Columbine 1999 yearbook for sale

The Report of Governor Bill Owens’

COLUMBINE RE VIE W COMMISSION

Hon. William H. Erickson, Chairman

M AY 2 0 0 1

T H E G O V E R N O R ’ S C O L U M B I N E R E V I E W C O M M I S S I O N

May 2001

Dear Fellow Coloradan,

On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School southwest of Denver murdered 12 fellow students and one teacher in the worst school shooting in U.S. history. The Columbine tragedy forever changed the way Americans think about the potential for violence in our schools. No one can erase the horror of that day, or restore the losses suffered by the victims and their families. Yet only by learning from Columbine can we hope to prevent similar tragedies in the future.

On January 28, 2000, I signed an executive order creating the Columbine Review Commission, to conduct an inde- pendent review of the tragedy that occurred on April 20, 1999. I appointed the distinguished William H. Erickson, former Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, to chair the commission. The commission’s volunteer members spent over a year conducting public hearings and examining thousands of pages of documents before compiling their findings and recommendations.

The full report follows. The report is also posted on the state’s website at: http://www.state.co.us.

To the members of the commission I extend a heartfelt thanks for the many hours devoted to this difficult task. They have provided a great public service, and we are deeply grateful.

Sincerely,

Bill Owens Governor of Colorado

Bill Owens Governor

STATE OF COLORADO

Commission members pictured here are:

1st row, l. to r.: Troy Eid, Sheriff George Epp, Raymond T. Slaughter, Hon. William H. Erickson, Pamela Jo Suckla, Professor William T. Pizzi. 2nd row: Donald S. Quick, Professor B. James George, C. Suzanne Mencer, Timothy M. Tymkovich.

3rd row: Stephen D. Vercelloni, Stanley T. Paprocki, Ruben E. Archuleta, Bill Ritter, Jr., and Dr. Robert F. Wintersmith.

(Commission members not pictured: Robert N. Miller, Dr. William J. Moloney, Gale Norton, Dr. John B. Peper, and Aristedes W. Zavaras.)

i The Governor announced the creation of the Commission on September 28, 1999 and appointed its members and staff at

that time. With the benefit of their recommendations, the Commission’s structure and scope were formalized in the Governor’s

order of January 28, 2000.

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THE GOVERNOR’S COLUMBINE REVIEW COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 28, 2000, Governor Bill Owens created by executive order a

Columbine Review Commission to inquire into the Columbine High School tragedy on

April 20, 1999, and to submit recommendations on several matters: (1) law

enforcement handling of the crisis; (2) the sufficiency of safety protocols as used at

Columbine High School; (3) an evaluation of emergency medical response and

evacuation techniques employed at Columbine; (4) the appropriateness of victim

assistance efforts at the scene; (5) identification of key factors that might have

contributed to the tragedy and of methods that might prevent similar future

occurrences; and (6) an examination of other relevant issues relating to the tragedy.i

The Columbine High School tragedy was the work of two disgruntled seniors at

the school, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, who determined to kill as many teachers

and fellow students as possible, first, by planting and detonating two 20-pound

propane bombs in the school cafeteria and then by shooting survivors fleeing the

ii Most components to construct pipe bombs are readily available for purchase at nearly every hardware or sporting goods

store. Consequently, controls over purchases by or on behalf of minors would be very difficult to impose and implement.

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inferno they hoped to create.ii When their explosive devices failed to ignite, the two

approached the school and killed one student and seriously wounded a second as they

ate their lunches on the grass. They then entered the school building and began

firing at students leaving the school cafeteria, wounding five students and

deliberately executing one of them.

Klebold entered the school cafeteria briefly but did not fire his weapon inside;

he returned outside the building and fired at students near the school parking lot,

wounding one of them seriously. Meanwhile, a number of students, two school

custodians, and at least one teacher fled to the cafeteria from which, in turn, many

either fled from the building or climbed stairs to the second-story library; one

teacher and a student were wounded when Harris fired a rifle at them through the

school’s double glass doors. Emergency calls were made to the 911 number, and

teachers urged students in the library to take cover under the tables. Klebold and

Harris reentered the building and fired at students in the main hallway and hallway

outside the library, wounding one. They also detonated or left for later detonation a

number of pipe bombs. Encountering a teacher, Dave Sanders, they seriously

wounded him with a shotgun blast. Sanders bled to death from his wounds before

medical assistance was provided more than three hours afterwards.

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About 15 minutes into their onslaught, the two entered the library where 56

students, two teachers and two library employees had sought concealment. Within

seven-and-a-half minutes, Klebold and Harris killed 10 students and seriously

wounded a number of other persons by rifle and shotgun fire; they detonated pipe

bombs, although without inflicting severe wounds. Several students were

deliberately killed execution-style.

Klebold and Harris fired at police from library windows and received return

fire. They left the library and moved to the science wing, where they shot at fleeing

students. After returning briefly to the cafeteria, the two perpetrators tried again to

explode by gunfire the two propane bombs they had carried earlier into the

cafeteria, without success, but managed to detonate smaller bombs, one of which

was attached to a container of flammable liquid. The resulting firebomb activated

the cafeteria sprinkler system, and soon thereafter the sprinkler and fire alarm

systems were activated throughout the school building.

The final moments of the perpetrators’ lives have not been clearly tracked.

Apparently they moved into the office area on the second floor, and then returned to

the cafeteria. A surveillance video camera captured their movements there: they

seemed to survey the damage to the cafeteria and police activities in the school

parking area. From there they went back to the library and exchanged gunfire from

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the library windows with police who were protecting paramedics rescuing students

wounded outside the school building. At about 12:08 p.m., or 47 minutes after the

two had commenced their assault, the two turned their weapons on themselves and

committed suicide, having left behind them a trail of 13 dead (12 students and one

teacher) and many wounded persons. Because the response teams outside the school

building were unaware of their deaths, it required several more hours before officers

could secure the building, obtain medical attention for the wounded, and collect the

dead.

Since the Columbine High School event left so many important questions to be

answered, questions that would not be answered if the Columbine tragedy were

simply relegated to the archives of history, Governor Owens entrusted the

Commission with the responsibility to identify the lessons that Columbine taught. It

could not bring back to life or physical wholeness any of the victims of Klebold’s and

Harris’s depredations. But the Commission’s efforts and the disbursement of state

funds would be well expended if even one life could be saved by effective law

enforcement and rescue responses to a future emergency like Columbine.

Governor Owens appointed William H. Erickson, retired Colorado Supreme

Court Justice, to chair the Commission, and designated ten voting members of the

Commission:

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Ruben E. Archuleta, retired chief of police for the Pueblo Police

Department.

George Epp, Boulder County Sheriff, and a member of Colorado’s Peace

Officer Standards and Training Board.

C. Suzanne Mencer, a retired FBI agent and the current executive

director of the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

Robert N. Miller, head of litigation at the Denver office of LeBoeuf,

Lamb, Greene, & MacRae, formerly district attorney for Weld County

and United States Attorney for Colorado from 1981-1988.

Gale A. Norton, who served as a Commission member until she became

Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; had been

Colorado Attorney General from 1991 to 1999, and was senior counsel at

Brownstein, Hyatt & Farber, P.C. at the time of her appointment to the

Commission.

Dr. John B. Peper, professor emeritus at the University of Texas at El

Paso and chair of the College of Education there before his retirement;

he served as superintendent of the Jefferson County School District from

1981 to 1990.

Bill Ritter, Jr., District Attorney for Denver County, and a member of

the Colorado Supreme Court’s Judicial Advisory Council.

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Pamela Jo Suckla, a rancher from Slickrock, Colorado, with service on the

Dolores County School Board and the Colorado School Board.

Dr. Robert F. Wintersmith, Director of Research and Education,

Colorado Division of Civil Rights; he served earlier as a Director of the

Social Services Division, St. Louis, Missouri, Housing Authority.

The ex officio members of the Commission are:

Troy Eid, Chief Counsel to Governor Bill Owens.

Dr. William J. Moloney, Colorado Commissioner of Education and

Secretary for the Colorado State Board of Education.

Stanley T. Paprocki, senior consultant for the Colorado Department of

Education.

Donald S. Quick, Deputy Attorney General of Colorado for Criminal

Justice.

Aristedes W. Zavaras, Manager of Safety for the City and County of

Denver; former Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public

Safety.

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The staff members of the Commission are:

Keith C. Coffman, a Denver-based writer and reporter who has covered

criminal justice and legal issues for several major national and

international news outlets for over 15 years.

Professor B. James George, professor of law emeritus, New York Law

School, and minister of pastoral care, First United Methodist Church of

Castle Rock, and a reporter for the Commission.

Professor William T. Pizzi, professor of law at the University of

Colorado Law School, and reporter for the Commission.

Raymond T. Slaughter, Director of the Colorado Division of Criminal

Justice, within the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

Timothy M. Tymkovich, a partner in the law firm of Hale, Hackstaff,

Tymkovich & ErkenBrack; he served as Colorado Solicitor General (1991-

1996).

Stephen D. Vercelloni, paralegal assistant, Division of Criminal Justice

within the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

More complete biographical information on the above-listed persons may be

found in Appendix B of the Commission Report.

iii A list of witnesses appearing before the Commission may be found as Appendix C of the Commission’s Report to the

Governor.

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The Commission conducted 15 meetings open to members of the public.iii Only

one meeting, lasting not more than one-and-a-half hours, was closed to the public at

the specific request of Jefferson County Sheriff John Stone, who was apprehensive of

the possible adverse impact of a public meeting on an ongoing criminal investigation

into the Columbine incident; Undersheriff John A. Dunaway and Division Commander

John Kiekbusch of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office presented only a brief

overview of the events at Columbine. In the course of its public hearings, the

Commission questioned experts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

Colorado Bureau of Investigation, the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office, the Arvada

Police Department, the Lakewood Police Department, the Littleton Fire Department

as well as many criminal justice experts. However, it was denied the privilege of

interviewing Sheriff Stone and his deputies, even though Sheriff Stone had agreed to

appear before the Commission on three separate occasions.

Emergency medical relief personnel and staff members from the six hospitals

providing treatment for victims of the Columbine assault testified before the

Commission and provided it with valuable information on proper procedures for

responding to critical emergencies like that at Columbine High School. Testimony

was also received from Littleton Fire Department personnel who provided emergency

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medical services at the scene. The training and crisis management engaged in by the

medical technicians and hospital personnel were exemplary. Experts also testified

concerning the victims assistance programs employed in the aftermath of Columbine;

their performance was likewise outstanding.

The Commission’s assigned duties were to review the events occurring on April

20, 1999 at Columbine High School and to submit recommendations for preventing or

handling similar emergencies should they arise in the future. The Commission

anticipated, and in most instances found, that subpoenas were not necessary to the

completion of its assignment. With the notable exception of the conduct of Sheriff

John Stone and a very few others, which foreclosed the Commission from completing

its investigation in depth of the law enforcement response at Columbine High School,

law enforcement and response agencies were quite helpful in providing most of the

information Sheriff Stone had refused to produce for the Commission.

In sum, the Commission received statements from an extensive list of state and

local officials and private persons who had experience with or information concerning

the Columbine High School event; its staff reviewed thousands of pages of official and

nonofficial documents, reports and studies. Its findings, set out at length below,

support a number of recommendations for remedial and preventive measures at all

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levels of Colorado’s governmental structure, and by the executive and legislative

branches of state and local government:

A. Recommendations Relating to Crisis Response Actions.

! Law enforcement policy and training should emphasize that the highest priority

of law enforcement officers, after arriving at the scene of a crisis, is to stop

any ongoing assault. All law enforcement officers who may be first responders

at a crisis, and all school resource officers (SROs) should be trained in concepts

and skills of rapid emergency deployment, whether or not assigned as members

of standing or reserve special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, and should

have immediately available all weapons and protective equipment that might

be required in a pursuit of active armed perpetrators.

! Because the establishment of an incident command system is an essential

component of successful planning for emergencies, implemented by well-

conceived and frequent intra- and interagency training programs, the

Commission recommends a much-increased emphasis on training in preparation

for large-scale emergencies. Designated law enforcement command personnel

should be trained to take command at the beginning of a crisis, to control

assembled personnel, and to communicate incident objectives clearly to their

subordinates.

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B. Recommendations for Improved Communications for Critical Emergencies.

! Law enforcement agencies should plan their communications systems to

facilitate crisis communication with other agencies with whom they might

reasonably be expected to interface in emergencies. Because effective radio

communications are indispensable to rapid deployment to meet critical

incidents, school districts where local police and rescue agencies utilize digital

bandwidths for communications should consider the installation of transmission

repeaters in larger school buildings to facilitate communications from within

those buildings to outside receivers.

! To promote interoperability of communications among agencies responding to

a critical emergency, the Commission recommends that Colorado continue to

develop a single statewide digital trunked communications system. The

Commission also recommends that agencies in parts of the state not yet within

the statewide system should receive state funds for the purchase of TRP 1000

or similar systems, enabling at least one of them to be available in the event

of a serious catastrophe in any part of the state.

C. Recommendations for Advance Planning for Critical Emergencies.

! Appropriate officials in each Colorado County should prepare and keep current

a major critical emergency response plan addressing large-scale crises,

including those arising at local schools; the appropriate contents of such a plan

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should include assessments of public and community response resources, the

location and availability of needed resources, and the operational

requirements to cope with such emergencies (for example, designation of

officers to be in charge of a command post and crime-scene processing,

procedures to be followed in evacuating injured persons and in designating

medical facilities to which they are to be transported, and assignment of

responsibility for extinguishing fires and disposing of incendiary and explosive

devices).

! Regular planning sessions should be held, participated in by representatives

from federal, county and local law enforcement entities, fire and rescue

agencies and local school administrators, to focus on preparations for a range

of foreseeable emergencies (including worst-case scenarios), based on the

county’s critical emergency response plan. Participating officials and agencies

should base interagency training and disaster-response rehearsals on the

current plan.

! Every school in Colorado should develop an emergency crisis plan tailored to

meet the particular safety concerns at that school. In drawing up such a plan,

school administrators at each school should solicit advice from local law

enforcement and rescue agency personnel. School safety planning likewise

should take into account the needs and expected responses to emergencies not

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only of students, administrators and faculty, but also of custodial staff, clerical

personnel, cafeteria workers, nurses, bus drivers and other school employees.

! School district officials should consider requiring local school administrators to

assemble an appropriate number of emergency kits, depending on the size of

the school, to include such things as school diagrams with exit routes clearly

indicated; information about procedures to shut off alarms, sprinkler systems

and utilities within the building; important telephone numbers; and a current

school roster. District school officials should review the safety plan for each

school in the district to ensure that it is appropriate for that school.

! Because school-based training and preparedness rehearsals are critical

components of an effective emergency plan, preparedness requires that key

members of each emergency response team know the roles they will be

required to play in the event of a crisis and that they practice or rehearse

those roles. Each school should schedule crisis drills at least once a year, and

preferably once each school term. It is desirable to include police and rescue

agency personnel in preparing for scenarios in which those agencies would

likely be involved.

D. Recommendations Bearing on Interaction with Media Representatives.

! Because substantial media coverage of major critical emergencies is to be

expected, each major response agency should designate a public information

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officer of command rank, experienced and trained for the role, who will

respond promptly to notice that a major critical incident is in progress at

which personnel of his or her response agency are present. The official in

charge at an incident command center should designate a principal public

information officer if two or more such officers arrive together at the center;

otherwise, the first-arriving public information officer should serve as the

official liaison with media personnel at the scene.

! Police, fire and rescue agencies, hospitals and victim support agencies, as part

of their planning for serious future crises, should prepare themselves to cope

with a spate of media attention that probably will become manifest well

before a crisis has ended. It would be well to include media representatives in

that planning process.

E. Recommendations Concerning Tasks of School Resource Officers (SROs).

! The primary tasks of SROs are to enforce the law and to protect the public

safety. SROs and school authorities alike must understand clearly that SROs are

law enforcement officers and, as such, should normally be in uniform

whenever assigned to a school. SROs should be trained like other first-

responders in rapid deployment tactics in case of a school emergency. If SROs

are to ensure the safety of persons within a school, school administrators

should provide them with all relevant information about students at the

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school, unless the information is privileged by law. Police command officials

should transmit to SROs all information relevant to school safety, including

reported criminal conduct on the part of students at the school.

F. Recommendations Concerning Detection by School Administrators of

Potential Perpetrators of School-Based Violence and Administrative

Countermeasures.

! School officials should continue to work to change the “code of silence”

dimension of the prevailing student culture, by emphasizing to students that

loyalty to fellow students has its limits, one of which is that statements or

conduct carrying with it a possible threat of violence, even an indirect threat,

must be reported to school authorities. Students, teachers, administrators and

parents also must be reminded that many perpetrators of school violence are

quite young. Therefore, threats of violence must not be discounted because a

student issuing a threat is young. School authorities should make it quite clear

to students and their parents that all threats of violence, whether of violence

to others or to the person making the threat, and whether direct or indirect,

will be taken seriously and evaluated. Students and their parents should be

brought to understand that threats of violence are never appropriate even as

jokes, and may well have consequences for students who utter them. If a

threat relates to a specific person, it should not matter that the person toward

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whom the threat was directed does not wish the matter pursued; it should be

evaluated like any other threat.

! Each school district should establish a mechanism like an anonymous telephone

line, through which students and others may anonymously report statements or

conduct that worries them. The Commission endorses the efforts of the

Colorado Attorney General and others to develop a statewide hotline number

that students and others can use to report threats and other forms of behavior

that concern them. Whatever the mechanism for anonymous reporting

eventually established in a school district, it is important that students learn of

it and be advised of its importance to their safety and the security of school

premises.

! All schools in the state should adopt one or more of the bullying-prevention

programs that have already been tested and proven effective. Every school

administration should adopt a code of behavior that sets forth clearly the

rights and responsibilities of both students and adults within the school

community, and should ensure that its code is enforced equably against all

violators. Because it is difficult for administrators in large schools to create a

supportive atmosphere for students, if fiscal and other concerns do not allow

for the continuation of smaller schools, communities should explore the use of

alternative approaches in larger facilities like schools-within-a-school.

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! A state task force should be created to develop model threat-assessment

plans, standards and training programs.

! A threat assessment team should be established at every Colorado high school

and middle school, responsible for evaluating threats of violence reported by

students, teachers, school staff or law enforcement personnel. All reports of

verbal and written threats, “hit lists,” or other indicia of future violence

should be taken seriously by a team. Each team should include a school staff

member like a counselor or a vice-principal who knows the students and the

student culture at the school, and who is able to gather information at the

school useful in assessing each threat. It is desirable, if feasible, to appoint to

each threat assessment team a trained mental health professional, for

example, a school psychologist, and someone with a background in law

enforcement. Members of each threat assessment team should receive

training on such matters as threat assessment, suicide prevention and the law

relating to student confidentiality. To ensure that a threat assessment team

acquires all information needed to evaluate threats, each school should be

expected to maintain accurate records about earlier threats and crime

incidents there. Every school should adopt an effective violence prevention

program that meet the needs of that school, including both in-school programs

and community-based programs, to which students and their families can be

referred.

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! All agencies that possess specific information regarding threatening behavior of

a juvenile, the potential for violent behavior by a juvenile or other delinquent

acts of a juvenile, should share that information with other agencies dealing

with that juvenile, to the extent allowed by law. Agencies that deal with

juveniles, including law enforcement, courts, probation, schools, social

services, and mental health agencies, should familiarize themselves with the

Colorado juvenile information exchange laws in order to understand what is

required under the law. Those agencies should then work to implement

protocols to ensure a full and timely exchange of appropriate information

regarding juveniles.

! Although security devices can effectively deter certain forms of school crimes,

including theft, graffiti, and gang violence, they have not yet been proven to

be cost-effective in preventing major school violence like that experienced at

Columbine High School. Therefore, the Commission does not recommend the

universal installation of metal detectors, video surveillance cameras and other

security equipment as a means of forestalling school violence generally; for the

present, such security devices can serve only to offer transient solutions to

specific problems at individual schools.

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G. Recommendations Concerning Medical Treatment for Attack Victims.

! Medical facilities in a given area should consider the advisability and feasibility

of instituting an intranet system among hospital emergency and critical care

units, not only to assist trauma centers in the course of major emergencies,

but to promote efficiencies in the routine diversion of patients from one

hospital trauma center to another.

! One technique for resolving time gaps between a SWAT team entry and the

arrival of EMTs is to include one or more EMTs in SWAT teams so that

emergency medical help arrives as a component of each SWAT team. An

alternative solution is for one or more members of each SWAT team to be

trained in emergency medical procedures and to carry emergency medical

equipment with them. Therefore, SWAT teams should include one or more

members with emergency medical training to reduce or minimize the time

interval between a SWAT team’s arrival and primary treatment of injured

victims.

H. Recommendations Concerning Reuniting Attack Victims and Their Families.

! Command centers at the sites of large-scale emergencies with many victims

should include a victim advocate at the command center so that accurate

information can be provided more directly to the families and friends of

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victims. Adequate provision for staff support and stress debriefing should be a

part of each responding agency’s planning for a major crisis.

! Families of victims of major emergencies should be assigned to victim

advocates whose offices or residences are nearby where they live.

I. Recommendations Concerning Identification of Victims’ Bodies and

Family Access to Bodies.

! In acknowledgment of the human anguish created by occurrences like that at

Columbine High School, the procedures for victim identification appropriate to

most emergencies perhaps ought to be relaxed to accommodate the immediate

emotional needs of victims and their families.

J. Recommendations Concerning Suicide Prevention in the Aftermath of

Incidents Like Columbine.

! Because suicide constitutes a very serious public health problem in Colorado,

and is an observable phenomenon in the aftermath of incidents like

Columbine, programs should be developed and implemented to enable

teachers and school administrators to discuss with students the subject of

suicide before it occurs and not exclusively afterwards. In particular, faculty

and staff at Colorado’s schools need to be conversant with the common

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warning signs for suicide and the appropriate responses and nonresponses to

them when observed.

In conclusion, April 20, 1999 memorializes a tragic and lethal school assault

that resulted in the deaths of 12 students and a teacher and the wounding of 24 other

students who encountered Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris before they turned their own

weapons on themselves and took their own lives. The sole purpose motivating the

assailants’ acts was to kill as many students and teachers as they could before ending

their own lives.

The Commission hopes that the recommendations embodied in its report will

provide methods of avoiding another Columbine and of more effective responses to

such assaults should they occur in the future.