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Ethics
LOUIS P. POJMAN Late of the United States Military Academy, West Point
JAMES FIESER University of Tennessee, Martin
Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States
Ethics
Discovering Right and Wrong
E IGHTH ED IT ION
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Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Eighth Edition
Louis P. Pojman and James Fieser
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About the Authors
Louis P. Pojman (1935–2005) was professor of philosophy, emeritus at the United States Military Academy and a life member of Clare Hall, Cambridge University. He received an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Union Theological Seminary/ Columbia University and a D.Phil. from Oxford University. He wrote in the areas of philosophy of religion, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy and is the author or editor of more than 30 books and 100 articles. Among these are Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong (8/e 2017), Environmental Ethics (7/e 2017), Who Are We? (2005), and Global Political Philosophy (2003).
James Fieser is professor of philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Martin. He received his B.A. from Berea College, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy from Purdue University. He is author, coauthor, or editor of 10 text books, including Socrates to Sartre and Beyond (9/e 2011), Ethical Theory: Classical and Con- temporary Readings (6/e 2010), A Historical Introduction to Philosophy (2003), and Moral Philosophy Through the Ages (2001). He has edited and annotated the ten- volume Early Responses to Hume (2/e 2005) and the five-volume Scottish Common Sense Philosophy (2000). He is founder and general editor of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Web site (www.iep.utm.edu).
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Contents
PREFACE vii i
1 What Is Ethics? 1
Ethics and Its Subdivisions 1
Morality as Compared with Other Normative Subjects 3
Traits of Moral Principles 6
Domains of Ethical Assessment 7
Conclusion 10
For Further Reflection 11
2 Ethical Relativism 13
Subjective Ethical Relativism 15
Conventional Ethical Relativism 17
Criticisms of Conventional Ethical Relativism 20
Conclusion 25
For Further Reflection 26
3 Moral Objectivism 28
Aquinas’s Objectivism and Absolutism 30
Moderate Objectivism 36
Ethical Situationalism 40
Conclusion 41
For Further Reflection 42
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content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
4 Value and the Quest for the Good 44
Types of Values 45
Foundational Nature of Values 50
The Good Life 55
Conclusion 58
For Further Reflection 59
5 Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral 61
Why Does Society Need Moral Rules? 63
Why Should I Be Moral? 67
Morality, Self-Interest, and Game Theory 69
The Motive to Always Be Moral 72
Conclusion 75
For Further Reflection 76
6 Egoism, Self-Interest, and Altruism 77
Psychological Egoism 78
Ethical Egoism 82
Arguments Against Ethical Egoism 87
Conclusion 91
For Further Reflection 92
7 Utilitarianism 93
Classic Utilitarianism 95
Act- and Rule-Utilitarianism 98
Criticism of Utilitarianism 101
Criticism of the Ends Justifying Immoral Means 106
Conclusion 110
For Further Reflection 111
8 Kant and Deontological Theories 113
Kant’s Influences 114
The Categorical Imperative 117
Counterexamples to the Principle of the Law of Nature 123
Other Formulations of the Categorical Imperative 125
The Problem of Exceptionless Rules 129
Conclusion: A Reconciliation Project 132
For Further Reflection 134
CONTENTS v
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9 Virtue Theory 135
The Nature of Virtue Ethics 136
Criticisms of Action-Based Ethics 140
Connections Between Virtue-Based and Action-Based Ethics 146
Conclusion 153
For Further Reflection 154
10 Biology and Ethics 155
Moral Behavior in Animals 156
Morality and Human Evolution 161
What Is Left for Traditional Morality? 167
Conclusion 172
For Further Reflection 174
11 Gender and Ethics 175
Classic Views 177
Female Care Ethics 181
Four Options Regarding Gender and Ethics 186
Conclusion 190
For Further Reflection 192
12 Religion and Ethics 194
Does Morality Depend on Religion? 195
Is Religion Irrelevant or Even Contrary to Morality? 200
Does Religion Enhance the Moral Life? 205
Conclusion 210
For Further Reflection 211
13 The Fact–Value Problem 212
Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically Stated 213
Ayer and Emotivism 216
Hare and Prescriptivism 220
Naturalism and the Fact–Value Problem 227
Conclusion 230
For Further Reflection 231
14 Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism 232
Mackie’s Moral Skepticism 234
Harman’s Moral Nihilism 238
vi CONTENTS
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A Defense of Moral Realism 242
Conclusion 245
For Further Reflection 246
APPENDIX 247
GLOSSARY 251
INDEX 255
For more information on an alternate version of this book which contains classic and contemporary philosophical reading selections in the back of the book, please contact your Cengage Learning representative.
CONTENTS vii
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Preface
In 1977, Australian philosopher John L. Mackie published his famous book Ethics:Inventing Right and Wrong, in which he argues that the moral values we hold are inventions of society: “we have to decide what moral views to adopt, what moral stands to take.” The title of the present book Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, is both an acknowledgement of the importance of Mackie’s view and a response to it.
Morality is not purely an invention, as Mackie suggests, but it also involves a discovery. We may compare morality to the development of the wheel. Both are creations based on discoverable features. The wheel was invented to facilitate the transportation of objects with minimal friction. The construction of a wheel adheres to the laws of physics to bring about efficient motion. Not just anything could function as a good wheel. A rectangular or triangular wheel would be inefficient, as would one made out of sand or bird feathers or heavy stones. Ana- logously, morality has been constructed to serve human needs and desires, for example, the need to survive and the desires to prosper and be happy. The ideal morality should serve as the blueprint for individual happiness and social harmony. Human beings have used their best minds over millennia to discover those principles that best serve to promote individual and social well-being. Just as the construction of the wheel is dependent on the laws of physics, so the con- struction of morality has been dependent on human nature, on discoverable fea- tures of our being. It is in this spirit of moral discovery that Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong surveys the main theories of moral philosophy today.
The philosophical community experienced a great loss in 2005 with the death of Louis Pojman, the original author of this book, who succumbed to his battle with cancer. His voluminous writings—over 30 books and 100 articles— have been uniformly praised for their high level of scholarship and insight, and countless philosophy students and teachers have benefited from them (see www. louispojman.com for biographical and bibliographical details).
Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong was first published in 1990 and quickly established itself as an authoritative, yet reader-friendly, introduction to ethics.
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In an earlier preface, Louis expresses his enthusiasm for his subject and his com- mitment to his reader:
I have written this book in the spirit of a quest for truth and under- standing, hoping to excite you about the value of ethics. It is a subject that I love, for it is about how we are to live, about the best kind of life. I hope that you will come to share my enthusiasm for the subject and develop your own ideas in the process.
Over the years, new editions of this book have appeared in response to the con- tinually evolving needs of college instructors and students. Throughout these changes, however, the book has focused on the central issues of ethical theory, which in this edition include chapters on the following 14 subjects, beginning with the more theoretical issues of (1) what ethics is most generally, (2) ethical relativism, (3) moral objectivism, (4) moral value, (5) social contract theory and the motive to be moral, and (6) egoism and altruism. The book next focuses on the influential normative theories of (7) utilitarianism, (8) Kantianism and deon- tology, and (9) virtue theory. Building on these concepts, the last portion of the book explores the more contemporary theoretical debates surrounding (10) biology and ethics, (11) gender and ethics, (12) religion and ethics, (13) the fact–value problem, and (14) moral realism and skepticism.
This newly revised eighth edition attempts to reflect the spirit of change that governed previous editions. As with most textbook revisions, the inclusion of new material in this edition required the deletion of a comparable amount of previously existing material. Many of the changes in this edition were suggested by previous book users, both faculty and students, for which I am very grateful. The most noticeable change is a new chapter on biology and ethics. Many minor changes have been made throughout for clarification and ease of reading.
MINDTAP
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The preface to the fifth edition of this book lists the following acknowledge- ments, which I present here verbatim:
Michael Beaty, Sterling Harwood, Stephen Kershnar, Bill Lawhead, Michael Levin, Robert Louden, Laura Purdy, Roger Rigterink, Bruce
PREFACE ix
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Russell, Walter Schaller, Bob Westmoreland, and Mark Discher were very helpful in offering trenchant criticisms on several chapters of this book. The students in my ethical theory classes at the University of Mississippi and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for the past 20 years have served as a challenging sounding board for many of my arguments. Ronald F. Duska, Rosemont College; Stephen Griffith, Lycoming College; Arthur Kuflik, University of Vermont; James Lindemann Nelson, Michigan State University; Peter List, Oregon State University; Ann A. Pang-White, University of Scranton; Fred Schueler, University of New Mexico; Nancy A. Stanlick, University of Central Florida; R. Duane Thompson, Indiana Wesleyan University; Peter Vallentyne, Virginia Commonwealth University; and David A. White, Marquette University reviewed the manuscript for an earlier edition and provided guidance in revising this latest edition.
I thank Debra Matteson, Liz Fraser, and the rest of the talented editorial staff at Cengage for their expertise and good nature throughout the production of this new edition. Thanks also to the dozens of ethics instructors who completed an online survey about the text and made valuable suggestions for improvement. Finally, I thank Louis’s wife, Trudy Pojman, for her gracious encouragement with this project.
James Fieser August 1, 2015
x PREFACE
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1
What Is Ethics?
S ome years ago, the nation was stunned by a report from New York City.A young woman, Kitty Genovese, was brutally stabbed in her own neighbor- hood late at night during three separate attacks while 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens watched or listened. During the 35-minute struggle, her assailant beat her, stabbed her, left her, and then returned to attack her two more times until she died. No one lifted a phone to call the police; no one shouted at the criminal, let alone went to Genovese’s aid. Finally, a 70-year-old woman called the police. It took them just two minutes to arrive, but by that time Genovese was already dead.
Only one other woman came out to testify before the ambulance showed up an hour later. Then residents from the whole neighborhood poured out of their apartments. When asked why they hadn’t done anything, they gave answers ranging from “I don’t know” and “I was tired” to “Frankly, we were afraid.”1
This tragic event raises many questions about our moral responsibility to others. What should these respectable citizens have done? Are such acts of omis- sion morally blameworthy? Is the Genovese murder an atypical situation, or does it represent a disturbing trend? This story also raises important questions about the general notion of morality. What is the nature of morality, and why do we need it? What is the Good, and how will we know it? Is it in our interest to be moral? What is the relationship between morality and religion? What is the rela- tionship between morality and law? What is the relationship between morality and etiquette? These are some of the questions that we explore in this book.
ETH ICS AND ITS SUBDIV IS IONS
Ethics is that branch of philosophy that deals with how we ought to live, with the idea of the Good, and with concepts such as “right” and “wrong.” But what is
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philosophy? It is an enterprise that begins with wonder at the marvels and mysteries of the world; that pursues a rational investigation of those marvels and mysteries, seeking wisdom and truth; and that results in a life lived in passionate moral and intellectual integrity. Taking as its motto Socrates’ famous statement “The unex- amined life is not worth living,” philosophy leaves no aspect of life untouched by its inquiry. It aims at a clear, critical, comprehensive conception of reality.
The main characteristic of philosophy is rational argument. Philosophers clarify concepts and analyze and test propositions and beliefs, but their major task is to con- struct and analyze arguments. Philosophical reasoning is closely allied with scientific reasoning, in that both build hypotheses and look for evidence to test those hypoth- eses with the hope of coming closer to the truth. However, scientific experiments take place in laboratories and have testing procedures to record objective or empiri- cally verifiable results. The laboratory of the philosopher is the domain of ideas. It takes place in the mind, where imaginative thought experiments occur. It takes place in the study room, where ideas are written down and examined. It also takes place wherever conversation or debate about the perennial questions arises, where thesis and counterexample and counterthesis are considered.
A word must be said about the specific terms moral and ethical and the asso- ciated notions of morals and ethics. Often these terms are used interchangeably—as will be the case in this book. Both terms derive their meaning from the idea of “custom”—that is, normal behavior. Specifically, “moral” comes from the Latin word mores and “ethical” from the Greek ethos.
The study of ethics within philosophy contains its own subdivisions, and dividing up the territory of ethics is tricky. The key divisions are (1) descriptive morality, (2) moral philosophy (ethical theory), and (3) applied ethics. First, descriptive morality refers to actual beliefs, customs, principles, and practices of people and cultures. Sociologists in particular pay special attention to the con- crete moral practices of social groups around the world, and they view them as cultural “facts,” much like facts about what people in those countries eat or how they dress. Second, moral philosophy—also called ethical theory—refers to the systematic effort to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles and theories. It analyzes key ethical concepts such as “right,” “wrong,” and “permissible.” It explores possible sources of moral obligation such as God, human reason, or the desire to be happy. It seeks to establish principles of right behavior that may serve as action guides for individuals and groups. Third, applied ethics deals with controversial moral problems such as abortion, pre- marital sex, capital punishment, euthanasia, and civil disobedience.
The larger study of ethics, then, draws on all three of these subdivisions, connecting them in important ways. For example, moral philosophy is very much interrelated with applied ethics, and here will be a difference in the quality of debates about abortion and other such issues when those discussions are informed by ethical theories. More light and less heat will be the likely outcome. With the onset of multiculturalism and the deep differences in worldviews around the globe today, the need to use reason, rather than violence, to settle our disputes and resolve conflicts of interest has become obvious. Ethical aware- ness is the necessary condition for human survival and flourishing.
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The study of ethics is not only of instrumental value but also valuable in its own right. It is satisfying to have knowledge of important matters for its own sake, and it is important to understand the nature and scope of moral theory for its own sake. We are rational beings who cannot help but want to understand the nature of the good life and all that it implies. The study of ethics is some- times a bit off-putting because so many differing theories often appear to contra- dict each other and thus produce confusion rather than guidance. But an appreciation of the complexity of ethics is valuable in counteracting our natural tendency toward inflexibility and tribalism where we stubbornly adhere to the values of our specific peer groups.
MORAL ITY AS COMPARED WITH OTHER
NORMATIVE SUBJECTS
Moral principles concern standards of behavior; roughly speaking, they involve not what is but what ought to be. How should I live my life? What is the right thing to do in this situation? Is premarital sex morally permissible? Ought a woman ever to have an abortion? Morality has a distinct action-guiding, or nor- mative, aspect, which it shares with other practices such as religion, law, and eti- quette. Let’s see how morality differs from each of these.
Religion
Consider first the relation between morality and religion. Moral behavior, as defined by a given religion, is usually believed to be essential to that religion’s practice. But neither the practices nor principles of morality should be identified with religion. The practice of morality need not be motivated by religious con- siderations, and moral principles need not be grounded in revelation or divine authority—as religious teachings invariably are. The most important characteristic of ethics is its grounding in reason and human experience.
To use a spatial metaphor, secular ethics is horizontal, lacking a vertical or higher dimension; as such it does not receive its authority from “on high.” But religious ethics, being grounded in revelation or divine authority, has that vertical dimension although religious ethics generally uses reason to supplement or complement revela- tion. These two differing orientations often generate different moral principles and standards of evaluation, but they need not do so. Some versions of religious ethics, which posit God’s revelation of the moral law in nature or conscience, hold that rea- son can discover what is right or wrong even apart from divine revelation.
Law
Consider next the close relationship between morality and law. Many laws are instituted in order to promote well-being, resolve conflicts of interest, and pro- mote social harmony, just as morality does. However, ethics may judge that
WHAT I S ETH ICS? 3
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some laws are immoral without denying that they have legal authority. For example, laws may permit slavery, spousal abuse, racial discrimination, or sexual discrimination, but these are immoral practices.
In a PBS television series, Ethics in America, a trial lawyer was asked what he would do if he discovered that his client had committed a murder some years earlier for which another man had been wrongly convicted and would soon be executed.2 The lawyer said that he had a legal obligation to keep this informa- tion confidential and that, if he divulged it, he would be disbarred. It is arguable that he has a moral obligation that overrides his legal obligation and demands that he act to save the innocent man from execution.
Furthermore, some aspects of morality are not covered by law. For example, although it is generally agreed that lying is usually immoral, there is no general law against it—except under such special conditions as committing perjury or falsifying income tax returns. Sometimes college newspapers publish advertise- ments by vendors who offer “research assistance,” despite knowing in advance that these vendors will aid and abet plagiarism. Publishing such ads is legal, but its moral correctness is doubtful.
Similarly, the 38 people who watched the attacks on Kitty Genovese and did nothing to intervene broke no New York law, but they were very likely morally responsible for their inaction. In our legal tradition, there is no general duty to rescue a person in need. In 1908, the dean of Harvard Law School pro- posed that a person should be required to “save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little or no inconvenience to himself.” The proposal was defeated, and one of its opponents posed the ques- tion of whether a rich person, to whom $20 meant very little, be legally obliged to save the life of a hungry child in a foreign land? Currently, only Vermont and Minnesota have “Good Samaritan” laws, requiring that one come to the aid of a person in grave physical harm but only to the extent that the aid “can be ren- dered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to others.”
There is another major difference between law and morality. In 1351, King Edward of England instituted a law against treason that made it a crime merely to think homicidal thoughts about the king. But, alas, the law could not be enforced, for no tribunal can search the heart and discover the intentions of the mind. It is true that intention, such as malice aforethought, plays a role in deter- mining the legal character of an act once the act has been committed. But, pre- emptive punishment for people who are presumed to have bad intentions is illegal. If malicious intentions by themselves were illegal, wouldn’t we all deserve imprisonment? Even if one could detect others’ intentions, when should the punishment be administered? As soon as the offender has the intention? How do we know that the offender won’t change his or her mind?
Although it is impractical to have laws against bad intentions, these inten- tions are still morally wrong. Suppose I buy a gun with the intention of killing Uncle Charlie to inherit his wealth, but I never get a chance to fire it (for exam- ple, suppose Uncle Charlie moves to Australia). Although I have not committed a crime, I have committed a moral wrong.
4 CHAPTER 1
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Etiquette
Lastly, consider the relation between morality and etiquette. Etiquette concerns form and style rather than the essence of social existence; it determines what is polite behavior rather than what is right behavior in a deeper sense. It represents society’s decision as to how we are to dress, greet one another, eat, celebrate festivals, dispose of the dead, express gratitude and appreciation, and, in general, carry out social transactions. Whether people greet each other with a handshake, a bow, a hug, or a kiss on the cheek depends on their social system. Russians wear their wedding rings on the third finger of their right hands, whereas Amer- icans wear them on their left hands. The English hold their forks in their left hands, whereas people in other countries are more likely to hold them in their right hands. People in India typically eat without a fork at all, using the fingers of their right hands to deliver food from their plate to their mouth. In and of them- selves, none of these rituals has any moral superiority. Polite manners grace our social existence, but they are not what social existence is about. They help social transactions to flow smoothly but are not the substance of those transactions.
At the same time, it can be immoral to disregard or defy etiquette. Whether to shake hands when greeting a person for the first time or put one’s hands together in front as one bows, as people in India do, is a matter of cultural deci- sion. But, once the custom is adopted, the practice takes on the importance of a moral rule, subsumed under the wider principle of showing respect to people.
Similarly, there is no moral necessity to wear clothes, but we have adopted the custom partly to keep warm in colder climates and partly to be modest. Accordingly, there may be nothing wrong with nudists who decide to live together in nudist colonies. However, for people to go nude outside of nudist colonies—say, in classrooms, stores, and along the road—may well be so offen- sive that it is morally insensitive. There was a scandal on the beaches of South India where American tourists swam in bikinis, shocking the more modest Indians. There was nothing immoral in itself about wearing bikinis, but given the cultural context, the Americans willfully violated etiquette and were guilty of moral impropriety.
Although Americans pride themselves on tolerance, pluralism, and awareness of other cultures, custom and etiquette can be—even among people from similar backgrounds—a bone of contention. A Unitarian minister tells of an experience early in his marriage. He and his wife were hosting their first Thanksgiving meal. He had been used to small celebrations with his immediate family, whereas his wife had been used to grand celebrations. He writes, “I had been asked to carve, something I had never done before, but I was willing. I put on an apron, entered the kitchen, and attacked the bird with as much artistry as I could muster. And what reward did I get? [My wife] burst into tears. In her family the turkey is brought to the table, laid before the [father], grace is said, and then he carves! ‘So I fail patriarchy,’ I hollered later. ‘What do you expect?’ ”3
Law, etiquette, and religion are all important institutions, but each has lim- itations. A limitation of religious commands is that they rest on authority, and we may lack certainty or agreement about the authority’s credentials or how the
WHAT I S ETH ICS? 5
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authority would rule in ambiguous or new cases. Because religion is founded not on reason but on revelation, you cannot use reason to convince someone from another religion that your view is the right one. A limitation of law is that you can’t have a law against every social problem, nor can you enforce every desir- able rule. A limitation of etiquette is that it doesn’t get to the heart of what is vitally important for personal and social existence. Whether or not one eats with one’s fingers pales in significance with the importance of being honest, trustwor- thy, or just. Etiquette is a cultural invention, but morality is more like a discovery.
In summary, morality differs from law and etiquette by going deeper into the essence of our social existence. It differs from religion by seeking reasons, rather than authority, to justify its principles. The central purpose of moral phi- losophy is to secure valid principles of conduct and values that can guide human actions and produce good character. As such, it is the most important activity we know, for it concerns how we are to live.
TRAITS OF MORAL PR INC IPLES
A central feature of morality is the moral principle. We have already noted that moral principles are guides for action, but we must say more about the traits of such principles. Although there is no universal agreement on the characteristics a moral principle must have, there is a wide consensus about five features: (1) pre- scriptivity, (2) universalizability, (3) overridingness, (4) publicity, and (5) practica- bility. Several of these will be examined in chapters throughout this book, but let’s briefly consider them here.
First is prescriptivity, which is the commanding aspect of morality. Moral principles are generally put forth as commands or imperatives, such as “Do not kill,” “Do no unnecessary harm,” and “Love your neighbor.” They are intended for use: to advise people and influence action. Prescriptivity shares this trait with all normative discourse and is used to appraise behavior, assign praise and blame, and produce feelings of satisfaction or guilt.
Second is universalizability. Moral principles must apply to all people who are in a relevantly similar situation. If I judge that an act is right for a certain person, then that act is right for any other relevantly similar person. This trait is exemplified in the Golden Rule, “Do to others what you would want them to do to you.” We also see it in the formal principle of justice: It cannot be right for you to treat me in a manner in which it would be wrong for me to treat you, merely on the ground that we are two different individuals.4
Universalizability applies to all evaluative judgments. If I say that X is a good thing, then I am logically committed to judge that anything relevantly similar to X is a good thing. This trait is an extension of the principle of consistency: we ought to be consistent about our value judgments, including one’s moral judg- ments. Take any act that you are contemplating doing and ask, “Could I will that everyone act according to this principle?”
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Third is overridingness. Moral principles have predominant authority and override other kinds of principles. They are not the only principles, but they take precedence over other considerations, including aesthetic, prudential, and legal ones. The artist Paul Gauguin may have been aesthetically justified in abandon- ing his family to devote his life to painting beautiful Pacific Island pictures, but morally he probably was not justified, and so he probably should not have done it. It may be prudent to lie to save my reputation, but it probably is morally wrong to do so. When the law becomes egregiously immoral, it may be my moral duty to exercise civil disobedience. There is a general moral duty to obey the law because the law serves an overall moral purpose, and this overall purpose may give us moral reasons to obey laws that may not be moral or ideal. There may come a time, however, when the injustice of a bad law is intolerable and hence calls for illegal but moral defiance. A good example would be laws in the South prior to the Civil War requiring citizens to return runaway slaves to their owners.
Fourth is publicity. Moral principles must be made public in order to guide our actions. Publicity is necessary because we use principles to prescribe behav- ior, give advice, and assign praise and blame. It would be self-defeating to keep them a secret.
Fifth is practicability. A moral principle must have practicability, which means that it must be workable and its rules must not lay a heavy burden on us when we follow them. The philosopher John Rawls speaks of the “strains of commitment” that overly idealistic principles may cause in average moral agents.5 It might be desirable for morality to require more selfless behavior from us, but the result of such principles could be moral despair, deep or undue moral guilt, and ineffective action. Accordingly, most ethical systems take human limitations into consideration.
Although moral philosophers disagree somewhat about these five traits, the above discussion offers at least an idea of the general features of moral principles.
DOMAINS OF ETH ICAL ASSESSMENT
At this point, it might seem that ethics concerns itself entirely with rules of con- duct that are based solely on evaluating acts. However, it is more complicated than that. Most ethical analysis falls into one or more of the following domains: (1) action, (2) consequences, (3) character traits, and (4) motive. Again, all these domains will be examined in detail in later chapters, but an overview here will be helpful.
Let’s examine these domains using an altered version of the Kitty Genovese story. Suppose a man attacks a woman in front of her apartment and is about to kill her. A responsible neighbor hears the struggle, calls the police, and shouts from the window, “Hey you, get out of here!” Startled by the neighbor’s repri- mand, the attacker lets go of the woman and runs down the street where he is caught by the police.
WHAT I S ETH ICS? 7
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Action
One way of ethically assessing this situation is to examine the actions of both the attacker and the good neighbor: The attacker’s actions were wrong whereas the neighbor’s actions were right. The term right has two meanings. Sometimes, it means “obligatory” (as in “the right act”), but it also can mean “permissible” (as in “a right act” or “It’s all right to do that”). Usually, philosophers define right as permissible, including in that category what is obligatory:
1. A right act is an act that is permissible for you to do. It may be either (a) obligatory or (b) optional. a. An obligatory act is one that morality requires you to do; it is not
permissible for you to refrain from doing it. b. An optional act is one that is neither obligatory nor wrong to do. It is
not your duty to do it, nor is it your duty not to do it. Neither doing it nor not doing it would be wrong.
2. A wrong act is one you have an obligation, or a duty, to refrain from doing: It is an act you ought not to do; it is not permissible to do it.
In our example, the attacker’s assault on the woman was clearly a wrong action (prohibited); by contrast, the neighbor’s act of calling the police was clearly a right action—and an obligatory one at that.
But, some acts do not seem either obligatory or wrong. Whether you take a course in art history or English literature or whether you write a letter with a pencil or pen seems morally neutral. Either is permissible. Whether you listen to rock music or classical music is not usually considered morally significant. Lis- tening to both is allowed, and neither is obligatory. Whether you marry or remain single is an important decision about how to live your life. The decision you reach, however, is usually considered morally neutral or optional. Under most circumstances, to marry (or not to marry) is considered neither obligatory nor wrong but permissible.
Within the range of permissible acts is the notion of supererogatory acts, or highly altruistic acts. These acts are neither required nor obligatory, but they exceed what morality requires, going “beyond the call of duty.” For example, suppose the responsible neighbor ran outside to actually confront the attacker rather than simply shout at him from the window. Thus, the neighbor would assume an extra risk that would not be morally required. Similarly, while you may be obligated to give a donation to help people in dire need, you would not be obligated to sell your car, let alone become impoverished yourself, to help them. The complete scheme of acts, then, is this:
1. Right act (permissible) a. Obligatory act b. Optional act
(1) Neutral act (2) Supererogatory act
2. Wrong act (not permissible)
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One important kind of ethical theory that emphasizes the nature of the act is called deontological (from the Greek word deon, meaning “duty”). These theories hold that something is inherently right or good about such acts as truth telling and promise keeping and inherently wrong or bad about such acts as lying and promise breaking. Classical deontological ethical principles include the Ten Command- ments and the Golden Rule. The leading proponent of deontological ethics in recent centuries is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who defended a principle of moral duty that he calls the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law.” Examples for Kant are “Never break your promise” and “Never commit suicide.” What all of these deontological theories and principles have in common is the view that we have an inherent duty to perform right actions and avoid bad actions.
Consequences
Another way of ethically assessing situations is to examine the consequences of an action: If the consequences are on balance positive, then the action is right; if negative, then wrong. In our example, take the consequences of the attacker’s actions. At minimum he physically harms the woman and psychologically trau- matizes both her and her neighbors; if he succeeds in killing her, then he emo- tionally devastates her family and friends, perhaps for life. And what does he gain from this? Just a temporary experience of sadistic pleasure. On balance, his action has overwhelmingly negative consequences and thus is wrong. Examine next the consequences of the responsible neighbor who calls the police and shouts down from the window “Hey you, get out of here!” This scares off the attacker, thus limiting the harm of his assault. What does the neighbor lose by doing this? Just a temporary experience of fear, which the neighbor might have experienced any- way. On balance, then, the neighbor’s action has overwhelmingly positive con- sequences, which makes it the right thing to do.
Ethical theories that focus primarily on consequences in determining moral rightness and wrongness are sometimes called teleological ethics (from the Greek telos, meaning “goal directed”). The most famous of these theories is utili- tarianism, set forth by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806– 1873), which requires us to do what is likeliest to have the best consequences. In Mill’s words, “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”
Character Traits
Whereas some ethical theories emphasize the nature of actions in themselves and some emphasize principles involving the consequences of actions, other theories emphasize a person’s character trait, or virtue. In our example, the attacker has an especially bad character trait—namely, malevolence—which taints his entire out- look on life and predisposes him to act in harmful ways. The attacker is a bad person principally for having this bad character trait of malevolence. The respon- sible neighbor, on the other hand, has a good character trait, which directs his
WHAT I S ETH ICS? 9
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outlook on life—namely, benevolence, which is the tendency to treat people with kindness and assist those in need. Accordingly, the neighbor is a good per- son largely for possessing this good trait.
Moral philosophers call such good character traits virtues and bad traits vices. Entire theories of morality have been developed from these notions and are called virtue theories. The classic proponent of virtue theory was Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who maintained that the development of virtuous character traits is needed to ensure that we habitually act rightly. Although it may be help- ful to have action-guiding rules, it is vital to empower our character with the tendency to do good. Many people know that cheating, gossiping, or overindul- ging in food or alcohol is wrong, but they are incapable of doing what is right. Virtuous people spontaneously do the right thing and may not even consciously follow moral rules when doing so.
Motive
Finally, we can ethically assess situations by examining the motive of the people involved. The attacker intended to brutalize and kill the woman; the neighbor intended to thwart the attacker and thereby help the woman. Virtually all ethical systems recognize the importance of motives. For a full assessment of any action, it is important to take the agent’s motive into account. Two acts may appear identical on the surface, but one may be judged morally blameworthy and the other excusable. Consider John’s pushing Mary off a ledge, causing her to break her leg. In situation (A), he is angry and intends to harm her, but in situation (B) he sees a knife flying in her direction and intends to save her life. In (A) he clearly did the wrong thing, whereas in (B) he did the right thing. A full moral description of any act will take motive into account as a relevant factor.
CONCLUS ION
The study of ethics has enormous practical benefits. It can free us from prejudice and dogmatism. It sets forth comprehensive systems from which to orient our indi- vidual judgments. It carves up the moral landscape so that we can sort out the issues to think more clearly and confidently about moral problems. It helps us clarify in our minds just how our principles and values relate to one another, and, most of all, it gives us some guidance in how to live. Let’s return to questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, some of which we should now be able to better answer.
What is the nature of morality, and why do we need it? Morality concerns discovering the rules that promote the human good, as elaborated in the five traits of moral principles: prescriptivity, universalizability, overridingness, public- ity, and practicability. Without morality, we cannot promote that good.
What is the good, and how will I know it? The good in question is the human good, specified as happiness, reaching one’s potential, and so forth.
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Whatever we decide on that fulfills human needs and helps us develop our dee- pest potential is the good that morality promotes.
Is it in my interest to be moral? Yes, in general and in the long run, for morality is exactly the set of rules most likely to help (nearly) all of us, if nearly all of us follow them nearly all of the time. The good is good for you—at least most of the time. Furthermore, if we believe in the superior importance of morality, then we will bring children up so that they will be unhappy when they break the moral code. They will feel guilt. In this sense, the commitment to morality and its internalization nearly guarantee that if you break the moral rules you will suffer.
What is the relationship between morality and religion? Religion relies more on revelation, and morality relies more on reason, on rational reflection. But, religion can provide added incentive for the moral life for those who believe that God sees and will judge all our actions.
What is the relationship between morality and law? Morality and law should be very close, and morality should be the basis of the law, but there can be both unjust laws and immoral acts that cannot be legally enforced. The law is shal- lower than morality and has a harder time judging human motives and inten- tions. You can be morally evil, intending to do evil things, but as long as you don’t do them, you are legally innocent.
What is the relationship between morality and etiquette? Etiquette consists in the customs of a culture, but they are typically morally neutral in that the culture could flourish with a different code of etiquette. In our culture, we eat with knives and forks, but a culture that eats with chopsticks or fingers is no less moral.
NOTES
1. Martin Gansberg, “38 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call Police,” New York Times, March 27, 1964.
2. Ethics in America, PBS, 1989, produced by Fred Friendly.
3. John Buehrens and Forrester Church, Our Chosen Faith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 140.
4. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 380.
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 176, 423.
FOR FURTHER REFLECT ION
1. Consider the Kitty Genovese story and what you think a responsible neighbor should have done. Are there any situations in which the neighbors might be morally justified in doing nothing?
Additional questions online
WHAT I S ETH ICS? 11
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2. The study of philosophy involves three main divisions: descriptive morality, moral philosophy, and applied ethics. Explain how these three divisions interrelate with a moral issue such as abortion, euthanasia, or capital punishment.
3. Illustrate the difference between a moral principle, a religious principle, a legal rule, a principle of etiquette. Are these sometimes related?
4. Take a moral principle such as “Don’t steal” and analyze it according to the five traits of moral principles.
5. French painter Paul Gauguin (1848–1903) gave up his job as a banker and abandoned his wife and children to pursue a career as an artist. He moved to Martinique and later to Tahiti, eventually becoming one of the most famous postimpressionist artists in the world. Did Gauguin do what was morally permissible? Discuss this from the perspective of the four domains of ethical assessment.
6. Siddhartha Gautama (560–480 BCE), appalled by the tremendous and per- vasive suffering in the world, abandoned his wife and child to seek enlight- enment. He eventually attained enlightenment and became known as the Buddha. Is there a moral difference between Gauguin and the Buddha?
12 CHAPTER 1
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2
Ethical Relativism
I n the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries sometimes used coercion tochange the customs of pagan tribal people in parts of Africa and the Pacific Islands. Appalled by the customs of public nakedness, polygamy, working on the Sabbath, and infanticide, they went about reforming the “poor pagans.” They clothed them, separated wives from their husbands to create monogamous households, made the Sabbath a day of rest, and ended infanticide. In the pro- cess, they sometimes created social disruption, causing the women to despair and their children to be orphaned. The natives often did not understand the new religion but accepted it because of the white man’s power of guns and medicine.
Since the nineteenth century, we’ve made progress in understanding cultural diversity and now realize that the social conflict caused by such “do-gooders” was a bad thing. In the last century or so, anthropology has exposed our fondness for ethnocentrism, the prejudicial view that interprets all of reality through the eyes of one’s own cultural beliefs and values. We have come to see enormous variety in social practices throughout the world. Here are a few examples.
Eskimos allow their elderly to die by starvation, whereas we believe that this is morally wrong. The Spartans of ancient Greece and the Dobu of New Guinea believe that stealing is morally right, but we believe that it is wrong. Many cul- tures, past and present, have practiced or still practice infanticide.
A tribe in East Africa once threw deformed infants to the hippopotamus, but our society condemns such acts. Sexual practices vary over time and from place to place. Some cultures permit homosexual behavior, whereas others condemn it. Some cultures practice polygamy, whereas Christian cultures view it as immoral. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict describes a tribe in Melanesia that views cooperation and kindness as vices, and anthropologist Colin Turnbull has
13
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documented that a tribe in northern Uganda has no sense of duty toward its children or parents. There are societies that make it a duty for children to kill their aging parents, sometimes by strangling.
The ancient Greek historian Herodotus (485–430 BCE) told the story of how Darius, the king of Persia, once brought together some Callatians (Asian tribal people) and some Greeks. He asked the Callatians how they disposed of their deceased parents. They explained that they ate the bodies. The Greeks, who cre- mated their parents, were horrified at such barbarous behavior and begged Darius to cease from such irreverent discussion. Herodotus concluded that “Custom is the king over all.”1
Today, we condemn ethnocentrism as a form of prejudice equivalent to rac- ism and sexism. What is right in one culture may be wrong in another, what is good east of the river may be bad west of the same river, what is virtue in one nation may be seen as a vice in another, so it is fitting for us not to judge others but to be tolerant of diversity.
This rejection of ethnocentrism in the West has contributed to a general shift in public opinion about morality so that for a growing number of Westerners consciousness raising about the validity of other ways of life has led to a gradual erosion of belief in moral objectivism, the view that there are universal and objective moral principles valid for all people and social environ- ments. For example, in polls taken in my philosophy classes over the past several years, students affirmed by a two-to-one ratio a version of moral relativism over moral objectivism, with barely 3 percent seeing something in between these two polar opposites. A few students claim to hold the doctrine of ethical nihilism; the doctrine that no valid moral principles exist, that morality is a complete fic- tion. Of course, I am not suggesting that all these students have a clear under- standing of what relativism entails, for many of those who say they are ethical relativists also state on the same questionnaire that “abortion, except to save a woman’s life, is always wrong,” that “capital punishment is always morally wrong,” or that “suicide is never morally permissible.” The apparent contradic- tions signal some confusion on the matter.
In this chapter, we examine the central notions of ethical relativism and look at the implications that seem to follow from it. There are two main forms of ethical relativism as defined here:
Subjective ethical relativism (subjectivism): All moral principles are justified by virtue of their acceptance by an individual agent him- or herself.
Conventional ethical relativism (conventionalism): All moral princi- ples are justified by virtue of their cultural acceptance.
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Both versions hold that there are no objective moral principles but that such principles are human inventions. Where they differ, though, is with the issue of whether they are inventions of individual agents themselves or of larger social groups. We begin with the first of these, which is the more radical of the two positions.
SUBJECT IVE ETH ICAL RELAT IV ISM
Some people think that morality depends directly on the individual—not on one’s culture and certainly not on an objective value. As my students sometimes maintain, “Morality is in the eye of the beholder.” They treat morality like taste or aesthetic judgments, which are person relative. Ernest Hemingway wrote,
So far, about morals, I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after and judged by these moral standards, which I do not defend, the bullfight is very moral to me because I feel very fine while it is going on and have a feeling of life and death and mortality and immortality, and after it is over I feel very sad but very fine.2
This extreme form of moral subjectivism has the consequence that it weak- ens morality’s practical applications: On its premises, little or no interpersonal criticism or judgment is possible. Hemingway may feel good about killing bulls in a bullfight, whereas Saint Francis or Mother Teresa would no doubt feel the opposite. No argument about the matter is possible. Suppose you are repulsed by observing a man torturing a child. You cannot condemn him if one of his prin- ciples is “Torture little children for the fun of it.” The only basis for judging him wrong might be that he was a hypocrite who condemned others for torturing. However, one of his or Hemingway’s principles could be that hypocrisy is mor- ally permissible (he “feels very fine” about it), so it would be impossible for him to do wrong. For Hemingway, hypocrisy and nonhypocrisy are both morally permissible (except, perhaps, when he doesn’t feel very fine about it).
On the basis of subjectivism, Adolf Hitler and the serial murderer Ted Bundy could be considered as moral as Gandhi, as long as each lived by his own standards whatever those might be. Witness the following paraphrase of a tape-recorded conversation between Ted Bundy and one of his victims, in which Bundy justifies his murder:
Then I learned that all moral judgments are “value judgments,” that all value judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either “right” or “wrong.” I even read somewhere that the Chief Justice of the United States had written that the American Constitution expressed nothing more than collective value judgments. Believe it or not, I figured out for myself—what apparently the Chief Justice couldn’t figure out for himself—that if the rationality of one value
ETH ICAL RELAT IV I SM 15
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judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one whit more rational. Nor is there any “reason” to obey the law for any- one, like myself, who has the boldness and daring—the strength of character—to throw off its shackles…. I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the insupportable “value judgment” that I was bound to respect the rights of others. I asked myself, who were these “others”? Other human beings, with human rights? Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer? Is your life more to you than a hog’s life to a hog? Why should I be willing to sacrifice my pleasure more for the one than for the other? Surely, you would not, in this age of scientific enlight- enment, declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as “moral” or “good” and others as “immoral” or “bad”? In any case, let me assure you, my dear young lady, that there is absolutely no com- parison between the pleasure I might take in eating ham and the plea- sure I anticipate in raping and murdering you. That is the honest conclusion to which my education has led me—after the most consci- entious examination of my spontaneous and uninhibited self.3
Notions of good and bad or right and wrong cease to have evaluative mean- ing beyond the individual. We might be revulsed by Bundy’s views, but that is just a matter of taste.
In the opening days of my philosophy classes, I often find students vehe- mently defending subjective relativism: “Who are you to judge?” they ask. I then give them their first test. In the next class period, I return all the tests, marked “F,” even though my comments show that most of them are of a very high caliber. When the students express outrage at this (some have never before seen that letter on their papers and inquire about its meaning), I answer that I have accepted subjectivism for marking the exams. “But that’s unjust!” they typ- ically insist—and then they realize that they are no longer being merely subjec- tivist about ethics.
Absurd consequences follow from subjectivism. If it is correct, then morality reduces to something like aesthetic tastes about which there can be neither argu- ment nor interpersonal judgment. A contradiction seems to exist between sub- jectivism and the very concept of morality, which it is supposed to characterize, for morality has to do with proper resolution of interpersonal conflict and the improvement of the human predicament. Whatever else it does, morality has a minimal aim of preventing a Hobbesian state of nature in which life is “soli- tary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” But if so, then subjectivism is no help at all, for it rests neither on social agreement of principle (as the conventionalist main- tains) nor on an objectively independent set of norms that binds all people for the common good. If there were only one person on earth, then there would be no occasion for morality because there would not be any interpersonal conflicts to resolve or others whose suffering that he or she would have a duty to
16 CHAPTER 2
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improve. Subjectivism implicitly assumes moral solipsism, a view that isolated individuals make up separate universes.
Subjectivism treats individuals as billiard balls on a societal pool table where they meet only in radical collisions, each aimed at his or her own goal and striv- ing to do the others in before they do him or her in. This view of personality is contradicted by the facts that we develop in families and mutually dependent communities—in which we share a common language, common institutions, and similar rituals and habits—and that we often feel one another’s joys and sor- rows. As John Donne wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent.”
Subjective ethical relativism, then, is incoherent, and it thus seems that the only plausible view of ethical relativism must be one that grounds morality in the group or culture. Thus, we turn now to conventional ethical relativism.
CONVENT IONAL ETH ICAL RELAT IV ISM
Again, conventional ethical relativism, also called conventionalism, is the view that all moral principles are justified by virtue of their cultural acceptance. There are no universally valid moral principles, but rather all such principles are valid relative to culture or individual choice. This view recognizes the social nature of morality, which is the theory’s key asset. It does not seem subject to the same absurd consequences that plague subjectivism. Recognizing the impor- tance of our social environment in generating customs and beliefs, many people suppose that ethical relativism is the correct theory. Furthermore, they are drawn to it for its liberal philosophical stance. It seems to be an enlightened response to the arrogance of ethnocentricity, and it seems to imply an attitude of tolerance toward other cultures.
The Diversity and Dependency Theses
John Ladd gives a typical characterization of the theory:
Ethical relativism is the doctrine that the moral rightness and wrongness of actions varies from society to society and that there are no absolute universal moral standards binding on all men at all times. Accordingly, it holds that whether or not it is right for an individual to act in a certain way depends on or is relative to the society to which he belongs.4
If we analyze this passage, we find two distinct theses that are central to con- ventional ethical relativism:
Diversity thesis. What is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so there are no universal moral standards held by all societies.
Dependency thesis. All moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance.
ETH ICAL RELAT IV I SM 17
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The diversity thesis is simply an anthropological thesis acknowledging that moral rules differ from society to society; it is sometimes referred to as cultural relativism. As we illustrated earlier in this chapter, there is enormous variety in what may count as a moral principle in a given society. The human condition is flexible in the extreme, allowing any number of folkways or moral codes. As Ruth Benedict has written,
The cultural pattern of any civilization makes use of a certain segment of the great arc of potential human purposes and motivations, just as we have seen ... that any culture makes use of certain selected material techniques or cultural traits. The great arc along which all the possible human behaviors are distributed is far too immense and too full of contradictions for any one culture to utilize even any considerable por- tion of it. Selection is the first requirement.5
It may or may not be the case that there is no single moral principle held in common by every society, but if there are any, they seem to be few, at best. Certainly, it would be very hard to derive one single “true” morality on the basis of observation of various societies’ moral standards.
The second element of conventional ethical relativism—the dependency thesis—asserts that individual acts are right or wrong depending on the nature of the society in which they occur. Morality does not exist in a vacuum; rather, what is considered morally right or wrong must be seen in a context that depends on the goals, wants, beliefs, history, and environment of the society in question. As William Graham Sumner says,
We learn the [morals] as unconsciously as we learn to walk and hear and breathe, and [we] never know any reason why the [morals] are what they are. The justification of them is that when we wake to conscious- ness of life we find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom, and habit.6
Trying to see things from an independent, noncultural point of view would be like taking out our eyes to examine their contours and qualities. We are sim- ply culturally determined beings.
In a sense, we all live in radically different worlds. Each person has a differ- ent set of beliefs and experiences, a particular perspective that colors all of his or her perceptions. Do the farmer, the real estate dealer, and the artist looking at the same spatiotemporal field actually see the same thing? Not likely. Their dif- ferent orientations, values, and expectations govern their perceptions, so different aspects of the field are highlighted and some features are missed. Even as our individual values arise from personal experience, so social values are grounded in the particular history of the community. Morality, then, is just the set of com- mon rules, habits, and customs that have won social approval over time so that they seem part of the nature of things, like facts. There is nothing mysterious about these codes of behavior. They are the outcomes of our social history.
There is something conventional about any morality, so every morality really depends on a level of social acceptance. Not only do various societies adhere to
18 CHAPTER 2
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different moral systems, but the very same society could (and often does) change its moral views over time and place. For example, in the southern United States, slavery is now viewed as immoral, whereas just over one hundred fifty years ago, it was not. We have greatly altered our views on abortion, divorce, and sexuality as well.
Conventional Ethical Relativism and Tolerance
Defenders of conventional ethical relativism often advertise another benefit of their theory: It supports the value of tolerance. As the anthropologist Ruth Benedict says, in recognizing ethical relativity, “We shall arrive at a more realistic social faith, accepting as grounds of hope and as new bases for tolerance the coexisting and equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself from the raw materials of existence.”7
Consider this example. In parts of northern Africa, many girls undergo female circumcision, cutting out their external genitalia. It has been estimated that 80 mil- lion living women have had this surgery and that 4–5 million girls suffer it each year. The mutilating surgery often leads to sickness or death and encumbers their sexual experience. Some African women accept such mutilation as a just sacrifice for marital stability, but many women and ethicists have condemned it as a cruel practice that causes women unjustified pain and mutilation and robs them of plea- sure and autonomy. Some anthropologists such as Nancy Scheper-Hughes accept relativism and argue that we Westerners have no basis for condemning genital mutilation.8 Scheper-Hughes advocates tolerance for other cultural values. She writes, “I don’t like the idea of clitoridectomy any better than any other woman I know. But I like even less the western ‘voices of reason’ [imposing their judgments].” She argues that judging other cultures irrationally supposes that we know better than the people of that culture do what is right or wrong.
The most famous proponent of this position is anthropologist Melville Herskovits,9 who argues even more explicitly than Benedict and Scheper- Hughes that ethical relativism entails intercultural tolerance:
(1) If morality is relative to its culture, then there is no independent basis for criticizing the morality of any other culture but one’s own.
(2) If there is no independent way of criticizing any other culture, then we ought to be tolerant of the moralities of other cultures.
(3) Morality is relative to its culture. (4) Therefore, we ought to be tolerant of the moralities of other cultures.
Tolerance is certainly a virtue, but is this a good argument for it? No. If morality simply is relative to each culture and if the culture in question has no principle of tolerance, its members have no obligation to be tolerant. Herskovits and Scheper-Hughes, as well, seem to be treating the principle of tolerance as the one exception. They are treating it as an absolute moral principle.
But, from a relativistic point of view, there is no more reason to be tolerant than to be intolerant, and neither stance is objectively morally better than the other. If Westerners condemn clitoridectomies on the basis of their cultural values, they are no more to be condemned than those people are who, because of their cultural
ETH ICAL RELAT IV I SM 19
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values, perform clitoridectomies. One cannot consistently assert that all morality is relative and then treat the principle of tolerance as an absolute principle.
CR IT IC ISMS OF CONVENTIONAL ETH ICAL
RELAT IV ISM
So far we’ve examined the main ingredients of conventional ethical relativism and considered its strengths. We now turn to the problems with this view.
Conventional Ethical Relativism Undermines Important Values
One serious problem with conventional ethical relativism is that it undermines the basis of important values. If conventional ethical relativism is true, then we cannot legitimately criticize anyone who adopts what we might regard as an atrocious principle. If, as seems to be the case, valid criticism supposes an objec- tive or impartial standard, then relativists cannot morally criticize anyone outside their own culture. Hitler’s genocidal actions, as long as they are culturally accepted, are as morally legitimate as Mother Teresa’s works of mercy. If con- ventional relativism is accepted, then racism, genocide of unpopular minorities, oppression of the poor, slavery, and even the advocacy of war for its own sake are as moral as their opposites. And if a subculture decided that starting a nuclear war was somehow morally acceptable, we could not morally criticize these peo- ple. Any actual morality, whatever its content, is as valid as every other and more valid than ideal moralities—since no culture adheres to the latter.
Another important value that we commonly hold is that regarding moral reformers: people of conscience like Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King who go against the tide of cultural standards. However, according to conventional ethical relativism, by going against dominant cultural standards, their actions are technically wrong. For example, in the eighteenth century, William Wilberforce would have been wrong to oppose slavery. In the nineteenth century, the British would have been wrong for banning the practice of widows committing suicide by jumping into the funeral pyre of their deceased husbands.
Yet, we normally feel just the opposite, that the reformer is a courageous innovator who is right, has the truth, and stands against the mindless majority. Sometimes the individual must stand alone with the truth, risking social censure and persecution. In Henrik Ibsen’s novel An Enemy of the People, a physician pro- tests against the unsanitary conditions of the town’s profitable bathhouse. When he fails to rally public support, he denounces the power that the majority has over the town’s values:
The most dangerous enemy of the truth and freedom among us—is the compact majority. Yes, the damned, compact and liberal majority. The majority has might—unfortunately—but right it is not. Right—are I and a few others.
20 CHAPTER 2
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