" she herself just cited. But she doesn't notice. You can tell that in the next discussion she'll be right back citing the same "proven fact."

There are no surefire ways to avoid rationalizing. It takes a kind of self-confidence, honesty, and maturity, which develop slowly. Even then we seldom escape the temptation entirely. Sometimes it's hard to recognize an offhand self-justification when it is right in front of our eyes. Yet there are some use- ful strategies for overcoming the urge.

Keep in mind how self-defeating it is. When we make ex- cuses to protect behaviors or opinions that really ought to be questioned and changed, we usually end up having to defend our excuses too. In this way we saddle ourselves with more and more unintelligent opinions—new ones invented, off the top of the head, to patch up the holes in the old ones. But the new ones are likely to be full of holes too. It's not a winning game.

Watch yourself. Step a little more slowly the next time you find yourself casting about for some excuse to put questions to rest. Ask instead whether you really are justified in the first place.

Watch for that telltale anger or irritation at being chal- lenged. We often find ourselves becoming irritated or angry when our especially precious excuses are too persistently or effectively challenged. But of course, we get angry at the per- son challenging us, rather than considering that we might re- ally be at fault for offering an offhand excuse in the first place. Better take the irritation as a warning sign.

Avoid the automatic counterattack. Again, watch yourself. Listening to someone else, are you trying to understand, or just waiting for the person to stop so that you can give your

8 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

comeback? Are you trying to "win," or to learn? Watch your voice tone: are you conveying ridicule, irritation? Take a time-out if you need it. Give yourself some space to think.

ETHICS AND DIVERSITY

It's clear, day to day, that moral values vary. I think speeding is morally OK; you don't. Some societies tolerate homeless populations running into the millions; other societies find it shameful to allow even one person to live on the streets. Some cultures condemn sex between unmarried young people; oth- ers encourage it.

Recognizing differences like these can lead us to a useful humility. It helps open our minds a little. And it can give us some space, sometimes, to try to figure things out for our- selves. What's right for you may not always be right for me.

It is tempting, though, to go much farther. From our differ- ences about moral values some people conclude that there is no way, or no need, to think carefully or critically about val- ues at all. "It's all relative" people say. "Mind your own busi- ness." Maybe any moral opinion is really as good as the next. "Relativism" in this sense is often considered a threat or chal- lenge to mindfulness in ethics. Is it?

Diversity and Common Values

Maybe not. For one thing, the diversity of values is probably overrated. Sometimes values appear to vary just because we have different beliefs about the facts. Maybe I am not both- ered by speeding because I think it is perfectly safe, whereas you don't. But we both value safety in the same way. That's the basic value involved, and one that, in this case, doesn't vary.

GETTING STARTED 9

How diverse are basic values? It's an open question. Some philosophers claim that ethics itself is framed by agreements about certain very basic values: not causing pain to innocent others, for example, or misleading others for your own ends. Every society must promote a certain degree of respect for others' lives and honesty in social and economic relations if it is to survive at all. Other basic values may still be "relative," though, such as the values attached to sex roles—one exam- ple of a kind of value that seems to vary a great deal among cultures. The relativity of values, then, may be somewhat par- tial, and as the values involved become more basic and more essential, they may converge too.

Besides, mostly we deal with people who share many of our values—and then once again thinking has a natural place to start. Maybe you and I cannot argue with, say, cannibals about the ethics of cannibalism. Maybe. But how often do you argue with cannibals? I have never argued with a cannibal, not even once, but I argue constantly with my own children, whose moral habits as well as eating habits also need some improvement. And I can argue with them—they are growing into our culture, and have some learning to do. Here, where most of our moral argument takes place, there's plenty of ba- sis for going on together.

Diversity and Critical Thinking

Let us also look more carefully at those cases where values really do differ, even at the basic level. It doesn't automati- cally follow that thinking isn't needed in these cases. For one thing, we may still need to think more critically about our own values (the point of the first part of this chapter).There's plenty to learn anyway.

The same goes for our arguments or discussions with oth- ers. People disagree about all kinds of things (Is there life on

10 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

Mars? Did the butler do it?), but we don't suppose these other disagreements can't be resolved intelligently. In fact, dis- agreements usually provoke us to more critical thinking. Why not in ethics too? The fact that some people are racists, for example, doesn't prove that racism is only wrong "for us." It proves that people have some learning to do.

Thus, although relativism may appear to be the very model of open-mindedness, it actually can have just the opposite ef- fect. It can close our minds instead.

U: I support the death penalty. I believe that it saves lives because it makes murderers think twice before killing some- one. Besides, the Bible says, "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."

V: I don't agree.

U: Why?

V: I just don't. That's my opinion and it's as good as yours!

Maybe that's a little blatant, but you get the idea. Here rela- tivism slides right into offhand self-justification. V treats it like a magic key to escape any kind of thinking whatsoever. She cannot be bothered to offer any reasons, let alone engage U's.

In fact, all opinions on this and most moral subjects require further thinking. Are U's arguments good ones? What values stand on the other side? What areV's reasons against the death penalty? Is the death penalty really a deterrent? Doesn't the Bible also tell us not to kill? Whether values are "relative" or not, there is no way out of some good hard thinking.

Diversity as the Occasion for Ethics

Sometimes, in fact, the very diversity of values creates the need for ethics. Certain decisions shape our lives together, and

GETTING STARTED 11

therefore affect all of us. Polluted air, for example, doesn't merely affect the polluters, or people who think pollution is morally unproblematic. All of us have to breathe it. Likewise, if our country joins a war effort or bans genetically modified foods or legalizes assisted suicide, all of us are to some degree affected. Or again:

D: I oppose legal abortion.

E: Why don't you just mind your own business? Like the slo- gan says, if you're against abortion, then don't have one!

But there is more to it than this. If some of us practice abor- tion and some do not, the result is a society in which abor- tion is practiced. The rest of us have to stand for it, at least in- sofar as we have to stand aside. In such matters, we cannot act as though everyone can simply do as they please without anyone else being affected.

The relativist's stock phrase "Mind your own business" is therefore an antisocial response. It not only lets the relativist avoid thinking: it also refuses to acknowledge that on issues like these, however much we differ, we still need to work out some intelligent way of going on together. These matters— certain basic moral issues—are not just your own business but everyone's business.

Some philosophers argue, in fact, that this is the very point of ethics: to help us arrive at certain standards that we all are to live by when all of us are affected by each other's behav- ior. On this view, ethics is precisely for those cases where "Mind your own business!" doesn't work as an approach to a problem—where we need to work things out together, however much we may differ. We still need to stay in touch, keep thinking, and keep talking. That is nothing less than ethics itself in practice.

12 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

FOR PRACTICE AND THINKING

Some Questions

We have noted some of the ways in which people close their minds,

often without even noticing or admitting that that is what is hap-

pening. Now consider yourself. When do you get dogmatic? About

certain issues more than others? Which ones? When do you tend

to rationalize? When do you get defensive?

Give yourself some credit too. What are you good at hearing?

On what topics are you truly open-minded? And why is this?

Hearing the "Other Side"

Name a moral position that you find especially hard to take seri-

ously. Now challenge yourself to write or state this position in as

neutral a way as possible. You don't have to be effusive, and don't

try to be extremely positive—usually it is easier to be overposi-

tive than to state a view carefully. Just try to state the position in

a reasonable way. You may have to do some research to get it

right. In class, ask a classmate who holds that position to help

you out.

Consider also the reasons that are typically used to support this

view. What are those reasons? What are the best reasons accord-

ing to you—the reasons that would persuade you if any reasons

could?

Again, don't argue with the position. Just look for the strongest

defense of the position you can find. On the other hand, you don't

have to agree with this position either—after all, you picked it be-

cause you not only disagree with it but find it hard to take seri-

ously. The point is to try to understand it, and in general to try to

get a little distance from your own reactions.

A Dialogue

Dogmatism, relativism, and various kinds of offhand self-justifica-

tion are partly conversational or argumentative moves: that is, they

occur in dialogue, in the back-and-forth of conversation or argu-

ment. Sometimes they are also subtle!

GETTING STARTED 13

Carefully consider the following classroom dialogue and con-

sider where (and why) you think it goes awry. How might a more

open-ended dialogue on the same theme go?

F: Fighting racism and sexism used to be easier than it is now. It's

harder to see what to do anymore. Affirmative action, for instance—

it's just not so clear an answer.

G: I think it's clear. If Martin Luther King, Jr. were alive today, he'd

be against affirmative action!

H: Why do you think that? He was for it when he was alive, wasn't

he?

G: He always spoke up against what was wrong. I believe affir-

mative action is wrong, so . . .

J: No, it makes sense. This society is still racist and sexist, you know.

And if you know someone is going to discount you because you're

black or female, a little extra nudge just makes things equal again.

M: Well, you must be the exception that proves the rule. Everybody

/ know is against all those quotas!

L: I don't think they use quotas. They just check for biased pat-

terns of hiring or school admissions over time.

M: And then what? Besides, how do you "check"? You have to use

quotas!

L: Computers or something, I don't know.

P: It's discrimination either way. Either the racism or sexism J

talked about, or reverse discrimination to correct past discrimina-

tion. Who's to say which is worse?

J: Oh give me a break! Colleges and universities already give pref-

erential treatment to the children of alumni, and athletes, and even

students from other parts of the country. What's the big deal about

giving some preference on the basis of race or sex?

P: Right! It's all in your head. You're only discriminated against if

that's how it feels to you.

14 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

NOTES

The view that values essentially reduce to feelings is sometimes called "subjectivism." The term "subjectivism," however, tends to have many different and even incompatible meanings, often de- pending on whether or not the person using the term agrees with the view being described. For a discussion and critique of various meanings of "subjectivism" in ethics, see the entry "Ethical Subjec- tivism" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan and Free Press, 1967).

Rationalizing may be one of the deepest of all pitfalls in ethics (and probably in life generally), and deserves a chapter of its own in any fuller treatment. For some psychological background, in- cluding some fascinating and unsettling experiments, see David Myers, Social Psychology (McGraw-Hill, 2001), Chapters 2-4 . For a useful overview of self-deception, see Chapter 19 of Mike Martin's Everyday Morality (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2001).

There are almost as many characterizations of relativism as there are people who write about it. For a survey, see the articles on "Rel- ativism" and "Moral Relativism" in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 1998). Chapter 2 of James Rachels' The Ele- ments of Moral Philosophy (McGraw-Hill, 2002) is a careful and ac- cessible analysis of "the challenge of cultural relativism." On the prospect of common values across cultures, a good place to start is Sissela Bok's book Common Values (University of Missouri Press, 1995).

Beware of the temptation to interpret any kind of skepticism about or resistance to moral argument as some form of relativism. Take that common phrase, "Who's to say?," as in, "Who's to say that we should always tell the truth?" or "Who's to say that sex outside of marriage is always wrong?" This can certainly be a troublesome kind of challenge. Often its function is to put an end to a discussion that is just developing a useful critical edge. Many students, and their teachers too, therefore take it to be an assertion of relativism.

GETTING STARTED 15

Yet it is not so clear that "Who's to say?" is really meant this way in normal use. Sometimes this little phrase may be just a way of re- sisting an appeal to authority in ethics—quite possibly a reasonable move. People need some space to think for themselves, and ques- tioning the moral authority of those who make dogmatic or sweep- ing pronouncements may be a way to make that space.

Other times, what's taken for relativism may really be more like a recognition of the complexity of moral matters. Maybe, after all, there is no one single "right" answer to (many) moral questions— but not for relativistic reasons. It may just be that many moral situ- ations are so complex that many different but equally good re- sponses are possible. It does not follow that any answer is as good as the next (there are still plenty of wrong answers) or that critical thinking is pointless in ethics. Quite the opposite, once again: surely it would call for more flexible and subtle thinking still.

A useful website on many ethical matters is Lawrence Hinman's "Ethics Updates" site at . Hinman's site covers a wide range of moral issues, and also offers a guide to other web-based ethics resources and a useful glossary of key terms in ethics. On relativism in particular, select the "Moral Relativism" box for articles and general definitions.

ETHICS AND RELIGION

Increasingly we are told that religion divides us on moral mat- ters. You and your moral or religious community may have very strong beliefs about, say, same-sex marriage (or preven- tive war or human cloning or . . . ), but then other people and their moral or religious communities may have quite different beliefs, just as deeply held and elaborately defended as yours. We seem to be stuck.

How can we negotiate ethical questions when such strong and insistent views come into play? Must the opposing sides just battle it out for the power to impose their distinctive truths? Or are there still ways to think together—between dif- ferent religions and between the religious and the secular?

COMING TO TERMS

In fact there are ready ways to make progress together. The main thing is to seek shareable terms and arguments. And this is neither a mystery nor even very hard.

18 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

Moral Argument in a Diverse Society

We already know that when the conclusions of a specific group or community are carried into the larger society, they need to be put in shareable ways. Think of manufacturers who want tax breaks or soccer teams who want new fields or kids who want bigger allowances. They're persuaded already, of course, but when the task is to persuade the rest of us— legislators, consumers, taxpayers, parents—then we must be approached in terms of broader, shared values: fairness, maybe, or "common sense," or the overall social good.

The same goes for moral debates. Specific moral pro- nouncements (religious or not) do not have automatic author- ity in the larger society Once again, some leaders or groups may be persuaded already, but when the task is to persuade others—all of us, in the broader and more diverse moral com- munity that includes people of various religious backgrounds as well as nonreligious people—then the appeal must be to shared values. What are required are not pronouncements but arguments: giving reasons that actually address the listener, and acknowledging counterarguments. No side can simply in- sist on its way without careful and open-ended dialogue.

Although many non-Catholics admire the pope, for example, we are unlikely to take his word on family planning or the econ- omy just because it is his word. Many Catholics don't either. Just like the rest of us, he has to persuade. In fact, the late Pope John Paul II was so effective for just this reason: he could reach across many differences not by appealing to his official religious authority, but by thoughtful argument and by example.

Working from Common Values

So look for shareable, general terms. In the larger, public de- bate, aim to speak not so much as Catholics or Muslims, ag-

ETHICS AND RELIGION 19

nostics or atheists, but instead as people united by certain ba- sic values we are aiming to understand and put into practice together. We can still disagree, even sharply. There is room for argument. But frame your arguments using common values.

An inspiring example is the partnership between former South African President Nelson Mandela and South African Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Mandela is really a kind of moral saint, exactly the right leader for South Africa at a crucial moment of transition, who through his own life has been able to show a whole nation how to transcend the bit- terness of past oppression. He is also a resolutely secular per- son. Tutu's lifelong struggle against apartheid, by contrast, has been from his pulpits, and the result is not only a stunning "Truth and Reconciliation" movement in South Africa—facing the past in order to move ahead together—but also in the wider world.

Two very different life paths, but common values still: one direction and one heart. Mandela and Tutu together have moved people of all stripes—religious and secular; Anglican and Jew and Catholic; political leaders and CEOs as well as ordinary folks—to action. If they could do it, in the face of such overwhelming odds, surely we can too.

Of course there will be times when we cannot find (enough) common terms. Sometimes you will find yourself challenged. On the other hand, if you can't make an argument work in common terms, maybe it is actually not so strong an argument after all. Here some caution is wise. As Chapter 1 put it, not every moral matter has the status of the Ten Commandments.

The Commandments themselves, though, really do lay out common values—values that others might "ground" in other ways, but common values nonetheless. No one is in favor of committing murder or bearing false witness or dishonoring

20 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

your parents or lusting for what your neighbor has—even though we may sometimes do all these things anyway There are many other common values too. Who wants to squelch hope, leave children in pain, or trash the earth? None of us. We can put it many ways, tell many stories, worship in a hun- dred different ways or not worship at all, but in the end, as to values like these, we are mostly on the same page. Start there.

LET THE STORIES BE STORIES

Certain biblical stories have become contentious too, with some groups claiming that certain stories have a single clear "moral"—a single truth about how we should live—while oth- ers draw different conclusions, and the nonreligious usually avoid them altogether. Once again it may appear that we're stuck.

Once again too, though, we can appreciate these stories within a broader understanding of moral argument that also requires us to acknowledge complexity and diversity—this time of interpretations.We'd be better off to consider that their truth isn't simple, and that, just as with conflicting moral ar- guments, no one moral story or interpretation of that story has automatic authority either. Still, they remain deep and suggestive—well worth thinking about.

Consider a particularly contentious one: the story of Sodom.

Two angels came to Sodom in the evening; and Lot was sitting in the gate... .When Lot saw them, he rose to meet them .. . and said, "My lords, turn aside, I pray you, to your servant's house, and spend the night, and wash your feet; then you may rise up early and go on your way."... He urged them strongly; so they turned aside to him and entered his house; and he made them a feast, and baked unleavened bread, and they ate.

ETHICS AND RELIGION 21

But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the people to the last man, sur- rounded the house, and they called to Lot,"Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, that we may know [i.e., rape] them." Lot went out of the door to the men, shut the door after him, and said, "I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly.... Do nothing to these men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof. Behold, I have two daugh- ters who have not known man; let me bring them out to you, and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof." But [the crowd] . . . pressed hard against Lot, and drew near to break the door. But [the angels] put forth their hands and drew Lot into the house to them, and shut the door. And they struck with blindness the men who were at the door of the house, so that they wearied themselves groping for the door. (Genesis 19:1-11)

God destroys the city the next day, after helping Lot and his family to flee.

So what is the true sin of Sodom? Some insist that it is ho- mosexuality. And it's true that homosexual acts (of a sort) are in the story. Other verses can be cited in support of this reading as well. Nonetheless, the insistence that the sin must be homo- sexuality—that no other reading is even possible and that no other possible sin matters—misses the depth of the story itself. It's much less clear—and much more fascinating!—than that.

An ancient reading is that the true crimes of Sodom are its shocking level of violence and its extreme disrespect for strangers. That's certainly in the story too—in fact, one might have thought, a lot more central to it.

Ezekiel had another interpretation: "Behold, this was the guilt of . . . Sodom: she and her daughters had pride, surfeit of food, and prosperous ease, but did not aid the poor and needy"

22 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

(Ezekiel 16:49). On this view, the story is really a call to so- cial justice!

Moderns might suppose that if anything is specifically con- demned in this story, it is rape. After all, rape is what the crowd had in mind. It turns out that gang rape was a common prac- tice of the times for humiliating enemies. So maybe that is the true sin of Sodom—the readiness to sexualize humiliation?

We can't stop there either. Lot, who is presented as the only decent man in Sodom, actually offers the crowd his own daugh- ters in the place of his guests. The angels prevent these rapes too from happening. But God still saves Lot from the destruc- tion of the rest of the city. Does not Lot's treatment of his own daughters offend God? Is the shelter of his roof for strangers more important than the shelter of his home for his own chil- dren? We are reminded that this story was written at a time when some values were very different than they are now: when, for one thing, women were regarded only as a father's or husband's property, for him to dispose of as he saw fit. And it therefore becomes hard to take the story, whatever exactly it condemns or doesn't condemn, as the moral last word.

In any case, again, the main point can hardly be said to be- clear. You begin to see why for some religious traditions—for many Jews, for example—exploring multiple interpretations of such stories is the core of the worship service itself. Read- ing the stories in this way is, once again, a shareable approach—a kind of common ground. It's the opposite of try- ing to squeeze a single moral out of them, which barely is to read them as stories at all. Let us approach them, together, as the complex, many-layered narratives that they are.

THINKING FOR YOURSELF

As Chapter 1 argues, the first requirement of ethics is to think, and to think appreciatively and hard, about moral matters. And

ETHICS AND RELIGION 23

whether you are religious or nonreligious (or for that matter even a relativist!), you must ultimately think for yourself.

We know that we cannot plead that we are "just doing what we're told" by a political or military leader or a boss at work. It is still up to us to ponder and decide. But it is not just that such authorities are—for better or worse—unreliable. Moral philoso- phers hold that it is part of our very nature to reflect on moral consequences and ultimate values, to look at things from di- verse perspectives, to reflect and to wonder. Kant and others argued that these capacities are the very ground of our own moral value. And most religious moralists agree. The traditional religious view is that by making us "in His own image," God gave us free minds and free will—so we are obliged to use them!

A Word from the Wise

Some people may find it hard to reconcile such a message with the experience of tight-knit religious communities in which the leaders fervently believe that they speak for God Himself and therefore do expect obedience. Critical thinking may be explicitly forbidden, and even when it is tolerated it is seldom understood or encouraged. Not only is it hard to buck such in- sistent and accepted authority, but also it can be hard to ques- tion leaders whom you rightly respect and may even love.

Still, though, there is a deep wisdom in what ethics asks. We can see this best by looking to the wisest of the wise. We have spoken of Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Tutu; I also think of Gandhi, the Islamic mystical poet Rumi, the original philosopher Socrates, just to name a few. These are great peo- ple. And they don't avoid moral issues—often they wade right in. They may advise us. They may attempt to persuade us, as may any respected and loved moral leader. But here is the cru- cial thing: none of these people would claim to speak for God or demand that you put their judgment in place of your own.

24 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

On the contrary, they are acutely aware of their own limits as well as the limits of others. They recognize that even with the best of intentions, they are still creatures of their time and place, and therefore even they will hear the voice of God (or however they might describe their moral perceptions) through the filters of partial understanding or the residues of local prejudice or the lack of the full range of human experi- ence. So they lead by inspiring more thinking—not less.

God came to Elijah alone in the cave at Mt. Horeb. There, the Bible says, God spoke in a "still small voice" (I Kings 19:12)—a phrase that can also be translated as "gentle breeze," "soft whisper," "hardly a sound." A hiss, a rustle. There is a vital caution here. Hearing that voice can be a very tricky thing— and in any case it comes to each of us on our own. You begin to see why Quakers and many others, both religious and sec- ular, have put their livelihoods and even their lives on the line for freedom of conscience—to heed the still, small voice within. Protestant Christianity itself began with the insistence that all people should be able to read and interpret the Scrip- tures for themselves. Thinking for yourself is not somehow ir- religious. It is at the very core of the religious experience.

A Biblical Ideal

Thinking for yourself is also a biblical ideal. In fact, it turns out to be another theme of the Sodom story.

Just before the angels go to Sodom, they visit the patriarch Abraham in his desert tent. They declare God's intention to destroy Sodom if the rumors about it are true. But Abraham is troubled by this. He cannot see the justice, of killing the in- nocent along with the wicked. So Abraham, says the Bible, "went before the Lord." He actually takes it upon himself to question God!

ETHICS AND RELIGION 25

Abraham drew near and said: "Wilt thou indeed destroy the righteous with the wicked? Suppose there are fifty righteous within the city; wilt thou then destroy the place and not spare it for the fifty righteous who are in it? Far be it from thee to do such a thing, to slay the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the wicked! Far be that from thee! Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right?"

And the Lord said, "If I find at Sodom fifty righteous in the city, I will spare the whole place for their sake." Abraham an- swered,"Behold, I have taken upon myself to speak to the Lord, I who am but dust and ashes. Suppose five of the fifty right- eous are lacking. Wilt thou destroy the whole city for lack of five?" And He said,"I will not destroy it if I find forty-five there." Again he spoke to him, and said, "Suppose forty are found there." He answered, "For the sake of forty I will not do it." Then he said, "Oh let not the Lord be angry, and I will speak. Suppose thirty are found there." He answered,"I will not do it, if I find thirty there." He said, "Behold, I have taken upon my- self to speak to the Lord. Suppose twenty are found there." He answered, "For the sake of twenty I will not destroy it."

Then [Abraham] said,"Oh let not the Lord be angry, and I will speak again but this once. Suppose ten are found there."The Lord answered,"For the sake of ten I will not destroy it." And the Lord went his way, when he had finished speaking to Abraham; and Abraham returned to his place. (Genesis 18:23-33)

Abraham will not accept injustice even when God Himself proposes to do it. He goes to God—Abraham who acknowl- edges himself to be "but dust and ashes"—and questions and challenges. He even dares to call God to His own standards: "Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right?"

Abraham certainly thinks for himself! Moreover, he is hon- ored for doing so. God listens and answers. Indeed Lot him- self was saved, the Bible says later, because God was "mindful of Abraham."

26 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

In short, thinking for ourselves is both a moral responsi- bility and a hard-won right. So the next time someone acts as though it is yours only to obey someone else's dictates, or even the dictates of God Himself (according to their intepre- tation, of course)—well, remember Abraham!

FOR PRACTICE AND THINKING

study!

Explore moral and religious frameworks other than your own.

Talk to people from other traditions. And read. Learn how other

people see things. You don't have to give up your own beliefs

to do so, but you certainly will come back to them with greater

understanding.

One good place to start is Peggy Morgan and Clive Lawton, Eth-

ical Issues in Six Religious Traditions (Edinburgh University Press,

1996). On the foundations of ethics, two books that can use-

fully be put alongside each other are Scott Rae's Moral Choices

(Zondervan, 1995), a conservative Christian approach to ethics in-

formed by the philosophical tradition, and Kai Nielsen's resolutely

secular Ethics Without Cod (Prometheus, 1990). There are further

references in the notes to this chapter.

A Sufi Story

The text recommends reading Bible stories for their richness and

depth. Certain religious traditions have been reading stories in this

open-ended way for hundreds of years. Here is a lovely eight-

hundred-year-old parable from the Sufi master Yusuf of Andalusia.

Nuri Bey was a respected and reflective Albanian, who married a wife much younger than himself. One evening when he had returned home earlier than usual, a faithful servant came to him and said: "Your wife is acting suspiciously. She is in her apartments with a huge chest, large enough to hold a man. . . . It should contain only a few ancient embroideries. I believe that there may now be much more in it. She will not allow me, your oldest retainer, to look inside."

ETHICS AND RELIGION 27

Nuri went to his wife's room, and found her sitting disconso-

lately beside the massive wooden box. "Will you show me what is

in the chest?" he asked.

"Because of the suspicion of a servant, or because you do not

trust me?"

"Would it not be easier just to open it, without thinking about

the undertones?" asked Nuri.

"I do not think it possible."

"Where is the key?"

She held it up. "Dismiss the servant and I will give it to you."

The servant was dismissed. The woman handed over the key and herself withdrew, obviously troubled in mind. Nuri Bey thought for a long time. Then he called four gardeners from his estate. Together they carried the chest by night unopened to a distant part of the grounds, and buried it. The matter was never referred to again.

Try interpreting this one yourself. Is Nuri Bey's act a wise one?

Does the story mean to suggest that it is? He doesn't push the

point—he doesn't open the chest—but he apparently doesn't en-

tirely trust his wife either. Or in burying the chest is his idea to also

bury mistrust—is he still trying to avoid the "undertones"? Would

his wife agree that he succeeded at this?

And—after all—what is in the box? Is it obvious that his wife is

hiding a lover? Could it be something else—a present, maybe, that

Nuri Bey is not quite ready for yet? Some other kind of magical

possibility that his jealousy "buries" for him? Notice that for her

the issue is trust. She withdraws "troubled in mind," but not in de-

nial or defiance. What do you make of that?

For more such stories, see Idries Shah's collection Tales

of the Dervishes (Penguin, 1970). The philosopher Martin Buber col-

lected volumes of Hasidic tales in Tales of the Hasidim (Schocken,

1991). Back in Genesis and Exodus, meanwhile, every page has high

drama. Here is Jacob cheating his brother out of his birthright,

in turn to be misled and manipulated by his own children for the

rest of his life. Here is Tamar seducing her father-in-law Judah—

the same Judah who gives his name to half of the kingdom of

28 A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO ETHICS

Israel, the same Tamar who is honored as an ancestor of King David

and hence also of jesus. Cain and Abel, Jacob wrestling the angel,

Korach's rebellion—these stories are full of "undertones" too. The

parables of jesus are also often elusive and ambiguous, as his dis-

ciples constantly complain. (And don't you think it's interesting

that the Bible reports this?) Keep exploring. . . .

Cod and the Good

Since Abraham asks, "Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right?"

he clearly does not think that values are literally defined by God's

commands. If God's commands simply define the good, then "the

Judge of all the Earth" does right by definition, and the question

would be senseless. Many people find such a view troubling be-

cause it makes values seem arbitrary.

Instead, Abraham questions God Himself by independent or

"natural" moral standards. This may seem troubling for other rea-

sons. For one thing, how does Abraham know that it is wrong to

kill the innocent, even if God Himself were to do it? Think about

that question for a while. If you are reading this book in an ethics

class, your readings may suggest some answers.

For another thing, if God does not define the good, then does

the good in some sense define God? It may not surprise you that

theologians and philosophers have been thinking about that ques-

tion for several thousand years. Most, though not all, answer yes—

in some sense. As to how this might be possible, ask your local

theologian!

Modern believers also take it upon themselves to question and

indeed disregard even the direct commands of God—indeed in

such an everyday way that we hardly notice. Chapters 11 and 19 of

Leviticus command us to avoid such "abominations" as eating shell-

fish and harvesting our fields to the very edges so as to leave none

for the poor. These, like passages used to defend slavery (e.g., Ex-

odus 2 1 : 2 -3 , 7, 20-21), are usually dismissed as unfortunate by-

products of a less enlightened time. The problem is that then it is

difficult to cite Leviticus to condemn certain other "abominations,"

such as male homosexual intercourse {Leviticus 20:13). If we are

ETHICS AND RELIGION 29

going to claim that some of the direct commands in the Bible are

outdated, then we can hardly claim that we simply have to accept

others because they are, well, direct commands in the Bible. Aren't

we necessarily back in Abraham's place, making judgments, as best

we can, partly on our own?

NOTES

Citations in the text are from the Christian Bible (Revised Standard Version). On the Sodom story, remember that one meaning of "to know" is "to have sexual intercourse." Compare Genesis 4:1: "And Adam knew Eve his wife, and she conceived and bore Cain...."