Mistakes Were Made
(but not by me) Why We justify Foolish Beliefs,
Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts
CAROL TAVRIS and ELLIOT ARONSON
IT-
I !
I Mistakes Were Made
I I I I I I
I
(but not by me)
Why We Justify
Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions,
and Hurtful Acts
o o o
CAROL TAVRIS alld ELLIOT ARONSON
11 HARCOURT, INC. Il � o"'�� :""'" N: YO" S==- TO',"" london , I
--11
Copyright Q 2007 by Carol Tavri$ and E1li(K Aronson
All rightS I'C5Cr�. No pan of this publicuion may be reproduo:zd. or transmitted in any form or by any means. electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, m:ording, or;my information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Requests for permission 10 make copies of ;my pan of the work should be submitted online at www.harcourt.com/contact Of mailed to the following address:
Permissions Dc:panmc:m, Harcourt, Inc., 62n Sea Harbor Drive, Orlando, Rorida 32887-6m.
www.Han;ourIBooks.com
"Frank arw:! Dcbra� extracl from Andrew ChrUIe:ruen and Ndl S. Jaco�n'i RrrondMbb Diffirmrn is " 2000 Guilford Press and is reprinted with permission of Guilford PteS$.
Library of Congress Cataloging.in.Publiation Dara Tavris, Carol.
Mistakes were made (bUl nOI by me); why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful acu/Carol Tavri5 & Elliot Aronson.-l 5t ed.
p. cm. Includes bibliogtaphial references and index.
I. Cognitive di5S0�ncc:. 2. Sdf--decc:pdon. I. Aronson, FJliol. II. Tide:. BF337.C63T38 2007
153--dc22 2006026953 ISBN 978-{}..15-101098-1
Text set in Adobe Gararnond
Printed in the United Statl'S of Aml'ria First roition
ACE GIKJHFD B
To Ronan, my WOl1derful 0'
-Carol Tavris
o o o
To Vera, of course
-Elliot Aronson
We are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue,
and then, when we are fmally proved wrong, impudently twisting
the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible
to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is
that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality , usu
ally on a battlefield.
A great nation is like a great man:
When he makes a mistake, he realizes it.
Having realized it, he admits it.
Having admiued it, he correas it.
-George Orwell (1946)
He considers those who point out his faults as his most benevolent
reachers.
-Lao Tzu
CONTENTS
o o o
INTRODUCTION
Knaves, Foo/s, Villains, and Hypocrites:
How Do They Live with Themselves? . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER I
Cognitive Dissonance: The Engine of Self-jusri/ication . . . . . . • . 11
CHAPTER 2
Pride and Prejudice ... ana Orher Blind Spars . . . . . • • • . . . . . . 40
CHAPTER 3
Memory, [he Self-juscifying HislOrian . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 68
CHAPTER 4
Good Intentions, Bad Science:
The Closed Loop of Clinical Judgment . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . 97
CHAPTER 5
Law and Disorder . . . . . • . . • • . . • • . . . • . . . • . . • • . . . • . . . . . . 127
CHAPTER 6
Loue's Assassin: Self-justification it! Marriage, . . . . . . . • . . . . . 158
x CONTENTS
CHAPTER 7
Wounds, Rifts, and Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
CHAPTER 8
Lelfing Go ana' Owning Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . 213
AFTERWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . 237
ENDNOTES . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . 239
INDEX . . . . . . • . . . . . • • • . . • • . . . . . . . • • • . • . • . . • . . . . . . 277
Mistakes Were Made
(bur not by me)
INTRODUCTION
o o o
Knaves, Fools, Villains, and Hypocrites:
How Do They Live with Themselves?
Mistakes were quite possibly made by the administrations in which I
served.
-Henry Kissinger, responding to charges [hat he committed
war crimes in his role in the United Stares' actions in
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Sourh America in the 1970$
If, in hindsight, we also discover that mistakes may have been
made . . . I am deeply sorry.
-Cardinal Edward Egan of New York, referring to the bishops
who failed to deal with child molesrers among the Catholic clergy
Mistakes were made in communicating to the public and CUS[Qrners
about the ingredients in our French fries and hash browns.
-McDonald's, apologizing to Hindus and other vegetarians
for failing to inform them that the �natural flavoring�
in their potatoes contained beefbyproducrs
2 CAROL TAVRIS lind ElLIOT ARONSON
This week's question: How can YOLI rell when.a presidential scandal is serious?
A. The president's poll numbers drop. B. The press goes after him. C. The opposition calls for his impeachmem. D. His own parry members turn on him. E. Or the White House says, "mistakes were made."
-Bill Schneider on CNN's Inside Politics
AS FALLWLE HUMAN BEINGS. all of us share the impulse to justify ourselves and avoid taking responsibility for any actions that turn our to be harmful. immoral, or stupid. Most of us will never be in a position (0 make decisions affecting the lives and deaths of mil� lions of people, but whether the consequences of our mistakes are trivial or tragic, on a small scaJe or a national canvas, most of us find it difficult, if not impossible, to say, "I was wrong; I made a terrible mistake." The higher the stakes-emotional. financial, moral-the greater the difficulty.
It goes further man that: Most people. when direCtly confronted. by evidence that they are wrong. do not change their point of view or course of action but justify it even more tenaciowly. Even irre futable evidence is rarely enough to pierce the mental armor of self justification. When we began working on this book. the poster boy for "tenacious dinging to a discredited belief" was George W Bush. Bush was wrong in his claim mat Saddam Hussein had weapons of
mass destruction, he was wrong in daiming mat Saddam was linked wim AJ Qaeda. he was wrong in predicting that Iraqis would be dancing joyfully in the streets to receive the American soldiers, he was wrong in predicting that the conflict would be over quickly. he was wrong in his gross underestimate of the financial COSt of the war, and he was most famously wrong in his photo-op speech six weeks after the invasion began. when he announced {under a banner read-
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by me) 3
ing MISSION ACCOMPUSHED) that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."
At mat time, the [\'/0 of us warched wim fascination as commenfa
tors from the right and left began fantasizing in prim about what it
would be like to have a presidem who admitted mistakes. The conser vative columnist George Will and the liberal columnist Paul Krugman both called for Bush to admit he had been wrong, bur the presidem remained intransigent. In 2006, with Iraq sliding into civil war and sixteen American intelligence agencies having issued a report that rhe
occuparion ofiraq had increased islamic radicalism and the risk of ter rorism, Bush said to a delegation of conservative columnists, "I've never been more convinced mar the decisions I made are the right decisions.'" Of course, Bush had to justify the war his administration pursued in Iraq; he had too much invested in that course of action to do otherwise-thousands of deaths and, according to a conserva tive estimate from me American Enterprise Instirute in 2006, at leasr a trillion dollars. Accordingly, when he was proved wrong in his orig
inal reasons for the war, he found new ones: getting rid of a "very bad guy," fighting rerroris[S, promoting peace in the MiddJe East, bringing democracy to Iraq, increasing the security of the United Srates, and finishing "the task [our troops] gave their lives for." In ocher words, we must continue the war because we began the war.
Politicians are the most visible of self-justifiers, which is why they provide such juicy examples. They have refined the art of speaking in the passive voice; when their backs are to the wall they will reluc tandy acknowledge error, bur not responsibility. Oh all right, mis takes were made, but not by me; by someone else, who shall remain nameless.l When Henry Kissinger said that the "administration" may have made mistakes, he was sidestepping the facr that as national se curity adviser and secretary of state (simulraneously) he, in effect, was the adminisrtarion. This self-jusrification allowed him to accept the Nobel Peace Prize with a straight face and a dear conscience.
We look at the behavior of politicians with amusement or alarm
4 CAROL TAVRIS and elliOT ARONSON
or horror, bU[, psychologically, what they do is no different in kind,
though certainly in consequence, from what most of us have done at one time or another in our private lives. We stay in an unhappy rela� cionship or merely one that is going nowhere because, after all, we in� vested so much time in making it work. We sray in a deadening job way [00 long because we look for all the reasons [0 juS[ify staying and are unable to dearly assess the benefits of leaving. We buy a lemon of a car because it looks gorgeous, spend thousands of dollars to keep the damn thing funning, and then we spend even more to justify that in� vestment. We self· righteously create a rift with a friend or relative over some real or imagined slight, yet see ourselves as me pursuers of peace-if only the other side would apologize and make amends.
Self-justification is not the same thing as lying or making excuses. Obviously, people will lie or invent fanciful stories to duck the fury of a lover. pacem. or employer; to keep from being sued or sem to prison; to avoid losing face; to avoid losing a job; to stay in power. Bur mere is a big difference between what a guilty man says to the
public to convince chern of something he knows is untrue ("I did not have sex with mat woman"; "I am not a crook"). and the process of
persuading himself [har he did a good thing. In the former situation, he is lying and knows he is lying to save his own skin. In rhe larter, he is lying to himself. That is why self-jusrificarion is more powerful and more dangerous than the explicit lie. It allows people to con vince themselves that what they did was the best thing mey could have done. In fact. come to think of it. it was the right thing. "There was nothing else I could have done." "Actually. it was a brilliant so lution to the problem." "} was doing the best for the nation. n uThose bastards deserved what they gOt." ''I'm entitled."
Self-justification not only minimizes our mistakes and bad deci sions; it is also the reason that everyone can see a hypocrite in action
except me hypocrite. It allows us to create a distinction between our moral lapses and someone else's, and to blur me discrepancy between our actions and our moral convictions. Aldous Huxley was right when
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bue no! by me) 5
he said, "There is probably no such thing as a conscious hypocrite." Ie
seems unlikely that Newt Gingrich said {Q himself, "My, what a hyp� ocrite I am. There I was, all riled. up about Bill Clinton's sexual affair, while I was having an extramarital affair of my own right here in town." Similarly, the prominent evangelist Ted. Haggard seemed obliv� ious to the hypocrisy of publicly fulminating against homosexuaIiry
while enjoying his own sexual relationship with a male prostitute. In the same way, we each draw our own moral lines and justify
mem. For example, have you ever done a litcle finessing of expenses on income taxes? That probably compensates for the legitimate ex
penses you forgot about, and besides, you'd be a fool not to, consid ering that everybody else does. Did you fail to report some extra cash income? You're entitled, given all the money mat me government wastes on pork-barrel projects and programs you detest. Have you been writing personal e-mails and surfing the Net at your office when you should have been tending to business? Those are perks of the job, and besides, it's your own prmcst against mose stupid company rules,
and besides, your boss doesn't appreciate all me extra work you do. Gordon Marino, a professor of philosophy and ethics, was staying
in a hotel when his pen slipped out of his jacket and left an ink spot
on me silk bedspread. He decided he would teli me manager, but he was tired and did nm want to pay for the damage. That evening he went out with some friends and asked meir advice. "One of them told me to stop with the moral fanaticism," Marino said. "He argued, The management expectS such accidentS and builds their COSt into
the price of the rooms.' It did not take long to persuade me that there was no need to trouble me manager. I reasoned that if I had spilled this ink in a family-owned bed-and-breakfast, then I would have im
mediately reported the accident, but that (his was a chain hotel, and yadda yadda yadda went the hoodwinking process. I did leave a note at me front desk about the spot when I checked out."3
But, you say, all chose justifications are true! Hotel room charges do include the costs of repairs caused. by clumsy guests! The government
6 CAROL TAVRIS �"d ELLIOT ARONSON
does waste money! My company probably wouldn't mind if I spend a lin:le time on e-mail and I do get my work done (eventually)! Whether those daims are true or false is irrelevant. When we cross these lines, we are juscifying behavior that we know is wrong pre cisely so that we can continue (0 see ourselves as honest people and not criminals or thieves. Whether the behavior in question is a small thing like spilling ink on a hotel bedspread, or a big thing like em bezuemem, the mechanism of self-justification is the same.
Now, berween the conscious lie ro fool others and unconscious self justification to fool ourselves lies a fascinating gray area, patrolled by that unreliable, self-serving historian-memory. Memories are often pruned and shaped by an ego-enhancing bias that blurs the edges of past events, softens culpability. and distorts what really happened. When researchers ask husbands and wives what percentage of the housework they do. the wives say, "Are you kidding? I do almost every� thing, at least 90 percent." And the husbands say, "I do a lot, actually, about 40 percent." Although the specific numbers differ from couple to couple. the total always exceeds 100 percent by a large margin.4 It's tempting [Q conclude that one spouse is lying, but it is more likely that each is remembering in a way (hat enhances his or her contribution.
Over time, as the self-serving distortions of memory kick in and we forget or disrort past events, we may come ro believe our own lies, little by litcle. We know we did something wrong. bue gradually we begin to think it wasn't all our fault, and after all the situation was complex.
We start underestimating our own responsibility, whittling away at it until it is a mere shadow of its former hulking self Before long, we have persuaded ourselves, believing privately what we originally said publicly. John Dean, Richard Nixon's White House counsel, the man who blew the whiscle on the conspiracy to cover up the iUega] activi� ties of the Watergate scandal, explained how this process works:
Interviewer: You mean those who made up the srories were believing their own lies?
I MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by me) 7 !
Dean: That's right. If you said it often enough, it would be� come rrue. When the press learned of the wire taps on news men and White House staffers, for example, and Aat denials failed. it was claimed that this was a national-security matter. I'm sure many people believed that me taps were for national security; they weren't. That was concocted as a justification after [he fact. But when they said it, you understand. they really beliroedir,s
Like Nixon, Lyndon Johnson was a master of self-jusdfication. According to his biographer Roben Caro, when Johnson came to be lieve in something, he would believe in it "totally, with absolute con
viction, regardless of previous beliefs, or of the facts in the matter." George Reedy. one of Johnson's aides, said that he "had a remarkable capacity to convince himself that he held the principles he should hold at any given time, and there was something charming about the air of injured innocence with which he would treat anyone who
brought forth evidence that he had held other views in the past. It
was not an act .... He had a fantastic capacity [0 persuade himself thar me 'truth' which was convenient for the present was the truth and anything that conflicted with it was the prevarication of ene mies. He literally willed what was in his mind to become reality. "6 Although Johnson's supporters found this to be a ramet charming as pect of the man's character, it might well have been one of the major reasons that Johnson could not extricate the coumry from the quag mire of Vietnam. A president who justifies his actions only to the public might be induced to change them. A president who has jus tified his actions to himself, believing mat he has the troth, becomes impervious to self-correction.
o o o
The Dinka and Nuer tribes of the Sudan have a curious tradition. They extract (he permanenr from teeth of their children-as many
8 CAROL TAVRIS lIud ELLIOT ARONSON
as six bottom teem and two top teeth-which produces a sunken
chin, a collapsed lower lip. and speech impediments. This practice
apparently began during a period when tetanus (lockjaw, which
causes me jaws [0 clench together) was widespread. Villagers began
pulling oU[ their front teeth and those of their children to make it
possible to drink liquids through the gap. The lockjaw epidemic is
long past, yet the Dinka and Nuee are still pulling our their children's front teeth.7 How come?
In 1847. Igoac Semmelweiss famously exhoned his fellow physi� cians to wash their hands before delivering babies. He realized that
they must have acquired some kind of "morbid poison" on their
hands from doing autopsies on women who had died of childbed fever. then transferred the poison to women in labor. (He didn't know
the exact mechanism, but he had the right idea.) Semmelweiss or· dered his own medical students to wash their hands in a chlorine an
tiseptic solution, and death rates from childbed fever dropped rapidly
thereafter. Yet his colleagues refused to accep{ Semmelweiss's conctete
evidence, the lower death rate among his own patients.' Why didn't
they embrace Semmelweiss's discovery immediately, thanking him ef
fusively for finding the reason for so many unnecessary deaths? After World War II. Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia Farnham
published the bestseller Madan WOman: The Lost Sa. in which mey claimed that a woman who achieves in "male spheres of action" may seem to be successful in the "big league," but she pays a big price:
"sacrifice of her most fundamental instinctual strivings. She is not.
in sober reality, temperamentally suited to this sort of rough and tumble competition, and it damages her, particularly in her own
feelings." And it makes her frigid. besides: "ChaHenging men on every hand. refusing any longer to play even a rdatively submissive
role, multitudes of women found their capacity for sexual gratifica
tion dwindling."9 In the ensuing decade, Dr. Farnham. who earned
her MD from the University of Minnesota and did postgraduate
work at Harvard Medical School. made a career OUt of telling women
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but Ilot by me) 9
noc ro have careers. Wasn'c she worried about becoming frigid and damaging her fundamental instinctual strivings?
The sheriff's department in Kern County, California, arrested a retired high-school principal, Patrick Dunn, on suspicion of the murder of his wife. They interviewed twO people who raid conflict ing stories. One was a woman who had no criminal record and no personal incentive to lie about the suspect, and who had calendars and her boss ro back up her account of events. The other was a ca reer criminal facing six years in prison, who had offered ro incrim inate Dunn as part of a deal with prosecutors, and who offered nothing ro suppon his srory except his word for it. The detectives had to choose between believing the woman (and in Dunn's inno cence), or the criminal (and in Dunn's guilt). They chose ro believe the criminal.1O Why?
By understanding the inner workings of self-justification, we can answer these questions and make sense of dozens of other things that people do that would ocherwise seem unfathomable or crazy. We can answer the question so many people ask when mey look at ruthless dictators, greedy corporate CEOs, religious zealots who murder in the name of God, priests who molest children, or people who cheat their siblings out of a family inheritance: How in the world can they Iiv�with themselves? The answer is: exactly the way the rest of us do.
Self-justification has COStS and benefits. By itself, it's not necessar ily a bad thing. It lets us sleep at night. Withom it, we would pro long the awful pangs of embarrassment. We would tonure ourselves wirh regret over the road not taken or over how badly we navigated the road we did take. We would agonize in the aftermath of almost every decision: Did we do the right rhing, marry the right person, buy the right house, choose the best car, enter the right career? Yet mindless self-justificarion, like quicksand, can draw us deeper into disaster. It blocks our abiHty ro even see our errors, let alone correct them. It distorts reality, keeping us from getting all the information we need and assessing issues clearly. It prolongs and widens rifts between
/0 CAROL TAVRIS lind ElLIOT ARONSON
lovers, friends, and nations. It keeps us from letting go of unhealthy habits. It permits the guilty to avoid taking responsibility for their
deeds. And it keeps many professionals from changing ourdated at
titudes and procedures that can be harmful to the public. None of us can live without making blunders. But we do have the
ability (0 say: "This is not working Out here. This is not making sense." To err is human, but humans then have a choice between cov ering up or fessi ng up. The choice we make is crucial to what we do
next. We are forever being told that we should learn from OUf mis
takes. but how can we learn unless we nrSt admit thar we made any?
To do that, we have co recognize the siren song of self-justification. In the next chapter, we will discuss cognitive dissonance, the hard
wired psychological mechanism that creates self-justification and pro tects our certainties, self-esteem, and tribal affiliations. tn the chapters
that follow. we will elaborate on the most harmful consequences of self-justification: how it exacerbates prejudice and corruption, dis
tortS memory. turns professional confidence into arrogance. creates
and perpetuates injustice, warps love, and generates feuds and rifts.
The good news is that by understanding how this mechanism works, we can defeat me wiring. Accordingly. in the final chapter. we will step back and see what solutions emerge for ourselves as individ
uals. for our relationships, for society. Understanding is the first step
toward finding solutions that will lead to change and redemption.
That is why we wrote this book.
C H APTER 1
o o o
Cognitive Dissonance:
The Engine of Self-justification
Press release dare: November " 1993
WE DIDN'T MAKE A MISTAKE when we wrote in our previous releases
that New York would be destroyed on September 4 and October 14,
1993. We didn't make a mistake, not even a teeny eeny one!
Press release date: April 4, 1994
All the dates we have given in our past releases arc correct dares
given by God as contained in Holy Scriptures. Nor one of these dates
was wrong ... Ezekiel gives a total of 430 days for the siege of the
city . . . rwhichl brings us exactly to May2, 1994. By now, all rhe people have been forewarned. We have done our job. ...
We are rhe only ones in the entire world guiding the people to
their safety, security, and salvation!
We have a 100 percent track record!'
12 CAROL TAVRIS lIud ELLIOT ARONSON
ITS FASCINATING. A"ID SOMeTIMES funny, to read dooms day predictions. but it's even more fascinating to watch what hap pens to the reasoning of true believers when the prediction Rops and the world keeps muddling along. Notice that hardly anyone ever says, "1 blew it! I can't believe how stupid I was to believe mat non sense"? On the contrary, mOSt of the time they become even morc deeply convinced of their powers of prediction. The people who believe mat the Bible's hook of Revelation or the writings of the sixteenth-century self-proclaimed prophet Nostradamus have pre dicted every disaster from the bubonic plague to 9/11 cling to their convictions, unfazed by me small problem that their vague and murky pre
Half a century ago, a young social psychologiS[ named Leon Fes tinget and twO associates infiluared a group of people who believed the world would end on December 21.1 They wanted to know what would happen to the group when (they hoped!) the propheey failed. The group's leader, whom the researchers called Marian Keech, prom ised that the Faithful would be picked up by a Hying saucer and ele vated to safety at midnight on December 20. Many of her followers quit their jobs, gave away their homes, and dispersed their savings, waiting for the end. Who needs money in outer space? Others waited in fear or resignation in their homes. (Mrs. Keech's own husband, a nonbeliever, went [Q bed early and slept soundly through the night as his wife and her followers prayed in the living room.) Festinger made his own prediction: The believers who had not made a strong com mitment [Q the prophecy-who awaited the end of the world by memselves at home, hoping they weren't going to die at midnight would quiedy lose their faith in Mrs. Keech. But those who had given away their possessions and were waiting with the others for the space ship would increase their belief in her mystical abilities. In Fact, they would now do everything they could to get others to join them.
At midnight, with no sign of a spaceship in the yard, the group felt a little nervous. By 2 A.M., they were getting seriously worried.
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bur nOl by me) 13
Ar 4:45 A.M., Mrs. Keech had a new vision: The world had been spared, she said, because of the impressive faith of her lircie band.
"And mighty is the word of God," she told her followers, "and by his word have ye been saved-for from the mouth of death have ye been delivered and at no time has there been such a force loosed upon [he Earth. Not since the beginning of rime upon this Earth has there been such a force of Good and light as now floods this room."
The group's mood shifted from despair to exhilararion. Many of (he group's members, who had nor felt the need to proselytize before December 21, began calling rhe press to report the miracle, and soon they were ou( on the streets. buttonholing passersby, trying to convert them. Mrs. Keech's prediction had failed, but nor Leon Fesringer's .
• • •
The engine rhar drives self-jusrificarion. the energy rhat produces the need {Q justify our actions and decisions-especially me wrong ones-is an unpleasant feeling thar Festinger called "cognitive disso nance." Cognitive dissonance is a stare of tension that occurs when ever a person holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) [har are psychologically inconsistent, such as "Smoking is a dumb thing to do because it could kil1 me" and "I smoke two packs a day." Dissonance produces mental discomfort, ranging from minor pangs {o deep anguish; people don't rest easy until they find a way to re
duce it. In this example. the moS( direct way for a smoker to reduce dissonance is by quitting. But if she has cried to quit and failed, now she must reduce dissonance by convincing herself that smoking isn't really so harmful. or that smoking is worth the risk because it helps her relax or prevents her from gaining weight (and after all, obesity is a health risk, too), and so on. Most smokers manage to reduce dissonance in many such ingenious. if self-deluding, ways.
Dissonance is disquieting because to hold twO ideas that con tradict each other is to flirt wirh absurdity and, as Albert Camus observed. we humans are creatures who spend our lives crying to
CAROL TAVRIS and ELLIOT ARONSON
convince ourselves that our existence is nO{ absurd. At the hean of it, Festinger's theory is about how people strive to make sense our of
contradictory ideas and lead lives that are, at least in their own
minds, consistent and meaningful. The theory inspired more man 3,000 experiments that, taken together. have transformed psycholo gists' understanding of how the human mind works. Cognitive dis sonance has even escaped academia and entered popular culcure. The term is everywhere. The twO of us have heard it in TV newscasts, po litical columns, magazine articles, bumper srickers, even on a soap opera. AJex Trebek used it on Jeopardy, Jon Stewart on The Daily Show, and President Bartlet on The west Wlng. Almough the expres sion has been thrown around a lot, few people fully understand its meaning or appreciate its enormous motivational power.
In 1956, one of us (Elliot) arrived at Stanford University as a graduate student in psychology. Festinger had arrived that same year as a young professor, and they immediately began working together,
designing experiments to test and expand dissonance theory.3 T heir
thinking challenged many notions that were gospel in psychology and among the general public. such as the behaviorist's view that people do things primarily for the rewards they bring, the econo mist's view that human beings generally make rational decisions. and me psychoanalyst's view that acting aggressively gets rid of ag
gressive impulses. Consider how dissonance theory challenged behaviorism. At the
time, most scientific psychologists were convinced that people's ac tions are governed by reward and punishment. It is cerrainiy true that if you feed a rat at the end of a maze, he will learn the maze faster than if you don't feed him; if you give your dog a biscuit when she gives you her paw. she will learn that nick faster than if you sit around hoping she wiU do it on her own. Conversely, if you punish
your pup when you carch her peeing on the carpet, she will soon stop doing it. Behaviorists funher argued that anything that was
merely associared with reward would become more attractive-your
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but 1'101 by me) 15
puppy will like you because you give her biscuits-and anything as sociated with pain would become noxious and undesirable.
Behavioral laws do apply to human beings. too, of course; no one
would stay in a boring job wimout pay, and if you give your toddler a cookie to stop him from having a rantrum, you have taught him ro have another tantrum when he wants a cookie. Bm, for better or worse, the human mind is more complex than the brain of a rat or a puppy. A dog may appear conttite for having been caught peeing on the carpet, but she will not try to think up justifications for her mis behavior. Humans think; and because we think, dissonance theory demonstrated that our behavior transcends the effects of rewards and punishments and often contradicts memo
For example, Elliot predicted that if people go through a great deal of pain, discomfort, effort, or embarrassment to get something, they will be happier with that "something" than if it came to them easily. For behaviorists, (his was a preposterous prediction. Why would people like anything associated with pain? But for Elliot, the
answer was obvious: self-justification. The cognition that I am a sen sible, competent person is dissonant with the cognition that I went through a painful procedure [0 achieve something-say, joining a group that curned om to be boring and worthless. Therefore. I would distort my perceptions of the group in a positive direction, rrying to find good things about them and ignoring the downside.
It might seem that the easiest way to test this hypothesis would be to rate a number of college fraternities on the basis of how severe their initiations are, and then interview members and ask them how much they like their fraternity. If the members of severe-initiation fraterni ties like their frat brmhers more than do members of mild-initiation
fraternities, does this prove that severity produces the liking? It does not. It may be just (he reverse. If the members of a fraternity regard themselves as being a highly desirable, elite group, they may require
a severe initiation to prevent the riffraff from joining. Only those who are highly attracted to the severe-initiation group to begin with
-
16 CAROL TAVRIS II"d ELLIOT ARONSON
would be willing to go through the iniriation to get into it. Those who are not excited by a particular fraternity but just want to be in one, any one, will choose fraternities that require mild initiacions.
That is why if is essential to conduct a controlled experiment. The beauty of an experiment is the random assignment of people to conditions. Regardless of a person's degree of inreresr ar the outset in joining the group. each participant would be randomly assigned (0 either the severe-initiation or the mild·iniriarion condition. If people who go through a cough rime [Q get ima a group later find that group to he more atcracrive than those who get in with no effort, then we
know that it was the effof[ that caused it, not differences in initial levels of interest.
And so Elliot and his colleague Judson Mills conducted just such an experiment.· Stanford students were invited to join a group that would be discussing the psychology of sex, bur before they could qualify for admission. they would first have to pass an entrance re
quirement. Some of me students were randomly assigned to a severely
embarrassing initiation procedure: They had to recite. out loud to the experimenter. lurid, sexually explicit passages from Lady Chatlerlty} Lover and other racy novels. (For conventional 19505 students. this was a painfully embarrassing thing to do.) Others were randomly as signed to a mildly embarrassing initiation procedure: reading aloud sexual words from the dictionary.
After the initiation. each of the students listened to an identical rape
recording of a discussion allegedly being held by the group of people they had just joined. Actually. the audiotape was prepared in advance so that the discussion was as boring and worthless as it could be. The ruscussants talked haltingly, with long pauses, about the secondary sex characteristics of birds-changes in plumage during courtship, that sort of thing. The taped discussants hemmed and hawed. frequently interrupted one another, and left sentences unfinished.
Finally, the students rated the discussion on a number of dimen sions. Those who had undergone only a mild initiation saw the dis-
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bul AO( by me) 17
cussion for what it was, worthless and dull, and they correctly rated me group members as being unappealing and boring. One guy on the tape, stammering and mutrering, admitted that he hadn't done the required reading on the courtship practices of some rare bird, and the mild iniciation listeners were annoyed by him. What an irresponsible idiot! He rudn'[ even do the basic reading! He let the group down! Who'd wane to be in a group wim him? But those who had gone through a severe initiation rated the discussion as imeresting and exciting and me group members as attractive and sharp. They forgave the irrespon sible idiot. His candor was refreshing! Who wouldn't want to be in a group with such an honest guy? It was hard to believe that they were listening to the same rape recording. Such is the power of dissonance.
This experimenc has been replicated several times by other scien tists who have used a variety of initiation techniques, from electric shock to excessive physical exertion.' The results are always me same: Severe initiations increase a member's liking for the group. These findings do not mean that people enjoy painful experiences, such as filling Out their income-tax forms, or that people enjoy things be cause they are associated with pain. Whar they do show is mat if a person voluntarily goes through a difficult or a painful experience in order to attain some goal or object, that goal or object becomes more amacrive. If, on your way to join a discussion group, a flowerpot fell from the open window of an apartment building and hit you on the head, you would not like thar discussion group any better. But if you volunteered to get hit on the head by a flowerpot to become a mem ber of the group, you would definitely like the group more.
Believing Is Seeing
I will look at any additional evidence to confirm the opinion to which I have already come.
-Lord Molson, British politidan (1903-199\)
18 CAROL TAVRIS !Hld elliOT ARONSON
Dissonance clteory also exploded the self-fl.atrering idea that we humans, being Homo sapims, process information logically. On the contrary: If the new information is consonant with our beliefs, we think it is well founded and useful: "Just what I always said!" But if the new information is dissonant, then we consider it biased or fool ish: "What a dumb argumend" So powerful is the need for conso nance that when people are forced [0 look at disconfirming evidence, they will find a way to criticize. distort. or dismiss it so chat they can maintain or even strengthen their existing belief. This men[3] con tortion is called the "confirmation bias. "6 Lenny Bruce, the legendary American humorist and social commentator, described it vividly as he watched the famous 1960 confrontation between Richard Nixon and John Kennedy, in the nation's very first televised presidential debate:
I would be with a bunch of Kennedy fans watching the debate and
their comment would be. "He's really slaughtering Nixon." Then
we would all go to another apartment, and the Nixon fans would say, "How do you like the shellacking he gave Kennedy?" And then
I reaJized that each group loved their candidate so that a guy would
have to be this blatant-he would have (0 look into the camera and
say: "I am a thief, a crook, do you hear me, I am the worst choice you could ever make for the Presidency!" And even men his follow
ing would say. "Now there's an honest man for you. It takes a big guy to admit that. There's the kind of guy we need for President."1
In 2003, after it had become abundantly clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Americans who had suppOrted the war and President Bush's reason for launching it were thrown into dissonance: We believed the president, and we (and he) were wrong. How to resolve this? For Democrats who had thought Saddam Hus sein had WMDs, the resolution was relatively easy: The Republicans were wrong again; the president lied. or at least was too eager to lis-
M I STAKES WERE M A D E (but not by me) 19
ten [Q faulty information; how foolish of me to believe him. For Re publicans, however, the dissonance was sharper. More than haJf of them resolved it by refusing to accept the evidence, telling a Knowlp
edge Networks poll that they believed the weapons had been found. The survey's director said, "For some Americans, their desire to sup port the war may be leading them to screen out information that weapons of mass destruction have not been found. Given the inren sive news coverage and high levels of public attention to the (opic, this level of misinformation suggests that some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." You ber.'
Neuroscienrists have recently shown that these biases in thinking are built into the very way the brain processes information-all brains, regardless of their owners' political affiliation. For example, in a study of people who were being monitored by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) while they were trying to process dissonant or con sonant information about George Bush or John Kerry, Drew Westen and his colleagues found that the reasoning areas of the brain virtu
ally shut down when participanrs were confronred with dissonant in formation, and the emotion circuits of the brain lit up happily when consonance was restored.' These mechanisms provide a neurological basis for the observation that once our minds are made up, it is hard to change them.
Indeed, even reading information that goes against your point of view can make you aJl the more convinced you are right. In one ex periment, researchers selected people who either favored or opposed capital punishment and asked them [Q read twO scholarly, well documented articles on the emotionaJly charged issue of whether the death penaJty deters violent crimes. One article concluded that it did; {he other that it didn't. If the readers were processing informa tion rationally, they would ac least realize thac me issue is more com plex than they had previously believed and would therefore move a bit closer to each other in their beliefs about capical punishment as a deterrence. But dissonance theory predicts that the readers would
20 CAROL TAVRIS (lI!d ELLIOT ARONSON
find a way ro distort the twO anicles. They would find reasons to clasp the confirming article fO their bosoms, hailing it as a higWy competent piece of work. And they would be supercritical of the dis confirming mide. finding minor Raws and magnifying them into major reasons why they need. not be influenced by it. This is precisely what happened. Not only did each side discredit me other's argu ments; each side became even more committed to its own.1Q
The confirmation bias even sees to it that no evidence-the ab sence of evidence-is evidence for what we believe. When the FBI and orner investigators Failed to find any evidence whatsoever for the belief that the nation had been infiirrared by Satanic cults that were ritually slaughtering babies. believers in these cults were unfazed. The absence of evidence. they said, was confirmation of how clever and evil the cult leaders were: They were eating those babies, bones and all. Ir's not JUSt fringe cultists and proponents of pop psychology who fall prey to this reasoning. When Franklin D. Roosevelt made the terrible decision to uproot thousands of Japanese Americans and put them in incarceration camps for the duration of World War II, he did so emirely on the basis of rumors that Japanese Americans were planning to sabotage the war effort. There was no proof then or later to suppOrt this rumor. Indeed. the Army's West Coast com mander, General John DeWitt, admitted that they had no evidence of sabotage or treason against a single Japanese-American citizen. "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place," he said, "is a dis turbing and confirming indication mat such action wi/l be taken."u
Ingrid's Choice. N ick's Mercedes, and El l iot's Canoe
Dissonance theory came to explain far more than the reasonable no tion that people are unreasonable at processing information. It also showed why they cominue to be biased after they have made impor-
MISTAKES WERE M A D E (but n.Ot by me) 21
tant decisions.12 Social psychologist Dan Gilbert, in his illuminating book Stumbling on Happintss, asks us to consider what would have happened at the end of Casablanca if Ingrid Bergman did not patri otically rejoin her Nazi-fighting husband but instead remained with
Humphrey Bogart in Morocco. L.I Would she, as Bogan tells her in a hean-wrenching speech, have regretted it-"maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but soon, and for the rest of your life"? Or did she forever regret leaving Bogart? Gilber[ marshals a wealth of data to show chat the answer to both questions is no, that either decision
would have made her happy in the long run. Bogart was eloquent bur wrong, and dissonance theory telis us why: lngrid would have found reasons to justify eicher choice, along with reasons to be glad she did not make the orher.
Once we make a decision, we have all kinds of tools at our dis� posal to bolster it. When our frugal, unflashy friend Nick traded in his eight�year�old Honda Civic on a sudden impulse and bought a new. fully loaded Mercedes. he began behaving oddly (for Nick). He
started criticizing his friends' cars, saying things like "Isn't it about time you traded in that wreck? Don't you think you deserve the plea� sure of driving a well�engineered machine?" and "You know, it's
really unsafe to drive little cars. If you got in an accident, you could be killed. Isn't your life worth an extra few thousand dollars? You have no idea how much peace of mind it brings me to know that my family is safe because I'm driving a solid automobile."
It's possible chat Nick simply got bitten by the safety bug and decided, coolly and rationally, char it would be wonderful if every one drove a great car like the Mercedes. But we don't think so. His behavior. both in spending all that money on a luxury car and in nagging his friends to do the same, was so uncharacteristic that we suspected that he was reducing me dissonance he must have felt over impulsively spending a big chunk of his life's savings on what he would once have referred ro as "just a car." Besides, he was doing this JUSt when his kids were about to go ro college, an event mat would
22 CAROL TAVRIS lind ELLIOT ARONSON
pur a strain on his hank accounr. So Nick began marshalling argu� menrs to justify his decision: "The Mercedes is a wonderful ma chine; I've worked hard all my life and I deserve it; besides. it's so safe." And if he could persuade his cheapskate friends to buy one toO, he would feel doubly justified. Like Mrs. Keech's converts, he began to proselytize.
Nick's need to reduce dissonance (like Ingrid's) was increased by me irrevocability of his decision; he could not unmake that decision without losing a lot of money. Some scientific evidence for che power of irrevocability comes from a clever study of the mental maneuvec ings of gamblers at a racetrack. The racetrack is an ideal place to study irrevocability because once you've placed your bet, you can't go back and tell the nice man behind the window you've changed your mind. In this srudy, the researchers simply imercepted people who were standing in line to place two-dollar bets and other people who had just left the window. The investigacors asked everyone how cer tain they were that their horses would win. The bettors who had placed their betS were far more certain about their choice than were the folks waiting in line.14 But, of course, nothing had changed ex cept the finality of placing the bet. People become more certain they are right about something they just did if they can't undo it.
You can see one immediate benefit of understanding how disso* oance works: Don't listen co Nick. The more costly a decision, in terms of time, money, effort, or inconvenience, and the more irrev* ocable its consequences, the greater the dissonance and the greater the need co reduce it by overemphasiz.ing the good things about the choice made. Therefore, when you are about to make a big purchase or an importam decision-which car or computer to buy. whether to undergo plastic surgery, or whether to sign up for a cosdy self-help program-don't ask someone who has just done it. That person will be highly motivated to convince you that it is the right thing to do. Ask people who have spem twelve years and $50,000 00 a particu* lar therapy if it helped, and most will say, "Dr. Weltschmerz. is won*
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but nOt by me) 23
derful! J would nroer have found true love [got a new job 1 [lost weight] ifit hadn't been for him." After all mat time and money, they aren't likely to say, "Yeah, J saw Dr. Weltschmen for twelve years, and boy, was it ever a waste." If you want advice on what product to buy, ask someone who is still garhering information and is srill open minded. And if you want to know whether a program will help you, don't rely on testimonials: Get the data from controlled experiments.
Self-justification is complicated enough when jt follows our con scious choices; at least we know we can expeCt it. But it also occurs
in the aftermath of things we do for unconscious reasons, when we haven't a due about why we hold some belief or cling to some cus tom but are (00 proud to admit it. For example, in the introduction we described the custom of the Dinka and Nuer tribes of the Sudan. who exuact several of the permanent front teeth of their children a painful procedure, done with a fish hook. Anthropologists suggest that this tradition originated during an epidemic of lockjaw; missing front teeth would enable sufferers to get some nourishment. But if
that were the reason, why in the world would the villagers continue
this custom once the danger had passed? A practice that makes no sense at all to outsiders makes perfect