Classics of western philosophy 7th edition

Philosophy

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

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CLASSICS OF

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY EIGHTH EDITION

Edited by STEVEN M. CAHN

HACKETT PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. INDIANAPOLIS/CAMBRIDGE

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To Marilyn

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First edition copyright © 1977 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Second edition copyright © 1985 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Third edition copyright © 1990 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Fourth edition copyright © 1995 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Fifth edition copyright © 1999 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Sixth edition copyright © 2002 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Seventh edition copyright © 2006 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Eighth edition copyright © 2012 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

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For further information, please address: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. P.O. Box 44937 Indianapolis, IN 46244-0937 www.hackettpublishing.com

Cover design by Brian Rak Text design by Meera Dash Printed at Victor Graphics, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Classics of Western philosophy / edited by Steven M. Cahn. — Eighth Edition. pages cm

Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-60384-743-8 (pbk.) — ISBN 978-1-60384-744-5 (cloth) 1. Philosophy. I. Cahn, Steven M. B29.C536 2012 190 — dc23 2012007912

PRC ISBN: 978-1-62466-015-3

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http://www.hackettpublishing.com
Contents

Preface

Plato Laches Euthyphro Apology Crito Phaedo Meno Symposium Republic (selections)

Aristotle Categories (Chapters 1–5) On Interpretation (selections) Posterior Analytics (selections) Physics (selections) On the Soul (selections) Metaphysics (selections) Nicomachean Ethics (selections)

Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus The Principal Doctrines

Epictetus Encheiridion

Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism (selections)

Augustine On Free Choice of the Will (selections) Confessions (Book XI)

Plotinus Enneads (selections)

Boethius Consolation of Philosophy (selections)

Anselm Proslogion Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo

Moses Maimonides The Guide of the Perplexed (selections)

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Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae (selections)

Levi Gersonides The Wars of the Lord (selections)

William of Ockham Summa Logicae (selections)

René Descartes Discourse on Method Meditations on First Philosophy

Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (selections)

Baruch Spinoza Ethics (Parts I, II)

Gottfried Leibniz Discourse on Metaphysics Monadology

John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (selections)

George Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding A Treatise of Human Nature (selections) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Immanuel Kant Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Critique of Pure Reason (selections) Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

G.W.F Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (selections)

Arthur Schopenhauer The World as Will and Representation (selections)

Søren Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript (selections)

John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism On Liberty (selections)

Friedrich Nietzsche

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Twilight of the Idols (selections)

Charles Sanders Peirce The Fixation of Belief How to Make Our Ideas Clear

William James What Pragmatism Means The Will to Believe

Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy (Chapters I–V)

Edmund Husserl Paris Lectures (selections)

Jean-Paul Sartre The Humanism of Existentialism

Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (selections)

J. L. Austin Sense and Sensibilia (Chapters I–III, V)

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Steven M. Cahn Professor of Philosophy The Graduate Center The City University of New York April 2012

Preface

Here in one volume are the complete texts or substantial selections from sixty philosophical masterpieces. Thirty-three of the world’s greatest philosophers are represented, their writings spanning more than two millennia. Crucial fields of philosophy are explored in depth: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion. An introduction to each author contains biographical data, philosophical commentary, and bibliographical guides. Annotations are provided to clarify textual references.

Marginal line numbers and references to them refer to the original text and are only approximate in the translations themselves. (In this ebook, the marginal numbers are enclosed in square brackets and embedded in the text.)

• • •

The eighth edition contains five major additions: Plato’s Laches; Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, III, 6–9; Descartes’ Discourse on Method; Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (previously included only in part), and Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.

I very much appreciate the assistance of Richard Bett, Meredith Williams, and Michael Williams of Johns Hopkins University; Kathleen Higgins of the University of Texas; Ruth Anna Putnam of Wellesley College; Sara Ahbel-Rappe of the University of Michigan; Israel Scheffler of Harvard University; David Shatz of Yeshiva University; David Sherman of the University of Montana; Jonathan Vogel of Amherst College; and past and present faculty members at the University of Vermont: Charles Guignon (now of the University of South Florida), Patricia Kitcher and Philip Kitcher (both now of Columbia University), William E. Mann, Derk Pereboom (now of Cornell University), and George Sher (now of Rice University). They have contributed most of the introductions, thereby providing expert commentary on the writings of each philosopher.

I benefited greatly from advice by Professor Guignon regarding the selections from Nietzsche; Professor Higgins regarding the selections from Schopenhauer; Professor Pereboom regarding the selections from Kant and Kierkegaard; Professor Ahbel-Rappe regarding the selections from Plotinus; and Professor Meredith Williams regarding the selections from Wittgenstein. I especially appreciated the advice from Professor Andrea Tschemplik of American University regarding the selections from Hegel and her willingness and that of James H. Stam to give permission for use of their translation of sections from the Phenomenology of Spirit. Professor Mann, with whom I consulted on a variety of editorial matters, furnished many of the translations of Latin textual references. For additional suggestions regarding the contents of the book, I am grateful to my friends of many years John O’Connor, David Rosenthal, and the late James Rachels, as well as to the numerous philosophers who have taken the time and effort to write and offer counsel.

Editing and production of the eighth edition were overseen by Brian Rak and Liz Wilson. I appreciate their conscientiousness and sound judgment.

I also wish to thank Jay Hullett and the late Frances Hackett, who have led Hackett Publishing Company and remained true to the values of its late founder, William H. Y. Hackett. Thirty-five years have passed since this work first appeared, and the kind reception it continues to enjoy is a testament to the power of William Hackett’s publishing vision.

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Plato

Plato (427–347 B.C.) is surely the most famous of all philosophers. Little is known of his early life, except that he was born into a noble Athenian family and at some time in his late teens came under the philosophical spell of Socrates (469–399 B.C.), about whom valuable information is contained in Plato’s Apology. The events leading up to and culminating in the Athenian government’s trial and execution of Socrates, when Plato was twenty-eight, soured Plato on the idea of embarking on a life in politics and resulted in his leaving Athens to travel for a number of years in the Mediterranean region. Plato returned to Athens in 387 and founded his school, the Academy, in the belief that such an institution was necessary for the education of political leaders who would be morally excellent. The Academy attracted many of the finest contemporary minds, including Aristotle. Plato twice visited Syracuse in a futile attempt to inculcate his moral and political ideas in Syracuse’s young tyrant, Dionysius II.

Socrates wrote nothing: It is fortunate that his most illustrious follower did not follow that example. At least twenty-six of Plato’s dialogues have survived, ranging in length from the brief Crito to the voluble Laws, which is longer than the Republic. The dialogues are customarily divided into three periods of Plato’s literary career: early, middle, and late. The early dialogues—of which the Laches, Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito are examples—are taken to be accurate if not verbatim portrayals of Socrates in philosophical action. The middle dialogues, represented here by the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, display Plato at the height of his literary abilities, seeking to further the projects inspired by Socrates while at the same time introducing doctrines that are extremely unlikely to have been Socrates’ own. The late dialogues are dialogues in name only, quite often technically demanding in nature. They appear to represent Plato’s efforts to grapple with the critical issues raised by the doctrines enunciated in the middle dialogues and most likely raised by others in the Academy.

As the Apology makes clear, Socrates professed to be ignorant of all matters philosophical, although not disputing the Delphic oracle’s pronouncement that he was the wisest of all men. He concluded that his “wisdom,” compared to the pretenses of others, lay in knowing the extent of his ignorance. Taking his mission to be to show others the magnitude of their ignorance about the most important matters of their lives, Socrates relentlessly grilled his fellow Athenian citizens, using rigorous argumentation to demonstrate that uncritically accepted opinions about philosophically important matters could lead to logical catastrophe: The Laches, Euthyphro and the early pages of the Meno provide excellent examples of Socrates’ technique.

Yet for all his professed ignorance, Socrates clung to several distinctive philosophical doctrines. First, one cannot have genuine knowledge about moral matters unless one can give a rationally defensible account of such notions as courage (Laches), piety (Euthyphro), justice (Republic), and virtue or human excellence in general (Meno). Socrates thus pitted himself against the Sophists, a contemporary group of itinerant professional teachers, many of whom fostered the belief in their students that no objective knowledge was to be had in ethics. Socrates believed that moral knowledge is possible but difficult to acquire, and that his method of exposing ignorance in others was a necessary first step to their acquiring it. Second, as the Meno intimates, in some way or other virtue (or excellence in humans) is knowledge. The Laches, for example, probes the hypothesis that courage is knowledge. That the dialogue’s participants do not succeed in identifying what kind of knowledge courage might be illustrates the difficulty in acquiring moral knowledge and the importance of becoming aware of one’s ignorance The remarkable corollary of the claim that virtue is knowledge is the thesis that all wrongdoing is the result of ignorance. Third, as illustrated in the Crito and argued for in the Republic, Socrates believed that it is better for one to suffer injustice than to do injustice.

Plato came to believe that, if ethics is something more than the product of arbitrary convention, and if moral judgments are objective, then ethics must be grounded in objects that are unchanging in character and accessible to human minds. These objects are the Forms, the perfect, abstract objects discussed in the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic. Humans can have knowledge of the Forms by recollection, a process that Plato describes in the Meno, alludes to in the Phaedo, and presupposes in the Republic. The importance Plato assigns to the Form of the Good in the Republic is designed to show how the acquisition of knowledge of the Forms provides one with the motivation to be virtuous. The connection between intellectual knowledge and moral motivation is also underscored in the Symposium, where Plato argues that love, rationally pursued, will lead the lover to its ultimate object, the Form of Beauty. The doctrine of Recollection in turn presupposes that humans have existed before their present lives. From there it seems a small step to the thesis that the soul is immortal. In the Phaedo, whose dramatic setting is the day of Socrates’ execution, Plato has Socrates present

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several arguments for the immortality of the soul. If the soul is immortal, then care for it should be more important than care for the body: One of the major themes of the Republic is that behaving justly is at least as valuable for the care of the soul, as well as for the care of the state, as physical health is for the care of the body.

• • •

The amount of excellent philosophical writings on Socrates and Plato is far too large to list here but certainly includes the following. On Socrates in general, see Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991) along with two collections of essays, Hugh Benson, ed., Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Gregory Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1971). Two studies on early dialogues appearing here are C. D. C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989) and, on the Crito, Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Although somewhat demanding, the following works on Plato are superb: R. E. Allen, ed., Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); Gail Fine, ed., Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, and Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Richard Kraut, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays: I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, and II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1970 and 1971); and Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies, second edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). Two books devoted to the Republic are Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) and Richard Kraut, ed., Plato’s Republic (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

William E. Mann

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Laches*

LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the man fighting in [178a] armor, Nicias and Laches. When Melesias and I invited you to see him with us, we neglected to give the reason why, but now we shall explain, because we think it especially right to be frank with you. Now there are some people who make fun of frankness and if anyone asks their advice, they don’t say what they [b] think, but they make a shot at what the other man would like to hear and say something different from their own opinion. But you we considered capable not only of forming a judgment but also, having formed one, of saying exactly what you think, and this is why we have taken you into our confidence about what we are going to communicate to you. Now the matter about which I have been making such a long preamble [179a] is this: we have these two sons here — this one is the son of my friend Melesias here, and he is called Thucydides after his grandfather, and this one is my son, who also goes by his grandfather’s name—we call him Aristides after my father. We have made up our minds to take as good care of them as we possibly can and not to behave like most parents, who, when their children start to grow up, permit them to do whatever they wish. No, we think that now is the time to [b] make a real beginning, so far as we can. Since we knew that both of you had sons too, we thought that you, if anyone, would have been concerned about the sort of training that would make the best men of them. And if by any chance you have not turned your attention to this kind of thing very often, let us remind you that you ought not to neglect it, and let us invite you to care for your sons along with ours. How we reached this conclusion, Nicias and Laches, you must hear, even if it means my talking a bit longer. Now you must know that Melesias and I take our meals [c] together, and the boys eat with us. We shall be frank with you, exactly as I said in the beginning: each of us has a great many fine things to say to the young men about his own father, things they achieved both in war and in peace in their management of the affairs both of their allies and of the city here. But neither of us has a word to say about his own accomplishments. This is what shames us in front of them, and we blame [d] our fathers for allowing us to take things easy when we were growing up, while they were busy with other peoples’ affairs. And we point these same things out to the young people here, saying that if they are careless of themselves and disobedient to us, they will turn out to be nobodies, but if they take pains, perhaps they may become worthy of the names they bear. Now the boys promise to be obedient, so we are looking into the question what form of instruction or practise would make them turn out best. Somebody suggested [e] this form of instruction to us, saying that it would be a fine thing for a young man to learn fighting in armor. And he praised this particular man whom you have just seen giving a display and proceeded to encourage us to see him. So we thought we ought to go to see the man and to take you with us, not only as fellow-spectators but also as fellow-counsellors and partners, if you should be willing, in the care of our sons. This is what we wanted to share with you. So now is the [180a] time for you to give us your advice, not only about this form of instruction—whether you think it should be learned or not—but also about any other sort of study or pursuit for a young man which you admire. Tell us too, what part you will take in our joint enterprise.

NICIAS: I, for one, Lysimachus and Melesias, applaud your plan and am ready to take part in it. And I think Laches here is ready too.

LACHES: You are quite right, Nicias. As for what [b] Lysimachus said just now about his father and Melesias’ father, I think that what he said applied very well to them and to us and to everyone engaged in public affairs, because this is pretty generally what happens to them—that they neglect their private affairs, children as well as everything else, and manage them carelessly. So you were right on this [c] point, Lysimachus. But I am astonished that you are inviting us to be your fellow-counsellors in the education of the young men and are not inviting Socrates here! In the first place, he comes from your own deme, and in the second, he is always spending his time in places where the young men engage in any study or noble pursuit of the sort you are looking for.

LYSIMACHUS: What do you mean, Laches? Has our friend Socrates concerned himself with any things of this kind?

LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus.

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NICIAS: This is a point I can vouch for no less than Laches, since he only recently recommended [d] a man to me as music teacher for my son. The man’s name is Damon, a pupil of Agathocles, and he is the most accomplished of men, not only in music, but in all the other pursuits in which you would think it worthwhile for boys of his age to spend their time.

LYSIMACHUS: People at my time of life, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, are no longer familiar with the young because our advancing years keep us at home [e] so much of the time. But if you, son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice to give your fellow-demesman, you ought to give it. And you have a duty to do so, because you are my friend through your father. He and I were always comrades and friends, and he died without our ever having had a single difference. And this present conversation reminds me of something — when the boys here are talking to each other at home, they often mention Socrates and praise him highly, but I’ve never though to ask if they were speaking [181a] of the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, boys, is this the Socrates you spoke of on those occasions?

BOYS: Certainly, father, this is the one. LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted, Socrates, that you keep up your father’s good reputation, for he was the

best of men, and I am especially pleased at the idea that the close ties between your family and mine will be renewed.

LACHES: Don’t under any circumstances let the man get away, Lysimachus—because I have seen him elsewhere keeping up not only his father’s reputation [b] but that of his country. He marched with me in the retreat from Delium,1 and I can tell you that if the rest had been willing to behave in the same manner, our city would be safe and we would not then have suffered a disaster of that kind.

LYSIMACHUS: Socrates, the praise you are receiving is certainly of a high order, both because it comes from men who are to be trusted and because of the qualities for which they praise you. Be assured that I am delighted to hear that you are held in such esteem, and please consider me among those most kindly disposed towards you. You yourself ought to have visited us long before and considered us your [c] friends—that would have been the right thing to do. Well, since we have recognized each other, resolve now, starting today, to associate both with us and the young men here and to make our acquaintance, so that you may preserve the family friendship. So do what I ask, and we in turn shall keep you in mind of your promise. But what have you all to say about our original question? What is your opinion? Is fighting in armor a useful subject for young men to learn or not?

SOCRATES: Well, I shall try to advise you about these things as best I can, Lysimachus, in addition to [d] performing all the things to which you call my attention. However, it seems to me to be more suitable, since I am younger that the others and more inexperienced in these matters, for me to listen first to what they have to say and to learn from them. But if I should have something to add to what they say, then will be the time for me to teach and persuade both you and the others. Come, Nicias, why doesn’t one of you two begin?

NICIAS: Well, there is no reason why not, Socrates. I think that knowledge of this branch of study is beneficial for the young in all sorts of ways. [e] For one thing, it is a good idea for the young not to spend their time in the pursuits in which they normally do like to spend it when they are at leisure, but rather in this one, which necessarily improves [182a] their bodies, since it is in no way inferior to gymnastic exercises and no less strenuous, and, at the same time, this and horsemanship are forms of exercise especially suited to a free citizen. For in the contest in which we are the contestants and in the matters on which our struggle depends,2 only those are practised who know how to use the instruments of war. And again, there is a certain advantage in this form of instruction even in an actual battle, whenever one has to fight in line with a number of others. But the greatest advantage of it comes when the ranks are broken and it then becomes necessary for a man to fight in [b] single combat, either in pursuit when he has to attack a man who is defending himself, or in flight, when he has to defend himself against another person who is attacking him. A man who had this skill would suffer no harm at the hands of a single opponent, nor even perhaps at the hands of a larger number, but he would have the advantage in every way. Then again, such a study arouses in us the desire for another fine form of instruction, since every man who learns to fight in armor will want to learn the subject that comes next, that is, the science of tactics; and when he has [c] mastered this and taken pride in it, he will press on to the whole art of the general. So it has already become clear that what is connected with this latter art, all the studies and pursuits which are fine and of great value for a man to learn and to practise, have this study as a starting-point. And we shall add to this an advantage which is not at all negligible, that this knowledge will make every man much bolder and braver in war that he was before. And let us not omit to mention, even if to some it might seem a point not worth making, that this art will give a man a finer-looking appearance at the very moment when he needs to have it, and [d] when he will appear more frightening to the enemy because of the way he

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looks. So my opinion, Lysimachus, is just as I say, that young men should be taught these things, and I have given the reasons why I think so. But if Laches has anything to say on the other side, I would be glad to hear it.

LACHES: But the fact is, Nicias, that it is difficult to maintain of any study whatsoever that it ought not to be learned, because it seems to be a good idea to learn everything. So as far as this fighting in armor [e] is concerned, if it is a genuine branch of study, as those who teach it claim, and as Nicias says, then it ought to be learned, but if it is not a real subject and the people who propose to teach it are deceiving us, or if it is a real subject but not a very important one, what need is there to learn it? The reason I say these things about it is that I consider that, if there were anything in it, it would not have escaped the attention of the Lacedaemonians, who have no other concern in life than to look for and engage in whatever studies and pursuits will increase their superiority in war. [183a] And if the Lacedaemonians had overlooked the art, the teachers of it would certainly not have overlooked this fact, that the Lacedaemonians are the most concerned with such matters of any of the Greeks and that anyone who was honored among them in these matters would make a great deal of money just as is the case when a tragic poet is honored among us. The result is that whenever anyone fancies himself as a good writer of tragedy, he does not go about exhibiting [b] his plays in the other cities round about Athens but comes straight here and shows his work to our people, as is the natural thing to do. But I observe that those who fight in armor regard Lacedaemon as forbidden ground and keep from setting foot in it. They give it a wide berth and prefer to exhibit to anyone rather than the Spartans —in fact they take pains to select people who themselves admit that plenty of others surpass them in warfare. Then again, [c] Lysimachus, I have encountered quite a few of these gentlemen on the actual field of battle and I have seen what they are like. This makes it possible for us to consider the matter at first hand. In a manner which seems almost deliberate, not a single practitioner of the art of fighting in armor has ever become renowned in war. And yet in all the other arts, those who are well-known in each are those who have practised the various ones. But the men who practise this art seem to be those who have the worst luck at it. For instance, this very man Stesilaus, whom you and I have witnessed giving a display before such a large [d] crowd and praising himself the way he did, I once saw in the quite different circumstances of actual warfare giving a much finer demonstration against his will. On an occasion when a ship on which he was serving as a marine3 rammed a transport-vessel, he was armed with a combination scythe and spear, as singular a weapon as he was singular a man. His other peculiarities are not worth relating, but let me tell you how his invention of a scythe plus a spear turned out. In the [e] course of the fight it somehow got entangled in the rigging of the other ship and there it stuck. So Stesilaus dragged at the weapon in an attempt to free it, but he could not, and meanwhile his ship was going by the other ship. For a time he kept running along the deck holding fast to the spear. But when the other ship was actually passing his and was dragging him after it while he still held onto the weapon, he let it [184a] slide through his hand until he just had hold of the ferule at the end. There was laughter and applause from the men on the transport at the sight of him, and when somebody hit the deck at his feet with a stone and he let go the shaft, then even the men on the trireme could no longer keep from laughing when they saw that remarkable scythe-spear dangling from the transport. Now perhaps these things may be of value, as Nicias maintains, but my own experience has been of the sort I describe. So, as I said in the [b] beginning, either it is an art but has little value, or it is not an art but people say and pretend that it is, but in any case it is not worth trying to learn. And then it seems to me that if a cowardly man should imagine he had mastered the art, he would, because of his increasing rashness, show up more clearly the sort of man he was, whereas in the case of a brave man, everyone would be watching him and if he made the smallest mistake, he would incur a great deal of criticism. [c] The reason for this is that a man who pretends to knowledge of this sort is the object of envy, so that unless he is outstandingly superior to the rest, there is no way in which he can possibly avoid becoming a laughingstock when he claims to have this knowledge. So the study of this art seems to me to be of this sort, Lysimachus. But, as I said before, we ought not to let Socrates here escape, but we ought to consult him as to his opinion on the matter in hand.

LYSIMACHUS: Well, I do ask your opinion, Socrates, since what might be called our council seems to me to be still in need of someone to cast the [d] deciding vote. If these two had agreed, there would be less necessity of such a procedure, but as it is, you perceive that Laches has voted in opposition to Nicias. So we would do well to hear from you too, and find out with which of them you plan to vote.

SOCRATES: What’s that, Lysimachus? Do you intend to cast your vote for whatever position is approved by the majority of us?

LYSIMACHUS: Why, what else could a person do, Socrates? SOCRATES: And do you, Melesias, plan to act in the same way? Suppose there should be a [e] council to

decide whether your son ought to practise a particular kind of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by

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the greater number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a good trainer? MELESIAS: Probably by the latter, Socrates. SOCRATES: And you would be persuaded by him rather than by the four of us? MELESIAS: Probably. SOCRATES: So I think it is by knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well,

and not by majority rule. MELESIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: So in this present case it is also necessary to investigate first of all whether any one of us is an

expert in the subject we are debating, or not. [185a] And if one of us is, then we should listen to him even if he is only one, and disregard the others. But if no one of us is an expert, then we must look for someone who is. Or do you and Lysimachus suppose that the subject in question is some small thing and not the greatest of all our possessions? The question is really, I suppose, that of whether your sons turn out to be worthwhile persons or the opposite—and the father’s whole estate will be managed in accordance with the way the sons turn out.

MELESIAS: You are right. SOCRATES: So we ought to exercise great forethought in the matter. MELESIAS: Yes, we should. SOCRATES: Then, in keeping with what I said [b] just now, how would we investigate if we wanted to

find out which of us was the most expert with regard to gymnastics? Wouldn’t it be the man who had studied and practised the art and who had had good teachers in that particular subject?

MELESIAS: I should think so. SOCRATES: And even before that, oughtn’t we to investigate what art it is of which we are looking for the

teachers? MELESIAS: What do you mean? SOCRATES: Perhaps it will be more clear if I put it this way: I do not think we have reached any

preliminary agreement as to what in the world we are consulting about and investigating when we ask which of us is expert in it and has acquired teachers [c] for this purpose, and which of us is not.

NICIAS: But, Socrates, aren’t we investigating the art of fighting in armor and discussing whether young men ought to learn it or not?

SOCRATES: Quite so, Nicias. But when a man considers whether or not he should use a certain medicine to anoint his eyes, do you think he is at that moment taking counsel about the medicine or about the eyes?

NICIAS: About the eyes. SOCRATES: Then too, whenever a man [d] considers whether or not and when he should put a bridle on a

horse, I suppose he is at that moment taking counsel about the horse and not about the bridle? NICIAS: That is true. SOCRATES: So, in a word, whenever a man considers a thing for the sake of another thing, he is taking

counsel about that thing for the sake of which he was considering, and not about what he was investigating for the sake of something else.

NICIAS: Necessarily so. SOCRATES: Then the question we ought to ask with respect to the man who gives us advice, is whether

he is expert in the care of that thing for the sake of which we are considering when we consider. NICIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: So do we now declare that we are [e] considering a form of study for the sake of the souls of

young men? NICIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the question whether any one of us is expert in the care of the soul and is capable of

caring for it well, and has had good teachers, is the one we ought to investigate. LACHES: What’s that, Socrates? Haven’t you ever noticed that in some matters people become more

expert without teachers than with them? SOCRATES: Yes, I have, Laches, but you would not want to trust them when they said they were good

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craftsmen unless they should have some well- [186a] executed product of their art to show you — and not just one but more than one.

LACHES: What you say is true. SOCRATES: Then what we ought to do, Laches and Nicias, since Lysimachus and Melesias called us in to

give them advice about their two sons out of a desire that the boys’ souls should become as good as possible— if we say we have teachers to show, is to point out to them the ones who in the first place are good themselves and have tended the souls of many young men, and in the second place have manifestly [b] taught us. Or, if any one of us says that he himself has had no teacher but has works of his own to tell of, then he ought to show which of the Athenians or foreigners, whether slave or free, is recognized to have become good through his influence. But if this is not the case with any of us, we should give orders that a search be made for others and should not run the risk of ruining the sons of our friends and thus incurring the greatest reproach from their nearest relatives. Now I, Lysimachus and Melesias, am the first to say, concerning myself, that I have had no teacher in this [c] subject. And yet I have longed after it from my youth up. But I did not have any money to give the sophists, who were the only ones who professed to be able to make a cultivated man of me, and I myself, on the other hand, am unable to discover the art even now. If Nicias or Laches had discovered it or learned it, I would not be surprised, because they are richer than I and so may have learned it from others, and also older, so they may have discovered it already. Thus they seem to me to be capable of educating a man, [d] because they would never have given their opinions so fearlessly on the subject of pursuits which are beneficial and harmful for the young if they had not believed themselves to be sufficiently informed on the subject. In other matters I have confidence in them, but that they should differ with each other surprises me. So I make this counter-request of you, Lysimachus: just as Laches was urging you just now not to let me go but to ask me questions, so I now call on you not to let Laches go, or Nicias, but to question them, saying that Socrates denies having any knowledge of the matter or being competent to decide which of [e] you speaks the truth, because he denies having been a discoverer of such things or having been anyone’s pupil in them. So, Laches and Nicias, each of you tell us who is the cleverest person with whom you have associated in this matter of educating young men, and whether you acquired your knowledge of the art from another person or found it out for yourselves, and, if you learned it from some one, who were your respective teachers, and what other persons share the [187a] same art with them. My reason for saying all this is that, if you are too busy because of your civic responsibilities, we can go to these men and persuade them, either by means of gifts or favors or both, to look after both our boys and yours too so that they won’t put their ancestors to shame by turning out to be worthless. But if you yourselves have been the discoverers of such an art, give us an example of what other persons your have already made into fine men by your care when they were originally worthless. Because if you are about to begin educating people now for the first [b] time, you ought to watch out in case the risk is being run, not by a guinea-pig, but by your own sons and the children of your friends, and you should keep from doing just what the proverb says not to do—to begin pottery on a wine jar. So state which of these alternatives you would select as being appropriate and fitting for you and which you would reject. Find out these things from them, Lysimachus, and don’t let the men escape.

LYSIMACHUS: I like what Socrates has said, [c] gentlemen. But whether you are willing to be questioned about such matters and to give account of them, you must decide for yourselves, Nicias and Laches. As far as Melesias here and I are concerned, we would certainly be pleased if the two of you were willing to give complete answers to all of Socrates’ questions. Because, as I started to say right at the beginning, the reason we invited you to advise us on these matters was that we supposed that you would naturally have given some thought to such things— especially so since your sons, like ours, are very nearly [d] of an age to be educated. So, if you have no objection, speak up and look into the subject along with Socrates, exchanging arguments with each other. Because he is right in saying that it is about the most important of our affairs that we are consulting. So decide if you think this is what ought to be done.

NICIAS: It is quite clear to me, Lysimachus, that your knowledge of Socrates is limited to your acquaintance with his father and that you have had no contact with the man himself, except when he was [e] a child—I suppose he may have mingled with you and your fellow demesmen, following along with his father at the temple or at some other public gathering. But you are obviously still unacquainted with the man as he is now he has grown up.

LYSIMACHUS: What exactly do you mean, Nicias? NICIAS: You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and

associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he had lived hitherto. And

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when he does submit to this questioning, [188a] you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail. I personally am accustomed to the man and know that one has to put up with this kind of treatment from him, and further, I know perfectly well that I myself will have to submit to it. I take pleasure in the man’s company, Lysimachus, and don’t regard it as at all a bad thing to have it brought to our attention that we have done or are doing wrong. Rather I think that a [b] man who does not run away from such treatment but is willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives,4 not supposing that old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life. For me there is nothing unusual or unpleasant in being examined by Socrates, but I realized some time ago that the [c] conversation would not be about the boys but about ourselves, if Socrates were present. As I say, I don’t myself mind talking with Socrates in whatever way he likes — but find out how Laches here feels about such things.

LACHES: I have just one feeling about discussions, Nicias, or, if you like, not one but two, because to some I might seem to be a discussion-lover and to others a discussion-hater. Whenever I hear a man discussing virtue or some kind of wisdom, then, if he really is a man and worthy of the words he utters, [d] I am completely delighted to see the appropriateness and harmony existing between the speaker and his words. And such a man seems to me to be genuinely musical, producing the most beautiful harmony, not on the lyre or some other pleasurable instrument, but actually rendering his own life harmonious by fitting his deeds to his words in a truly Dorian mode, not in the Ionian, nor even, I think, in the Phrygian or Lydian, but in the only harmony that is genuinely Greek. The discourse of such a man gladdens my heart and makes everyone think that I am a discussion-lover [e] because of the enthusiastic way in which I welcome what is said; but the man who acts in the opposite way distresses me, and the better he speaks, the worse I feel, so that his discourse makes me look like a discussion-hater. Now I have no acquaintance with the words of Socrates, but before now, I believe, I have had experience of his deeds, and there I found him a person privileged to speak fair words and to indulge in every kind of frankness. So if he possesses [189a] this ability too, I am in sympathy with the man, and I would submit to being examined by such a person with the greatest pleasure, nor would I find learning burdensome, because I too agree with Solon, though with one reservation—I wish to grow old learning many things, but from good men only. Let Solon grant me this point, that the teacher should himself be good, so that I may not show myself a stupid pupil taking no delight in learning. Whether my teacher is to be younger than I am or not yet famous or has any other such peculiarity troubles me not at all. To [b] you then, Socrates, I present myself as someone for you to teach and to refute in whatever manner you please, and, on the other hand, you are welcome to any knowledge I have myself. Because this has been my opinion of your character since that day on which we shared a common danger and you gave me a sample of your valor—the sort a man must give if he is to render a good account of himself. So say whatever you like and don’t let the difference in our ages concern you at all. [c]

SOCRATES: We certainly can’t find fault with you for not being ready both to give advice and to join in the common search.

LYSIMACHUS: But the task is clearly ours, Socrates (for I count you as one of ourselves), so take my place and find out on behalf of the young men what we need to learn from these people, and then, by talking to the boys, join us in giving them advice. Because, on account of my age, I very often forget what questions I was going to ask, and I forget the answers as well. Then, if fresh arguments start up [d] in the middle, my memory is not exactly good. So you do the talking and examine among yourselves the topics we proposed. And I will listen, and when I have heard your conversation, I will do whatever you people think best and so will Melesias here.

SOCRATES: Let us do what Lysimachus and Melesias suggest, Nicias and Laches. Perhaps it won’t be a bad idea to ask ourselves the sort of question which we proposed to investigate just now: what teachers have we had in this sort of instruction, and what other persons have we made better? However, I [e] think there is another sort of inquiry that will bring us to the same point and is perhaps one that begins somewhat more nearly from the beginning. Suppose we know, about anything whatsoever, that if it is added to another thing, it makes that thing better, and furthermore, we are able to make the addition, then clearly we know the very thing about which we should be consulting as to how one might obtain it most easily and best. Perhaps you don’t understand what I mean, but will do so more easily this way: suppose we know [190a] that sight, when added to the eyes, makes better those eyes to which it is added, and furthermore, we are able to add it to the eyes, then clearly we know what this very thing sight is, about which we should be consulting as to how one might obtain it most easily and best. Because if we didn’t know what sight in itself was, nor hearing, we would hardly be worthy counsellors and doctors about either the eyes or the ears as to the manner in which either sight or hearing [b] might best be obtained.

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LACHES: You are right, Socrates. SOCRATES: Well then, Laches, aren’t these two now asking our advice as to the manner in which virtue

might be added to the souls of their sons to make them better? LACHES: Yes, indeed. SOCRATES: Then isn’t it necessary for us to start out knowing what virtue is? Because if we are not

absolutely certain what it is, how are we going to [c] advise anyone as to the best method of obtaining it? LACHES: I do not think that there is any way in which we can do this, Socrates. SOCRATES: We say then, Laches, that we know what it is. LACHES: Yes, we do say so. SOCRATES: And what we know, we must, I suppose, be able to state? LACHES: Of course. SOCRATES: Let us not, O best of men, begin straightaway with an investigation of the whole of virtue—

that would perhaps be too great a task—but let us first see if we have a sufficient knowledge of a [d] part. Then it is likely that the investigation will be easier for us.

LACHES: Yes, let’s do it the way you want, Socrates. SOCRATES: Well, which one of the parts of virtue should we choose? Or isn’t it obvious that we ought to

take the one to which the technique of fighting in armor appears to lead? I suppose everyone would think it leads to courage, wouldn’t they?

LACHES: I think they certainly would. SOCRATES: Then let us undertake first of all, Laches, to state what courage is. Then after this we will go

on to investigate in what way it could be added [e] to the young, to the extent that the addition can be made through occupations and studies. But try to state what I ask, namely, what courage is.

LACHES: Good heavens, Socrates, there is no difficulty about that: if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away, then you may rest assured that he is a man of courage.

SOCRATES: Well spoken, Laches. But perhaps I am to blame for not making myself clear; the result is that you did not answer the question I had in mind but a different one.

LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates? [191a] SOCRATES: I will tell you if I can. That man, I suppose, is courageous whom you yourself mention, that