According to carl rogers maladjustment occurs when

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Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

• Describe William James’ theory on multiple selves.

• Characterize Carl Rogers’ humanistic approach to understanding the self and the constructs of unconditional positive regard and conditions of worth.

• Identify Maslow’s needs hierarchy and its relation to self-actualization.

• Characterize the views of the existential theorists.

• Describe and critique the research examining the emergence of the self, using self-directed behavior in the mirror.

• Understand Markus and Nurius’ concept of possible selves and how they can motivate behavior.

Self-Psychology: Humanistic/ Existential Models of Personality 9

Chapter Outline Introduction

9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology • William James and Multiple Selves • Carl Rogers and the Humanistic Movement • Abraham Maslow • Søren Kierkegaard, Rollo May, Viktor Frankl,

Irvin Yalom, Fritz Perls, and the Existentialist Movement

9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self • Testing Self-Recognition in Humans • Testing Self-Recognition in Non-Human

Species • A Critique of Research on Self-Directed

Behavior

• Describe Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory and the contrasts among the actual, ideal, and ought selves.

• Contrast the public and private self and how these constructs relate to individualism and collectivism.

• Describe terror management theory and how we experience existential threats to the self via mortality salience and the buffering effects of self-esteem.

• Name and describe several measures of self-related constructs.

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CHAPTER 9

Introduction “There comes a time when you look into the mirror and you realize that what you see is all that you will ever be. And then you accept it. Or you kill yourself. Or you stop looking in mirrors.” Tennessee Williams

I am a ____________. If you were asked to complete this sentence, what would you say? What word or phrase would best explain who you are? You might say “boyfriend/girlfriend of _______,” or “son/daughter of ______,” or maybe you’d use a trait like “funny” or “smart.” Or maybe the context of your environment would dictate your response. If you were traveling abroad, for example, you might claim your nationality, but at home you might claim your state or town as integral to your identity. Or maybe your response would be dictated by your mood; you then might be “thankful” on a holiday, “miserable” during finals, or “angry” after you fail your personality theory test. So which response(s) defines the “real” you? Of course, each of these responses (and the many more you could have written) reveals some aspect of who you are and begins to address what will be termed the self-concept.

The self-concept is, in essence, a theory one has about oneself. It provides mean- ing for one’s life, it makes predictions about the future, and it guides motivated behavior. When does the self-concept develop and does it develop for non-human species? How do we know when someone develops a self-concept? What can the mirror tell us about the self and can it induce greater self-focused attention? Is self-awareness the same as self-recognition? How do we respond when the self is threatened? How do other cultures view the self? These are some of the questions to be considered in this chapter to help us better understand what is encompassed by the self-concept. We will review the perspectives of humanism and existential- ism, along with the more traditional views of the self.

Introduction

9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research • Possible Selves • Self-Discrepancy Theory • The Private and Public Self • Threats to the Self: Terror

Management Theory

9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self and Related Constructs • The Q-Sort Methodology • The Assessment of Possible Selves • Assessing Self-Discrepancies • Measuring Self-Actualization • Measuring Self-Focused Attention:

The Self-Focus Sentence Completion Blank (SFSC)

• Measuring Self-Consciousness: The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)

• Measuring Personal Growth: The Personal Growth Scale (PGIS)

Summary

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

Although virtually every prominent figure in psychology makes reference to the self, a lim-ited number of theorists made this the central theme of their theoretical contributions to understanding the person. The theorists who reclaimed the “self” as the focus of investigat- ing human personality initiated a movement known as humanism-existentialism. In this chapter, we will review the works of those who contributed to this movement and the emphasis on the self, including William James, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Viktor Frankl, Rollo May, and others.

William James and Multiple Selves William James was one of the earliest writers to expound on the concept of self. He defined the self as the sum total of everything that can be referred to as ours, and he explicitly included our “psychic powers” (i.e., internal mental experiences), as well as all of our material possessions, family, ancestors, friends, and even our body (James, 1890). Because James adopts such a broad view of the self, he considered it to encompass the constituent parts of “I,” which is a subjective sense of self, and reflects active thought (the knower), and “me,” which is an objective sense of self, with features that reflect the self-concept (the known). James further subdivided the self into (1) its constituents, (2) the aroused feelings and emotions, and (3) the actions prompted by the former two, which James specified as being either self-seeking or self-preserving in nature.

James’ (1890) theory further divides the constituents into three selves: the material, social, and the spiritual, listed in ascending order of importance. The material self (me) includes all of our material possessions, including our bodies. James suggested that as we become more invested in our material possessions, they define us more. The social self is defined by all of our interpersonal relationships, and James believed that there were many, often diverse, versions of this self. James tied the manifestation of a specific version of the social self to the available social cues. Thus, he believed that we present with the social self that is most consistent with (or drawn out by) the given social environment. The most important self—the one that reveals our innermost self—is the spiritual self. James believed that the spiritual self reflected our conscience, morality, and inner will. James also believed that the spiritual self guides the other selves, dictating the range of available social selves and the sought-after material selves. When considered in this way, it is reasonable to assume that by examining a person’s possessions and interpersonal presentations, it is possible to discern the inner (spiritual) self.

Finally, James (1890) also wrote extensively about the ego, but he referred to it in a different way from Freud, who was likewise articulating some of his earliest theories at this time. Specifically,

James defined the ego as one’s total sense of identity, empha- sizing the ego’s ability to con- ceive of the totality of the self, an integration of all of the com- ponents. This ability is critical to identifying incongruities, which can prompt ego-driven change. For example, if the material self involves the amassing of numer- ous material possessions, but some of the core values of the

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

In this early writing, William James (1892) writes about his multiple conceptualizations the self. Read it at http://psych classics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm.

Reference: James, W. (1892). The conscious self. In W. James, The principles of psychology (Volume 1), Chapter 10. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

spiritual self emphasize self-sacrifice and philanthropy, then this inconsistency will presumably lead to changes in the material self.

James believed that there is the potential for multiple selves, but that ultimately those selves must compete for a limited resource—that being you. In the end, we must choose who we will be, if not exclusively, then at least predominantly.

Carl Rogers and the Humanistic Movement Carl Rogers was a psychologist who also had trained in pastoral ministries, and his theory reflects many of the values that were no doubt instilled in his pastoral training. For example, Rogers believed that humans were good at the core, but that circumstances could foster bad behavior. This was in sharp contrast to the baser nature of Freud’s id.

Rogers based his ideas on the central tenet that a person is at the center of his or her own phenomenal field, coming from a Greek word that means “how things show themselves.” The phenomenal field is the totality of a person’s immediate experiences from his or her own per- spective. This experience is not static; rather, it is a dynamic process. Therefore, the self is also dynamic, changing as a function of one’s subjective experience. In this sense, Rogers was at least partly responsible for putting the person back at the center of personality. Rogers emphasized not just the experience that is readily available to the individual, but also what is potentially avail- able (i.e., the phenomenal field includes things of which one might not have awareness at the moment) (Rogers, 1959). Rogers emphasized the perception of reality, and although most people’s perceptions capture aspects of the real world with which we all must deal, it is the case that an individual’s perception could be quite unique and distinct from it (Rogers, 1951).

Although popularized by other theorists, it was Carl Rogers who first used the term self- actualization to refer to the goal-directed behavior of the individual toward achieving his or her potential. Rogers emphasized that actualization of the self is not automatic and can be extraordi- narily difficult depending on the environmental circumstances (Rogers, 1951). Rogers stated that the process of actualization is more likely to occur when people have full awareness of themselves and the world around them. Emotions are thought to facilitate the process of actualization by driv- ing goal-directed behavior. More recently, researchers have used the term “flourishing” to refer to a process similar to Rogers’ self-actualization, and they include the concepts of self-acceptance, autonomy, mastery, and personal growth (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 2000).

Rogers’ view of the self is an important aspect of the phenomenal field that with time becomes a differentiated entity. Rogers defined this part of the phenomenal field using terms similar to those employed by James, like “I” and “me,” and he includes not only one’s own views, but also those of others (e.g., how others view what I call “me”). Rogers also believed that all of our experiences are either accepted, which Rogers would refer to as symbolized (i.e., perceived by the individual and cognitively organized), or they are not accepted, and either distorted into something else that is more consistent with one’s self-concept (i.e., changing the reality of how something is perceived), or denied, which preserves the self-concept from any experience that might threaten it. Distor- tion and denial are Rogers’ equivalents of Freud’s defense mechanisms.

Important to Rogers’ theory is the belief in an ideal self, which is essentially the self that reflects the attainment of goal-directed action. By using the term “ideal,” Rogers is implying that the ideal self is not real—and in some ways, it is out of reach. The ideal self is thought to emerge when the individual’s actual experiences and symbolized experiences are equivalent. In this scenario, the

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

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In what ways have you experienced unconditional positive regard versus conditions of worth?

actual self, which refers to the person’s perceived current self-state (the “I am”), and the ideal self are the same. When there are significant discrepancies between the actual and ideal self, which would occur when the person engages in denial or distortion of experiences, then, Rogers argued, the individual experiences incongruence, and this can lead to maladjustment.

Thus, psychological adjustment comes from fully experiencing and accepting reality; the use of defenses undermines this process. Notice how this differs from Freud, who believed that the defenses were needed to achieve psychological adjustment. In fact, Rogers believed that we would function best after becoming aware of impulses so that we could consciously control them.

Establishing Conditions of Worth

Rogers was an advocate of the position that in the absence of restriction on the self, indi- viduals will strive for and achieve their ideal self. Rogers referred to this as the experience of

unconditional positive regard, which means that you feel accepted no mat- ter what you do (unconditionally). The prototype for a relationship with uncon- ditional positive regard is supposed to be the parental relationship, but not everyone receives this from their parents. When Rogers developed his therapeutic approach, one of the tech- niques he employed was to be a source of unconditional positive regard for his patients. The reason for the success of this approach, according to Rogers, was that many individuals lack unconditional positive regard from anyone in their life. In contrast, Rogers saw people experi- encing what he termed conditions of worth, which is when people withhold love and acceptance unless the individ-

ual behaves in a certain manner. “I’ll love you if you do me this favor,” would be an example of a condition of worth, because it says that you’re valued and accepted only if and when you do the favor. Rogers believed that maladjustment occurs as a result of too many conditions of worth, because the individual either fails to meet the conditions and gain the positive regard from oth- ers or because he or she does not act in a genuine manner in order to meet the conditions. This theoretical position on the meaning of maladjustment provided a justification for Rogers’ form of therapy (referred to as person-centered therapy), in which he provides unconditional positive regard by being empathic, accepting, and genuine. In his theory, Rogers emphasized an almost single-minded focus on positive development, rather than focusing on negative behavior and the incidence of psychological disorders. In this respect, Rogers was at the forefront of what would later be referred to as the positive psychology movement (e.g., Seligman & Csikszenmihalyi, 2000). Rogers also believed that human beings are the primary agents of change and that his role in affecting any change was simply to provide non-guided support in the form of unconditional posi- tive regard. This was ultimately characterized as supportive psychotherapy.

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

Abraham Maslow Abraham Maslow was a convert from behaviorism who established a hierarchical model of human motivation and the self. Like Rogers, he believed that humans are focused on growth, rather than simply repairing problems. Maslow (1970) also used the term self-actualization to refer to the individual’s capacity and willingness to reach his or her fullest potential. This includes striving for happiness and self-satisfaction.

Maslow noted the difference between what he called motivation and meta-motivation. His moti- vation referred to the satisfaction of deficits (which is very similar to the behavioral definition). This deficit-reduction aspect of motivation focuses on the deficiency needs (or D-needs) that arise from our basic requirements for life. They include, in ascending order of importance, according to Maslow (1970):

1. Physiological needs, which are the most basic and strongest needs in life. For example, in order to survive, we need food, water, and air.

2. Safety needs, which not only refers to threats to our existence, but also to anything that can undermine predictability and a sense of security.

3. Belongingness needs, which refers to our basic human need for affection and interac- tion. We need to feel as though we belong in a social context.

4. Esteem needs, which refers to both our own sense of competence and the sense that oth- ers perceive our competence.

These needs have to be continually met, as their satisfaction is only temporary.

In contrast, meta-motivation is focused exclusively on growth. These being needs (B-needs) are the essence of our need and desire to self-actualize—that is, they are the motivation to achieve complete self-fulfillment. On a day-to-day basis, the individual must focus on D-needs in order to survive. The B-needs allow one to thrive, and become the focus of atten- tion only after the D-needs are met. Of course, because the satisfaction of D-needs is always a temporary state, this means that opportunities for self- actualization are necessarily brief. For- tunately, however, even a single experi- ence of self-actualization can sustain us for a lifetime. As an illustration, some individuals achieve a moment of com- plete spiritual fulfillment, or a brief time of supreme relaxation or love (e.g., that special beach you visited with someone close to you), or, for some, it occurs in something as simple as a hobby like golf (e.g., a few holes when you seemed to hit everything just right with very little effort or thought). In that brief period of time, you enjoy the moment, achieve a higher level of awareness, and maybe even experience the world outside of

Joggie Botma/iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Maslow suggested that self-actualization involves “peak experiences” that allow for a sense of personal growth and meaning. If this individual is having such an experience, then he would be enjoying the moment with a high level of self-awareness and would not be thinking about any deficiency needs.

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

yourself (i.e., no thoughts of your D-needs). We can then relive this experience and receive much of the same positive emotional experiences well after the fact.

Unlike many others in the field of personality psychology, Maslow focused on some of the highest- functioning individuals to better understand the basics of the self. As noted from his model, Maslow believed that those who self-actualize represent our highest level of achievement and the highest level with respect to mental health. Maslow believed that those who self-actualize (as described above) have what he termed “peak experiences,” where the individual transcends D-needs and can simply live (briefly) in the moment and reach their highest potential. Peak experi- ences were defined as experiences of personal growth and meaningfulness in life. By living in the moment, someone who regularly self-actualizes can have a peak experience even by engaging in mundane activities that are part of the process of satisfying D-needs.

Although Maslow studied a wide range of people who he considered self-actualizers, his sample was somewhat limited to those who had achieved political, scientific, or artistic prominence in Western culture.

Søren Kierkegaard, Rollo May, Viktor Frankl, Irvin Yalom, Fritz Perls, and the Existentialist Movement These individuals collectively contributed to the existential movement, which thrived in the 19th and 20th centuries, and proliferated most following World War II. Like the humanistic movement, existentialism begins with the individual (the self) as he or she emerges (i.e., the emergence and development of identity). A second basic assumption is that humans begin with a sense of disori- entation or confusion caused by the lack of intrinsic meaning in our world.

Søren Kierkegaard

Søren Kierkegaard was a philosopher, but he is often credited as the first existentialist—even though this label came after the fact, as Kierkegaard himself never used that term (Marino, 2004). Kierkegaard believed that every individual was responsible for creating a sense of meaning in life and then living it in a real (“authentic”) manner. Kierkegaard believed that individuals acquire free- dom by expanding self-awareness and taking responsibility for their actions. This responsibility is focused largely on establishing the meaning of life, rather than placing that burden on society. However, Kierkegaard (1957) believed that gaining freedom and responsibility has a trade-off; it is accompanied by anxiety and dread.

Rollo May

Rollo May’s work is considered within the existential movement because of his emphasis on the experience of the self, the person as the active agent in life, and the role of anxiety as an existen- tial threat (May, 1950). May believed that human behavior cannot be predicted from abstract laws and principles because any laws that are relevant to the individual come from that person’s expe- rience of life (May, 1953). The existential view also begins with a questioning of one’s personal existence, with a meaningful life defined by authenticity to the self.

May was a clinical psychologist who, like Rogers, initially pursued a degree in religion (he actu- ally completed his masters degree in divinity school). May believed that significant problems are found in individuals’ failure to assume responsibility, perception that they are unable to act effec- tively in the face of considerable problems in life (termed powerlessness), and unwillingness to make difficult choices.

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

May wrote extensively about anxiety, suggesting that anxiety manifests when we become aware of our own sense of mortality. In keeping with his theory, May defined anxiety as a response that occurs when something that is central to one’s existence is threatened (May, 1950). May believed that such existential threat from anxiety is inevitable but that the particular source of anxiety can change. He also differentiated normal anxiety, which naturally occurs, is proportionate to a threat, can be managed, and can even lead to creative responses, from neurotic anxiety, which is disproportionate to the threat, inhibits personal growth, and results in defensiveness. May believed that a significant source of our neurosis comes from the loss or misplacement of values, especially given Western society’s dominant values of materialism and success.

Central to May’s theory, and existentialism, is an awareness of the self (May, 1953). May sug- gested that this process of awareness or consciousness occurs over several stages. The first is innocence, in which as an infant we first become aware of the self. The second stage is rebellion, in which the child begins to establish self-driven behavior as independent of the will of others. This may manifest as defiance as the individual seeks to express free will. The third stage involves ordinary awareness, whereby one is experiencing free will but is also taking responsibility for those choices. The last stage is a creative awareness of the self and involves our ability to see the self beyond its normal bounds. May defined the third and fourth stages as the healthy versions of consciousness of the self, but he noted that few individuals achieve the fourth stage.

May also wrote about guilt, suggesting that it occurs when we fail to recognize our potential, fail to recognize the needs of others, or fail to acknowledge our interdependence in the world (largely referring to our interdependence with other people). May wrote about many other topics, such as love and free will, but in all cases he emphasized our personal ability to make choices and take responsibility for those choices. Importantly, May believed that apathy and emptiness were the biggest existential threats and that psychopathology would result from problems connecting with others and the inability to reach one’s destiny. In keeping with this philosophy, May did not “cure” disorders. Instead, he believed that his therapy simply made people more human.

Viktor Frankl

Viktor Frankl was also a proponent of existential psychotherapy, as he emphasized human exis- tence and human reality, and he focused on human crises. Drawing from his experiences in a concentration camp during World War II, Frankl (1984) noted how individuals are able to derive meaning from such horrific circumstances, and the ability to derive meaning is what can offset the emptiness that can otherwise exist in and disrupt life. Interestingly, Frankl didn’t just experience life in concentration camps (including Auschwitz), he actually engaged in therapy to help new- comers experiencing shock adjust to the difficult environment. Frankl’s version of therapy, which he called logotherapy, involved imbuing life with meaning, which meant intentionally seeking out and creating meaningful encounters.

In his book, The Search for Meaning, Frankl (1984) wrote about such topics as anxiety and love, and he believed that humans should always direct their actions and will toward others. Frankl claimed that by focusing on others and forgetting oneself, one can achieve a greater sense of humanity, with even a possibility of self-actualization for a select few. Indeed, by focusing on others (or the broader human condition), he believed that the end product is a greater sense of fulfillment, whereas by focusing on oneself, the end product is existential angst and a sense of meaninglessness (see also Sartre, 1965, for a similar perspective).

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

In addition to helping people deal with the horrors of concentration camps, Frankl also dealt with the more mundane aspects of life that could undermine one’s sense of meaning. For example, he coined the term “Sunday neurosis” to characterize people who have no sense of meaning in their life outside the context of their work. Thus, on a traditional day of rest, Frankl suggested that these indi- viduals were in an existential vac- uum and unable to find meaning in their lives (see also Yalom, 1980). Frankl would argue that if you feel bored, apathetic, and empty when you are not working, this label would apply to you as well (a problem that is, no doubt, now minimized by 24-7 access to the Internet).

Irvin Yalom

Irvin Yalom is another prominent existentialist who has made significant contributions to the field. He developed his own version of existential therapy that converged with many of the above- mentioned theorists and practitioners. Yalom’s (1980) writings on existential therapy emphasized four assumptions that apply to the human condition: (1) the experience of meaninglessness, (2) isolation, (3) mortality, and (4) freedom. The key for Yalom is not whether these experiences occur (he believes they do for everyone), but rather how people respond to them and whether that response is adaptive or not. Yalom believes that the responses determine and reflect character development, and determine whether forms of psychopathology will emerge.

More recently, Yalom has attempted to provide direction to the next generation of therapists by providing them with guidelines for how to most effectively and humanely conduct therapy (Yalom, 2002). Yalom emphasizes the well-timed use of self-disclosures (i.e., giving the client information about yourself) and how this can assist the process of therapy. He also cautions against the use of diagnostic labels and short-term therapy and an overreliance on psychiatric medications.

Although many of the theorists discussed in this section were also practitioners and, there- fore, applied their theory in the context of clinical work, none were actively involved in pri- mary research. In the next section, we will review the research investigating many of the ideas presented.

Fritz Perls

While Gestalt psychology actually began in the early 20th century with Max Wertheimer in what was known as the Berlin School of Experimental Psychology, the name that has become synony- mous with Gestalt is that of Fritz Perls. Perls was trained in Freudian psychoanalysis, but, with his wife, Laura Perls, broke away from the analytic tradition when he immigrated to the United States in 1946.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Read Sartre’s 1946 lecture, Existentialism Is a Humanism, in which he explains and defends existentialism against its crit- ics, at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre /works/exist/sartre.htm.

Reference: Satre, J. (1989). Existentialism is a humanism. In W. Kaufman (Ed.), Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sarte. Amsterdam: Meridian Publishing Company.

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CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

Gestalt psychology began its evolution in America in 1947 when Perls published Ego, Hunger, and Aggression, but is generally accepted to have formally become a distinct psychological and therapeutic model in 1951 with the publication of Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality, co-authored by Perls, Goodman, and Hefferline (Sale, 1995). Gestalt psychol- ogy is concerned with experiencing and perceiving the whole rather than the parts, and was a response to the reductionism of psychoanalysis.

Authenticity is probably at the core of Perls’ ideas. Gestalt psychology focuses on living authenti- cally and with awareness. Unhappiness is thought to come from inauthenticity and resistance to contact. Unhappy people are living in their heads while disowning their feelings. They are out of touch with their bodies. They are living in the past or the future, but avoiding the present. They talk about their experiences rather than experiencing them. And they are unaware of these con- ditions. Learning to live in the “here and now” is core to the Gestalt perspective of well-being. In fact, in therapy situations, clients are asked to deal with past issues in the now. So, rather than talk about what happened in the past and how they felt about it, they are required to experience the issue in the now and feel their feelings in the now. For example, a client who has lingering issues with his deceased mother might be asked to mentally put his mother in the “hot seat” and talk to her about his issues as if they were current. It moves from a third person perspective (putting the disturbing circumstance out there and analyzing it) to a first person perspective (experiencing the disturbing circumstance in the here and now).

Gestalt therapy focuses on the importance of paying attention to the body. Laura Perls (1992) believed that anxiety is related to oxygen deprivation and therefore emphasized the importance of breathing. Another basic tenet of Gestalt is that resistance to contact is often betrayed by the body, and enhancing awareness of the body is a method of building awareness.

Perls also postulated that people cannot be understood outside of the context of their environ- ments. Experiencing meaningful “contact” with ourselves and with the environment is also core. Contact occurs at the boundary. The contact boundary is where we differentiate between what is “me” and what is not “me.” It is about having authentic interactions with self and others. People develop methods to resist contact that keeps them from being in the here and now and having meaningful interactions with the environment. Perls also suggested that we use language to resist authentic interactions by, for example, saying “I can’t” when in fact we mean “I won’t.”

Resistance to contact is a concept very similar to Freud’s defense mechanisms. There are five pri- mary interruptions to contact:

1. Introjection: passively taking in the environment without discrimination 2. Projection: disowning parts of ourselves and projecting them onto others 3. Retroflection: doing to ourselves what we want to do to others 4. Deflection: changing the focus of a contact experience to avoid authentic interactions 5. Confluence: blurring the lines between self and environment (Polster & Polster, 1973)

The contact boundary must be permeable enough to allow interaction with the environment but firm enough to maintain autonomy. Perls called this organismic self-regulation. Awareness allows us to control that balance. “There is only one thing that should control: the situation. If you under- stand the situation you are in and let the situation you are in control your actions, then you learn to cope with life” (Perls, 1976, p. 33).

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CHAPTER 9 9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

In this section, we examine how the concept of self has been studied and examined by its con-stituent parts. Researchers have typically begun at the most basic level, establishing what is thought to be the minimum requirement for the emergence of a self-concept: self-awareness. This section will focus on the research establishing a methodology for self-awareness and an understanding of how the self-concept first emerges.

Testing Self-Recognition in Humans What do you see when you look in the mirror? Do you see the same person others see? Do you have a grandiose view of yourself, or perhaps a devalued view?

The challenge for science is to develop methods for operationally defining and measuring con- cepts. Of course, many psychological constructs are not directly accessible, and there can be considerable subjectivity and variability in how they are assessed. Consider, for example, how researchers can know if the self-concept is present. One approach has been to identify some

lower-level constructs that would have to be present before the self-concept could emerge. For example, researchers have generally agreed that in order for a self-concept to exist, there would have to be self-awareness (i.e., in the absence of self-awareness, a self-concept would be highly unlikely). Thus, researchers have identified some methods for defining self-awareness. The most widely used of these is to look for self-recognition when infants and young children are exposed to a mirror; this is sometimes referred to as the mirror test.

To measure recognition, researchers have typically used the emergence of self-directed behavior, which is when the person (or animal) directs behavior toward (acts upon) oneself. For exam- ple, when you look in the mirror and fix your hair, this is an illustration of a self-

directed behavior. It requires that you recognize that the mirror image is you, that you use the information from the mirror image, and that you direct behavior toward yourself. If, instead, you attempted to fix the hair of the image in the mirror, expressed anger at the mirror image, or began a conversation with the image, then we would conclude that there is no self-recognition, and one would not expect to see any self-directed behavior.

.2006 Angela Georges/Flickr/Getty Images

The rouge test requires that the infant recognize the image as him/herself, and then engage in self-directed behavior to remove the red mark that would not be visible without the mirror image.

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CHAPTER 9 9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

Self-directed behavior has been studied by covertly putting marks (rouge) on the faces of children of different ages to see how they react to those marks (also known as the rouge test). Researchers following this method have found that children engage in self-directed behavior beginning around 18–24 months of age, and this behavior is thought to be a central precursor to later self-awareness (e.g., Amsterdam, 1972; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Bullock & Lutkenhaus, 1990; Butterworth, 1992; see also Vyt, 2001). Interestingly, using alternative methodologies (e.g., gazing times), some researchers suggest that the most basic level of self-recognition may occur as early as 3 months of age (Bahrick, Moss, & Fadil, 1996). Thus, overall there is sufficient research evidence to sug- gest that physical self-recognition is the first of several developmental abilities to emerge in the formation of the self, with later aspects of the self to include awareness of emotions, verbal self- descriptions, and the developmental of self-evaluative emotions (Lewis, 1994; Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990; for a review see Courage & Howe, 2002).

The development of the self is thought to be facilitated by socialization experiences, whereby children learn to develop knowledge and emotional experiences about the self as distinct from knowledge and emotional experiences about others (e.g., Harter, 1983; see also Kärtner, Keller, & Chaudhary, 2010). Although there is some evidence to suggest individual differences in the emergence of self-directed behavior (e.g., the absence of such behavior in children with profound cognitive impairments), such variability has not been well documented. The research that has been conducted has yielded generally consistent effects. For example, whether children were mal- treated does not appear to impact the timing of the development of self-recognition, nor does their socioeconomic status (see Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1984; Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1991), and as noted, the research is very clear in demonstrating an age effect.

Testing Self-Recognition in Non-Human Species A second line of research examines whether self-directed behaviors (and by extension, the self- awareness and the self-concept) are a uniquely human phenomenon. This question is important because it tells us something about the uniqueness of the self-concept and the level of cognitive abilities needed to develop a self-concept. As recently as the mid-1970s, theorists and research- ers hypothesized that self-awareness or self-recognition was one of the abilities that separated humans from other advanced species and may have been one of the later attributes to evolve (e.g., Buss, 1973; Kinget, 1975). However, research on a number of non-human species has since suggested that self-recognition is not unique to humans.

Building largely from the work of Gordon Gallup, researchers have established a reliable para- digm for evaluating self-recognition. Gallup began by examining chimpanzees in front of a mir- ror. Initially they responded in a manner indicating no self-recognition (i.e., they responded with threatening gestures in response to their mirror images). However, they did ultimately demon- strate self-directed behavior, including grooming. Thus, there does appear to be a learning effect for self-directed behavior; such that experience with the mirror does facilitate the emergence of self-directed behavior (Gallup, 1970; see also Gallup, 1979, 1982, 1987; Gallup et al., 1995; Inoue- Nakamura, 2001). In contrast, when studied in humans, past experience with the mirror (or any reflecting surface) does not appear to impact the incidence or speed with which self-directed behavior occurs (Priel & de Schonen, 1986). In addition, more recent research has shown that chimpanzees can also engage in self-directed behavior even when exposed to their image via video (Hirata, 2007). Finally, research suggests that just as humans show a developmental pattern for the emergence of self-directed behavior, so too do chimpanzees (Inoue-Nakamura, 2001).

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CHAPTER 9 9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

Gallup and others devised what is now commonly known as the mirror test, a method to gauge the self-awareness of animals by determining whether they recognize their own reflection in a mirror. Using a paradigm similar to that described for humans, researchers examined whether great apes (including chimpanzees, orangutans, bonobos, and gorillas) who see their reflection with, for example, a foreign marking on their face would take action to remove that object (Gal- lup, 1977). The results indicate that all great apes demonstrate self-directed behavior under these testing circumstances (e.g., Patterson & Gordon, 1993; Povinelli, de Veer, Gallup, Theall, & van den Bos, 2003). Moreover, research also indicates that self-recognition and self-directed behav- ior occur in a number of marine mammals, including bottlenose dolphins (Marten & Psarakos, 1995), killer whales, false killer whales, California sea lions (Delfour & Marten, 2001), and Asian elephants (Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006). Moreover, researchers have also now documented self-directed behavior in non-mammalian species, with the magpie being the only instance to date (Prior, Schwarz, Güntürkün, & de Waal, 2008).

A Critique of Research on Self-Directed Behavior There are, of course, some confounds with this type of research. First and foremost, self-recogni- tion alone (as indicated by the presence of self-directed behavior) does not imply or demonstrate the existence of a self-concept—or at least not a well-articulated self-concept. Moreover, despite many similarities between human and non-human species, it is reasonable to question whether self-recognition holds the same implications for humans as it does for non-human species, given the presence of more advanced cognitive capabilities in humans. Another shortcoming of the mir- ror test is that any animal that depends largely on the other senses for identification or has poorly developed vision will not be able to validly take the mirror test.

With respect to the human research, it is also possible that the children are not motivated to clean their face or remove the mark. Indeed, some researchers have suggested modified procedures for increasing motivation for self-directed behavior (e.g., demonstrating the cleaning of a doll’s face with a similar dot prior to the mirror test), and this results in an increased incidence of self- recognition in the mirror test (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonniere, 1996).

Another issue is that self-awareness could occur at an earlier age when the child is not able to evidence or able to conceive of some resolution to the foreign object observed on their person. For example, it is possible that younger children recognize the rouge as being on their cheeks, but they do not have the cognitive capacity to realize that they could remove it.

Moreover, in light of the recent finding of self-directed behavior in magpies (i.e., without any behavioral conditioning, the magpies appeared to engage in self-directed behavior to remove a foreign object on their feathers and only visible in the mirror), it raises the possibility that either the self-concept is a much broader (cross-species) experience than was first thought, or there may be some issues with the mirror methodology (e.g., it could simply be a form of learned behavior).

Finally, it should be noted that self-awareness, and therefore self-directed behavior, may be affected by individual differences. That is, rather than considering self-awareness as a static point that is “achieved” and something that is consistent across individuals, it may be the case that individuals vary in the extent to which they have high self-awareness. For example, in a broad review of the literature, it was shown that self-focused attention is consistently associated with negative affect, and this was especially true when studying females and clinical populations (Mor & Winquist, 2002).

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CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

One interesting line of research looking at this issue has introduced the term self-concept clarity (SCC). SCC refers to the structural components of the self and includes the clarity and confidence with which the self-concept is known and conveyed by the indi- vidual, and it is thought to be internally consistent and stable over time (Campbell et al., 1996). Researchers have noted that low SCC is associated with high neuroticism, low conscientious- ness, low agreeableness, and self-focused ruminative attention (Campbell et al., 1996).

While there are still questions surrounding mirror test methodology, the key issue may in fact be whether there any self-related experiences that are uniquely human. Researchers investigating what are referred to as possible selves and those examining existential threats to the self would argue that there are at least some uniquely human experiences (even if self-directed behavior is not unique to humans), and these examples will be the focus of the next sections.

9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Most of the earliest contributions from the theoretical perspectives reviewed in this text (with the exception of trait theory) emerged from clinical applications. That is, the theory emerged from working in settings with individuals experiencing varying degrees of dys- function in their lives. In contrast, self-theory is largely focused on the normal development of the self and is grounded in research. Of course, much can be learned about the self when considering situations such as the experience of stress and even threats to the self. We will here review some of the more recent self-theories, the consequence of experiencing threats to the self, and the research upon which these constructs are based.

Possible Selves Researchers have developed the concept of possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), a term that identifies the versions of the self that you could be, but which are not necessarily occurring right now. Possible selves are somewhat limitless, in the sense that they can be anything that you imagine yourself to be; possible selves can even be unrealistic. However, past experiences play a critical role in defining possi- ble selves, and as a result, they tend to be reasonably grounded in reality.

Possible selves can be differentiated with respect to their temporal focus (past, present, or future) and their valence; positive possible selves denote what the indi- vidual would like to become, and negative possible selves denote what they would like to avoid (Markus & Nurius, 1986). For example, one could refer to past negative possible selves (one example of which might be associated with regrets) or future positive possible selves (one example being the ideal self). Although there are many possible selves, researchers have largely focused on the future possible selves, as this construct serves to provide meaning to our lives and motivate action toward future goals (see Erikson, 2007).

iStock/Thinkstock

Some experiences can activate a number of possible selves. For example, receiving a text from your boyfriend/girlfriend that says “we need to talk” may activate future possible selves of you as “single.”

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CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest that possible selves are influenced by both individual and con- textual (i.e., situational, social, cultural, etc.) factors. Thus, possible selves can be triggered by developmental factors and social norms (Conger & Peterson, 1984; Oyserman & Markus, 1990). For example, adolescence is a time when family, peer groups, and school are the contexts in which the self is defined. Normative tasks such as dating, gaining independence from family, and initial experience with employment will also define possible selves at this stage in life. Similarly, college students are focused on occupational, educational, and interpersonal (dating and marriage- related) possible selves, whereas possible selves related to parenting and family are more typical for young and middle-aged adults.

Information in our environment can also trigger possible selves that were previously unavailable. For example, we may feel as though we are in a committed, long-term relationship. However, when a boyfriend or girlfriend sends us a text saying “We have to talk,” or they change their Facebook status to “single,” (or both!), this would likely activate a possible self that you may not have been consid- ering prior to receiving that information; the negative future possible self as single (and lonely). Similarly, if you made a comment in your psychology class and the professor said that it was quite possibly one of the more brilliant statements ever made in that course, then this might activate a future positive possible self as a graduate student. Some of the cues that trigger possible selves may be fleeting and less personally directed (an image on a poster or in a commercial), or they may be activated by inner thoughts and experiences (e.g., a moment of self-doubt or supreme confidence, a reminiscence, etc.). This also means that some possible selves are considerably less likely as a result of our circumstances and past experiences. For example, if you have had past academic failures, then it will be more difficult and less likely that you will have future positive possible selves with respect to academics. Indeed, research has shown that juvenile delinquents and those coming from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to identify possible selves in the academic and vocational domains and identify strategies to facilitate the emergence of related possible selves (e.g., Oyser-

man, Bybee, & Terry, 2006; Oyser- man & Markus, 1990; Oyserman & Saltz, 1993). Similarly, research- ers have shown that health pro- motion behavior is less likely for racial minorities who identify with an ingroup self-concept that involves unhealthy behaviors; viewing health promotion behav- iors as defining White, middle— class possible selves (Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007).

Possible Selves as Motivators of Action

Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest that individuals are motivated to reduce the discrepancy between their present and future positive possible selves while increasing the discrepancy between their present and future negative possible selves. Moreover, establishing future positive possible selves increases the likelihood of individuals engaging in behavior and strategic planning that then increases the probability of the possible selves coming to fruition (e.g., Oyserman & Saltz, 1993; Oyserman, Terry, & Bybee, 2002). For example, high-risk students who developed school-based, positive pos- sible selves demonstrated better in-class behavior (Oyserman, Brickman, & Rhodes, 2007), felt more confident about their prospects for success and achieved better grades relative to their peers who did not articulate positive possible selves in school (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004).

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

In this 1986 paper, Hazel Markus and Paul Nurius introduce the concept of possible selves and their implications. Read it at http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1987-01154-001.

Reference: Markus, H. & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist 41(9), 954–969.

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http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1987-01154-001
CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Similarly, negative future possible selves can also motivate behavior. Thus, a future possible self as a “drop-out” can also lead to better school-related outcomes (Oyserman et al., 2006). Based on these findings, it is reasonable to conclude that future negative possible selves in other life domains could also motivate favorable behavior. Research suggests that a balance of negative and positive possible selves may result in the best outcomes, especially in contexts where there may be considerable obstacles undermining the achievement of one’s positive possible selves (e.g., Oyserman & Markus, 1990; Oyserman et al., 2006; Van Dellen & Hoyle, 2008).

In this respect, positive and negative possible selves (also referred to as hoped-for and feared pos- sible selves, respectively) are similar in nature to approach-avoidance goals discussed in Chapter 8, such that there may be behavioral consequences for focusing on one type of possible self, and the tendency to do so can reflect individual differences. Indeed, multiple negative possible selves can be associated with more adverse outcomes. For example, a recent study showed that women with anorexia were likely to have negative future possible selves and that negativity tended to be stronger relative to a control group of women (Erikson, Hansson, & Lundblad, 2012). Moreover, it appears that most individuals have more (or can more readily access) positive, relative to nega- tive, possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).

Self-Discrepancy Theory What are your standards of comparison for your self-concept? How do you know when you are doing well in life or not? These questions stand at the center of one interesting line of research introduced by E. Tory Higgins.

Self-Constructs

Higgins (1987) introduced the concept of self-guides to refer to the internal standards that indi- viduals use for comparison purposes. Some examples of self-guides are the self you ideally want to achieve and the self you think others want you to be. Higgins suggested that these comparisons occur all the time, and somewhat automatically, even without our awareness. Higgins emphasized that any differences between the self-concept and the self-guides are referred to as self-discrepan- cies, and individuals are highly motivated to minimize such discrepancies, as discrepancies result in cognitive and affective discomfort (Higgins, 1987). Of course, self-discrepancy theory was not the first to introduce the idea that discrepancies with the perceived self can result in discomfort and that individuals are motivated to reduce such discomfort (see Festinger, 1957, for a related discussion of cognitive dissonance, and James, 1890, who also discussed discrepancies and incon- gruities in the self). However, Higgins’ theory advanced the field by articulating how certain types of discrepancies result in specific emotional experiences and vulnerabilities. For example, negative emotional states such as sadness would be predicted when the actual and ideal self-discrepancies are especially large. In contrast, guilt might occur when the actual and ought selves are notably different (see Erikson, 2007, for a discussion of how possible selves can be redefined).

Higgins identified three self-domains that can be internally compared. The first is the actual self, which is one’s mental representation of the attributes, accomplishments, and abilities that one perceives oneself to possess. In contrast, the ideal self is a mental depiction of the self one wants to be but is not yet manifesting as the actual self. The ideal self serves to motivate goal-directed behavior to achieve either the ideal self or approximations of it. The ought self is one’s mental representation of the self that someone believes one should (or “ought to”) have. That someone could be a family member, a friend, an intimate partner,—or it could be the individual him- or herself. These can manifest in the form of perceived obligations or responsibilities.

Own

Actual Ideal Ought

Other

The Self Domains

How I see myself as I truly am

How I think others see me

How I think others see the ideal me

How I see myself as I would ideally be

How I think I should be

How I think others think I should be

Standpoints

Figure 9.1: Higgins’ six self-state representations

This figure illustrates the six possible comparisons of the self-states from two different standpoints (perspectives).

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CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Higgins also posited that in making comparisons between the different self-domains, the individ- ual could do so from two distinct vantage points. Higgins specified that one could adopt one’s own standpoint or the standpoint of a significant other. By considering both the three self-domains and the two standpoints, six self-state representations can be identified (i.e., actual-own, actual-other, ideal-own, ideal-other, ought-own, and ought-other; see Figure 9.1). Higgins (1987) proposed that the two actual self-states (actual-own and actual-other) are what most people consider as the self-concept, while the other self-states provide the framework (self-guides) used for comparison with the self-concept to motivate behavior, so as to maximize the match between the actual, the ideal, and the ought self-states. Although self-theory fits well within the framework of personality psychology, as an additional connection, Higgins proposed that there are individual differences in the self-guides that one is most likely to use to motivate behavior. Thus, for some individuals, the ideal self-guides are constantly considered and compared to the actual self, whereas for others, it is the ought self-guides that drive their actions. For example, if you are someone who chronically experiences guilt over what you should do relative to what you are doing in life, then it is more likely that you are thinking extensively about the ought self-guides. If you are frequently fantasiz- ing about a better life, then perhaps you are being largely guided by ideal self-guides.

Emotional Outcomes of Construct Comparisons

Because comparisons among the self-states are what ultimately motivate behavior, it is instructive to both consider the different comparisons (e.g., actual-own vs. actual-other, ideal-own vs. ideal- other, ought-own vs. ought-other, actual-own vs. ideal-own, actual-own vs. ought-own, ideal-own vs. ought-own) and the distinct emotional experiences that might emerge as a result of those comparisons. As an illustration, consider the long-term goal of obtaining your Ph.D. in psychology (an end goal to motivate behavior). Using Higgins’ terminology, you might consider the ideal self as the successful doctor in a thriving career, resulting in a good standard of living and prestige from colleagues. The ought self might look a little different, perhaps as someone who uses their doctoral degree to help others, and is very giving of one’s time in pro bono work. The actual self might be a struggling graduate student who is perhaps questioning whether there is the stamina to continue in graduate school for several more years and complete the dissertation. Perhaps, then, the actual-own versus actual-other comparison involves the nearly burnt-out and uncertain actual self from your perspective to the driven and nearly finished actual self from the perspective of your parents. In this case, when the idea of dropping out crosses your mind, the disappoint- ment you perceive from your parents’ perspective (the “other” in this case) may be one of the motivating agents that keep you going.

Similarly, negative future possible selves can also motivate behavior. Thus, a future possible self as a “drop-out” can also lead to better school-related outcomes (Oyserman et al., 2006). Based on these findings, it is reasonable to conclude that future negative possible selves in other life domains could also motivate favorable behavior. Research suggests that a balance of negative and positive possible selves may result in the best outcomes, especially in contexts where there may be considerable obstacles undermining the achievement of one’s positive possible selves (e.g., Oyserman & Markus, 1990; Oyserman et al., 2006; Van Dellen & Hoyle, 2008).

In this respect, positive and negative possible selves (also referred to as hoped-for and feared pos- sible selves, respectively) are similar in nature to approach-avoidance goals discussed in Chapter 8, such that there may be behavioral consequences for focusing on one type of possible self, and the tendency to do so can reflect individual differences. Indeed, multiple negative possible selves can be associated with more adverse outcomes. For example, a recent study showed that women with anorexia were likely to have negative future possible selves and that negativity tended to be stronger relative to a control group of women (Erikson, Hansson, & Lundblad, 2012). Moreover, it appears that most individuals have more (or can more readily access) positive, relative to nega- tive, possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).

Self-Discrepancy Theory What are your standards of comparison for your self-concept? How do you know when you are doing well in life or not? These questions stand at the center of one interesting line of research introduced by E. Tory Higgins.

Self-Constructs

Higgins (1987) introduced the concept of self-guides to refer to the internal standards that indi- viduals use for comparison purposes. Some examples of self-guides are the self you ideally want to achieve and the self you think others want you to be. Higgins suggested that these comparisons occur all the time, and somewhat automatically, even without our awareness. Higgins emphasized that any differences between the self-concept and the self-guides are referred to as self-discrepan- cies, and individuals are highly motivated to minimize such discrepancies, as discrepancies result in cognitive and affective discomfort (Higgins, 1987). Of course, self-discrepancy theory was not the first to introduce the idea that discrepancies with the perceived self can result in discomfort and that individuals are motivated to reduce such discomfort (see Festinger, 1957, for a related discussion of cognitive dissonance, and James, 1890, who also discussed discrepancies and incon- gruities in the self). However, Higgins’ theory advanced the field by articulating how certain types of discrepancies result in specific emotional experiences and vulnerabilities. For example, negative emotional states such as sadness would be predicted when the actual and ideal self-discrepancies are especially large. In contrast, guilt might occur when the actual and ought selves are notably different (see Erikson, 2007, for a discussion of how possible selves can be redefined).

Higgins identified three self-domains that can be internally compared. The first is the actual self, which is one’s mental representation of the attributes, accomplishments, and abilities that one perceives oneself to possess. In contrast, the ideal self is a mental depiction of the self one wants to be but is not yet manifesting as the actual self. The ideal self serves to motivate goal-directed behavior to achieve either the ideal self or approximations of it. The ought self is one’s mental representation of the self that someone believes one should (or “ought to”) have. That someone could be a family member, a friend, an intimate partner,—or it could be the individual him- or herself. These can manifest in the form of perceived obligations or responsibilities.

Own

Actual Ideal Ought

Other

The Self Domains

How I see myself as I truly am

How I think others see me

How I think others see the ideal me

How I see myself as I would ideally be

How I think I should be

How I think others think I should be

Standpoints

Figure 9.1: Higgins’ six self-state representations

This figure illustrates the six possible comparisons of the self-states from two different standpoints (perspectives).

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CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Self-discrepancy theory predicts that the discrepancy involving the actual and ideal self from one’s own perspective results in feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction when the actual self does not meet the standards of the ideal self. Discrepancies in this domain from the self- perspective are also thought to be associated with depression and low self-esteem (e.g., Strau- man, 1992; see also Strauman & Higgins, 1988). The magnitude of the discrepancy is one of the factors that can also predict the behavioral response, as small discrepancies can foster adaptive efforts to minimize the discrepancy, whereas as large discrepancies are more likely to result in the individual giving up. In contrast, when the perspective is that of significant others, these same actual-ideal self-discrepancies are more likely to induce feelings of shame and embarrassment because the individual believes that he or she has fallen short of what is perceived as the expecta- tions and hopes of others. Thus, we assume that others are disappointed in our achievements (or lack thereof), which leads to shame.

Predicting Important Outcomes With Self-Discrepancy Theory

Possible selves have been predictive of a wide range of important life outcomes. For example, smaller actual-ideal self-discrepancies for students is associated with academic success (Oyser- man et al., 2006), and larger actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies have been linked to depression (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2006; Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992) and anxiety (Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992). Self-discrepancy theory has also been used to predict coping effectiveness and inter-role conflict for married professional mothers (Polasky & Holahan, 1998), the incidence of disordered eating behavior (Landa & Bybee, 2007; Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991), psychological adjustment to a diagnosis of cancer (Heidrich, Forsthoff, & Ward, 1994), help seeking behavior for alcohol-related problems (Buscemi et al., 2010), physi- cal activity (Lamarche & Gammage, 2012), and even immune functioning (i.e., cortisol levels and natural killer cell activity; Strauman, Lemieux, & Coe, 1993).

The Private and Public Self One of the more interesting studies of the self with important implications is a consideration of what is known as the private and public self (also referred to as private and public self-consciousness). Pri- vate self-consciousness is the direction of attention to our inner experiences (thoughts and feelings), and our private self is therefore less likely to be shared with others. We may actively or automatically keep this self hidden from others. Public self-consciousness is when we consider how we appear to others, and as a result, our public self is the identity that we allow others to see.

Researchers (especially in the field of social psychology) have examined how we respond to manipulations of private and public self-consciousness—for example, when an audience or cam- era is used to activate public self-consciousness. Moreover, research has shown that public set- tings minimize the distinction between the private and public self, while concealment (i.e., private contexts or issues) can enhance distinctions between the two self-constructs (e.g., Sedlovskaya et al., 2013).

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CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

In contrast, personality researchers have investigated stable, individual differences in the direction of self-consciousness. In fact, the descriptive term private self-dominant is used to refer to people who tend to be more self-aware in general (i.e., self-conscious) and actively engage in self-focused attention and self-focused goals. Self-disclosure is a common practice for these individuals. In con- trast, those who are public self-dominant are less self-conscious, less focused on their own internal experiences, and instead focused on social goals. Fenigstein and colleagues have assessed these individual differences in self-consciousness and demonstrated that where attention is focused (pri- vate vs. public self) determines which characteristics of the self (private vs. public) are emphasized or valued most (for an overview, see Fenigstein, 2009). In connecting the current research back to self-discrepancy theory, it has been shown that public self-consciousness is more likely to activate thoughts related to the public view of the ought self, whereas private self-consciousness is more likely to activate the ought self from the individual’s own perspective (Nasby, 1996).