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*ADP 6-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes ADP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0 i

Army Doctrine Publication

No. 6-0 Headquarters

Department of the Army Washington, D.C., 31 July 2019

Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces

Contents

Page

PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO MISSION COMMAND ............................................................ 1-1 The Nature of Operations .......................................................................................... 1-1 Unified Land Operations ............................................................................................ 1-2 Mission Command ..................................................................................................... 1-3 Principles of Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-6 The Role of Subordinates in Mission Command ..................................................... 1-14 Command and Control ............................................................................................ 1-16 The Command and Control Warfighting Function ................................................... 1-19 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 1-21

Chapter 2 COMMAND................................................................................................................ 2-1 Nature of Command .................................................................................................. 2-1 Elements of Command .............................................................................................. 2-1 The Role of Commanders in Operations ................................................................. 2-12 Guides to Effective Command ................................................................................. 2-16 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 2-24

Chapter 3 CONTROL ................................................................................................................. 3-1 Nature of Control ....................................................................................................... 3-1 Elements of Control ................................................................................................... 3-3 Control Measures .................................................................................................... 3-10 Guides to Effective Control ...................................................................................... 3-14 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 3-17

Chapter 4 THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ............................................................ 4-1 Command and Control System Defined .................................................................... 4-1 Organizing for Command and Control ..................................................................... 4-13 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 4-15

SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1

REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1

Preface

ii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Introductory figure-1. Logic map ........................................................................................................ x

Figure 1-1. Levels of control .......................................................................................................... 1-6

Figure 1-2. Combat power model ................................................................................................ 1-20

Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding ............................................................................................. 2-4

Figure 2-2. The operations process ............................................................................................. 2-13

Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process ..................................................... 2-14

Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization ....................................................................................... 2-15

Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement ......................................................................................... 2-19

Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control ........................................................................................ 3-4

Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation ......................................................................... 3-12

Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations ...................................................................................... 3-13

Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system ......................................................... 4-1

Tables

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms ....................................................... ix

Table 3-1. Operational variables .................................................................................................... 3-5

Table 3-2. Mission variables .......................................................................................................... 3-6

Vignettes

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik ....................................................................................................... 1-4

Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864 ......... 1-9

Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily ............................................................................................ 1-13

Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-15

Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army ........................................................ 2-2

Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam.................................................. 2-8

Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement ........................ 2-18

Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik ................................................................................ 3-2

Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War ....................................................................... 3-10

Control in Austerlitz ...................................................................................................................... 3-11

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 iii

Preface

ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, provides a discussion of the

fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting

function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of command

and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission

accomplishment.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in ADP 6-0, readers should understand the nature of operations and

the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0, Operations. Army leadership attributes

and competencies are vital to exercising command and control, and readers should also be familiar with the

fundamentals of leadership in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, and FM 6-22, Leader Development. The Army

Ethic guides decisions and actions while exercising command and control, and readers must understand the

ideas in ADP 6-22. As the operations process is the framework for exercising command and control, readers must also understand the fundamentals of the operations process established in ADP 5-0, The Operations

Process.

The doctrine in ADP 6-0 forms the foundation for command and control tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For an explanation of these tactics and procedures, see FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and

Operations. For an explanation of the techniques associated with command and control, see ATP 6-0.5,

Command Post Organization and Operations, as well as other supporting techniques publications.

The principal audience for ADP 6-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. Mission command

demands more from subordinates at all levels, and understanding and practicing the mission command

principles during operations and garrison activities are imperative for all members of the Army Profession.

The Army historically fights with joint and multinational partners as part of a coalition, and ADP 6-0 is

nested with joint and multinational doctrine. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint

capabilities to conduct operations, or serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters, should also

refer to applicable doctrine concerning command and control of joint or multinational forces.

ADP 6-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreement 2199, Command and

Control of Allied Land Forces.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their

Soldiers operate in accordance with the Army Ethic, the law of war, and the rules of engagement. (See

FM 27-10 for a discussion of the law of war.)

ADP 6-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with

an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in

the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent

publication follows the definition.

ADP 6-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 6-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence. Send comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 6-0),

300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to

usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil
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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 v

Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source

Notes lists other sources of quotations and photographs.

Excerpts from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael E.

Howard. Copyright © 1976, renewed 2004 by Princeton University Press.

Quotes reprinted courtesy B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. Copyright © 1974 by Signet

Printing. Copyright © renewed 1991 by Meridian.

Excerpts from War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton

Walters, Ruth Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by MG

George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by

permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in

Burma and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © 1956 by Viscount William Slim. Copyright ©

renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press.

Quote courtesy Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We

Are the Mighty, 8 April 2016. Online

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

Quote courtesy Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United

Kingdom: Alden Press, 1953.

Excerpts from Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956

by Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956 The Curtis Publishing Company. Reprinted by

permission of Andesite Press, 2017.

Quote courtesy Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Copyright © 1999.

Quote courtesy Field Marshall Carver, cited in ADP AC 71940, Land Operations. Copyright © 2017

by British Ministry of Defence Crown.

Excerpts from William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History. Copyright © 1959 by Field-Marshal Sir

William Slim. Reprinted 1962 by Orion Publishing Group.

Excerpts from William M. Connor, “Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement

of the Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military

Experience. Edited by Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer

Academic/Plenum Press.

Quote courtesy Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant,

Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2. Edited by William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely.

Copyright © 1990 by Literary Classics of the United States.

Quote courtesy Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men. Edited by Harold Lamb. Copyright © 1927

by Harold Lamb. Reprinted, New York: Doubleday, 1956. All rights reserved.

Quote courtesy Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Copyright © 1953

by B. H. Liddell Hart.

Excerpts from Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France. Copyright ©

1990 by Robert A. Doughty.

Quote courtesy Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal

Tukhachevskii. Copyright © 1987 Brassey’s Defence.

Quote courtesy George S. Patton, Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S.

Army 02605 1885 – 1945. Edited by Charles M. Province. Copyright © 2002 by the George

S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society. All rights reserved.

http://freerepublic.com/focus/fchat/3535576/posts?page=12
Acknowledgements

vi ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Quote reprinted courtesy Erin Johnson, “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at Symposium,” The

Daily Universe, 21 October 2001. Online https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-

speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/.

Quote courtesy Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, “Address to Canadian Junior War Staff Course,

24 April 1941.” Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-

defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-

lineages/reports.html.

https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/
https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html
31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 vii

Introduction

This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned

since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things—the warfighting function, the

system, and a philosophy—created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control,

but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among leadership

cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities.

Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command,

which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations.

Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on

mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and

multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control.

Command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over

assigned and attached forces—is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military

function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for

command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to

integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment. Military operations are

inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants.

Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy

forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that

empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

The nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command.

Mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik (literally, mission-type

tactics). Auftragstaktik was a result of Prussian military reforms following the defeat of the Prussian army

by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1809. Reformers such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von

Gneisenau, and Helmuth von Moltke sought to develop an approach for planning campaigns and

commanding large armies over extended battlefields. At the heart of the debate was a realization that

subordinate commanders in the field often had a better understanding of what was happening during a battle

than the general staff, and they were more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities

if they were allowed to make decisions based on this knowledge. Subordinate commanders needed the

authority to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the

plan. After decades of debate, professionalization of the army, practical application during the

Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Russian War of 1870,

Auftragstaktik was codified in the 1888 German Drill Regulation.

In Auftragstaktik, commanders issue subordinate commanders a clearly defined goal, the resources to

accomplish the goal, and a time frame to accomplish the goal. Subordinate commanders are then given the

freedom to plan and execute their mission within the higher commander’s intent. During execution,

Auftragstaktik demanded a bias for action within the commander’s intent, and it required leaders to adapt to

the situation as they personally saw it, even if their decisions violated previous guidance or directives. To

operate effectively under this style of command requires a common approach to operations and subordinates

who are competent in their profession and trained in independent decision making.

Aspects of mission command, including commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, mission orders, and

mutual trust, have long been part of U.S. Army culture. The most successful U.S. Army commanders have

employed elements of mission command since the 18th century. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign

of 1864 and Sherman’s supporting plan are models of clear commander’s intent, mission orders, and

understanding based on mutual trust. (See the vignette on page 1-9.) When addressing operations orders, the

Army’s 1905 Field Service Regulation contained the following passage that served as an early discussion of

mission orders:

Introduction

viii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

An order should not trespass on the province of the subordinate. It should contain

everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more.

When the transmission of orders involves a considerable period of time, during which the

situation may change, detailed instructions are to be avoided. The same rule holds when

orders may have to be carried out under circumstances which the originator of the order

cannot completely forecast; in such cases letters of guidance is more appropriate. It should

lay stress upon the object to be attained, and leave open the means to be employed.

Eisenhower’s general plan and intent for the 1944 invasion of Europe and defeat of Nazi Germany is an

example of mission command that guided Allied forces as they fought their way from Normandy to the Rhine

and beyond. A more recent example is the 3rd Infantry Division’s march to Baghdad in 2003 and the

subsequent “thunder runs” that showed the world that the Iraqi regime was defeated. Retired General David

Perkins (a brigade commander during this operation) writes, “These thunder runs were successful because

the corps and division-level commanders established clear intent in their orders and trusted their

subordinates’ judgment and abilities to exercise disciplined initiative in response to a fluid, complex problem,

underwriting the risks that they took.”

Mission command requires tactically and technically competent commanders, staffs, and subordinates

operating in an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding. It requires building effective teams

and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to take risks and exercise disciplined

initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders,

commanders focus their subordinates on the purpose of an operation rather than on the details of how to

perform assigned tasks. This allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action in the context of a

particular situation. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary

conditions for success by allocating resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

Commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At every echelon of command,

commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting function—the related tasks and a system

that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. Commanders execute

command and control through their staffs and subordinate leaders.

This publication provides fundamental principles on mission command, command and control, and the

command and control warfighting function. Key updates and changes to this version of ADP 6-0 include—

 Combined information from ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 into a single document.

 Command and control reintroduced into Army doctrine.

 An expanded discussion of command and control and its relationship to mission command.

 Revised mission command principles.

 Command and control system reintroduced, along with new tasks, and an updated system

description.

 Expanded discussion of the command and control system.

ADP 6-0 contains 4 chapters:

Chapter 1 provides an overview of mission command, command, and control. It describes the nature of

operations and the Army’s operational concept, and how it is enabled by the mission command. It then

discusses the function of command and control, and how commanders create conditions for mission

command to flourish. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

Chapter 2 defines and describes command. It describes the nature of command, provides the elements of

command, describes the role of the commander in operations, and offers guides to effective command.

Chapter 3 defines and describes control and its relationship to command. It discusses the elements of control

and guides to effective control. Finally, this chapter discusses the importance of knowledge management and

information management as they relate to control.

Chapter 4 discusses the command and control system that performs the functions necessary to exercise

command and control. This includes a discussion of the people, processes, networks, and command posts

Introduction

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 ix

that are components of the command and control system. It also discusses command post design and

organization considerations.

Introductory table-1 lists modified terms and acronyms. The introductory figure-1 on page x illustrates the

ADP 6-0 logic map.

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms

Term or Acronym Remarks

art of command No longer defines term.

authority No longer defines term.

civil considerations ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the definition.

command and control Adopts the joint definition.

command and control system New Army definition.

commander’s visualization ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

common operational picture Modifies the definition.

data New definition.

essential element of friendly information ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the definition.

information New definition.

information protection No longer defines term.

information system No longer defines term.

knowledge New term and definition.

key tasks ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

mission command New Army definition.

mission command system Rescinds term.

mission command warfighting function Rescinds term.

prudent risk Rescinds term.

relevant information New term.

science of control No longer defines term.

situational understanding ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

understanding New term and definition.

Introduction

x ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Introductory figure-1. Logic map

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Introduction to Mission Command

The situations that confront a commander in war are of infinite variety. In spite of the most

careful planning and anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are

common occurrences in battle. A commander must school himself to regard these events

as commonplace and not permit them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

This chapter sets the context for understanding mission command and command and

control by describing the nature of operations and summarizing the Army’s operational

concept. It defines and describes mission command as the Army’s approach to

command and control that enables unified land operations. Then it defines and

describes command and control, their relationship to each other, and their elements.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS

1-1. Military operations fall along a competition continuum that spans cooperation to war. Between these extremes, societies maintain relationships. These relationships include economic competition, political or

ideological tension, and at times armed conflict. Violent power struggles in failed states, along with the

emergence of major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea seeking to gain strategic

positions of advantage, present challenges to the joint force. Army forces must be prepared to meet these

challenges across the range of military operations during periods of competition and war.

1-2. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose against the backdrop of the competition continuum. The potential range of

military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, up

through large-scale combat operations in war. Whether countering terrorism as part of a limited contingency

operation, or defeating a peer threat in large-scale ground combat, the nature of conflict is constant. Military

operations are—

 Human endeavors.

 Conducted in dynamic and uncertain environments.

 Designed to achieve a political purpose.

HUMAN ENDEAVOR

1-3. War is a human endeavor—a clash of wills characterized by the threat or application of force and violence, often fought among populations. It is not a mechanical process that can be precisely controlled by

machines, calculations, or processes. Nor is it conducted in carefully controlled and predictable

environments. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. It is both a contest of wills and a

contest of intellect between two or more sides in conflict, with each trying to alter the behavior of the other

side. During operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas among the actors

involved, and the variable perceptions of public opinion both inside and outside of an area of operations. As

friendly forces seek to impose their will on enemy forces, the enemy forces resist and seek to impose their

will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs among civilian groups whose own desires influence and

are influenced by military operations. All sides act, react, learn, and adapt. Appreciating these relationships

is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations.

Chapter 1

1-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

DYNAMIC AND UNCERTAIN

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is

based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty....The commander must work

in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive power cannot always

fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-4. War, especially land combat, is inherently dynamic and uncertain. The complexity of friendly and enemy organizations, unique combinations of terrain and weather, and the dynamic interaction among all

participants create uncertainty. Chance and friction further increase the potential for chaos and uncertainty

during operations. Chance pertains to unexpected events or changes beyond the control of friendly forces,

while friction describes the obstacles that make the execution of even simple tasks difficult. Both are always

present for all sides during combat.

1-5. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale ground combat exacerbates the dynamic and uncertain nature of war, delaying or making precise cause-and effect determinations difficult. The unintended

effects of operations often cannot be anticipated and may not be readily apparent. War is inherently chaotic,

demanding an approach to the command and control of operations that does not attempt to impose perfect

order, but rather makes allowances for uncertainty created by chance and friction.

DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL PURPOSE

[T]he role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the

resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of

the war— the goal defined by fundamental policy.

B.H. Liddell-Hart

1-6. All U.S. military operations share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve specific objectives that support attainment of the overall political purpose of the operation. Objective—directing every military

operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal—is a principle of war. In large-scale ground

combat, the purpose of operations may be to destroy the enemy’s capabilities and will to fight. The purpose

of operations short of large-scale combat may be more nuanced and difficult to define, and they may require

support to achieve multiple objectives. These operations frequently involve setting conditions that improve

positions of relative advantage compared to that of a specific adversary and contribute to achieving strategic

aims in an operational area without large-scale ground combat. In either case, all operations are designed to

achieve the political purpose set by national authorities.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-7. The Army operational concept for conducting operations as part of a joint team is unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense

support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict,

prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). The goal of

unified land operations is to achieve the joint force commander’s end state by applying landpower as part of

unified action. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of unified land operations.)

1-8. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. During the conduct of

unified land operations, Army forces support the joint force through four strategic roles:

 Shape operational environments.

 Prevent conflict.

 Prevail during large-scale ground combat.

 Consolidate gains.

1-9. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Army forces assist in

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-3

shaping an operational environment by providing trained and ready forces to geographic combatant

commanders in support of their combatant commander’s campaign plans. Shaping activities include security

cooperation, military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. The

theater army and subordinate Army forces assist the geographic combatant commander in building partner

capacity and capability and promoting stability across an area of responsibility. Army operations to shape are

continuous throughout a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility and occur before, during,

and after a specific joint operation. If operations to shape are successful, they may prevent conflict and negate

the requirement to conduct large-scale ground combat operations.

1-10. Army operations to prevent conflict are designed to deter undesirable actions by an adversary through the positioning of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. Army forces may have a

significant role in the execution of directed flexible deterrent options or flexible response options.

Additionally, Army prevent activities may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other pre-deployment

activities; initial deployment into a theater, including echeloning command posts; and development of

intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the joint force

commander.

1-11. While the Army may conduct combat operations at various levels across the range of military operations, Army forces must be manned, equipped, and trained for large-scale ground combat. During

large-scale ground combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground

forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break

an opponent’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to

achieve national objectives.

1-12. Operations to consolidate gains include activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.

Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. In some instances, Army

forces will be in charge of integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other

situations, Army forces will be in support. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation,

consolidating gains becomes the focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded.

(See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of how Army forces shape operational environments, prevent conflict,

conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.)

MISSION COMMAND

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with

their ingenuity.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

1-13. Army operations doctrine emphasizes shattering an enemy force’s ability and will to resist, and destroying the coherence of enemy operations. Army forces accomplish these things by controlling the

nature, scope, and tempo of an operation and striking simultaneously throughout the area of operations to

control, neutralize, and destroy enemy forces and other objectives. The Army’s command and control

doctrine supports its operations doctrine. It balances coordination, personal leadership, and tactical flexibility.

It stresses rapid decision making and execution, including rapid response to changing situations. It

emphasizes mutual trust and shared understanding among superiors and subordinates.

1-14. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports

the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and

exploiting the initiative.

1-15. The mission command approach to command and control is based on the Army’s view that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change

rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation. No single person is ever sufficiently informed

to make every important decision, nor can a single person keep up with the number of decisions that need to

be made during combat. Subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of what is happening during

a battle, and are more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities if allowed to make

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decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the initial plan in order

to achieve their commander’s intent. Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, a route may

become impassable, or units could consume supplies at unexpected rates. Friction and unforeseeable

combinations of variables impose uncertainty in all operations and require an approach to command and

control that does not attempt to impose perfect order, but rather accepts uncertainty and makes allowances

for unpredictability.

1-16. Mission command helps commanders capitalize on subordinate ingenuity, innovation, and decision making to achieve the commander’s intent when conditions change or current orders are no longer relevant.

It requires subordinates who seek opportunities and commanders who accept risk for subordinates trying to

meet their intent. Subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation help

manage uncertainty and enable necessary tempo at each echelon during operations. Employing the mission

command approach during all garrison activities and training events is essential to creating the cultural

foundation for its employment in high-risk environments.

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik

Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) was appointed chief of the Prussian general staff in 1857. One of the important concepts he promulgated was Auftragstaktik (literally, “mission tactics”), a command method stressing decentralized initiative within an overall strategic design. Moltke understood that, as war progressed, its uncertainties diminished the value of any detailed planning that might have been done beforehand. He believed that, beyond calculating the initial mobilization and concentration of forces, “…no plan of operations extends with any degree of certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force.” He believed that, throughout a campaign, commanders had to make decisions based on a fluid, constantly evolving situation. For Moltke, each major encounter had consequences that created a new situation, which became the basis for new measures. Auftragstaktik encouraged commanders to be flexible and react immediately to changes in the situation as they developed. It replaced detailed planning with delegation of decision-making authority to subordinate commanders within the context of the higher commander's intent. Moltke realized that tactical decisions had to be made on the spot; therefore, great care was taken to encourage initiative by commanders at all levels.

Moltke believed that commanders should issue only the most essential orders. These would provide only general instructions outlining the principal objective and specific missions. Tactical details were left to subordinates. For Moltke, “the advantage which a commander thinks he can attain through continued personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them.”

Moltke's thoughts, codified in the 1888 German field regulation, were imbued into the culture of the Germany Army.

SUBORDINATE DECISION MAKING

1-17. Successful commanders anticipate future events by developing branches and sequels instead of focusing on details better handled by subordinates during current operations. The higher the echelon, the

more time commanders should devote to future operations and the broader the guidance provided to

subordinates. Subordinates empowered to make decisions during operations unburden higher commanders

from issues that distract from necessary broader perspective and focus on critical issues. Mission command

allows those commanders with the best situational understanding to make rapid decisions without waiting

for higher echelon commanders to assess the situation and issue orders.

Introduction to Mission Command

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1-18. Commanders delegate appropriate authority to deputies, subordinate commanders, and staff members based upon a judgment of their capabilities and experience. Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act

for their commander in specified areas. Delegating decision-making authority reduces the number of

decisions made at the higher echelons and reduces response time at lower echelons. In addition to determining

the amount of decision-making authority they will delegate, commanders also identify decisions that are their

sole responsibility and cannot be delegated to subordinates.

1-19. When delegating authority to subordinates, commanders strive to set the necessary conditions for success. They do this by assessing and managing risk. Taking risk is inherent at all levels of command.

Commanders and staffs assess hazards and recommend controls to help manage risk, rather than forcing

unnecessary risk decisions on subordinates. Risk, including ethical risk, should be identified and mitigated

by the higher level commander to the greatest extent possible. Two ways of managing risk are by managing

the number of tasks assigned to subordinates and by providing the appropriate resources to accomplish those

tasks. These resources include information, forces, materiel, and time.

1-20. While commanders can delegate authority, they cannot delegate responsibility. Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use of delegated authority, but commanders remain solely

responsible and accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

1-21. Decentralized execution is the delegation of decision-making authority to subordinates, so they may make and implement decisions and adjust their assigned tasks in fluid and rapidly changing situations.

Subordinate decisions should be ethically based and within the framework of their higher commander’s

intent. Decentralized execution is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the operational initiative

during operations in environments where conditions rapidly change and uncertainty is the norm. Rapidly

changing situations and uncertainty are inherent in operations where commanders seek to establish a tempo

and intensity that enemy forces cannot match.

1-22. Decentralized execution requires disseminating information to the lowest possible level so subordinates can make informed decisions based on a shared understanding of both the situation and their

commander’s intent. This empowers subordinates operating in rapidly changing conditions to exercise

disciplined initiative within their commander’s intent. Generally, the more dynamic the circumstances, the

greater the need for initiative to make decisions at lower levels. It is the duty of subordinates to exercise

initiative to achieve their commander’s intent. It is the commander’s responsibility to issue appropriate intent

and ensure subordinates are prepared in terms of education, training, and experience to exercise initiative.

1-23. The commander’s intent provides a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an overarching framework. It provides guidance within which individuals may exercise initiative to accomplish

the desired end state. Understanding the commander’s intent two echelons up further enhances unity of effort

while providing the basis for decentralized decision making and execution throughout the depth of a

formation. Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise initiative

effectively in unexpected situations. Under the mission command approach to command and control,

subordinates have both responsibility and authority to fulfill the commander’s intent.

LEVELS OF CONTROL

1-24. Determining the appropriate level of control, including delegating decisions and determining how much decentralized execution to employ, is part of the art of command. The level and application of control