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2 Skepticism About Ethics

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Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

• Explain what it means to be a moral skeptic.

• Explain the notion of moral relativism and how it differs from moral objectivity.

• Discuss challenges to relativism.

• Explain the notion of egoism and how it differs from the notion that moral standards are unconditional.

• Discuss Glaukon’s challenge from Plato’s Republic and identify the main claims made in the story.

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Section 2.1 Introduction to Skepticism

2.1 Introduction to Skepticism In contemporary usage, skepticism means a doubt that a belief or claim is true. We often use this word to refer to general doubts about all claims of a particular sort. For example, a reli- gious skeptic might have doubts about claims pertaining to the existence of God, the possibil- ity of knowing anything about God, and so on. A global warming skeptic might doubt claims that human activity is the main cause of average global temperature rise, or a 9/11 “truther” might be skeptical about claims that the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., were exclusively the doings of al-Qaida (as opposed to being supported by the U.S. gov- ernment). Likewise, many people regard the claims of politicians, salespersons, and media personalities with doubt and suspicion.

Similarly, a moral skeptic—in the way we will be using this term here—will doubt common beliefs about morality itself. It is important to note that we are not referring to people who doubt specific moral claims, such as the claim that eating animals is wrong or that abortion is morally justified. Nor are we referring to those who doubt the truth of certain general moral theories or principles, such as utilitarianism or deontology. If we recall the discussion of the landscape of moral philosophy from Chapter 1, claims about concrete moral problems like eating animals or abortion fall under applied ethics, while claims about the general rules, principles, and values that should inform our judgments and choices fall under normative ethics. The kind of skepticism we are discussing in this chapter involves the more basic kinds of claims that fall under the scope of metaethics.

Specifically, we will consider the reasons one might hold doubts about two commonly assumed features of morality itself:

1. Moral standards are objective. 2. Moral standards are unconditional.

The forms of moral skepticism we will consider in this chapter raise doubts about those two features.

1. Relativism doubts whether moral standards are objective, instead maintaining that they are only true or false relative to a culture or individual.

2. Egoism doubts whether moral standards are unconditional, instead maintaining that they are only good if they serve an individual’s self-interest, which in turn implies that it may be better for individuals to act contrary to moral standards if they can.

We will focus a section of this chapter on each of these. First, however, it is important to note three features common to each form of skepticism.

First, skepticism is not mere doubting or contradicting. One can doubt a claim without hav- ing any basis for doing so, and one can contradict any claim by merely saying the opposite of what another person says. Neither of these are worth taking seriously by themselves, because there is no good reason for those doubts or contradictions.

The kinds of moral skepticism we will examine aim to provide such reasons. Indeed, the word skepticism itself comes from the Greek word skeptesthai, meaning “to examine” or “to consider.” Since the skeptic uses reason to undermine certain assumptions about morality,

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

we have every right to test the strength of his or her reasons. Perhaps doing so will lead us to question whether the reasons to doubt morality are good reasons (we might even become skeptical of the skeptics, so to speak). In other words, being skeptical about morality does not mean that one has abandoned the use of reason in thinking about what morality is, why it matters, and related issues. We should therefore approach skeptical views with as much criti- cal thought as a skeptic approaches the views he or she calls into question.

Second, the general features of morality that skeptics question—such as its objectivity and unconditionality—are ones that most moral systems take for granted. Accordingly, skeptics of morality generally provide an alternative explanation for why most people take these fea- tures for granted. A skeptic will have to explain why certain assumptions about morality have such a grip on us, despite the fact that we are deeply misguided (as they would claim). In addition, just as we can test the strength of the skeptic’s reasons for doubt, we can test the strength of his or her alternative explanation.

Third, we mentioned previously that the kind of skepticism we consider in this chapter is not primarily concerned with applied ethical issues like abortion or eating animals; nor does it focus on the general principles, rules, and values with which normative ethics is primarily concerned. Rather, it questions metaethical ideas like moral objectivity or unconditionality. However, questioning these ideas can have significant implications with respect to norma- tive and applied ethics.

The relation between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics is comparable to the way we might think of a house. The strength of the roof depends on the strength of the house’s framework—the walls, support beams, and so on. But the framework needs a strong founda- tion if it is to support the roof. If the foundation has serious problems (e.g., the concrete has major cracks, the ground is giving way), then the support system will be unstable. If the sup- port system is unstable, then the roof is weak and liable to give way. We can think of concrete moral judgments as the “roof,” normative theories as the “framework,” and metaethics as the “foundation.” Moral skepticism questions the strength of the foundation, and, by implication, the strength of the framework and roof.

As we examine the different forms of skepticism, we should ask ourselves if the skeptic has provided good reasons to be skeptical of our common beliefs and assumptions about ethics. Has he or she provided a satisfactory alternative explanation for why we have these common beliefs and assumptions that adequately accounts for the role that ethics plays in our indi- vidual lives? And what would be the broader implications of accepting his or her skeptical claims about ethics?

With these thoughts in mind, we will examine skepticism about moral objectivity.

2.2 The Relativist Challenge American restaurant goers know that when a waiter or waitress provides good service, he or she deserves a decent tip; withholding a tip when good service has been provided is usually regarded as disrespectful. In Japan, however, the opposite is the case: Providing a tip is often a sign of disrespect. Similarly, consider that most Westerners believe that the way to show