American military university charles town wv

How has the operational relationship between the U.S. intelligence community and the homeland security enterprise evolved in the past eight years? What do you believe are the biggest gaps in developing seamless interoperability and why do these gaps exist? Describe at least two major intelligence reforms in the past eight years.

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(U) The FBI: Protecting the Homeland

in the 21 st Century

(U) Report of the Congressionally-directed

(U) 9/11 Review Commission

To

(U) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

By

(U) Commissioners

Bruce Hoffman

Edwin Meese III

Timothy J. Roemer

(U) March 2015

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(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

(U) Introduction: The 9/11 Review Commission…..……….………........ p. 3

(U) Chapter I: Baseline: The FBI Today…………………………….. p. 15

(U) Chapter II: The Sum of Five Cases………………….……………. p. 38

(U) Chapter III: Anticipating New Threats and Missions…………....... p. 53

(U) Chapter IV: Collaboration and Information Sharing………………. p. 73

(U) Chapter V: New Information Related to the 9/11 Attacks………… p. 100

(U) Key Findings and Recommendations…………………………………. p. 108

(U) Conclusion: ………………………………………………………… p. 118

(U) Appendix A: Briefs Provided by FBI Headquarters’ Divisions.…..… p. 119

(U) Appendix B: Interviews Conducted…………………………………. p. 121

(U) Appendix C: Select FBI Intelligence Program Developments…….… p. 122

(U) Appendix D: Acronyms……………………………………………… p. 124

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(U) INTRODUCTION

THE FBI 9/11 REVIEW COMMISSION

(U) The FBI 9/11 Review Commission was established in January 2014 pursuant to a

congressional mandate. 1 The United States Congress directed the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI, or the “Bureau”) to create a commission with the expertise and scope to

conduct a “comprehensive external review of the implementation of the recommendations

related to the FBI that were proposed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission).” 2 The Review Commission was

tasked specifically to report on:

1. An assessment of the progress made, and challenges in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are related to the FBI.

2. An analysis of the FBI’s response to trends of domestic terror attacks since September 11, 2001, including the influence of domestic radicalization.

3. An assessment of any evidence not known to the FBI that was not considered by the 9/11 Commission related to any factors that contributed in any manner to the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

4. Any additional recommendations with regard to FBI intelligence sharing and counterterrorism policy.

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(U) The Review Commission was funded by Congress in Fiscal Years 2013, 2014, and 2015

(FY13, FY14, and FY15) budgets that provided for operations for one-year ending with the

submission of its review to the Director of the FBI. The enabling legislation also required the

FBI Director to report to the Congressional committees of jurisdiction on the findings and

recommendations resulting from this review. 4

(U) In late November 2013, the FBI Director, in consultation with Congress, appointed three

commissioners to what became known as the 9/11 Review Commission: former Attorney

General Edwin Meese, former Congressman and Ambassador Tim Roemer, and Professor and

counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University. In February 2014, the

1 (U) The relevant legislation includes: Title II, Div. B, Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,

2013, P.L. 113-6 (March 26, 2013) (Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation) and accompanying

Explanatory Statement, S1287, S1305 (March 11, 2013); Title II, Div. B, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,

P.L. 113-76 (January 17, 2014) (Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation) and accompanying

Explanatory Statement, H475, H512 (January 15, 2014); Title II, Div. B, Consolidated and Further Continuing

Appropriations Act, 2015, P.L. 113-235 (December 16, 2014) (Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of

Investigation) and accompanying Explanatory Statement, H9307, H9346 (December 11, 2014).

2 (U) Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 113-6 at S1305 (March 11, 2013).

3 (U) Ibid.

4 (U) Title II, Div. B, Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, P.L. 113-6 (March 26, 2013)

(Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation) and accompanying Explanatory Statement, S1287, S1305

(March 11, 2013).

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commissioners appointed as Executive Director, John Gannon, former Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) Deputy Director for Intelligence and ex-Chairman of the National Intelligence

Council.

(U) The Executive Director, working with the commissioners and coordinating with the Bureau,

assembled a staff that eventually numbered 12 individuals: two former senior intelligence

officers, one former assistant US Attorney (and previously a Senior Counsel on the original 9/11

Commission) detailed from the MITRE Corporation, one trial attorney detailed from the

Department of Justice (DOJ), one retired senior Congressional (intelligence committees) staffer,

two senior counterterrorism experts detailed from the RAND Corporation, two senior analysts

detailed from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), two personnel detailed from the FBI, and

one former federal and military prosecutor currently in private practice in Washington. 5

(U) The Review Commission produced a conceptual framework to guide the staff’s review and

production of a report fully addressing its legislative mandate. The framework contained five

objectives around which four staff teams were organized. The commissioners presented this

framework in testimony before the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on March 26, 2014.

(U) Four team leaders were identified and assigned to lead the specific lines of inquiry stated in

the commissioners’ March Congressional testimony: (1) a baseline assessment of where the

Bureau is today in its transition to a threat-based, intelligence-driven organization and “the

development of an institutional culture imbued with deep expertise in intelligence and national

security;” (2) an analysis of institutional lessons learned and practical takeaways from the

assessment of five high-profile counterterrorism cases that occurred in the past six years; (3) an

evaluation of the FBI’s current state of preparedness to address the rapidly evolving, global

threat environment of the next decade—including escalating cyber intrusions, proliferating

numbers of foreign fighters, and increasingly adaptive terrorist activities; and (4) an examination

of the Bureau’s current and future need for closer collaboration and information sharing with

strategic partners inside and outside government, and with other federal, state, local, tribal, and

international counterparts. In addition, the Review Commission produced a fifth chapter

summarizing its effort to identify any evidence now known to the FBI that was not considered by

the 9/11 Commission related to any factors that contributed in any manner to the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001.

5 (U) The staff, hired over several months, consisted of seven full-time and five part-time employees. Delays in

hiring slowed the progress of the review, but never halted it. All staff members reported administratively to the FBI.

The three commissioners, the executive director, and three of the staff members worked under personal services

contracts (PSCs), three staff members served pursuant to Intergovernmental Personnel Agreements (IPAs), with the

remaining staff under rotational or specialized agreements with the FBI. With regard to access, we experienced a

“pull system”—we received what we asked for—but the responsiveness and collaborative spirit of our two

substantive FBI liaison officers, Elizabeth Callahan and Jacqueline Maguire, provided us invaluable access to key

people and relevant data that enabled us to produce an objective, comprehensive, and constructive review. They

also conducted, in collaboration with the commission staff, an exhaustive fact-based review of the draft report that

improved its accuracy and clarity.

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(U) Scope of Effort

(U) The Review Commission received over 60 extensive briefings on a broad range of subjects

from the FBI headquarters’ divisions. A comprehensive list of the briefing topics can be found in

Appendix A. 6 No briefing requests were denied. The Review Commission made numerous

document and information requests and in turn generated internal documents and Memoranda for

the Record. The Review Commission conducted meetings at the training and science and

technology facilities at Quantico, Virginia, to gain firsthand knowledge regarding the changes to

the training program as well as developments in the scientific realm.

(U) The Review Commission interviewed over 30 Bureau and United States Intelligence

Community (USIC) officials and other experts, including former FBI Director Robert Mueller,

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper, Director of CIA John Brennan, former

DIA Director Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Michael Flynn, former National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

Directors Michael Leiter and Matthew Olson, Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

Commissioner Gil Kerlikowske, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator

John Pistole, and had several meetings with current FBI Director James Comey. A

comprehensive list of the interviewees can be found in Appendix B. 7

(U) The Review Commission traveled to eight field offices (Washington, Boston, Denver,

Detroit, Minneapolis, Chicago, San Diego, and New York) interviewing key personnel, including

members of counterterrorism squads, analytic units, Joint Terrorism Task Force members, field

office leadership, and key external partners such as local police chiefs. The Review Commission

also visited six Legal Attaché (LEGAT) posts (Ottawa, Beijing, Manila, Singapore, London, and

Madrid) for extensive discussions and meetings with the LEGATs (and members of his or her

team), ambassadors, relevant members of the country teams, and participated in outside meetings

with the Bureau’s key foreign liaison partners.

(U) The Review Commission and staff selected field office and LEGAT visits based on issues

related to the cases reviewed, on significant US border issues, on important internal US and

foreign collaborative relationships, and on specific local or regional counterterrorism challenges.

The Review Commission also interviewed at Headquarters the LEGATS from Abu Dhabi,

Ankara, Hong Kong, Kiev, Nairobi, and Tel Aviv.

(U) The Review Commission received outstanding support from Headquarters divisions, from

the field offices, and from the LEGAT posts in response to its extensive requirements. At

Headquarters, Elizabeth Callahan and Jacqueline Maguire, who were in daily contact with the

staff, deserve special mention for their unfailing positive response to the Review Commission’s

steady flow of requirements for briefings, meetings, and documents. We are also grateful to

Patrick Findlay, who provided guidance on legal, contracts, and logistical issues. The

commissioners also wish to thank Sarah Maksoud, a graduate student in the Security Studies

Program at Georgetown University, for her generous preparation of exceptionally useful

summaries of relevant unclassified reports.

6 (U) A complete list of briefings and meetings is contained in Appendix A.

7 (U) A complete list of interviews conducted is contained in Appendix B.

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(U) It is important to acknowledge the report’s limitations. The Review Commission took

several months to assemble staff and hire personnel, due to bureaucratic, clearance, and other

unpredictable and administrative issues. The staff worked for 11 months to address an extremely

broad and challenging mandate from Congress, which required continuous focus on the most

challenging issues. In particular, the staff devoted extensive time to the Bureau’s intelligence

collection and analysis programs, its collaboration and information sharing practices, and its

strategic planning and implementation. The staff also derived practical lessons from recent FBI

cases.

(U) 9/11 Commission Recommendations

(U) The Review Commission recognized that its report must move beyond the baseline of 2004,

when the country was at the peak of launching reforms to prevent another catastrophic terrorist

attack on the Homeland, to a decade later when those enacted reforms have arguably helped to

prevent another such attack. Many of the findings and recommendations in this report will not

be new to the FBI. The Bureau is already taking steps to address them. In 2015, however, the

FBI faces an increasingly complicated and dangerous global threat environment that will demand

an accelerated commitment to reform. Everything is moving faster. The box below summarizes

the Bureau’s response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, a good place to start.

(U) The FBI’s Response to the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendations 8

(U) Overarching Recommendation:

(U) “A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI

consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained,

rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep

expertise in intelligence and national security.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: The Bureau has established comprehensive structures,

programs, and policies to build an end-to-end intelligence architecture for intelligence

requirements, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. It has assigned analysts,

including reports officers, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors to the field. It has

introduced a well-conceived, entity-wide threat prioritization process. Intelligence support has

been prioritized, though it requires faster progress and deeper execution. Its detailees to other

agencies, including the NCTC and the National Intelligence Council (NIC), have had a positive

impact. Fundamentally, however, the Review Commission’s report highlights a significant gap

between the articulated principles of the Bureau’s intelligence programs and their effectiveness in

practice. The Bureau needs to accelerate its pursuit of its stated goals for intelligence as a matter

of increased urgency.

(U) Subordinate Recommendations:

8 (U) The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations quoted from The 9/11 Review Commission Report: Final Report of

the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report) (US Government

Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2004): 425-427.

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1. (U) “The president, by executive order or directive, should direct the FBI to develop this intelligence cadre.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: In the aftermath of the events in 9/11, the FBI had already

taken steps to improve and expand its intelligence cadre. However, the FBI was first formally

directed to create a Directorate of Intelligence through a November 18, 2004, Presidential

Memorandum for the Attorney General (titled “Further Strengthening Federal Bureau of

Investigation Capabilities”). 9 The Bureau has responded with the creation of an Executive

Assistant Director for Intelligence.

2. (U) “Recognizing that cross-fertilization between the criminal justice and national security disciplines is vital to the success of both missions, all new agents should receive basic training in

both areas. Furthermore, new agents should begin their careers with meaningful assignments in

both areas.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: Subsequent to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, the

FBI re-engineered new agent training to encompass both criminal and national security training

and increased the training from 16 weeks to 21 weeks. New agents are required to complete

certain developmental tasks that cover foundational skills as well as skills needed for National

Security Branch (NSB) and Intelligence functions.

3. (U) “Agents and analysts should then specialize in one of these disciplines and have the option to work such matters for their entire career with the Bureau. Certain advanced training courses and

assignments to other intelligence agencies should be required to advance within the national

security discipline.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: Through the Agent Operational Designation Program

(AODP), agents are assigned career path designations in order to increase program-specific and

intelligence expertise of agents by providing clear guidance for career progression and high

quality, job-relevant training, and developmental opportunities. While the option to choose an

area of focus exists for intelligence analysts, for some the development of advanced courses and

required interagency rotations their progression in the national security field is still a work in

progress. The FBI is engaged in the USIC joint duty program and requires USIC joint duty credit

experience for all senior executive positions within the FBI’s national security and intelligence

components. Its personnel are increasingly enrolled in the certificate and degree awarding

programs of the National Intelligence University (NIU). These new efforts must be expedited and

encouraged.

4. (U) “In the interest of cross-fertilization, all senior FBI managers, including those working on law enforcement matters, should be certified intelligence officers.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: There is a lack of clarity regarding the qualifications of a

“certified” intelligence officer as directed by the original 9/11 Commission. The FBI Intelligence

Officer Certification (FIOC) program was established in response to the recommendation;

however, it is currently under suspension and review for its effectiveness in promoting the FBI’s

goals for integrated professional development. To broaden intelligence experience, the FBI is

9 (U) “Memorandum for the Attorney General: Further Strengthening Federal Bureau of Investigation Capabilities”

November 18, 2004.

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creating intelligence operations training and education for the workforce, scheduled to be rolled

out in FY15 and FY16.

5. (U) “The FBI should fully implement a recruiting, hiring, and selection process for agents and analysts that enhances its ability to target and attract individuals with educational and professional

backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other relevant

skills.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: The Bureau has made a concerted effort over the past decade

to upgrade its skills-based recruitment for its increasingly complex missions, including cyber. This

effort will need to be accelerated to meet the diverse personnel and technology challenges ahead.

6. (U) “The FBI should institute the integration of analysts, agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field so that a dedicated team approach is brought to bear on national security

intelligence operations.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: In response to the need for greater integration of agents and

analysts and to provide a firm foundation of working on a team, over the past decade the FBI

instituted some shared training for new analysts and agents to integrate them together at the

beginning of their FBI careers. Once deployed to the field, many of these analysts have been

embedded in operational squads in the field, though their work favors support to tactical and case

work at the expense of strategic analysis. The FBI launched a more structured Integrated

Curriculum Initiative (ICI) in 2014, with the primary goal to develop a comprehensive basic

training program for new agents and analysts that teaches them to operate in a threat-based,

intelligence-driven, operationally-focused environment. According to data provided by the FBI,

the newly developed curriculum will be the foundation for the FBI’s 20-week Basic Field Training

Course (BFTC) for new agents and analysts and consist of over 300 hours of integrated training,

reinforced with joint practical exercises. The BFTC will be piloted in April 2015, with full

implementation to begin in September 2015. Except for the larger field offices, linguists, who are

still in short supply, are principally accessed by a virtual system. The Review Commission

recognizes this is a challenging process; however, hiring additional linguists and integrating them

into operations should be a high priority

7. (U) “Each field office should have an official at the field office's deputy level for national security matters. This individual would have management oversight and ensure that the national priorities

are carried out in the field.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: Each field office has at least one Assistant Special Agent in

Charge (ASAC) responsible for the intelligence program and national security matters. The FBI

has further instituted changes to ensure national priorities are carried out in the field through

systematic mechanisms such as the Threat Review and Prioritization Process (TRP) and Integrated

Program Management (IPM); however, it is unclear the extent to which the program metrics are

effective or ensure priorities are addressed.

8. (U) “The FBI should align its budget structure according to its four main programs: intelligence, counterterrorism and counterintelligence, criminal, and criminal justice services—to ensure better

transparency on program costs, management of resources, and protection of the intelligence

program.”

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(U) Review Commission Finding: In direct response, the FBI adjusted its budget structure to

meet the objectives of the recommendation and further consolidated all national security and

intelligence programs under the NSB in 2005. In 2014, the FBI further re-aligned its intelligence

program by creating the new Intelligence Branch (IB). It is important to note that sequestration in

FY14 severely hindered the FBI’s intelligence and national security programs.

9. (U) “The FBI should report regularly to Congress in its semiannual program reviews designed to identify whether each field office is appropriately addressing FBI and national program priorities.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: The FBI, according to the data it provided, reports regularly to

Congress on these programs through its meetings, testimony, and general oversight process. For

example, during the 111th Congress, the FBI presented 15 briefings and participated in two

hearings that addressed issues related to national security and intelligence program priorities.

During the 112th Congress, the FBI provided 16 briefings and participated in six hearings that

addressed these issues. In addition, Congress must actively perform its oversight responsibilities

to ensure the implementation of these Review Commission recommendations.

10. (U) “The FBI should report regularly to Congress in detail on the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts in the field and at headquarters. Congress should ensure that analysts are afforded

training and career opportunities on a par with those offered to analysts in other intelligence

community agencies.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: According to data provided to the Review Commission by the

FBI, the above-mentioned Congressional briefings and hearings on national security program

priorities also addressed issues related to the intelligence program, to include the qualifications,

status, and roles of analysts in the field and at headquarters. The Review Commission found that

the training and professional status of analysts has improved in recent years. The Intelligence

Community Analysis Training and Education Council (ICATEC) in December 2014 found that the

FBI’s analytic training was on par with CIA, DIA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

(NGA), and National Security Agency (NSA). The Review Commission found, however, that

access to continuous FBI training, to external education, and to developmental career opportunities

lags behind other USIC agencies.

11. (U) “The Congress should make sure funding is available to accelerate the expansion of secure facilities in FBI field offices so as to increase their ability to use secure e-mail systems and

classified intelligence product exchanges. The Congress should monitor whether the FBI's

information-sharing principles are implemented in practice.”

(U) Review Commission Finding: The FBI continues to make progress in acquiring adequate

secure facilities for its field offices and LEGAT posts, though it is still behind where it needs to be.

It also is investing in IT infrastructure improvements to enhance communications with the USIC

and state and local partners. The Review Commission found that the FBI’s information sharing

practices have progressed markedly, with continuing room for improvement with local law

enforcement.

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(U) COMMISSIONERS

(U) EDWIN “ED” MEESE III

(U) Ed Meese is currently associated with the Heritage Foundation as the

leading think tank’s Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow Emeritus. In that

capacity, Meese oversees special projects and acts as an ambassador for

Heritage within the conservative movement. He is also a distinguished

visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in California

and lectures, writes, and consults throughout the United States on a variety of

subjects. From 1977 to 1981, Meese was a law professor at the University of

San Diego, where he also directed the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and

Management. From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position of counselor to the

President—and functioned as President Reagan's chief policy adviser. Meese then served as

Attorney General under President Reagan from 1985-1988. In May 2006, Meese was named a

member of the Iraq Study Group and co-authored the group's final December 2006 report.

Meese also served on the National War Powers Commission and the Commission for the

Evaluation of the National Institute of Justice. Meese has authored several books, including

Leadership, Ethics and Policing, Making America Safer, and With Reagan: The Inside Story.

Meese is a retired Colonel in the United States Army Reserve, where he served in the military

intelligence and civil affairs branches.

(U) TIM ROEMER (U) Tim Roemer, former six-term US representative for Indiana’s 3rd

congressional district, most recently served as US ambassador to India. He

has a strong background in international trade and investment, education

policy, and national security.

(U) During his tenure as the lead diplomat in India, Ambassador Roemer was

charged with leading one of America’s largest diplomatic missions. Under

the leadership of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he

was responsible for broadening and deepening the US-India partnership. He

oversaw the implementation of several key policies and initiatives, including increasing

cooperation, technology transfer and commercial sales in the defense and space industries;

signing the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative to further expand cooperation in areas such

as intelligence and homeland security, border security, money laundering and terrorist financing;

and working with the United States to assist India on its Global Center for Nuclear Energy

Partnership. He also emphasized commerce and exports, helping move India from America’s

25th-largest trading partner to 12th.

(U) Prior to his diplomatic appointment, Ambassador Roemer served for 12 years in the US

House of Representatives, where he was deeply engaged in efforts to improve access, standards,

and achievement for American education. He was a member of the 9/11 Commission and one of

the first members of Congress to advocate for a more dynamic and entrepreneurial Department

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of Homeland Security. He also served on the Washington Institute’s Presidential Task Force on

Combating the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Additionally, Ambassador Roemer has served

on national commissions and advisory panels and on the board of directors for Oshkosh

Corporation.

(U) Known as a consensus-builder and problem-solver, Ambassador Roemer was also president

of the Center for National Policy, where he brought together experts and policy-makers to

facilitate political cooperation to address critical national security challenges.

(U) Ambassador Roemer has served as a distinguished scholar at George Mason University and

has taught at Harvard University’s Institute of Politics. He earned a BA degree from the

University of California at San Diego and his M.A. and Ph.D. in American government from the

University of Notre Dame. He has received distinguished alumnus awards from both schools.

(U) BRUCE HOFFMAN

(U) Professor Bruce Hoffman has been studying terrorism and insurgency for

nearly four decades. He is a professor in Georgetown University’s Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service where he is also the Director of both the

Center for Security Studies and of the Security Studies Program. Professor

Hoffman is also a visiting Professor of Terrorism Studies at St. Andrews

University, Scotland. He previously held the Corporate Chair in

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation and was

also Director of RAND’s Washington, D.C. office. He was Scholar-in-

Residence for Counterterrorism at the Central Intelligence Agency between

2004 and 2006; an adviser on counterterrorism to the Office of National Security Affairs,

Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq, in 2004; and from 2004-2005 an adviser on

counterinsurgency to the Strategy, Plans, and Analysis Office at Multi-National Forces-Iraq

Headquarters, Baghdad. Professor Hoffman was also an adviser to the Iraq Study Group. He is

the author of Inside Terrorism (2006). His most recent book is The Evolution of the Global

Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s Death (2014). Anonymous Soldiers: The

Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947 will be published in 2015.

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(U) COMMISSION STAFF

(U) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

(U) John Gannon served as CIA’s Director of European Analysis (1992-1995), as Deputy

Director for Intelligence (1995-1997), Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and

Production (1998-2001), and as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2001).

After his retirement from CIA in 2001, he served in the White House as the head of the

intelligence team standing up the Department of Homeland Security (2002-2003) and later on the

Hill as the staff director of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security (2003-2005). In

2004, President George W. Bush awarded him the National Security Medal, the nation’s highest

intelligence award. Gannon retired from BAE Systems (2005-2012) as President of the

Intelligence and Security Sector. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University in the

Security Studies Program. Gannon is a member of the Board of Visitors of the National

Intelligence University. He is a member of the Board of Directors of Voices of September 11th

(9/11 families), of the Homeland Security Project, of the National Academies of Science (NAS)

Division Committee on Engineering and Physical Sciences, and of the Council on Foreign

Relations. Gannon earned his BA in psychology at Holy Cross College, and his M.A. and Ph.D.

in history at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a former Naval Officer (retired captain)

and Vietnam veteran. He was an elected member of the city council and Chairman of the

Planning Commission in his home town of Falls Church, Virginia.

(Staff Members in Alphabetical Order)

(U) Kim Cragin, MPP, Ph.D., is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation focusing

on terrorism-related issues. She has taught as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and

the University of Maryland. In spring 2008, she spent three months on General David Petraeus’s

(Ret.) staff in Baghdad. Cragin also has conducted fieldwork in Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt,

northwest China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, among others. She is the author of

Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs (Praeger, 2009), and her RAND

publications include a contribution to The Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to

Terrorism; Social Science for Counterterrorism; and Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist

Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies. Cragin also has published in such journals as

Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and the Historical Journal.

(U) William Giannetti is a Senior Intelligence Analyst from DIA. His 18-year career spans

time as a civil servant, Philadelphia cop and military intelligence officer. He served two tours in

Afghanistan and has a M.A. in Criminal Justice from St. Joseph’s University.

(U) Barbara A. Grewe is a Principal Policy Advisor for the MITRE Corporation where she

serves as a trusted advisor to senior government leaders and has been responsible for leading

interagency efforts to address high priority issues. She previously served as a Senior Counsel on

the 9/11 Commission where she was responsible for investigating several key areas. She has

also served as an Associate General Counsel in the Government Accountability Office and as an

Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. She has a J.D. from the

University of Michigan Law School, an M.A. (Oxon.) from the University of Oxford (where she

was a Rhodes Scholar), and a B.A. from Wellesley College.

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(U) Christine “Chris” Healey served as the top legal advisor to the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence. She worked for the Government Affairs Committee on the landmark legislation

that reformed the intelligence community and created the position of the Director of National

Intelligence. Healey also served as a Senior Counsel and team leader on the 9/11 Commission.

Prior to that, she was on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, including as

staff director.

(U) Seth G. Jones is director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the

RAND Corporation, as well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School for

Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He served in numerous positions in US Special

Operations Command, including as an advisor to the commanding general in Afghanistan. He is

the author of Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qa'ida after 9/11 (W.W. Norton, 2012),

and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

(U) Johanna Keena is a Staff Operations Specialist for the FBI focusing on counterterrorism.

She previously served at a legal and lobbying firm. Keena has received an M.S. in Intelligence

Management from the University of Maryland University College.

(U) Joseph Moreno is a former federal prosecutor with the United States Department of Justice

in the National Security Division. Currently a Major in the United States Army Reserve Judge

Advocate General Corps, Joseph is a two-time combat veteran of Operations Iraqi Freedom and

Enduring Freedom, and recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for his service in Iraq. He currently

works in private practice at the law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP in Washington

DC. Moreno has a B.A. from Stony Brook University, a J.D./M.B.A. from St. John’s University,

and is a certified public accountant.

(U) Jamie Pirko is a Security and Intelligence Analyst, in the area of National Security for US

government agencies including the DOD, FBI, and the Congressional Commission on the

Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Before joining the Commission, she served as an

Intelligence Analyst in the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Domain Awareness program.

(U) Elisabeth Poteat is an attorney with the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism

Section in US Department of Justice, where she has served on the National Security Cyber

Specialists Network and the Antiterrorism Advisory Council. She is a former organized crime

prosecutor at the US Attorney’s Office for Washington, D.C., and a former Deputy Public

Defender for Los Angeles. She is the author of two recent works on classified information:

“Discovering the Artichoke: How Omissions Have Blurred the Enabling Intent of the Classified

Information Procedures Act” (Journal of National Security Law and Policy Vol. 7); and a

chapter, “How Classified Information is Handled in Leak Cases,” in the book Whistleblowers,

Leaks, and the Media: The First Amendment and National Security, ABA, 2014.

(U) William Richardson served 32 years at CIA, where he held numerous senior leadership

positions in the Directorate of Intelligence at CIA Headquarters and overseas. He also served as

the DNI’s National Intelligence Manager for South Asia, and as the intelligence briefer to

President Barack Obama and Vice President Al Gore.

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(U) Amy Buenning Sturm is an analyst for US Special Operations Command and has eight

years of government and non-profit experience focused on counterterrorism and national security

issues. She is a Ph.D. student at University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy and earned an

M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University in 2010. Sturm is a Truman Scholar and a

former Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow.

(U) Caryn Wagner is a former Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department

of Homeland Security. Prior to that, she was a 30-year intelligence professional who began her

career as a Signals Intelligence officer in the United States Army. Wagner spent seven years at

DIA, where she served as the Deputy Director for Analysis and Production, and on the staff of

the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and as Budget Director. She also served

as Director of the IC Community Management Staff, the Assistant Deputy Director of National

Intelligence for Management, and as first Chief Financial Officer for the National Intelligence

Program.

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CHAPTER I

(U) BASELINE: THE FBI TODAY

(U) The mandate of the FBI 9/11 Review Commission, (hereafter Review Commission) is to

measure the Bureau’s progress over “yesterdays” since 9/11 and to assess its preparedness for

“tomorrows” in a rapidly evolving and dangerous world. To accomplish this, the Review

Commission worked to determine how close the Bureau is today to its goal of becoming a threat-

based, intelligence-driven organization, and to ascertain the extent to which this complies with

the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the Bureau transform itself into America’s premier

domestic intelligence agency. The report also looks ahead to an evolving and increasingly

complex threat environment that should drive reform in the Bureau.

(U) This first chapter will provide background and perspective on the Review Commission’s

findings developed in the following chapters, a broader look at relevant national and global

trends that have driven FBI reforms in recent years, a summary of the related initiatives put forth

by former Director Robert S. Mueller, III, and a description of where the Review Commission

sees the Bureau’s transformation today—its 2015 baseline.

(U) Key Points

 (U) The FBI has made measurable progress over the past decade in developing end-to-end intelligence capabilities and in significantly improving information sharing and collaboration with

key partners at home and abroad. This has undoubtedly contributed to protecting the Homeland

against another catastrophic terrorist attack. But progress in building key intelligence programs,

analysis and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection in particular, lag behind marked advances in

law enforcement capabilities. This imbalance needs urgently to be addressed to meet growing and

increasingly complex national security threats, including from adaptive and increasingly tech-savvy

terrorists, more brazen computer hackers, and more technically capable, global cyber syndicates.

 (U) The FBI’s reform efforts have been impeded—but never halted—by early confusion with regard to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) guidance on

intelligence activities, by the uneven commitment of mid-level leadership to intelligence-focused

transformation, by a one-year budget process out of sync with the five-year cycle of the major

intelligence agencies, by an initial cultural clash between seasoned special agents and a vastly

expanded cadre of inexperienced analysts, by conflicting structural recommendations from the 9/11

and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) commissions, and by the negative impact of sequestration

on multiple reform initiatives.

 (U) The FBI requires a five-year, top-down strategic plan to provide the resources needed to upgrade its support services—including information technology (IT), procurement, contracting, and security—

and to achieve its growing mission as a global, intelligence-driven investigative service. The plan

must enable the professionalization of FBI analysis, the improvement of HUMINT capabilities, a

more focused and long-term attention to the Legal Attachés (LEGAT) program, the recognition of

science and technology (S&T) as a core competency for future investment, and closer relations with

Congressional committees of jurisdiction to ensure that the Bureau has both the state-of the art

capabilities to counter increasingly dangerous threats and the effective internal safeguards to protect

civil liberties.

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(U) The full report, which is based on 10 months of formal internal briefings and research,

extensive outside interviews, and 14 field visits, concludes that the Bureau has made important

progress in building a “specialized and integrated national security work force” yet must

accelerate its efforts and deepen progress in several critical areas. 10

Director Mueller pursued

this goal relentlessly for a dozen years, by centralizing key functions in a field-dominated

bureaucracy, launching multiple programs and processes to build an end-to-end intelligence

process within the FBI, and significantly improving collaboration and information sharing with

partners at home and abroad. A list of select intelligence program developments can be found in

Appendix C. These changes, consistently implemented year-after-year, demonstrate the

Bureau’s commitment to its national security and intelligence program reform. The Review

Commission evaluated several of these reform efforts, many of which were well intentioned but

fell short in execution, with an eye toward recommendations for the future.

(U) The Review Commission also responded to the Congressional mandate to identify obstacles

to reform efforts. Director Mueller’s initiatives were impeded by the early institutional struggle

to reconcile the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) and the (DNI) guidance

on intelligence activities, the initial cultural clash between special agents and a suddenly vastly

expanded cadre of new analysts, conflicting structural recommendations from the 9/11 and

WMD commissions, and the severe impact of sequestration on multiple reform initiatives.

Progress also was hindered by the uneven commitment to reform of FBI leadership in the field.

The Bureau’s efforts to integrate its intelligence and law enforcement missions continue to be

constrained by a bifurcated annual budget process—versus five-year cycles of other intelligence

agencies—that runs through the rigorous review of separate DOJ and Office of the Director of

National Intelligence (ODNI) budget offices and on to Congressional committees of jurisdiction,

which are similarly divided between intelligence and law enforcement priorities. This lack of

alignment between Executive and Legislative overseers needs to be addressed as the Bureau

develops a multi-year strategic plan. The Review Commission took all this into account in

assessing the Bureau’s progress.

(U) The Bureau’s goal for intelligence during the Mueller era, which is consistent with the basic

recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, was stated in the FBI Strategic Plan, 2004-2009: “The

FBI has a mandate from the President, Congress, the Attorney General, and the DCI (Director of

Central Intelligence) to protect national security by producing intelligence in support of its own

investigative mission, national intelligence priorities, and the needs of other customers.” 11

The

Review Commission has taken the Director’s commitment to these three customer sets as the

standard for testing the Bureau’s performance today.

(U) The Urgency of the Threat

(U) The Review Commission recognizes that national security threats to the United States have

multiplied, and become increasingly complex and more globally dispersed in the past decade.

Hostile states and transnational networks—including cyber hackers and organized syndicates,

space-system intruders, WMD proliferators, narcotics and human traffickers, and other organized

10 (U) The 9/11 Commission Report, 425.

11 (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan, 2004-2009 (2003): 20.

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criminals—are operating against American interests across national borders, and within the

United States. In the coming decade, these evolving threats will increasingly challenge the FBI’s

leadership at every level, its traditional culture, and all of its core capabilities in criminal

investigation, counterintelligence, intelligence collection and analysis, and technology. The

extensive reforms of the past decade must be accelerated to fulfill the Bureau’s expanded global

mission as a fully integrated, intelligence-driven investigative organization.

(U) Decentralized terrorist networks and militias— so evident today in the Middle East, sub-

Saharan Africa, and South Asia—are recruiting homegrown violent extremists from Western

countries to their fights that are suffused in jihadist rhetoric but also fueled by the growing

instability and widening violence of failing states. These foreign fighters, including growing

numbers of US citizens, are a clear and present security threat to the United States due to their

training and experience on the jihadist battlefield and to the prospect of their return to the United

States and other countries. Extremists, who are now inspired through social media and recruited

on the internet, increasingly pose a domestic threat given the propaganda and encouragement

emanating from overseas to carry out attacks at home.

(U) All of these state and non-state adversaries of the United States are becoming more adaptive

and sophisticated in their strategies, more advanced in their use of technology, and more

successful in their counterintelligence operations. They are exploiting rapid advances in IT,

including sophisticated use of social media, to accelerate the real-time flow of their operational

information (including bomb-making expertise), and of their people, finances, and transfers of

weapons across borders. The continuing broader IT-driven revolution in dual-use

technologies—including biotechnology, nanotechnology, material sciences, neuroscience, and

robotics—challenges the FBI to understand how these technologies, separately and in synergistic

combination, outpace its own current tradecraft and strengthen that of its adversaries.

(U) What is the Goal?

(U) The Review Commission based its findings and recommendations on its vision of what a

fully operational threat-based, intelligence-driven FBI would look like. The FBI, as the core of

US domestic intelligence, can never be identical to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any

other national intelligence agency. Criminal investigators openly pursue and handle evidence

under strong internal and external constraints—including the US Constitution and generations of

law aimed at protecting civil liberties. In contrast, intelligence officers in national agencies

pursue information abroad in secret with fewer of these constraints and with an abundance of

incentives to assess risk and probability virtually unconstrained.

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(U) Enduring Drivers of Reform

(U) The FBI has been slow to adapt at times in its 106-year history, but it has never stood still.

Its progression has not been linear. Some eras were more challenging than others, some

responses were bolder, and some lapses—including the covert and frequently illegal

Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that peaked in the 1960s—blemished the record.

But the Bureau’s success against a wide range of targets over the years has been impressive by

any reckoning. Its targets for investigation have included WWI-era anarchists, notorious bank

robbers in the post-WWI decades, Prohibition-era gangsters, Nazi saboteurs, Soviet spies, illegal

drug traffickers, violent militias, white supremacists, Ku Klux Klan “dragons,” air-land-and-sea

hijackers, legions of corrupt politicians, domestic and foreign organized crime bosses, human

traffickers, weapons proliferators, child pornographers, crooked corporate executives, identity

thieves, cyber criminals, and both domestic and international terrorists. And from the beginning,

the Bureau has always supported its law enforcement mission by collecting and analyzing

intelligence.

(U) For the past several decades, however, the Bureau’s job has gotten much harder as

increasingly complex threats have demanded unprecedented intelligence support and analytic

capability in the midst of a global information revolution. For this more focused intelligence

mission, it is still a work in progress. Since the early 1980s, three intersecting trends have

pushed the FBI to change the way it does business. First, the Cold War world order has been

transformed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by nuclear Russia’s troubling response to its

loss of global stature, the dramatic rise of China, and the emergence of multi-polar regional

powers in the European Union, Brazil, Mexico, Iran, South Korea, and India. Regional

(U) A Model for US Domestic Intelligence

(U) The Review Commission’s vision of the future FBI is one in which criminal investigation,

counterintelligence, intelligence collection and analysis, and science and technology applications are seen

as complementary core competencies of a global intelligence and investigative organization. These

competencies are applied to the same criminal and national security missions, and intersect synergistically

in mission support—with a budget that incentivizes the integration. But these competencies remain as

distinct professional disciplines requiring their own investment strategies, specialized training, and

discipline-managed career services. The FBI will fulfill its domestic intelligence role with analysts and

collectors who are grounded in criminal investigation; who have ready access to state-of-the-art

technology; who continuously exploit the systems, tools, and relationships of the national intelligence

agencies; and who both cultivate and benefit from robust Continental United States (CONUS) and outside

the Continental United States (OCONUS) collaborative relationships that widen the Bureau’s access to

both investigative leads and reportable intelligence. Achieving this should not be a zero-sum game

between intelligence analysis and investigation. It should mean a continued FBI commitment to a

growing criminal investigation mission, a tighter and smoother integration of intelligence analysts and

collectors into the USIC, and increasingly closer collaborative relationships with US and foreign partners.

US domestic intelligence, with the FBI at its hub, will be a collaborative enterprise optimizing the

integration of international, federal, state, local, and community players.

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instability has grown with the proliferation of new terrorist organizations unaffiliated with nation

states, insurgent groups, and countless violence-prone militias that flow across defenseless

borders of failing states in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. America now exists in a

world of globally distributed threats, and this complicated picture will only expand and become

more complex in the decades ahead.

(U) The second trend involves the rapid pace of technology research and development (R&D),

which is now a challenging global phenomenon that was once wholly dominated by the United

States. According to the National Academies of Science, China— with 1.3 billion people—

today has the capacity for technological innovation, as does the tiny island nation of Singapore

(5.5 million people) in the Malaccan Straits, along with several Western countries. 12

Foreign

R&D continues to make rapid advances in key areas such as IT, biotechnology, DNA

applications, nanotechnology, material sciences, neuroscience, and robotics—all with worrisome

dual-use implications.

(U) IT-driven globalization has led individuals, nations, non-government organizations, and

multi-national corporations to leverage international networks for the good of mankind. At the

same time, terrorists, organized criminals, and other state and non-state actors hostile to the

United States are able to move people, ideological information, finance, and catastrophic

destructive know-how across borders in real time with unprecedented ease. Al-Qa’ida exploited

global networks—below the radar of Western intelligence agencies—to plan and execute the

9/11 attacks. Homegrown jihadists in Madrid and London, connected to al-Qa’ida terrorists,

carried out catastrophic attacks against urban transportation in 2004 and 2005. Today, a

proliferation of terrorist groups—including the formidable Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

(ISIL)—and militias in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa are exploiting social media with

increasing sophistication and effectiveness.

(U) The internet gave Usama bin Laden a global platform to energize and expand his jihadist

following. It also gave rise to other charismatic leaders like the infamous US-born cleric, Anwar

al-Aulaqi, who effectively exploited the internet to recruit young Islamic extremists, including

his fellow Americans, and to lead them to jihadist violence. A growing number of US citizens or

permanent residents—Jose Padilla, Najibullah Zazi, David Coleman Headley, Faisal Shahzad,

Nidal Hasan, and Boston Marathon bombers Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev, were radicalized,

in part, via the internet and/or emboldened by jihadist training and/or contacts abroad. So was

22-year-old Moner Mohammad Abusallah, an impressionable Florida-raised basketball fan, who

succesfully traveled to and from Syria and died a suicide bomber there in May 2014, while

avoiding disruption by western intelligence agencies.

(U) The third trend concerns the growing US demand in recent years for a more capable

domestic intelligence service. This results from the unprecedented intersection of adverse

geopolitics and advancing technology since the 1980s, punctuated by the national trauma of the

9/11 terrorist attacks. Americans were understandably rattled by the “backyard” proximity of the

al-Qa’ida terrorist threat. Not surprisingly, new national security stakeholders emerged at the

12 (U) The National Research Council of the National Academies, S&T Strategies of Six Countries: Implications

for the United States (Washington, D.C., The National Academies Press, 2010): 81-91.

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state and local levels, including first-responders who claimed a legitimate need for intelligence

support from the Federal Government and a collaborative hand from the FBI. First responders

today have been encouraged, for good reason, to see the Bureau as the core of US domestic

intelligence. Many say that it could do a better job keeping them informed.

(U) Relevant Pre-9/11 Reforms

(U) The USIC, the police community, and Congress responded to this new, distributed threat

environment in the mid-1980s, with the pace picking up dramatically in the ensuing decade. A

brief synopsis of the period reveals two critical facts to be gleaned about the FBI’s reformist

efforts. First, the FBI leadership had impressive insight into its challenges before 9/11 and

developed a visionary strategic plan in the late 1990s to address them. Second, it did not

implement its own well-crafted plan to change the way it was doing business in the face of a

growing terrorist threat. Anecdotal testimony indicates that the plan lost momentum for a variety

of reasons, including competing pressures on leadership, DOJ reluctance to buy into the growing

counterterrorism mission, the inattention of Congressional oversight, and the inherent difficulty

of moving a field office-dominated bureaucracy. Whatever the cause of the plan’s demise, the

lesson of history is that the FBI and the United States would have been well served by its

implementation.

(U) The FBI supported United States Intelligence Community (USIC) reforms and participated

in many joint efforts. In 1982, Director William H. Webster, in response to an upsurge in global

terrorist attacks, made counterterrorism a fourth Bureau priority. In 1984, the Hostage Taking

Act (18 U.S.C. §1203) extended FBI jurisdiction to investigate terrorist acts against US citizens

abroad. In 1986, Congress passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (HR-

4418), which established a new extraterritorial statute related to terrorist acts against US citizens

or interests abroad. The DCI stood up the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) at CIA in 1986,

integrating FBI agents, followed by the Counternarcotics Center and several iterations of a

counter-proliferation center—all mandated to promote interagency rotations, to focus collection,

to integrate analysis, and to promote information sharing. Both CIA and the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) reorganized their intelligence units in the mid-1990s to meet new

threats and to enable technology. The FBI took similar steps later in the decade, including

stepping up its collaborative dialogue and leadership exchanges with the CIA. The White House

in 1998 established the position of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,

and Counterterrorism.

(U) In 1989, DOJ authorized the Bureau to arrest terrorist suspects without the consent of their

country of residence. The FBI launched a new counterterrorism division in 1999. The FBI,

along with other USIC components, introduced commendable reform initiatives in the 1990s,

though they did not all take hold. Every CIA directorate, along with many counterparts in other

agencies, developed strategic plans and multiple reorganizations in the 1990s. Advancing

technology drove the controversial creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency

(NIMA) in 1996. NIMA (later named National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency-NGA) launched

a major push to get ahead of the geospatial technology curve, while the National Security

Agency (NSA) began a fundamental transformation to adapt to the global revolution in

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communications technology. In 1998, the Ballistic Missile Commission, headed by Donald

Rumsfeld, included with its report a side letter critiquing USIC analytic performance that was an

impressive blueprint for reform. The FBI significantly increased its overseas LEGAT presence

and developed a five-year strategic plan in the late 1990s that included goals to develop a

comprehensive global intelligence collection and analytic capability.

(U) The Bureau issued the FBI Strategic Plan, 1998-2003: Keeping Tomorrow Safe in May

1998. The plan, seven months in the making under the leadership of Deputy Director Robert

“Bear” Bryant, included the strategic goal to “prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations

before they occur.” 13

It pointed to the imperative for the Bureau to boost its performance in

intelligence collection and analysis, threat prioritization, S&T, IT systems and applications, and

in collaboration with other United States government (USG) agencies and with state and local

partners. It also upgraded multiple management and business processes essential to

implementing the plan.

(U) The FBI leadership in the era of Director Louis J. Freeh experienced an intelligence world

turning upside down and was closely involved in the establishment of the USIC centers. DCI

William Webster went from the FBI to CIA in 1987 committed to a counterterrorism mission

that was growing rapidly along with international organized crime—including the Sicilian mafia

operating in the United States. In December 1988, Libyan terrorists blew up Pan Am 103 over

Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people, and raising the investigative profile of both the FBI and

a leading DOJ official, Robert Mueller. In June 1996, Saudi Hizballah bombed Khobar Towers,

a US military residence in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, killing 19. An FBI investigation ensued, led by

then Assistant United States Attorney James Comey.

(U) In this unsettling period, the FBI and the USIC generally increased their appreciation for

analysis to help guide collection and to focus operations against complex global threats. In 2000,

the new FBI Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Counterterrorism, Dale Watson, produced a

prescient strategic plan called MAXCAP05, which sought sensibly to build intelligence and

analysis capacity against the terrorist threat over the next five years. The FBI also participated

with USIC analytic units in the work of the Community-wide National Intelligence Producers

Board (NIPB), which did a baseline assessment of USIC analytic capabilities and followed it up

early in 2001 with a strategic investment plan for community analysis. 14

The FBI was

emphasizing a stronger attention to counterterrorism and a greater reliance on intelligence long

before 9/11.

(U) The investment plan flagged to Congress the alarming decline in investment in analysis

across the USIC and the urgent need to build or strengthen interagency training, database

interoperability, collaborative networks, a system for threat prioritization, links to outside

experts, and an effective open-source strategy. A strong consensus, which included the FBI,

13 (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan 1998-2003: Keeping Tomorrow Safe (1998): 12.