In plato's republic what service does glaukon do for socrates

2 Skepticism About Ethics

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Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

• Explain what it means to be a moral skeptic.

• Explain the notion of moral relativism and how it differs from moral objectivity.

• Discuss challenges to relativism.

• Explain the notion of egoism and how it differs from the notion that moral standards are unconditional.

• Discuss Glaukon’s challenge from Plato’s Republic and identify the main claims made in the story.

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Section 2.1 Introduction to Skepticism

2.1 Introduction to Skepticism In contemporary usage, skepticism means a doubt that a belief or claim is true. We often use this word to refer to general doubts about all claims of a particular sort. For example, a reli- gious skeptic might have doubts about claims pertaining to the existence of God, the possibil- ity of knowing anything about God, and so on. A global warming skeptic might doubt claims that human activity is the main cause of average global temperature rise, or a 9/11 “truther” might be skeptical about claims that the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., were exclusively the doings of al-Qaida (as opposed to being supported by the U.S. gov- ernment). Likewise, many people regard the claims of politicians, salespersons, and media personalities with doubt and suspicion.

Similarly, a moral skeptic—in the way we will be using this term here—will doubt common beliefs about morality itself. It is important to note that we are not referring to people who doubt specific moral claims, such as the claim that eating animals is wrong or that abortion is morally justified. Nor are we referring to those who doubt the truth of certain general moral theories or principles, such as utilitarianism or deontology. If we recall the discussion of the landscape of moral philosophy from Chapter 1, claims about concrete moral problems like eating animals or abortion fall under applied ethics, while claims about the general rules, principles, and values that should inform our judgments and choices fall under normative ethics. The kind of skepticism we are discussing in this chapter involves the more basic kinds of claims that fall under the scope of metaethics.

Specifically, we will consider the reasons one might hold doubts about two commonly assumed features of morality itself:

1. Moral standards are objective. 2. Moral standards are unconditional.

The forms of moral skepticism we will consider in this chapter raise doubts about those two features.

1. Relativism doubts whether moral standards are objective, instead maintaining that they are only true or false relative to a culture or individual.

2. Egoism doubts whether moral standards are unconditional, instead maintaining that they are only good if they serve an individual’s self-interest, which in turn implies that it may be better for individuals to act contrary to moral standards if they can.

We will focus a section of this chapter on each of these. First, however, it is important to note three features common to each form of skepticism.

First, skepticism is not mere doubting or contradicting. One can doubt a claim without hav- ing any basis for doing so, and one can contradict any claim by merely saying the opposite of what another person says. Neither of these are worth taking seriously by themselves, because there is no good reason for those doubts or contradictions.

The kinds of moral skepticism we will examine aim to provide such reasons. Indeed, the word skepticism itself comes from the Greek word skeptesthai, meaning “to examine” or “to consider.” Since the skeptic uses reason to undermine certain assumptions about morality,

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

we have every right to test the strength of his or her reasons. Perhaps doing so will lead us to question whether the reasons to doubt morality are good reasons (we might even become skeptical of the skeptics, so to speak). In other words, being skeptical about morality does not mean that one has abandoned the use of reason in thinking about what morality is, why it matters, and related issues. We should therefore approach skeptical views with as much criti- cal thought as a skeptic approaches the views he or she calls into question.

Second, the general features of morality that skeptics question—such as its objectivity and unconditionality—are ones that most moral systems take for granted. Accordingly, skeptics of morality generally provide an alternative explanation for why most people take these fea- tures for granted. A skeptic will have to explain why certain assumptions about morality have such a grip on us, despite the fact that we are deeply misguided (as they would claim). In addition, just as we can test the strength of the skeptic’s reasons for doubt, we can test the strength of his or her alternative explanation.

Third, we mentioned previously that the kind of skepticism we consider in this chapter is not primarily concerned with applied ethical issues like abortion or eating animals; nor does it focus on the general principles, rules, and values with which normative ethics is primarily concerned. Rather, it questions metaethical ideas like moral objectivity or unconditionality. However, questioning these ideas can have significant implications with respect to norma- tive and applied ethics.

The relation between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics is comparable to the way we might think of a house. The strength of the roof depends on the strength of the house’s framework—the walls, support beams, and so on. But the framework needs a strong founda- tion if it is to support the roof. If the foundation has serious problems (e.g., the concrete has major cracks, the ground is giving way), then the support system will be unstable. If the sup- port system is unstable, then the roof is weak and liable to give way. We can think of concrete moral judgments as the “roof,” normative theories as the “framework,” and metaethics as the “foundation.” Moral skepticism questions the strength of the foundation, and, by implication, the strength of the framework and roof.

As we examine the different forms of skepticism, we should ask ourselves if the skeptic has provided good reasons to be skeptical of our common beliefs and assumptions about ethics. Has he or she provided a satisfactory alternative explanation for why we have these common beliefs and assumptions that adequately accounts for the role that ethics plays in our indi- vidual lives? And what would be the broader implications of accepting his or her skeptical claims about ethics?

With these thoughts in mind, we will examine skepticism about moral objectivity.

2.2 The Relativist Challenge American restaurant goers know that when a waiter or waitress provides good service, he or she deserves a decent tip; withholding a tip when good service has been provided is usually regarded as disrespectful. In Japan, however, the opposite is the case: Providing a tip is often a sign of disrespect. Similarly, consider that most Westerners believe that the way to show

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

respect to the deceased is to cremate or bury their bodies, while leaving a body out in the open is the epitome of disrespect. However, in Himalayan cultures—partly because there is not much wood for burning and the hard ground makes it difficult to dig graves—it is custom- ary to leave the bodies of the dead out in the open to be consumed by animals and the ele- ments, which is regarded as dignifying.

Countless other examples can be raised about behaviors that one culture regards as ethical but another regards as unethical, and vice versa. Over the past century or two, as contact with other cultures has become increasingly common, many people have come to doubt whether their way of behav- ing and judging is the only “right” way.

Even within contemporary Western culture, there has been increased emphasis placed on individual self-determination of the values and principles that guide one’s life, which leads to doubts about whether any single set of values and principles should be authoritative for all. Indeed, bitter and sometimes violent conflicts often arise when one per- son or group is perceived as imposing its moral views on others. Instead, people commonly preface their expressions of moral commitment with phrases like “in my opinion” or “in my personal view”—the implication being that they have no right to suppose that others should agree.

These factors have contributed to a sense that moral judgments are not true or false in any objective sense but are instead relative to a culture or individual. Moral objectivity is the view that at least some moral truths are independent of the beliefs and values of any particu- lar culture or individual. By contrast, relativism rejects moral objectivity. Instead, relativism holds that the truth of moral standards depends entirely on the beliefs and values that a cul- ture or individual subject happens to hold. This means that if a culture or individual believes or values certain ideas, the associated moral judgments are relatively true (i.e., true for them); if they lack those beliefs and values, any conflicting moral judgments are relatively false (i.e., false for them).

Before examining this more closely, it is important to note that most people who think care- fully about what relativism means ultimately conclude that it has limits and cannot be entirely correct. Most people hold many deep beliefs that conflict with the relativist position, and there are significant ways in which the position itself may be incoherent. Moreover, relativism is not a normative ethical theory like utilitarianism or deontology; that is, one cannot invoke relativism as a reason to affirm or deny a particular moral judgment, as if it were an alterna- tive to, say, the principle of utility or the Categorical Imperative. For instance, one cannot say something like “According to utilitarianism, stealing this item would be wrong, but according to relativism it would not be wrong.” Before going into detail, we will look more closely at the general claims of relativism itself.

Jupiterimages/Stockbyte/Thinkstock Different attitudes toward giving and receiving gifts represent one example of how cultures can have different ethical standards.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

Two Types of Relativism Thinking back to the examples above, when an American claims that not tipping a waitress, leaving a dead body to rot in the open, or stoning a woman to death are wrong, one might suppose it is only wrong according to modern American culture; according to another culture, these behaviors may in fact be right. Such a view would be considered cultural relativism, since it acknowledges that within a particular culture, given a set of characteristic beliefs, val- ues, and customs, certain behaviors might be right or wrong; it denies, however, that the same judgment can be applied to similar behaviors in another culture with a different set of charac- teristic beliefs, values, and customs. In other words, it denies that there are any judgments of right and wrong that extend across all cultures regardless of whether their beliefs, values, and customs support those judgments. One might also subscribe to subjectivism, which is the view that matters of right and wrong are ultimately relative to the values that each individual subject recognizes and affirms.

In either form, relativism can have great appeal. It can be taken as a sign of respect for other cultures or individuals by refusing to deny or denounce what they find important and mean- ingful or by refraining from imposing oneself on others. It can help us avoid the conflicts that can result from disagreeing over ethical matters. It can be an expression of honesty and humility, in that it helps us presume to know more than we really do about ethical questions. Finally, it can be a way to acknowledge that much of what we believe and how we think people should act has been shaped by our own culture and upbringing.

Challenges to Relativism One can appreciate the appeal of relativism without being a relativist about everything of ethical significance; as we mentioned above, most people are relativists about some ethical matters but not all of them. The limits of both cultural relativism and subjectivism become clear when one considers personal experiences, the implications that relativism has, the con- sistency and coherence of the relativist position, and the interconnectedness of cultures and personal lives.

Personal Experience To understand the problems with the relativist position, think about your own experiences for a moment. Each one of us has a story to tell about how we came to be where we are, which includes elements such as community, society, religion, family, friends, and many other factors that influenced and shaped who we are and what we believe. Each of these elements is quite diverse in and of itself, incorporating many different beliefs and forms of life (think of the diversity within American society, for instance). To come out of a culture is thus to have been exposed to a range of different and often conflicting perspectives out of which we have to form our own identity, values, and moral beliefs. Moreover, none of us has all of the same beliefs and values that our parents did or that we ourselves had when we were younger, and these beliefs and values continue to change throughout our lives in profound or subtle ways.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

At least some of the ways we arrived at the beliefs and values we have is the result of reflec- tion and experiences that lead us to affirm, reject, or modify aspects of our own prior per- spectives, the perspectives with which we were raised, and those of our surrounding culture. That is, our own development was not wholly determined for us by some outside factor like family or culture, nor was it arbitrary or accidental. Rather, we had some reason indepen- dent of our culture to accept or reject certain elements of it. Likewise, we had some reason independent of how we were raised to accept or reject certain elements of our upbringing, and some reason independent of our subjective perspective would have led us to change that perspective. In short, our own experiences point to reasons for or against moral convictions that are independent of culture, upbringing, and personal values and thus not merely relative to those factors.

We can strengthen this observation, though, by looking more closely at what holding a relativ- ist position would involve and whether it would have implications that conflict with much of what we otherwise believe about morality.

Implications of Relativism First, what are the implications of relativism? When we become aware that different cultures have different views on whether it is respectful to tip a restaurant server, we may come to think that there is no objective truth about tipping that applies to all cultures. Let’s assume this is correct. We might then be tempted to think that all matters of respect or disrespect—or any other matter of ethical importance—are relative to one’s culture. But do we really think this? What would such a view imply about other matters of moral significance?

For example, consider an issue such as whether certain kinds of people should be enslaved or exterminated. During the 1930s and 1940s, German Nazis engaged in the mass extermination of those they regarded as unworthy and unfit, such as Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and peo- ple with certain disabilities—we call this event the Holocaust. Relative to the beliefs, values, and customs characteristic of German Nazis, Jews and others deserve no respect, and thus it may have been true (for that culture) that the atrocities of the Holocaust were not wrong but necessary, even noble. Similarly, relative to the beliefs, values, and customs characteristic of southern White culture in America prior to the freeing of the slaves in the 19th century, it was true (for that culture) that people with dark skin did not deserve the basic freedoms owed to Whites and thus that slavery was not wrong; in fact, many in that culture regarded slavery as good and right.

If we accept the cultural relativist position, two important implications follow. First, cultural relativism implies that we would have to abandon the judgments most of us make about the absolute rightness or wrongness of certain kinds of actions. For example, since exter- minating Jewish people, enslaving Blacks, or persecuting and killing those of different faiths are morally justified relative to the beliefs, values, and customs of cultures that engage in those actions, we cannot legitimately say that they are wrong, even if our culture disapproves of them. Likewise, our own rejection of such things cannot legitimately be called right, since this judgment is merely relative to our culture. However, hardly anyone accepts this: Most people maintain that regardless of the beliefs, values, and customs of the cultures that engage or engaged in such actions, their behavior is or was despicable and wrong, period. In that case one is not a relativist about such matters.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

The second implication of cultural relativism is that we must reject any notions of cultural progress and decline. In addition to no longer permitting slavery, American society no longer allows the segregation of Blacks and Whites in schools, restaurants, buses, and many other contexts, as it did long after the end of slavery. American society also once refused women the right to vote and allowed children to work long hours in mines and factories, but none of these practices are legal or generally accepted nowadays. Recently, homosexuals have been given the right to marry and serve openly in the military, more women are being given equal pay for equal work, and increased efforts are being made to ensure that children and those with disabilities are protected. There may be controversy regarding whether certain specific cultural changes represent progress or decline, but in either case, in the words of the philoso- pher James Rachels (2003), “that is just the sort of transcultural judgment that, according to cultural relativism, is impossible” (p. 22). In other words, if one were to judge that American

The Bacha Bāzī

Recent military activity by American and other Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has embroiled them in some challenging cultural conflicts. One of the most challenging and contentious conflicts concerns the practice in Afghanistan of bacha bāzī, which those in the West would call pederasty or pedophilia. In short, bacha bāzī involves powerful warlords and other prominent men taking prepubescent and adolescent boys as their sexual slaves. This practice seems to have been present in some Asian cultures for centuries, and though it was officially outlawed by the Taliban, the ouster of that regime by Western forces in 2002 removed the penalties for participating in this practice. Thus, it became more commonplace among the Afghan warlords and police commanders that the U.S. and allied forces depended on to secure the nation (Londoño, 2012).

Is the practice of using vulnerable boys as sexual slaves merely wrong relative to our own culture, or is it wrong no matter the cultural traditions, beliefs, or practices?

One way to frame this question is to ask whether a child has a set of basic human rights that would be violated by this practice. This is certainly the view taken by the United Nations and the 196 countries that have signed its Convention on the Rights of the Child, among which is a provision that protects children from sexual abuse (UN News Center, 2015; United Nations, 1989). These provisions are based on the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” (United Nations, 1989, para. 1), which is to say that it recognizes that all people have certain rights above and beyond particular cultural beliefs and practices, among which is the right of a child not to be sexually abused.

Now, denying the relativist position and acknowledging such rights does not settle all of the ethical issues, for there is still the question of how one should respond when confronted with practices like bacha bāzī. The U.S. military’s policy has been to look the other way so as to maintain good relationships with the Afghan leaders who perpetrate this abuse (Goldstein, 2015). However, there have been several cases of soldiers disobeying such orders and attempting to prevent the abuse (Goldstein, 2015). Whether they were right to do so is a question we cannot address here, but surely we can presume that they would not have done so unless they regarded the actions of the abusers as a violation of objective standards—that no one should abuse children regardless of whether such abuse is accepted by a culture.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

culture has progressed by outlawing slavery and segregation and by granting women the right to vote, one must deny cultural relativism. Likewise, if one were to judge that American cul- ture has declined in certain ways, one must deny cultural relativism. Why?

The reason is that any notion of a culture’s progress or decline must refer to standards that are independent of the culture as it happens to be. If increased racial or gender equality is to count as progress, it is because we think that racial or gender equality is good, and so a cul- ture that has more equality is better than one that has less. Or if we think that a culture has declined in certain ways, it would be because we regard certain norms as good and judge that the culture has veered from those norms. Either way, we are judging a culture by standards that are independent of the beliefs, values, and customs they happen to have. This is contrary to the relativistic view that there are no such independent standards. If we accept relativism, then we have no basis on which to hold that cultural changes like the elimination of slavery or granting women the right to vote is progress or that any changes could represent decline.

Similar problems arise for subjectivism. While we can appreciate that individuals within a culture have a wide variety of lifestyles and conceptions of what is good and worthwhile and that a “one-size-fits-all” perspective is often unjustified, most people recognize limits to this relativistic attitude. For instance, Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in 2016, may have acted consistently with his beliefs, as do others who per- petrate terrible atrocities. But few of us would be content to suppose that the wrongness of such actions is merely relative to our own personal values. Moreover, as we previously dis- cussed, many of us have changed our moral views and behavior as we have matured, and we experience this change as one of personal growth or progress. Just as the notion of cultural progress is difficult to square with a belief in cultural relativism, the experience of personal growth in one’s moral convictions and choices is inconsistent with the view that moral truth is only relative to the beliefs and values that an individual happens to have. The best we can say is that we had certain beliefs and made certain choices at one point in our lives and sim- ply changed at a later point. Again, however, most of us experience that kind of change not as arbitrary, but as one of genuine development. All of this implies that one is not a relativist about moral matters.

In short, the implications of relativism are that we can no longer sustain judgments that things such as slavery, genocide, terrorist attacks, rape, child molestation, and others are truly wrong; nor can we do adequate justice to the notion of cultural progress and the experience of personal moral development. Thus, we find that while most people are relativists about some matters of cultural or personal difference, very few people are relativists about all such matters.

Consistency and Coherence of Relativism The second set of challenges to relativism has to do with the consistency and coherence of the relativist position. Think back to the appealing aspects of relativism: It may seem to show respect for other persons or cultures, can help us avoid conflicts, and can be an expression of honesty and humility. Notice that each appealing aspect refers to some value that the rela- tivist position seems to affirm or embody: respect, peace, honesty, humility, and so on. All of these are adduced as good reasons to adopt a relativist position.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

However, respect for other cultures or for individual choices has a particular value that many of us affirm but some others may not. Peace is also something that many, but not all, value. Honesty and humility are generally regarded as virtues, but not everyone agrees. If the value of respect, peace, honesty, and humility are to count as reasons in favor of relativism, this value must be independent of whether others recognize it; in other words, they must have objective value. But if this is the case, then relativism must be false. Thus, what we thought were reasons in favor of relativism turn out, upon examination, to be reasons to reject it.

To see how defenses of relativism undermine relativism by appealing to nonrelative values and principles, think about the consistency and coherence of a few common expressions one might hear in support of relativism:

• “We should not pass judgment on other cultures.” In other words, passing judgment on other cultures is wrong. What should we say about a culture that passes judgments on other cultures? Are we not saying that what they do is wrong? By saying that what they do is wrong, are we not still passing judgment?

• “Who am I to say that what someone else does is wrong?” This saying means that no one has a right to say that what someone else does is wrong. But what if someone does say that what someone else does is wrong? Doesn’t that mean that they have done something wrong?

• The Bible says, “Judge not, lest ye be judged” (Matthew 7:1). The Bible seems to indicate that we should not pass judgment on another. But the Bible also contains a great many ethical teachings that seem to be presented as objec- tively true. Many of those teachings challenged the prevailing culture and its leaders to whom Jesus was speaking in this verse. Does this suggest that this verse should be understood as a warning against the objective wrong of hypocrisy rather than as a support of relativism?

One can see the inconsistency that arises when phrases like these are used to express or sup- port a relativist view. There may be contexts in which the sentiment they express is appro- priate, but the bottom line is that these expressions endorse values or principles that other cultures or persons may not share or ones that apply in some contexts but not all. In doing so, they do not support a position of moral relativism but rather one of nonrelativism.

Respect for Others Not only does the relativist’s endorsement of respect, honesty, and humility imply these ideas’ objective value, but their value may even be undermined if we were to adopt a consistently relativist position. Take respect, for example. As we noted before, a relativist position is often taken to express respect for other persons or cultures by refusing to pass negative judgment on their beliefs and practices. However, what does respect really mean? Generally, it means that we recognize some kind of value or merit in whatever we respect. We are making a judg- ment that a person or culture is worthy of respect.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

Moreover, as the philosopher Mary Midgley (1981) notes, “To respect someone [or some cul- ture], we have to know enough about [the person or culture] to make a favourable judgment” (p. 69). In other words, to show respect requires a certain level of understanding of a person’s or a culture’s beliefs and practices that allows us to recognize their potential value and merit. However, the level of understanding that would justify respect and praise has to allow for the possibility of negative judgments as well. “It is hardly possible that we could praise them effectively,” Midgley observes, “if we could not, in principle, criticize them” (p. 71). What does she mean by this?

The popular radio show A Prairie Home Companion includes a regular segment about the fic- tional town of Lake Wobegon, Minnesota, where “all the children are above average.” The joke behind this description of the community is that it is impossible: No child can be above aver- age except in comparison to other children who are average and still others who are below average. In other words, describing a child as above average requires us to have a standard for “average” according to which a child can be judged to be at, above, or below. By declaring that all children are above average, one is essentially saying that no child is above average, since all are at the same level. Thus, the praise and esteem implied by the term above average is meaningless.

Just as being above average constitutes a positive judgment about a child, being worthy of respect is a positive judgment about a person’s or culture’s beliefs and practices. But for the positive judgment to be meaningful, there has to be the possibility of a negative judgment as well. Just like the positive judgment that a child is above average must entail that some chil- dren are average or below average, the positive judgment that cultural beliefs and practices are worthy of respect must entail that some cultural beliefs and practices are not worthy of respect. If we declare that all cultural beliefs and practices are worthy of respect, that is just as vacuous as declaring that all children in a community are above average.

To put it another way, if we refuse to judge other cultures at all, we “are not taking the other culture seriously” (Midgley, 1981, p. 73), a point that can be applied to judging other persons as well. It is a powerful idea: Would a positive judgment like “worthy of respect” be meaning- ful or significant if there wasn’t the possibility of negative judgments, that some things are not worthy of respect?

Consider this same idea as it pertains to a value like honesty. Imagine you were seeking a friend’s honest opinion on your new outfit. Would you trust her thoughts if you knew that she would never say anything negative? If you suspected that she would say you look good no matter what, would you turn to her if you really wanted to know if the outfit looked good? Probably not. Genuine honesty, like genuine respect, depends on the possibility of a negative judgment; otherwise, any positive remark would be empty and meaningless.

In short, by insisting that all value judgments are merely relative, a stance of relativism entails that we cannot make positive judgments about another culture or individual, including the judgment that they are worthy of respect. Thus, relativism does not, in fact, show respect for others, as some defenders maintain.

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Section 2.2 The Relativist Challenge

Intellectual Humility Perhaps the most common and familiar way to defend relativist attitudes is by using phrases like “Who am I to say what’s right or wrong for someone else?” Such phrases seem to call us to intellectual humility: How can we pass judgment on others when we know so little of their circumstances or when we cannot be sure our judgments are well grounded? This is important, but we can only account for its importance if we reject relativism and accept there are certain standards by which we can, at least in principle, judge others and ourselves. Why is this?

As we saw in Chapter 1, acting on the basis of reasons—which is fundamental to human life— depends on the capacity to judge that certain choices are better than others. It is easy to see that in many everyday situations, such as deciding on the best car to buy or how to treat an illness, our own knowledge is limited; we may not have better judgment than someone else, and we can probably learn a lot from others if we open ourselves up to their judgment and perspective. Because of these limitations, humility and a willingness to learn from others seems to be in order.

But this only makes sense if there are, in fact, better or worse judgments on such matters. Why suppose that we may be limited in our knowledge of how to treat an illness or buy a car if there were no such thing as better and worse judgments about them? If humility and being open to learning from others is important, we must suppose that there are some judgments that are good and others that are not.

In most everyday situations, this is not hard to see: If a doctor recommends a certain treat- ment for an illness, it would be absurd to suppose that the effectiveness of this treatment is relative to one’s beliefs and values. Likewise, if humility and an openness to learning from others are important regarding ethical matters, then we would have to presuppose that there are some ethical judgments that are good and others that are not. To put it another way, if we think we might have something to learn from another people or cultures, we have to suppose that their ethical judgment might be better than ours, but this logically entails that their ethi- cal judgment might also be worse than ours in certain respects. Both of these possibilities, however, imply that relativism is false, and phrases like “Who am I to judge?” actually deny relativism rather than support it.