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“I recommend it to everyone, whether already a Simpsons fan or not. You’ll be surprised at what wisdom lurks in these pages.” ––TOM MORRIS, author of If Aristotle Ran General Motors

“Fans of The Simpsons are certain to find this book to be the perfect rebuttal for those who dismiss the show as a no-brainer.” ––PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

“Not only is The Simpsons and Philosophy highly educational, it enhances the viewing and re-viewing of the Simpsons episodes, and sheds a new light on the series.”

––PROFESSOR PER BROMAN, Butler University, Indianapolis

“ The Simpsons and Philosophy is a great place to begin any program in Simpsons studies. A serious look at a funny subject.” ––MARK I. PINSKY, author of The Gospel According to The Simpsons

“The Simpsons and Philosophy is a terrific book. Philosophers and non-philosophers come together to show that some very interesting philosophical issues arise from the characters, the thoughts, and the plots of The Simpsons. The essays are well written, many times provocative, reflective, intelligent without being elitist and, perhaps most valuable, a lot of fun to read. Not a Simpsons love-fest by any stretch (for example, could Bart be a Nietzschean hero or Heideggerian thinker?), this book is serious philosophy applied to a sometimes serious (and seriously funny) television show.

“There are also papers devoted to more literary sorts of concerns, such as parody, allusion, and irony, with attempts to show how The Simpsons can be compared with other forms of art, such as cinema. There are some splendid comparisons of The Simpsons with numerous other television series, for instance Seinfeld, Leave It to Beaver, The Jack Benny Show, and MASH, as well as films such as Psycho, Pulp Fiction, Goodfellas, and The Picture of Dorian Gray.

“I recommend this book to anyone who’s ever been caught off guard by an example of Homer being logically challenged, or Bart pulling a “dirty trick,” or a poignant remark by Lisa. I recommend this book to anyone interested in using a provocative, and sometimes challenging text in an Introduction to Philosophy class.

“You can learn from this book (now hear Homer’s and Bart’s voices echoing), “but you don’t have to if you don’t want to.” –––PROFESSOR MICHAEL F. GOODMAN, Humboldt State University

The Simpsons and Philosophy

Popular Culture and Philosophy General Editor: William Irwin VOLUME 1 Seinfeld and Philosophy: A Book about Everything and Nothing (2000) Edited by William Irwin

VOLUME 2 The Simpsons and Philosophy: The D’oh! of Homer (2001) Edited by William Irwin, Mark T. Conard, and Aeon J. Skoble

VOLUME 3 The Matrix and Philosophy (2002) Edited by William Irwin

The Simpsons and Philosophy The D’oh! of Homer

Edited by

WILLIAM IRWIN, MARK T. CONARD, and AEON J. SKOBLE

OPEN COURT Chicago and La Salle, Illinois

Dedicated to Lionel Hutz and Troy McClure

(whom you might remember from such TV shows as The Simpsons)

Contents Acknowledgments Introduction: Meditations on Springfield? Part I: The Characters 1. Homer and Aristotle RAJA HALWANI 2. Lisa and American Anti-intellectualism AEON J. SKOBLE 3. Why Maggie Matters: Sounds of Silence, East and West ERIC BRONSON 4. Marge’s Moral Motivation GERALD J. ERION and JOSEPH A. ZECCARDI 5. Thus Spake Bart: On Nietzsche and the Virtues of Being Bad MARK T. CONARD Part II: Simpsonian Themes 6. The Simpsons and Allusion: “Worst Essay Ever” WILLIAM IRWIN and J.R. LOMBARDO 7. Popular Parody: The Simpsons Meets the Crime Film DEBORAH KNIGHT 8. The Simpsons, Hyper-Irony, and the Meaning of Life CARL MATHESON 9. Simpsonian Sexual Politics DALE E. SNOW and JAMES J. SNOW Part III: I Didn’t Do It: Ethics and The Simpsons 10. The Moral World of the Simpson Family: A Kantian Perspective JAMES LAWLER 11. The Simpsons: Atomistic Politics and the Nuclear Family PAUL A. CANTOR 12. Springfield Hypocrisy JASON HOLT 13. Enjoying the so-called “Iced Cream”: Mr. Burns, Satan, and Happiness DANIEL BARWICK 14. Hey-diddily-ho, Neighboreenos: Ned Flanders and Neighborly Love DAVID VESSEY 15. The Function of Fiction: The Heuristic Value of Homer JENNIFER L. MCMAHON Part IV: The Simpsons and the Philosophers 16. A (Karl, not Groucho) Marxist in Springfield

JAMES M. WALLACE 17. “And the Rest Writes Itself”: Roland Barthes Watches The Simpsons DAVID L. G. ARNOLD 18. What Bart Calls Thinking KELLY DEAN JOLLEY

Episode List Based on Ideas By Featuring the Voices Of Notes Copyright Page

Acknowledgments The writing, editing, and other miscellaneous tasks involved in producing The Simpsons and Philosophy amounted to a fun and stimulating experience. We would like to thank the contributors for keeping both a sense of professionalism and a sense of humor throughout the project. We would sincerely like to thank the good folks at Open Court, particularly David Ramsay Steele and Jennifer Asmuth for their advice and assistance. And, last but not least, we would like to thank our friends, colleagues, and students with whom we discussed The Simpsons and philosophy, who helped make the work possible, and who offered valuable feedback on the work in progress. A list such as this is almost inevitably incomplete, but among those to whom we are indebted are: Trisha Allen, Lisa Bahnemann, Anthony Hartle, Megan Lloyd, Jennifer O’Neill, and Peter Stromberg.

Introduction: Meditations on Springfield? How many philosophers does it take to write a book about The Simpsons? Apparently, about 20 to write it and 3 to edit. But that’s not so bad, considering it takes 300 people 8 months, at a cost of 1.5 million dollars, to make a single episode of The Simpsons. Seriously, though, don’t we have other work to do besides writing about TV shows? The short answer is yes, we do, but we enjoyed writing these essays, and we hope you’ll enjoy reading them.

The seeds for this volume were sown a few years ago. When the popular comedy Seinfeld was going off the air, William Irwin had a quirky idea—a collection of philosophical essays on the “show about nothing.” He and his philosopher pals enjoyed the show and engaged in many humorous and stimulating discussions about it, so why not share the fun in the form of a book? The people at Open Court had the vision, fortitude, and sense of humor to take on the project, and so Irwin found himself editing Seinfeld and Philosophy: A Book about Everything and Nothing. The book was a true success, not only among academics, but among the general public as well.

Another television show Irwin and his friends enjoyed and had discussed is The Simpsons. They appreciated its irony, its irreverence, and they realized that—like Seinfeld—it was a rich and fertile ground for philosophical investigation and discussion. So Irwin decided to put together a second volume, this one on The Simpsons, and he asked two of the contributors to the Seinfeld book, Mark Conard and Aeon Skoble, to co-edit the work. Once again, Open Court applauded the idea, and if you’re reading this, you’re obviously at least a little interested in either philosophy, The Simpsons, or both. The concept is the same: the show has enough intelligence and depth to warrant some philosophical discussion, and as a popular show, can also serve as a vehicle for exploring a variety of philosophical issues for a general audience.

The Simpsons is rich in satire. Without question it is one of the most intelligent and literate comedies on television today. (We know that’s not saying much, but still . . .) It may seem incongruous to those who have dismissed it as a mere cartoon about an oaf and his family (and we’ve seen plenty of those) to say that the show is intelligent and literate, but attentive viewing reveals levels of comedy far beyond farce. We see layer upon layer of satire, double meanings, allusions to high as well as popular culture, sight gags, parody, and self-referential humor. In response to Homer’s criticism of a cartoon that his kids are watching, Lisa replies, “If cartoons were meant for adults, they’d be on in prime time!” Despite Lisa’s words, The Simpsons is clearly for adults, and it’s superficial to dismiss the show merely because it is popular and animated.

Matt Groening studied philosophy in college, but none of the contributors to this

book believes there is a deep underlying philosophy to Groening’s cartoon. This is not “the philosophy of The Simpsons” or “The Simpsons as philosophy”; it’s The Simpsons and Philosophy. We’re not attempting to convey the intended meaning of Groening and the legion of writers and artists who work on the show. Rather, we’re highlighting the philosophical significance of The Simpsons as we see it. Some of the essays in this book are the reflections of academics on a show they like and which they think says something about an aspect of philosophy. For example, Daniel Barwick looks to the miserly curmudgeon, Mr. Burns, to determine if we can learn something about the nature of happiness from Burns’s unhappiness. Others explore the thought of a philosopher by making use of one of the characters. For instance, Mark Conard raises the question, Can Nietzsche’s rejection of traditional morality justify Bart’s bad behavior? Still others use the show as a vehicle for developing philosophical themes in a way that is accessible to the non-specialist (an intelligent person who has some interest in philosophical reflection but who doesn’t make a living at it). For example, Jason Holt explores “Springfield Hypocrisy” to determine whether hypocrisy is always unethical.

This book is not an attempt to reduce philosophy to the lowest common denominator; we have no “dumbing-down” agenda. On the contrary, we hope to get our non-specialist readers to read more philosophy, the kind that doesn’t involve television shows. We also hope our colleagues who read these essays will find them both thought-provoking and entertaining.

Is it legitimate to write philosophical essays about popular culture? The standard response to that question is to point out that Sophocles and Shakespeare were popular culture in their day, and no one questions the validity of philosophical reflections on their work. But that won’t do in the case of The Simpsons. (D’oh!) Making that response invites the misperception that we think The Simpsons is the equivalent of history’s best works of literature, deeply profound in a way that illuminates the human condition as never before. We don’t. But it nevertheless is just deep enough, and certainly funny enough, to warrant serious attention. Furthermore, its popularity means that we can use The Simpsons as a means of illustrating traditional philosophical issues to effectively reach readers outside the academy.

And please keep in mind that even though we are occasionally charged with impiety and executed, philosophers are people too. Don’t have a cow, man.

Part I

The Characters

1 Homer and Aristotle RAJA HALWANI

[M]en, though they look, fail to see what is well-being, what is the good in life. — Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1216a10 I can’t live the button-down life like you. I want it all! The terrifying lows, the dizzying highs, the creamy middles! Sure, I might offend a few of the blue-noses with my cocky stride and musky odors—Oh, I’ll never be the darling of the socalled “City Fathers” who cluck their tongues, stroke their beards, and talk about “What’s to be done with this Homer Simpson?” — Homer Simpson, “Lisa’s Rival”

Homer Simpson does not fare well when evaluated morally. This is especially true if the focus is on his character rather than on his acts (although he does not exactly shine in the latter category either). Yet, somehow, there is something that is still ethically admirable about Homer. This raises the following puzzle: If Homer Simpson fares badly morally, in what ways is he admirable? Let’s investigate this.

Aristotle’s Character Types

Aristotle gave us a logical categorization of four types of character.1 Roughly speaking, and putting aside the two extreme types of the superhuman and the bestial characters, we have the virtuous, the continent, the incontinent, and the vicious character. To best understand each type, let’s contrast them with one another in terms of how each character manifests itself in actions, decisions, and desires. Let’s also consider one situation as an example and see how each character would respond to it.

Suppose someone, let’s call her “Lisa,” were walking down the street and found a wallet with a substantial amount of money in it. Now if Lisa were virtuous, she would not only make the decision to turn in the wallet to the proper authorities, she would gladly do so. Lisa’s desires would be in accordance with her right decision and action. Consider now Lenny, who is continent: if Lenny were to find the wallet, he would be able to make the right decision—to return the wallet intact—and he would be able to act on his decision to do so, but he would have to go against his desires to not do so. This is the mark of the continent person: he has to struggle against his desires to be able do the right thing.

With the incontinent and the vicious types, things get worse. The incontinent person is able to reach the right decision about what to do but would suffer from weakness of will. In the wallet case, and supposing Bart is our incontinent character,

he would succumb to his desire to keep the wallet and so fail to act properly, even though he knows that keeping it is wrong. With the vicious person, there is no struggle against one’s desires and there is no weakness of will. The reason, however, is that the vicious person’s decision is morally wrong, and his desires are fully co- operative with it. If Nelson were vicious, he would decide to keep the money (and either throw away the rest of the wallet, or return it but lie about its original contents), would fully desire to do so, and would actually do so.

Let’s take a closer look at what it is that constitutes a virtuous character. A virtuous person is one who has and exercises the virtues. The virtues, moreover, are states (or traits) of character that dispose their possessor to act in the right ways and to react emotionally in the right ways also. Given this, we see why Aristotle insisted that the virtues are states of character concerned with both action and feeling (Ethics, Book II, especially 1106b15–35). For example, if one has the virtue of benevolence, then one will be disposed to be charitable to the right people under the right circumstances. One would not give money to just anyone who asked for it. The virtuous person must perceive that his recipient is in need of the money, and that he will use it properly. Furthermore, the virtuous person’s emotional reaction is appropriate to the situation. This means that the benevolent person in our example would give the money gladly, not regret giving it, and would be moved to give it by the plight of his recipient. By contrast, a continent person would not easily part with his money, and this is so not because he needs it and cannot spare it, but because he is disposed to be greedy, or to over-estimate how much he might need the money in the future.

But notice that, given the above account, reason has a crucial role to play. For, if to be virtuous one needs to have perceptive abilities regarding the situations one is faced with, then the virtuous person cannot be stupid or naive. He must have critical reasoning abilities that would allow him to notice differences in situations and so be able to respond accordingly. Indeed, this is one reason why Aristotle emphasized the idea that the subject-matter of ethics does not admit of rigorous precision (Ethics, 1094b13–19). The role of practical reason (phronesis) is something that Aristotle insisted upon: if one were virtuous by, so to speak, impulse, one would not possess “full” virtue but at most “natural” virtue (Ethics, 1144b3–15), and to possess natural virtue is to be inclined to do the right thing by accident, to put it loosely.2

If we now bring in Aristotle’s conditions for right action, we will be in a position to round out our account. Aristotle states, “First [the agent] must know that he is doing virtuous actions; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging character” (Ethics, 1105a30–1105b). Briefly, what Aristotle had in mind here is the following. First, the agent must, when acting virtuously know that his action is virtuous; he acts under the description that “such-and-such an action is just (or generous, or honest).”

The second condition seems to embody two, and not one, conditions. The agent must act voluntarily, and he must do so because the action is virtuous. So even if one were to act under the description that “this action is fair,” one’s action would not be virtuous unless one also acted because the action is fair. The third stated condition is crucial, and it brings us to the start of this discussion: a virtuous person acts virtuously not only when the action is fair and because it is so, but he acts virtuously because he is a fair person. He is the type of person who is disposed to behave morally correctly when the situation requires it. This is (part of) what it means to have a “firm and unchanging” character.

Homer’s Character: D’oh!, D’oh!, and Double D’oh! Given Aristotle’s account of virtue, things look quite dim for Homer Simpson (and I will not later rescind this judgment; so don’t expect some ingenious distinction that will overhaul this claim). Consider, as a start, the virtue of temperance (moderation) which, basically though somewhat contentiously, covers the ability to moderate our bodily appetites. It does not require astute observation to realize that Homer is far from being a temperate man. Not only is he not virtuous with respect to his bodily appetites, but he is quite vicious. This is particularly true with regard to Homer’s consumption of food and drink, rather than sexual activity. His desires impel him to constantly gorge himself, and he succumbs willingly to these desires. For instance, in “Homer’s Enemy,”3 he wholeheartedly ate half of a sandwich that belonged to his temporary co-worker Frank Grimes—or “Grimey”—even though the sandwich bag was clearly marked to the effect that it belonged to the latter. Still worse, even after Grimes pointed this out to him, Homer managed to take two extra bites out of the sandwich before putting it back in the bag. Homer’s desire for food also leads him to create some interesting recipes. Witness, for example, his wrapping a half-cooked waffle around a whole stick of butter and, of course, eating it (“Homer the Heretic”). Homer’s health was jeopardized by bad eating habits, to the point where he had to undergo a bypass operation (“Homer’s Triple Bypass”), but he has not relented. Indeed, even when enduring immediate and obvious physical pain, Homer does not relent. Witness his eating bad meat at the Kwik-E-Mart, getting sick, and being rushed to the hospital. Instead of pursuing his complaint against Apu, he was immediately appeased (“Woo-hoo!”) by Apu’s offer of ten free pounds of rancid shrimp. Homer knew that the shrimp smelled “funny,” ate it anyway, and was then rushed again to the hospital (“Homer and Apu”). Homer’s gluttony is so much a part of his character, that he consumes food even while half-asleep. In “Rosebud,” Homer, half asleep, walks into the kitchen, opens the door of the fridge, comments, “Mmm . . . 64 slices of American cheese,” and proceeds to eat them for the duration of the night. The point about Homer’s intemperance needs no further explanation; his name has come to be

synonymous with his love of food and (Duff) beer. Homer is also a habitual liar; he lacks honesty. In “Duffless,” he lied to his

family about his plans for the day, telling them that he was going to work when he was actually planning to go take the Duff Brewery tour. To catalogue some of Homer’s other fibs: He lied to Marge about the fact that he never graduated from high school (“The Front”), he lied to her about his financial losses in investments (“Homer vs. Patty and Selma”), and he consistently lied to Marge about getting rid of the gun he bought (“The Cartridge Family”). Homer also once involved Apu in a large web of lies to the latter’s mother, telling her that he was already married to Marge, thus also forcing Marge to go along with the scheme (“The Two Mrs. Nahasapeemapetilons”).

Homer also lacks sensitivity to the needs and claims of others; he seems to lack both benevolence and justice. In “When Flanders Failed,” he continuously pushed Ned Flanders to sell him his furniture for dirt-cheap prices, even though he knew that Ned was broke and desperately needed money. In “Bart the Lover,” he advised Bart, in his alias as Woodrow (Mrs. Krabappel’s secret pen-lover), to break up with Mrs. Krabappel by writing her a note saying, “Dear Baby, Welcome to Dumpsville. Population: you” (he prefaces this by saying to Bart that sensitive love letters are his specialty). He’s not inclined towards generosity, either; he once said to Bart, “You gave both dogs away? You know how I feel about giving!” (“The Canine Mutiny”). And Homer decided not to vote guilty on Freddy Quimby’s assault charges, not because he thought that Quimby was innocent, but because he realized that if he did so, the jury would be deadlocked and he would get to stay for free at the Springfield Palace Hotel (“The Boy Who Knew Too Much”).

Homer has a number of buddies, but he does not have friends. Aristotle emphasized the importance of friendship due to his beliefs that without friends we cannot exercise virtue and that without friends we cannot lead full, flourishing lives. Homer does not have a single genuine friend. At most he has drinking buddies (Barney, Lenny, and Carl), but he has no one with whom he shares his goals, activities, joys, and sorrows.4 Indeed, it is something of a problem even to claim that Homer has goals and activities, other than drinking, that is.

Homer’s marital and parenting skills also leave much to be desired (Aristotle seemed to have included spouses and children within the purview of friendship; see Ethics 1158b9–16). Let’s consider some of Homer’s blunders. He tried to win Lisa’s love by buying her a pony (“Lisa’s Pony”). He resented Bart for getting a “Bigger Brother” and so became a Bigger Brother himself to Pepi (whom he called “Pepsi”) (“Brother from the Same Planet”). He sent Bart to work at a burlesque salon as a form of punishment (“Bart After Dark”). Homer fueled the fire of sibling rivalry when Lisa found out she had a knack for ice hockey: “This Friday Lisa’s team is playing Bart’s team. You’re in direct competition. And don’t go easy on each other just because you’re brother and sister. I want to see you both fighting for your parents’ love” (“Lisa

on Ice”). Let’s not forget his numerous throttlings of Bart, preceded by, “Why you little . . . !” (although once, in “Mother Simpson,” it was, “I’ll Kwanza you . . . !”). Last, but certainly not least, Homer continuously forgets that Maggie exists.5

Homer’s marital skills are no better. He’s either unsupportive of or indifferent to Marge’s projects; he professed as much to Marge in “A Streetcar Named Marge.” His refusal to go to artistic shows and exhibits once led Marge to seek the companionship of Ruth Powers; their friendship landed both women in a police chase à la Thelma and Louise. Homer did apologize to Marge, but his apology is quite revealing: “Look, Marge, I’m sorry I haven’t been a better husband, I’m sorry about the time I tried to make gravy in the bathtub, I’m sorry I used your wedding dress to wax the car, and I’m sorry—oh well, let’s just say I’m sorry for the whole marriage up to this point” (“Marge on the Lam”). In “Secrets of a Successful Marriage,” Homer reached a new peak. He realized what it was that he could uniquely offer Marge, and that is “complete and utter dependency.” Indeed, even when he tries to be supportive, he ends up bungling things: Homer once tried to help Marge’s pretzel business by going to the Springfield mafia for help, thus landing Marge in the position of having to deal with Fat Tony and his cohorts (“The Twisted World of Marge Simpson”).

Furthermore, any hope for Homer that he might acquire the moral virtues would be dashed by the recognition that he lacks the one intellectual virtue necessary for an ethical character, namely, that of practical wisdom (phronesis). Phronesis is not theoretical knowledge, although Homer certainly lacks this, too.

Nor is it the knowledge of facts, although Homer certainly lacks this as well. Practical wisdom is the ability to steer one’s way through the world intelligently, morally, and in a goal-oriented way. A few examples will suffice. First, Homer subscribes to some highly dubious nuggets of wisdom. In “There’s No Disgrace Like Home,” he states, “When will I learn? The answers to life’s problems aren’t at the bottom of a bottle. They’re on TV!” And—while on the topic of bottles—he once famously toasted, “To alcohol! The cause of—and solution to—all of life’s problems” (“Homer vs. the Eighteenth Amendment”). In “The Otto Show,” he told Bart that “If something’s hard to do, then it’s not worth doing.” And in “Realty Bites,” he told Marge that “Trying is the first step towards failure.”

Second, Homer seems to lack minimal powers of inference. He once inferred that Timmy O’Toole (the fictitious boy whom Bart claimed fell down a well) was a real hero from the mere “fact” that he had fallen down a well and couldn’t get out (“Radio Bart”). He once inferred that Mayor Quimby’s policy of having a Bear Patrol was successful from the mere fact that there were no bears roaming the streets of Springfield! When Lisa pointed out that his reasoning was specious, he thought she was complimenting him (“Much Apu About Nothing”). Homer once reasoned against Lisa’s claim that stealing cable is wrong by “arguing” that Lisa is a thief, given that she herself does not pay for her meals at home and for the clothes she wears (“Homer

vs. Lisa and the 8th Commandment”). Third, Homer lacks one of the most crucial aspects of practical reasoning: the