Core questions in philosophy elliott sober free pdf

PHILOSOPHY

Explain one of Locke's arguments for the existence of external, mind-independent things. How would Descartes respond to Locke's argument?

Core Questions Philosophy • 1n

A Text with Readings

Elliott Sober University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sober, Elliott.

Core questions in philosophy: a text with readings/Elliott Sober.-6th ed. p.cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-205-20669-8 ISBN-10: 0-205-20669-7 i. Philosophy-ll)troductions. I. Title. BD2i.S615 2013 100-dc23

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Contents

Boxes xv111 Preface xix Acknowledgments xx MySearchLab Connections in This Text xxii

Part One. Introduction i

Chapters

1. What Is Philosophy? 3 Examples 4 Three Theories about What Philosophy Is 6 The Nature of Philosophy Has Changed Historically 7 Philosophical Method 8

MySearchlab Connections 9 CEJ-{Read on MySearchlab The Value of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell

2. Deductive Arguments 11 Argu1nents 11 Good Arguments 12 Deductive Validity Defined 13 "Validity" Is a Technical Term 13 Logical Form 14 Invalidity 14 Testing for Invalidity 15 Circularity, or Begging the Question 18 Truth 18 "True for Me" 20 Wishful Thinking 20 Self-Fulfilling Prophesies 20

MySearchlab Connections 22

3. Inductive and Abductive Arguments 24 Deductive Validity Is a Limitation 25 Nondeductive Inference-A Weaker Guarantee 26 Two Gambling Strategies 26 Universal Laws 26 Detective Work 27

v

vi Contents

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Induction 27 1\vo Factors Influence Inductive Strength 28 Abduction 28 Inferring What Isn't Observed 29 Abduction Differs from Induction 29 Can You Deduce the Explanation front the Observations? 30 Deducing Observational Predictions from a Theory 30 When the Prediction Comes True 30 When the Prediction Turns Out to Be False 31 How True Predictions and False Predictions Are Interpreted 31 The Surprise Principle: When Does Successful Prediction

Provide Strong Evidence? 32 Evidence May Discrilninate bet\veen So1ne Hypotheses

While Failing to Discriminate between Others 34 True Prediction Isn't Enough 35 Modest Favoring 36 The Surprise Principle Summarized 36 The Only Game in Town Fallacy 36

MySearchLab Connections 39

Suggestions for Further Reading 39

Part Two. Philosophy of Religion 41

Chapters

4. Aquinas's First Four Ways 43 IJ!l-[Read on MySearchLab Five Ways to Prove that God Exists,

fro1n Sun1111a Theologiae, Tho1nas Aquinas The Concept of God 44 The First Two Arguments: Motion and Causality 44 Aquinas on the Cause of Motion 46 God Is a Person, Not Just a Cause That Exists Outside of Nature 46 The Birthday Fallacy 46 Why Can't Nature Be Infinitely Old? 47 Why Must Every Event in Nature Have a Cause? 48 The Third Argument: Contingency 48 Necessary and Contingent Beings 48 Possible Worlds 48 Reductio Ad Absurdum 50 Contingency and Eternity 51 Conservation La\vs in Physics 52 The Birthday Fallacy (Again) 52 Necessary Beings other than God 52

Necessary and Contingent Propositions 53 Mathematical Truths 53 Names Differ from the Things Named 53 Nun1bers Aren't Nun1erals 54

Sets 54 Necessity and Certainty Are Different 55 Numbers Are Necessary Beings 56 Aquinas's Fourth Argument: Properties That Come in Degrees 56 Criticizing an Argun1ent versus Sho\ving the Argu1nent's

Conclusion Is False 57

MySearchlab Connections 58

5. The Design Argument 59 Goal-Directed Systems 60 Two Kinds of Design Argument 60 Paley's Watch 61 ~Read on MySearchLab The Design Argurnent, fro1n

Natural Theology, William Paley The Analogy 62 Abductions Arguments Often Postulate Unobserved Entities 62 Hume's Criticisms of the Design Argument 63 ~Read on MySearchLab Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,

David Hume Is the Design Argument a Weak Argument from Analogy? 63 Is the Design Argument a Weak Induction? 65

MySearchlab Connections 67

6. Evolution and Creationism 68 Creationism 69 Some Creationist Argu1nents 69 Darwin's Two-Part Theory 70 Natural Selection 71 Speciation 73 The Tree ofLife 73 The Principle of the Common Cause 74 Arbitrary Similarities among Organisms 75 Useful Similarities among Organisms 75 Irreducible Complexity 76 Is Creationism Testable? 78 Predictive Equivalence 78 Prediction versus Accon1n1odation 79 Does Evolutionary Theory Make Novel Predictions? Bo Concluding Remarks 81

MySearchlab Connections 82

Contents vii

viii Contents

. '' ..... ' ... '.'.''.'' ' .. '' ... '.,'' ' ... ''.'''.'.','''.' .... ' '''' .... ' ... ''' 7. Can Science Explain Everything? 83

Scientific Ignorance 84 The Only Game in Town Fallacy 85 The Two Questions 85 What Is a Scientific Explanation? 85 A Thesis about Explanation 86 Why Is There Something Rather than Nothing? 87 Can Physics Explain the Origin of the Universe? 87 Leibniz: God Chooses Which Possible World to Actualize 87 Clarke: God Explains Why the Actual World Consists

of One Total History Rather than Another 88 The Only Game in Town Fallacy, Again 88 Causality 89 The Principle of Sufficient Reason 90

MySearchLab Connections 91

8. The Ontological Argument 92 A Posteriori and A Priori 92 Definitions and Existence 93 Anselm's Argument 93 CE!-[ Read on MySearchLab Debate, Guanilo and Anselm Gaunilo's Criticism 95 Anselm's Reply 97 Dispensing with Perfection 98 Conclusion 98

MySearchlab Connections 100

9. Is the Existence of God Testable? 101 Logical Positivis1n 101 The Testability Theory of Meaning 102 Analyticity 102 Falsifiability 102 Auxiliary Assumptions Needed 104 Auxiliary Assumptions Must Be Independently Established 106 "God Exists" Is Meaningful 106 CE!-[ Read on MySearchlab Of Miracles, from An Enquiry Concerning

Human Understanding, David Hume MySearchlab Connections 108

10. Pascal and Irrationality 109 Prudential and Evidential Reasons for Belief 109 CE!-[ Read on MySearchLab The Wager, from Pensees, Blaise Pascal When Does It Make Sense to Gamble? no Pascal's Argument 111

Contents ix

'" .. '.' ...... ,.'', '''. ''''.' '' .. "'' '' ... ' '',. ', .. ' '.' '.''.''.' ...... '''., First Criticis1n of Pascal's Argu1nent 112 Second Criticism of Pascal's Argument 113 The Role of Reason 113 Freud's Psychological Explanation of Theism 114

A New Prudential Argument 115 Prag1natism 115

i'.E-CRead on MySearchlab The Will to Believe, William James CEJ-[Read on MySearchlab 111e Ethics of Belief, W. K. Clifford MySearchlab Connections 118

11. The Argument from Evil 119

First Version of the Argument 119 Two Kinds of Evil 120

Possible Reactions to the Argument 120 Theodicy and Defense 121 Soul-Building Evils 121 Second Version of the Argument 123 Free Will 123

Examples and a Third Version of the Argument 123 A Criticism of the Argument 124 Testability, Again 125 Another Kind of Argument-The Evidential Argument from Evil 125

MySearchlab Connections i27 i'.E-CRead on MySearchlab Theodicy, Gottfried Leibniz

Suggestions for Further Reading 127

Readings 129

Five Ways to Prove That God Exists, Thomas Aquinas 129 The Design Argument, William Paley 129 Critique of the Design Argument, David Hume 129 The Ontological Argument, Anselm 130 The Meaninglessness of Religious Discourse, A.). Ayer 130 Belief in God-What Do You Have to Lose?, Blaise Pascal 134 The Will to Believe, William James 134

Part Three. Theory of Knowledge 135

Chapters

12. What Is Knowledge? i37 Epistemology 137 Three Kinds of Knowledge 138

x Contents

Two Requirements for Knowledge: Belief and Truth 140 Plato: True Belief Isn't Sufficient for Knowledge 140 Justification 141 The JTB Theory 141 Three Counterexamples to the )TB Theory 142 What the Counterexa1nples Have in Con11non 143

An Argument for Skepticism 143 Problems for Further Thought 145

MySearchlab Connections 145

13. Descartes' Foundationalism 147 Foundationalis1n 147 t'.1!1-[Read on MySearchLab Meditations 1-5 of Meditatio11s 011

First Philosophy, Rene Descartes Euclid's Parallel Postulate 148 Descartes' Method of Doubt 149 The Method Applied to a Posteriori Beliefs 150 Dubitability Is a Logical, Not a Psychological, Property 150 The Method Applied to Beliefs Based on Rational Calculation 150 I Am Thinking, Therefore I Exist 151 Thesis of the Incorrigibility of the Mental 152 Do First-Person Psychological Beliefs

Provide a Sufficient Foundation? 153 An Additional Foundational Belief: God Exists and Is No Deceiver 154 How to Prove that God Exists 154 The Clarity and Distinctness Criterion 156 The Cartesian Circle 157 Conclusion 157 MySearchlab Connections 159

14. The Reliability Theory of Knowledge 161 Descartes: Knowledge Is Internally Certifiable 161 What Makes a Thermometer Reliable? 162 Relevance to the Problem of Knowledge 164 Three Concepts oflmpossibility 164 To Have Knowledge, You Don't Have to Be Able to

Construct a Philosophical Argument Refuting the Skeptic 165 A Consequence of the Reliability Theory 167 Thesis of the Relativity of Knowledge 168 What Does the Relativity Thesis Say about Skepticism? 169

MySearchlab Connections 171

15. Justified Belief and Hume's Problem oflnduction 172 Knowledge versus Justified Belief 172

Contents xi

' ... '' '''''''' '''' '''',' ''' '''''' ', .. ' , '''.' '',' . ''.'.' ' ... '.'. , '''''. Skepticism about Justified Belief 173 t:E:J-[Read on MySearchlab Section IV of An Enquiry Concerning

Hu111an Understanding, David Htune Hume's Skeptical Thesis about Induction 174 Hume's Argument that Induction Can't Be Rationally Justified 175 Why Caiit PUN Be Justified? 176 Sununary of Hume's Argu1nent r76

MySearchlab Connections 177

16. Can Hume's Skepticism Be Refuted? 178 What, Exactly, Does the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature Say? 178 A New Concept: Degrees of Reliability 179 What Is a Rule oflnference? 180 Does the Past Reliability of Induction Provide an Answer? 180 Hume's Argument Reformulated 181 Strawson: It Is Analytic that Induction Is Rational 181 Black: Induction Can Be Inductively Justified 182

MySearchlab Connections 184

17. Beyond Foundationalism 185 Hume's Proble1n and Descartes' Proble1n 185

Whether X Is Evidence for Y Depends on Background Assumptions Z 187 Another Relativity Thesis 188 Foundationalism Leads to Skepticism 188 A Nonfoundationalist Approach to Justification 189 Standards of Justification Often Depend on the Audience 189 Two Metaphors-Building a Building and Repairing a Raft 190

MySearchlab Connections 191

18. Locke on the Existence of External Objects 192 t:E:J-[Read on MySearchlab Chapter u of Essay Concerning

Human Understanding, john Locke Locke's First Argument-"Those That Want the Organs of Any Sense" 193 Locke's Second Argument-"Ideas Which Force Themselves upon Me" 194 Locke's Third Argument-"Pleasure or Paiii' 194 Locke's Fourth Argument-"Our Senses Assist One

Another's Testimony" 195

MySearchlab Connections 196

Suggestions for Further Reading 196

Readings 198

The Theaetetus-Knowledge Is Something More than True Belief, Plato 198 Meditations 011 First Philosophy, Rene Descartes 198

xii Contents

Induction Cannot Be Rationally Justified, David Hume 199 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, john Locke 199

Part Four. Philosophy of Mind 201

Chapters

19. Dualism and the Mind/Body Problem 203 What ls the Mind/Body Problem? 204 Descartes' Dualis1n 204 The Mind/Brain Identity Theory 204 CEJ--[Read on MySearchLab Meditation VI, from Meditations

on First Philosophy, Rene Descartes Immortality of the Soul 205 Leibniz's Law 205 Descartes' First Argument for Dualism-The Indubitable

Existence Argun1ent 206 An Analogy 207 Propositional Attitudes and Aboutness 207 Descartes' Second Argument for Dualism-The Divisibility Argument 210 Causality between the Physical and the Nonphysical 210 CEJ-[Read on MySearchlab Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth,

Rene Descartes

MySearchlab Connections 212

20. Logical Behaviorism 214 The Attack on "the Ghost in the Machine" 215 Logical Behaviorism Says Mentalism Is False

Because It Leads to Skepticism 215 Do We Know about the Mental States of Others

by Analogy with Our Own Case? 216 Abduction 216 Logical Behaviorism's Positive Thesis-Its Analysis of

Mentalistic Vocabulary 217 The Dispositional Analysis of Desire ls Incomplete 218 A Dispositional Analysis Does Not Refute Mentalism 218

MySearchlab Connections 220

21. Methodological Behaviorism 221 The Negative Thesis: Psychology Should Avoid Belief/Desire

Explanations 222 Methodological Behaviorism's Positive Thesis 223 First Objection to Behaviorism's Positive Thesis: Novel Behaviors 224

''. ' •• '' 0'','''' ''' '''' '' '' ''''''''

Second Objection to Behavioristn's Positive 'I'hesis: It Assun1es that Environmental Detern1inisn1 Is True 226

The Two Objections Summarized 227

MySearchlab Connections 228

22. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory 229 The Identity Theory ls an A Posteriori Claim 229 Materialistn 230 Progress in Science 230 Dualism Resembles Vitalism 231 A Correlation Experitnent 231 The Principle of Parsimony 232

MySearchlab Connections 235

23. Functionalism 236 Functionalism's Negative Thesis: What's Wrong

with the Identity Theory? 237 Multiple Realizability 237 Could a Computer Have Psychological Characteristics? 238 Multiple Realizability within the Class of Living Things 239 Functionalism's Positive Thesis 240 Sensations 241

MySearchlab Connections 243

24. Freedom, Determinism, and Causality 244 The Problem of Freedom 245 Examples of Unfree Acts 246 Are All Behaviors Like Those Produced by

Braitnvashing and Con1pulsions? 247 A Clash of Plausible Conceptions 247 What Is Causality? 248 Detern1inisn1 248 Indeterminisn1 249 Does Indeter1ninism Make Us Free? 250 Causality Is the Issue, Not Detern1inism 251 What Does Determinism Say about the Causation of Behavior? 252 Determinism Differs fro1n Fatalisin 252

MySearchlab Connections 254

25. A Menu of Positions on Free Will 255 "Compatibility" Defined 255 Incompatibilism and Compatibilism 256 Libertarianisn1 257 r::El-{Read on MySearchLab The System of Nature, Baron d'Holbach

Contents xiii

xiv Contents

'''.' > ''.' •• ' •• ' •• ' ••••••••• '.' ••••• ' ••• '.' ••• '.'.'.' ••• ' •• ,- • ' ' •• '. ' •• ''.

Two Soft Determinist Theories 259 Hume 259 t:EJ-[Read on MySearchLab Of Liberty and Necessity, David Hume First Objection to Hume's Theory: Compulsive Behavior 260 Second Objection to Hume's Theory: Locke's Locked Room 261 Does Coercion Rob Us of Free Will? 261 A Second Compatibilist Proposal: The Relevance of

Second-Order Desires 262 t:EJ-[Read on MySearchLab On Free Choice, Thomas Aquinas MySearchLab Connections 263

26. Compatibilism 265 The Weather Vane Analogy 265 Function and Malfunction 266 What Does It Mean to Ascribe a Function to Something? 267 The Function of the Desire-Generating Device 268 Reply to the Distant Causation Argument 269 What Does Responsibility Mean? 269 Moral Responsibility 270 Reply to the Could-Not-Have-Done-Otherwise Argument 271 Are Coerced Actions Unfree? 272 An Objection to the Weather Vane Theory: Freely Chosen,

Rational Self-Sacrifice 273

MySearchLab Connections 274

27. Psychological Egoism 275 T\vo Truisn1s 276 Goals and Side Effects of an Act 277 A Simple Example 277 Four Preference Structures . 278 People Are Rarely Pure Altruists or Pure Egoists 279 An Experimental Test 281 A Second Experimental Test 282 Conclusion 283

MySearchlab Connections 284 t:EJ-[Read on MySearchLab The Republic, Book II, 357A-367E, Plato

Suggestions for Further Reading 285

Readings 286

Meditation VI, Rene Descartes 286 Other Minds Are Known by Analogy from One~ Own Case, Bertrand Russell 286 Has the Self"Free Will"?, C.A. Campbell 289 Determinism Shows that Free Will Is an Illusion, Baron d'Holbach 300

Of Liberty and Necessity, David Hume 301 What Motivates People to Act Justly?, Plato 301

Part Five. Ethics 303

Chapters

28. Ethics-Normative and Meta 305 Ethics and Religion 305 Metaethics and Normative Ethics 306 Truth and Opinion 306 Alternative Metaethical Positions 307 Subjectivism 307 Realism 307 Conventionalisn1 307 Three Varieties of Conventionalism 308

MySearchLab Connections 310

29. The ls/Ought Gap and the Naturalistic Fallacy 311 Subjectivism: Ethical Statements Are Neither True Nor False 311 Does the Existence of Ethical Disagreement Show

that Subjectivism Is True? 312 The Genetic Fallacy 313 Hume: The Is/Ought Gap 314

Contents

(St): An Argument for Subjectivism with Hume's Thesis as a Premise 314 The Naturalistic Fallacy 316 (S2): An Argument for Subjectivism with Moore's Thesis as a Premise 317

MySearchlab Connections 318

30. Observation and Explanation in Ethics 319 Reasoning about Ethical Issues 319 Testing General Principles by Applying Them to Specific Examples 320 Thought Experiments versus Empirical Experiments 321 Observations Are ((Theory Laded' 321

Observation Does Not Imply Objectivity 322 Insoluble Disagreements 322 Is Subjectivism Preferable to Realism on Grounds of Parsimony? 324 Does Subjectivism Follow? 326 An Explanatory Role for Ethical Principles 326 What Is the Point ofEthics? 327 l::EJ-[Read on MySearchLab Treatise of Human Nature, Part III, 1.1,

David Hume

MySearchlab Connections 328

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xvi Contents

'''.'.''' ........... ' ....... '.' ... '' ... '.,' '.' ........ '' '' ... '''.''' '.' 31. Conventionalist Theories 329

What Makes a View Conventionalist? 330 Trivial Semantic Conventionalism 330 Substantive versus Trivial Conventionalisn1 330 Plato's Critique of the Divine Command Theory 331 l'.EJ-{Read on MySearchLab Euthyphm, Plato 1\vo Objections to the Divine Command Theory 332 Ethical Relativism 333 Ethical Relativism Is Normative, Not Descriptive 333 A Further Clarification of Ethical Relativism 334 Ethical Relativistn Is a Version of Conventionalisn1 334 If Imperialism Is Wrong, Does That Justify Ethical Relativism? 334 Sartre's Existentialism 336 l'.EJ-{Read on MySearchLab Existentiaiisn1 Is a Hun1anis1n,

Jean-Paul Sartre

MySearchLab Connections 338

32. Utilitarianism 340 l'.EJ-{Read on MySearchLab Utilitarianism, Chapters 1-4, John Stuart Mill Mill's Defense of the Greatest Happiness Principle 341 Reciprocal Illumination 342 What Is Happiness? 343 The Problem of the Experience Machine 343 Mill on "Higher" and "Lower" Pleasures 344 Objection to Hedonistic Utilitarianism 345 Preference Utilitarianism 345 The Apples and Oranges Problem 346 Utilitarianism and Justice: The Case of the Lonesome Stranger 347

Punishment 347 A Reply: Distinguish Rule and Act Utilitarianism 348 Utilitarianism and Tolerance: The Problem of the Fanatical Majority 349 l'.EJ-{Read on MySearchLab On Liberty, Chapters 1-3, John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism and Personal Integrity: The Problem of Dirty Hands 352 Utilitarianism and Personal Loyalties 353 A Psychological Objection to My Criticisms of Utilitarianism 353 l'.EJ-{Read on MySearchlab Principle of Utility, Jeremy Bentham

MySearchLab Connections 355

33. Kant's Moral Theory 357 Hume on Reason's Role 358 Kant Rejects the Idea that Reason Is Purely Instrumental 358 l'.EJ-{Read on MySearchlab Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,

Sections I and 2, Immanuel Kant Kant: Moral Rules Are Categorical Imperatives 358

Contents xvii

"''',''','' ''' ''.'',', .. '' .. '''''.''.'.' ..... ,' ''. The Moral Law 359 Kant: The Moral Value of an Act Derives from Its Maxim,

Not from Its Consequences 359 Kant Rejected Consequentialism 360 The Universalizability Criterion 360 Four Examples 361 Evaluation of Kant's Examples 362 A Problem for the Universalizability Criterion 363 Kant: People Are Ends in Themselves 364 The Rabbit and the Hat 365 MySearchLab Connections 366

34. Aristotle on the Good Life 368 How Far Do Obligations Extend? 368 The Theory of the Right and the Theory of the Good 369 Are There General Principles about the Good Life? 369 CE}-{ Read on MySearchLab Nico111achea11 Ethics, Books I, II and X

(Sections 7 and 8), Aristotle What ls a Good X? 370 Human Beings Are Goal-Directed Systems 371 The Capacity to Reason 371 Aristotle: Happiness Is Not a Subjective State 372 Why the Life of Rational Activity Is Best: Two More Reasons 373 The Doctrine of the Mean 373 A Second Criticism of Aristotle's Theory-Defining What

a Good X Is Differs from Saying What Is Good for an X 374 A Third Criticism-Why Single Out Contemplation as the Best Life? 375

MySearchLab Connections 377

Suggestions for Further Reading 378

Readings 379

The Euthyphro-A Critique of the Divine Command Theory, Plato 379 Existe11tialis111, jean-Paul Sartre 379 Defense of Utilitarianism, john Stuart Mill 379 Ethics Founded on Reason, Immanuel Kant 380 Morality and Human Nature, Aristotle 380 Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Peter Singer 380

Boxes

1. Conditionals 18 2. Begging the Question 19 3. Deducing That a Theory is True 32 4. No Surprise/Surprise 34 5. An Investment Swindle 37 6. Hun1ans fron1 Nonhu1nans, Life fron1 Nonlife 76 7. "But How do You Explain God?" 84 8. A Priori/A Posteriori and Necessity/Contingency 95 9. Neptune and Vulcan 105

10. The Expected Value of an Action 110 11. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 139 12. Is Skepticism Self-Refuting? 144 13. Indubitability 149 14. The KK-Principle 166 15, What's Relative About Einstein's Theory of Relativity? 170 16. Sense and Reference 208 17. Pain Without Pain Behavior? 219 18. Minimal Explanation Versus Deep Explanation 226 19. Ne\vton on Parsin1ony 233 20. The Birthday Fallacy, Again 238 21. Transitivity 245 22. Two Uses of Probability 250 23. The Normative Problem of Freedom 257 24. What is Coercion? 272 25. Apportioning Causal Responsibility 282 26. E1notivisn1 312 27. Values in Science 323 28. Two Views of Democracy 336 29. Liberalism and Conservatism 350 30. Good Versus Green 370 31. "Natural" and "Norn1al" 374

xviii

Preface

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS investigated in this book concern fundamental facts about our place in the universe. Many of us were brought up to believe that God exists, that there is a real difference between right and wrong, that we can freely choose what sort of lives to lead, and that it is possible for us to gain knowledge of the world we inhabit. A major goal of philosophy is to discover whether these opinions can be rationally defended or are just comfortable illusions.

Core Questions in Philosophy emphasizes the idea that philosophy is a subject devoted to evaluating arguments and constructing theories. This is not the same as describing the history of what various philosophers have thought. Although I discuss historical texts, I do so because they are rich sources of ideas pertinent to answering philosophical questions. The point is not to say solemn and respectful words about worthy figures now dead, but to engage them in dialogue-to grapple with the theories they have proposed, to criticize these theories, even to itnprove upon the1n.

Besides proposing answers to philosophical questions, I also try to make clear which questions I have not answered. I hope that the reader will approach what I say the way I have approached the philosophical texts I discuss. This is a book to argue with, to dissect. It isn't my goal to have the reader accept without question the conclusions I reach.

This work is a combination textbook with readings. In Parts 1\vo through Five of the book, the chapters I wrote are followed by related readings (drawn from the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Anselm, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Mill, and others). The chapters are intended to flow together, so that the main areas covered-philosophy of reli- gion, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics-are connected to each other to make a coherent whole. The chapters often discuss the readings that follow, but the area of over- lap is far from total. Many chapters contain material that isn't touched on in any reading; and the readings raise a wealth of issues that the chapters dmrt address. The chapters are intended to stand on their own as well as to provide points of entry into the readings. The chapters I wrote are intended to be launching pads from which readers can pursue issues on their own. I believe students are best able to think about philosophy if they are first provided with some basic tools and concepts. It is the purpose of the chapters to provide these core ideas.

Each chapter is followed by review questions and problems for further thought. These should help readers to consolidate their understanding of what I have said, and to think creatively about related problems. The chapters often contain material in boxes; these boxes provide, in a nutshell, a restatement of an important idea or a brief discus- sion of a related matter that may interest the reader. A list of the boxes immediately fol- lows the table of contents. Each main part of the book includes suggestions for further reading. There is also a glossary at the end of the book that provides simple definitions of the inain concepts used.

xix

xx Preface

'. ''''' ''.' <'''' " •• ''. ' •• ' ''' •• ' ' •• ,'' '' •••• '.'.'' '''''' '' ' •• ' ' ••• '' '>.' '.

Besides discussing a number of traditional topics, this book also takes up some con- temporary theories and problems, both from philosophy and from other disciplines. Creationism and evolutionary theory are hotly debated now. The issues they raise are con- tinuous with a tradition of argument in philosophy of religion that goes back (at least) to Aquinas, Hume, and Paley. The relation of mind and body is a philosophical problem of long standing, but the ideas of Freud and Skinner get a hearing along with those of Descartes. In ethics, there has long been a debate as to whether ethical truths are discov- ered or created. Plato and Sartre are separated by more than two thousand years, but both speak to this issue. The problem of free will raises the question of whether every event is caused. Here, the contribution of modern physics must be brought into contact with a perennial problem of philosophy. Philosophy isn't the same as biology, psychology, or physics, but the problems of philosophy cannot be isolated from the sciences. One aim of this book is to connect philosophical problems with ideas derived from a wider culture.

In addition to rewriting each chapter for clarity (and in a few instances correcting what I think were mistakes in the previous edition), I added new readings by Plato, Hans Reichenbach, and Peter Singer.

The etymology of the word philosopher is lover of wisdom. This doesn't guarantee that all philosophers are wise, nor even that each individual philosopher is devoted to the attainment of wisdom. Philosophers should strive for wisdom; whether they do so, and 'vhether they attain it, are separate questions. Wisdom involves understanding-seeing how things fit together. When the pieces of a puzzle are fitted together, one attains a sense of wholeness. Current philosophy is embedded in a historical tradition of philosophical discourse. It also is connected to problems in the sciences, the other humanities, and the arts. This book aims to give the reader a sense of these multiple connections.

Acknowledgments

Elliott Sober U11iversity of Wisco11si11-Madison

My debts to colleagues in philosophy at University of Wisconsin, Madison, are enor- mous. A fixed point in my work week has been discussions of the ideas and tech- niques that go into presenting central problems of philosophy to new students. My philosophical outlook, as well as the view I have of teaching, have been shaped by these conversations.

It is a pleasure to thank Michael Byrd, Claudia Card, Fred Dretske, Ellery Eells, Berent Enc;, Malcolm Forster, Martha Gibson, Paula Gottlieb, Daniel Hausman, Andy Levine, Steve Nadler, Terry Penner, Mark Singer, Dennis Stampe, Daniel Wik:ler, and Keith Yandell. They were generous enough to suffer my trespasses onto philosophical ter- rain that belonged more to them than to me. Some read parts of this book and gave me comments; others listened patiently while I tried out what I thought was a new angle.

The first five editions of Core Questions i11 Philosophy elicited a steady stream of cor- respondence and phone calls from teachers of philosophy and their students. These took a variety of forms; there \Vas praise and blan1e, suggestions on ho'iv to do better, and even

Preface xxi

'. '''' '.'.' ''. < ••• '.'.'' •• '''. '.' •• >. '. ' ... '' ' ... ''.'.' .. ' .. ' •... ' '' ... ' •. a few not-so-gentle suggestions that I should turn my attention to other projects. On the whole, though, I was happy with what I heard, though this didn't mean that I felt that I should leave the book unchanged. I thank everyone who took the trouble to let me know what they thought. Most (but not all) will find evidence that I listened to what they said in the way this edition differs from the ones before.

Deserving of special mention are Richard Behling, Keith Butler, John Carpenter, Paul Christopher, William R. Carter, Robert Cummins, Doug Frame, Phil Gasper, Ronald Glass, Richard Hanley, John Hines, Burton Hurdle, Charles Kielkopf, John Koolage, Gregory Mougin, Bradley Monton, Margaret Moore, William Russell Payne, Howard Prospersel, David Ring, Roy Sorensen, Whilhelm S. Wurzer, Stephen Wykstra, and Joel Velasco. The help they provided was extremely valuable. I also must thank the anonymous readers of previous editions of this textbook for their valuable suggestions. In addition, I'm grateful to Hayley Clatterbuck, Stewart Eskew, Casey Hart, Reuben Stern, and Naftali Weinberger for helping me prepare this new edition.

Writing an introduction to philosophy is a challenge. The challenge is to reconstruct what a problem or idea would sound like to someone who hasn't studied the subject be- fore. The project requires that one return to the beginning-to the fundamentals of the subject. I hope what I found by beginning again will be useful to those who are beginning for the first time.

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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books I, II, and X (Sections 7 and 8) (34) G11ani/o and Ansel111, "Debate" (8) Thomas Aq11i11as, "Five Ways to Prove that God Exists", from S11111ma Theologiae (4) Thomas Aq11inas, "On Free Choice" (25) Jeremy Bentham, "Principle of Utility" (32) W. K. Clifford, "The Ethics ofBelief" (10) Rene Descartes, ((Correspondence \vith Princess Elizabeth'' (19) Rene Descartes, Meditation VI from Meditations on First Philosophy (19) Rene Descartes, Meditations 1-5 of Meditations on First Philosophy (13) Baron d'Holbach, "The System of Nature" (25) David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 2 (5) David H11111e, "Of Liberty and Necessity" (25) David Hume, "Of Miracles': from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (9) David Hume, Section IV of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (15) David Hu111e, Treatise of Human Nature; Part Ill, 1.1. (30) William James, "The Will to Believe" (10) I111111a11ue/ Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Sections 1 and 2 (33) Gottfried Leibniz, Theodicy (n) John Locke, Chapter 11 of Essay Concerning Human Understanding (18) William Paley, "The Design Argument", from Natural Theology (5) Blaise Pascal, "The Wager': from Pensees (10) Plato, "The Republic" Book II, 357A-367E (27) Plato, "Euthyphro'' (31) Bertrand Russell, "The Value of Philosophy" (1) Jean-Pa11l Sartre, "Existentialism ls a Humanism" (31) John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism;' Chapters 1-4 (32) John St11art Mill, "On Liberty;' Chapters 1-3 (32)

part one •••••••••••••••• ·-· ·-5·_.-~ •• ~. ~-. ~-~

Introduction

chapter l ..............................

What Is Philosophy?

Chapter Outline

Examples

Three Theories about What Philosophy Is

The Nature of Philosophy Has Changed Historically

Philosophical Method

Summary

When asked "do you have a philosophy?" most people say "yes;' but what do they mean? They usually have in mind a set of beliefs that they admit are difficult to prove are true, but that nonetheless are important to the way they think of themselves and the world they inhabit. Sometimes people describe their philosophies by saying what they think makes an action right or wrong. The statement "it's part of my philosophy that people should help each other" might be an example. A person's philosophy might include the fundamental ethical principles he or she believes. But people often have more than ethics in mind when they talk about their philosophies. A religious person might say that it is part of his or her philosophy that God exists; an atheist might say that it is part of his or her philosophy that there is no God and that there is no life after death. These propositions are important to the people who believe them. They describe what exists; philosophers would say that they are part of metaphysics, not ethics. Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that attempts to describe, in very general tenns, \Vhat there is.

If every day people think of their philosophies as the important beliefs they have that are difficult to prove, how does this idea of philosophy relate to how philosophers under- stand their own subject? Sometimes a term is used in ordinary talk in a way that differs dramatically from the way it is used by specialists. People sometimes say that tomatoes are vegetables, but a botanist will tell you that tomatoes are fruits. Every day people say they

3

4 Part One: Introduction

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are concerned about "ecology;' but biologists understand "ecology" in a very different way. Perhaps philosophers use the term "philosophy" in a way that departs fundamentally from what ordinary people mean when they say that they have a philosophy.

To gain a better purchase on what philosophy is, I'm going to discuss the question of what is distinctive about philosophy from two angles. First, I'll sketch some of the main philosophical problems that I'll examine in this book. That is, I'll describe some examples of philosophy. But giving examples doesn't really answer the question of what philosophy is. If you asked, "What is a 1nanunal?" and I sho'ived you a human being, a hippo, and a cat, these exan1ples n1ight give you a hint about 'ivhat a 1nanunal is. Ho'ivever, citing exa1nples isn't the sa1ne as saying 'ivhat it is to be a 111anunal. That is 'ivhy there 'ivill be a second stage to my discussion of what philosophy is. After giving some examples of philosophical problems, I'll present some theories about what philosophy is. I believe these theories have n1erit, though I adn1it none is entirely adequate.

Examples

The first philosophical problem we'll consider in this book is whether God exists. Some philosophers have constructed arguments that attempt to establish that God exists, others have tried to show there is no God, and still others think that the question can't really be answered. I'll evaluate some of the more influential arguments and try to see whether they work.

The second problem we will consider concerns knowledge. It is pretty clear that belief and knowledge are different. Long ago some people thought that the earth is flat. They believed this, but they didn't know it, since it isn't true. Of course, they thought they knew it, but that's different. It is also pretty clear that true belief isn't the same as knowledge. If you believe something for no reason at all, but happen to be right by accident, you have true belief but not knowledge. For example, think of a gullible gambler at a racetrack who believes for no good reason that the first horse in every race will win. Occasionally this person will be right-he will have a true belief. But it isn't plausible to say that he knew, on those races about which he turned out to be right, which horse would win. So having knowledge involves something more than having a true belief.

The philosophical problem about knowledge will split into two parts. First, there are the questions: What is knowledge? What makes knowledge different from true belief? Second, there is the question: Do human beings ever know anything? One philosophical position we 'ivill consider ans'ivers this last question in the negative. Sure, vve have beliefs. And granted, son1e of our beliefs turn out to be true. Kno\vledge, ho,vever, \Ve never have. We don't even know those things that we take to be most obvious. This position is called philosophical skep- ticisn1. We \Vill consider argu1nents for skepticisn1 and argun1ents that attempt to refute it.

The third philosophical subject that will be addressed in this book consists of a collection of topics from the philosophy of mind. The first of these is the so-called mind/ body problem. You have a mind; you also have a brain. What is the relationship between these items? One possible answer is that they are identical. Although "mind" and "brain'' are different words, they name the same thing, just like the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent:' An alternative position in this area is called dualism; it says that the mind and the brain are different things. We will consider other theories that have been advanced about the mind/body problem as well.

Chapter 1: \Y/hat Is Philosophy? 5

''' '''',' ''''''''' '.''' ''.' '' .. '.''' ... ''. '. Another topic from the philosophy of mind that we'll address concerns human freedom.

Each of us has the personalities 've have because 've inherited a set of genes fron1 our parents and then gre'v up in a sequence of environ1nents. Genes plus environn1ents n1ake us the sorts of people 've are. We didn't choose the genes 've have, nor did '"e choose the environn1ents we experienced in early life. These were thrust upon us from the outside. Each of us per- fonns certain actions and abstains from perfor111ing others. This pattern of ,vhat 've do and don't do results fron1 the personalities 've have. Can 've be said to perfor111 actions freely? Is it really in our control to perform some actions and abstain from others? Perhaps the fact that our actions are the results of factors outside our control (our genes and our early environ- ment) shows that it is a mistake to say that we freely choose what we do. Of course, we talk in everyday life about people doing things "of their own free will:' We also think of ourselves as facing real choices, as exercising control over 'vhat "Te do. Ho,vever, the philosophical prob- lem of freedom asks whether this common way of thinking is really defensible. Maybe free- don1 is just an illusion. Perhaps 've tell ourselves a fairy tale about our o'vn freedom because we can't face the fact that we are1it free. The philosophical problem will be to see whether we can be free agents if our personalities are the results of factors outside our control.

The last problem area we will address is ethics. In everyday life, we frequently think that some actions are right and others are wrong. The philosophical problem about this familiar attitude divides into two parts. First, we'll consider whether there really are such things as ethical facts. Maybe talk about ethics, like talk about freedom, is just an elabo- rate illusion. Consider a parallel question about science. In every science, there are ques- tions that are controversial. For example, physicists have different opinions about how the solar system began. But most of us think that there is something else to physics besides opinions. There are facts about what the world is really like.

Clashes of opinion occur in what I'll call the subjective realm. Here we find one human mind disagreeing with another. But facts about physics exist in the objective realm. Those facts exist independently of anybody's thinking about them. They are out there, and science aims to discover 'vhat they are. In science, there are both subjective opinions and objective facts-people have beliefs, but there also exists, independently of what anyone believes, a set of facts concerning the way the world really is. The question about ethics is whether both these realms (subjective and objective) exist in ethics, or only one of them does. We know that people have different ethical opinions. The question is whether, in addition to those opinions, there are ethical facts. In other words, does ethics parallel the description I've just given of science, or is there a fundamental difference here? The accompanying two-by-two table illustrates this question. Ethical subjectivism is the philosophical thesis that there are no ethical facts, only ethical opinions. According to this position, the claim that ((n1urder is ahvays 'vrong" and the clahn that "n1urder is sometimes permissible'' are both misguided-there are no facts about the ethics of murder for us to have opinions about. We'll consider argu111ents supporting and criticizing this position.

Subjective Realm Objective Realm

Science Scientific opinions Scientific facts

Ethics Ethical opinions Ethical facts?

6 Part One: Introduction

....... '' .... '' .... '. ' .. ' ......... ' .. '''.' ''' '' ' .... ''. '.'. '.' '' .. '' ... ' ' ' The second question that arises in ethics is this: If there are ethical facts, what are they?

Here \Ve assume a positive ans,ver to the first question and then press for 1nore details. One theory we'll consider is utilitarianism, which says that the action you should perform in a given situation is the one that will produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of individuals. This may sound like common sense, but I'll argue that there are some serious problems with this ethical theory.

Three Theories about What Philosophy Is

I've just described a menu of four central philosophical problems: God, knowledge, mind, and ethics. What makes them all philosophical problems? Instead of giving examples, can we say something more general and complete about what distinguishes philosophy from other areas of inquiry? I'll offer three theories about what is characteristic of at least some philosophical problems.

Several of the problems just described involve fundamental questions of justification. There are many things that we believe without hesitation or reflection. These beliefs that are second nature to us are sometimes called "conunon sense;' Common sense says that the sense experiences we have (via sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell) provide each of us with knowledge of the world we inhabit. Common sense also says that people often act ((of their ovvn free \vill:' and conunon sense holds that some actions are right \vhile others are wrong. Philosophy examines the fundamental assumptions we make about ourselves and the world we inhabit and tries to determine whether those assumptions are rationally defensible.

Another characteristic of many philosophical questions is that they are very general; often they're more general than the questions investigated in specific sciences. Physicists have asked whether there are electrons; biologists have investigated whether genes exist; geologists have sought to find out whether the continents rest on movable plates. However, none of these sciences really bother with the question of why we should think that physical objects exist. The various sciences sin1ply assunie that there are things outside the 1nind; they then focus on more specific questions about what those things are like. In contrast, it is a characteristically philosophical question to ask why you should believe that there is anything at all outside your mind. The idea that your mind is the only thing that ex- ists is called solipsism. Philosophers have addressed the question of whether solipsism is true. This is a far more general question than the question of whether electrons, genes, or continental plates exist.

The third view of what philosophy is says that philosophy is the enterprise of clarifying concepts. Consider some characteristic philosophical questions: What is knowledge? What is freedom? What is justice? Each of these concepts applies to some things but not to others. What do the things falling under a concept have in common, and how do they differ from the things to which the concept does not apply?

We must be careful here, since many questions that aren't especially philosophical sound like the exan1ples just given. Consider so1ne characteristic scientific questions: What is photosynthesis? What is acidity? What is an electron? How does the first batch

Chapter 1: What Is Philosophy? 7

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of questions differ from these? One difference between these questions concerns the 'vays in ,vhich reason and observation help ans,ver then1. You probably are a'vare that philosophy courses don't include laboratory sections. Philosophers usually don't per- form experiments as part of their inquiries. Yet, in many sciences (though not in all), laboratory observation is central. This doesn't mean that observation plays no role in philosophy. Many of the philosophical arguments we will consider begin by making an observation. For example, in Chapter 5, I'll consider an argurnent for the existence of God that begins with the following assertion: Organisms are complicated things that are remarkably well adapted to the environments they inhabit. The thing to notice here is that this fact is something we know by observation. So philosophers, as well as scientists, do rely on observations.

Nonetheless, there is son1ething distinctive about ho'v observations figure in a philosophical inquiry. Usually the observations that are used in a philosophical the- ory are familiar and obvious to everyone. A philosopher will try to show by reasoning that those observations lead to some rather surprising conclusions. That is, although philosophy involves both observation and reasoning, it is the latter that in some sense does more of the work. As you will see in what follows, philosophical disputes often involve disagreements about reasoning; rarely are such disputes decidable by making an observation.

Each of these ways of understanding what philosophy is should be taken with a grain of salt (or perhaps with two). I think there is something to be said for each, even though each is somewhat simplified and distorting.

The Nature of Philosophy Has Changed Historically

One thing that makes it difficult to define "what philosophy is" is that the subject has been around at least since the ancient Greeks and has changed a great deal. There are many problems that are just as central to philosophy now as they were to the ancient Greeks, but there are other problems that have broken away from philosophy and now are thought of as purely scientific.

For example, ancient Greek philosophers discussed what the basic constituents of physical things are. Thales (who lived around 580 n.c.E.) thought that everything is made of 'vater; many other theories 'vere discussed as 'vell. No1v such questions are thought to be part of physics, not philosophy. Similarly, until the end of the nineteenth century, universities put philosophy and psychology together in the same academic de- partment. It is only recently that the two subjects have been thought of as separate. Scientists in the seventeenth century-for exan1ple, Isaac Ne,vton-used the ter1n "natural philosophy" to refer to 'vhat \Ve no'v think of as science. The ter1n "scientist" was invented in the nineteenth century by the British philosopher William Whewell. The idea that philosophy and science are separate subjects may seem clear to us now, but the separation we now find natural was not so obvious in the past. Many of the problems that we now regard as philosophical are problems that have not broken away from philosophy and found their way into the sciences. Perhaps there are problems now

8 Part One: Introduction

. ' .. ' ........ '' '' .. '.'',' .. '.''.' ''.''' . '.'' ' ..... '. ' ..... ' ' ..... '.'.'' taken to be philosophical that future generations won't regard as such. The shifting his- torical nature of what counts as philosophy makes it difficult to say anything very pre- cise about what that subject is.

Philosophical Method

Having tried to say something about what philosophy is, I now want to say something about what philosophy is not (at least not in this book). You may have the impression that doing philosophy involves lying under a tree, staring up at the sky, and making deep and mysterious pronouncements off the top of your head that sound very important but that are hard to make sense of when you try to think about them clearly. I'll call this the mysti- cal guru model of philosophy. Your experience reading this book won't correspond to this itnpression.

There is, however, another experience you've probably had that comes closer. If you took a high school geoinetry course, you'll re1ne1nber proving theore1ns fro1n axio1ns. If your geometry course was like the one I had, the axioms were given to you with very little explanation of why you should believe them. Maybe they looked pretty obvious to you, and so you didn't wonder very much about their plausibility. Anyhow, the main task was to use the axioms to prove theorems. You started with the axio1ns as assun1ptions and then showed that if they are true, other statements must be true as well.

Philosophers tend to talk about "arguments" rather than "proofs:' The goal is to try to reach answers to important philosophical questions by reasoning correctly from assumptions that are plausible. For example, in Chapter 4, I'll examine some attempts to prove that God exists. The idea here is to start with assumptions that practically anybody would grant are true and then show that these assumptions lead to the conclusion that there is a God. This resembles what you may have done in geometry: Starting with simple and supposedly obvious assumptions, you were able to establish something less obvious and more complex-for example, that the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles (180°).

Sometimes the philosophical questions we'll consider will strike you as diffi- cult, deep, even n1ysterious. I \Von't shy a\vay from such qt1estions. I'll try, ho\vever, to address them with clarity and precision. The goal is to take hard questions and deal with them clearly, which, I emphasize, should never involve trying to pull the \Vool over someone's eyes by making deep-sounding pronouncements that mean who-knows-what.

Summary

I began this chapter by describing how every day people use the term "philosophy:' In fact, their usage is not so distant from what philosophers mean by the term. Philosophy does address the most fundamental beliefs we have about ourselves and the world we in- habit. Precisely because these assu1nptions are so central to the 'vay "\Ve think and act, it is difficult to step back for a moment from these assumptions and examine them critically.

Chapter 1: \Y/hat Is Philosophy?

The French have an expression: "the most difficult thing for a fish to see is water:' Some assu1nptions are so natural and see1ningly obvious that it is hard to see that \ve are mak- ing assumptions at all. Philosophy is the effort to help us identify these assumptions and evaluate them. Each of us does have a philosophy. What divides some people from others is their willingness to ask probing questions about what they believe and why. This is what philosophy as a discipline tries to add to the philosophies that each of us carries with us through our lives.

Review Questions

i. What is the difference between objective and subjective?

2. If you \Vant to say \Vhat philosophy is, why isn't it enough to list some examples of philosophical problems?

A Problem for Further Thought

Which of the ideas presented here about what philosophy is also apply to mathematics? Which do not?

Supplementary Reading

BERTRAND RUSSELL

The Value of Philosophy

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), a British philosopher and logician, was one of the greatest and most infiuential philosophers of the twentieth century. In this short passage, Russell defends the practice of philosophy against the criticism that it is frivolous or has resulted in few definite answers, arguing that philosophy's value lies in the questions it asks rather than in the answers it yields.

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l. Bertrand Russell, "The Value of Philosophy" According to Russell, what does the study of philosophy contribute to a person's life? How does philosophy, and not science or other pursuits, provide that benefit?

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9

10 Part One: Introduction

........................ ''' ' ... ''.' ... '' ''.'' WATCH AND LISTEN

©{WATCH {<•>{LISTEN l. Listen "Edward Craig on What Is Philoso-

phy?"-Philosophy Bites podcast Edward Craig, editor of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, argues that philosophy has been too narrowly defined in the past and that there is no sharp divi· sion between "philosophical" thought and "nonphilosophicol" thought. Why does Craig think that scientific and religious statements are also philosophical? Does this make the definition of "philosophy" too vogue?

2. Listen "John Armstrong on What Can You Do With Philosophy?"-Philosophy Bites podcast , john Armstrong claims that philosophy

provides its students with a wide variety of intellectual resources. Jn what kinds of fields does Armstrong think that these resources are useful? Do you see any instances of philosophical reasoning in your daily life?