Introduction to international disaster management coppola pdf

Introduction to Emergency Management

Fourth Edition

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Introduction to Emergency Management

Fourth Edition

George D. Haddow

Jane A. Bullock

Damon P. Coppola

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Haddow , George D.

Introduction to emergency management / George D. Haddow, Jane A. Bullock, Damon P. Coppola. — 4th ed.

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85617-959-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Emergency management. 2. Emergency management — United States. 3. Communication in management. I. Bullock, Jane A. II. Coppola, Damon P. III. Title. HV551.2.H3 2010 363.34�80973 — dc22 2010014614

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN : 978-1-85617-959-1

Printed in the United States of America

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For information on all BH publications visit our website at www.elsevierdirect.com/security

This book is dedicated to Lacy Suiter. Lacy taught us all the responsibility, privilege, and honor of serving people as emergency managers. He singlehandedly made emergency management an important discipline to the safety of our citizens. He was a gentleman, a mentor, a teacher, a cheerleader, and an impromptu singer, but most of all, he was the best friend anyone could ever have.

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Contents

Foreword xiii

Acknowledgments xv

Introduction xvii

1 . The Historical Context of Emergency Management 1

What You’ll Learn 1

Introduction 1

Early History: 1800 – 1950 2

The Cold War and the Rise of Civil Defense: the 1950s 3

Changes to Emergency Management: the 1960s 4

The Call for a National Focus on Emergency

Management: the 1970s 5

Civil Defense Reappears as Nuclear Attack Planning: the 1980s 8

An Agency in Trouble: 1989 – 1992 9

The Witt Revolution: 1993 – 2001 10

Terrorism: 2001 12

The Steps Leading to the Katrina Debacle 20

Post-Katrina Changes 20

The Future Environment of Emergency Management 23

Important Terms 26

Self-Check Questions 26

Out-of-Class Exercise 27

2 . Natural and Technological Hazards and Risk Assessment 29

What You Will Learn 29

Introduction 29

Natural Hazards 30

Technological Hazards 51

viii Contents

Chemical 56

Biological 56

Radiological 57

Nuclear 58

Hazards Risk Management 59

Risk Management Technology 62

Social and Economic Risk Factors 62

Conclusion 64

Important Terms 65

Self-Check Questions 66

Out-of-Class Exercises 67

3 . The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 69

What You’ll Learn 69

Introduction 69

Mitigation Tools 70

Hazard Identification and Mapping 73

Impediments to Mitigation 83

Federal Mitigation Programs 84

The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program 91

Nonfederal Mitigation Grant Programs 93

Conclusion 93

Important Terms 94

Self-Check Questions 94

Out-of-Class Exercises 94

4 . The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 97

What You’ll Learn 97

Introduction 97

A Systems Approach: The Preparedness Cycle 98

Mitigation versus Preparedness 102

Preparedness: The Emergency Operations Plan 102

Education and Training Programs 107

Emergency Management Exercises 111

Evaluation and Improvement 114

Contents ix

Preparedness: A National Effort 116

Preparedness Grant Programs 118

Business Continuity Planning and Emergency Management 121

Conclusion 123

Important Terms 130

Self-Check Questions 130

Out-of-Class Exercises 130

5 . The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 133

What You’ll Learn 133

Introduction 133

The Mission 134

Audiences/Customers 139

Communicating in the Era of Homeland Security 140

Disaster Communications in a Changing Media World 142

Building an Effective Disaster Communications Capability in a

Changing Media World 151

Creating Effective Disaster Communications 151

Conclusion 162

Important Terms 163

Self-Check Questions 163

Out-of-Class Exercises 163

6 . The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 165

What You’ll Learn 165

Introduction 165

Local Response 171

State Response 172

Volunteer Group Response 173

Incident Command System 175

The Federal Response 178

Federal Assistance 185

Key Federal Response Officials 203

Other FEMA Response Resources 206

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 209

x Contents

Conclusion 210

Important Terms 211

Self-Check Questions 211

Out-of-Class Exercises 212

7 . The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Recovery 213

What You’ll Learn 213

Introduction 213

The National Response Framework for Disaster Recovery

Operations 220

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Recovery Programs 226

FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Programs 232

Other Federal Agency Disaster Recovery Funding 236

Recovery Planning Tools 240

Long-Term Recovery Planning Annex 241

Community Long-Term Recovery Planning 243

Conclusion 245

Important Terms 249

Self-Check Questions 250

Out-of-Class Exercises 250

8 . International Disaster Management 251

What You’ll Learn 251

Introduction 251

Disasters in Developing Nations 252

International Disasters 252

Important Issues Influencing the Response Process 253

The United Nations System 256

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs 261

Nongovernmental Organizations 270

Assistance Provided by the U.S. Government 275

Conclusion 295

Important Terms 295

Contents xi

Self-Check Questions 295

Out-of-Class Exercises 296

9 . Emergency Management and the Terrorist Threat 297

What You’ll Learn 297

Introduction 297

Changes in Emergency Management and the War on Terrorism 298

September 11, 2001 301

Federal Government Terrorism Activity 307

The 911 Commission 323

State Government Terrorism Activity 327

Local Government Terrorism Activity 329

The Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Terrorism Preparedness

and Response 331

Conclusion 338

Important Terms 339

Self-Check Questions 339

Out-of-Class Exercises 340

10 . The Future of Emergency Management 341

Understanding the Past 341

The Obama Administration 344

“ Those Who Forget the Past Are Doomed to Repeat It ” 344

Emergency Management Ideas for the Future 347

Conclusion 353

Appendix A: Acronyms 355

Appendix B: Emergency Management Websites 361

Appendix C: Ready.gov Citizen Preparedness Recommendations 365

Appendix D: A Day in the Life of Homeland Security 373

Glossary 377

References 381

Index 387

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Foreword

In 1993, when I took over leadership of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), emergency management was not a very well known or respected discipline. Many in the pro- fession were hold-overs from the days of civil defense, and most elected officials did not see the value of emergency management until they had a major disaster in their community; and even then, the value was transitory. Throughout the 1990s, as the United States and the world experienced an unprecedented number of severe disasters, the critical role emergency management plays in protecting the social and economic stability of our communities was evidenced. Emergency management began to grow beyond the response environment and focus on risk analysis, communications, risk prevention/mitigation, and social and economic recovery. This required a new skill base for emergency managers, and colleges and universi- ties added courses and degrees in emergency management to their offerings. This resulted in a better educated, multidisciplinary, proactive approach to emergency management. Emergency managers were valued members of a community’s leadership. Emergency manage- ment became an important profession. It allowed me as Director of FEMA, to work with our state, local, and private partners to build one of the most respected emergency management systems in the world.

As the tragic outcome of Hurricane Katrina so vividly demonstrated, a strong emergency man- agement system is vital to the safety of all of our citizens. There is no time in our recent history when the need for and understanding of the discipline of emergency management have been more important. The current risk environment we live in, from potential bioterrorist threats, increa singly severe hurricanes and floods, and more frequent wildfires, has dramatically increased the skills and knowledge required to be an effective emergency manager in today’s world.

Introduction to Emergency Management is the authoritative guide on today’s discipline of emergency management. It takes the reader through the historical context of emergency man- agement to the present day evolution into the world of homeland security. This book focuses on the elements of an emergency management process while providing the policy underpin- nings that support that process. It provides a comprehensive case study that examines the events and issues surrounding Hurricane Katrina. While focusing on the current changes hap- pening to the United States system for emergency management, it provides readers with a solid background in international practices and policies for disaster management/homeland security. This book gives the reader practical, real world experiences through documented case studies and provides extensive references and Internet sites for follow up research.

My philosophy about emergency management has always been that we need to take a common-sense, practical approach to reducing the risks we face and protecting our citizens and our communities. We need to identify our risks, educate and communicate to our people about those risks, prepare as best we can for the risks, and then, together, form partnerships to take action to reduce those risks. This approach applies whether we are dealing with a flood, a tornado, a hazardous materials spill, a wildfire, a potential suicide bomb explosion, or a pan- demic flu outbreak. George Haddow and Jane Bullock were my Deputy Chief of Staff and my Chief of Staff, respectively, when I was Director of FEMA. Together we worked to apply this approach to making our citizens and communities more disaster resistant and safer throughout the world. As you read and learn from this book, I hope you will keep those ideals in mind.

— James Lee Witt, James Lee Witt Associates

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Acknowledgments

This book could not have been completed without the assistance of a series of valuable part- ners. We would like to thank Wayne Blanchard, whose vision, encouragement, and insights on effective education in emergency management have improved our work and the work of emergency managers everywhere. We are also grateful to the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management at The George Washington University, and its codirectors, Dr. Jack Harrald and Dr. Joseph Barbera, for their support. Greg Shaw’s humor helped us to keep things in perspective.

We thank the many professors, students, and practitioners who gave us valuable feedback on different aspects of the book and provided suggestions to make the text more relevant and useful.

Finally , the authors wish to thank their respective spouses, Kim Haddow and Mary Gardner Coppola, for their enduring good humor and patience.

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Introduction

No country, community, or individual is immune to the impacts of disasters. Disasters, however, can be and have been prepared for, responded to, and recovered from, and have had their consequences mitigated to an increasing degree. The profession (and academic disci- pline) that addresses this “ management ” of disasters is called emergency management , and this book is designed to provide the reader with a comprehensive foundation on the history, structure, organization, systems, and concerns that shape the management of disasters and other emergencies. Contained within are details and descriptions of contemporary emergency management practices and strategies, as well as descriptions of the key players involved in emergency management both within the United States and around the world. Our intent is to provide the reader with a working knowledge of how the functions of comprehensive emer- gency management operate and the influence they can have on everyday life.

This fourth edition represents a documentation of the current status of the discipline as it gravitates toward a state of equilibrium. The 2001 terrorist attacks set in motion a series of events that forever changed not only the way government jurisdictions at all levels (federal, state, and local) addressed the terrorism hazard but also the way members of the public, non- governmental organizations, and businesses prepare for disaster events independent of and in concert with these agencies. Popular opinion is that these actions were mostly knee-jerk in nature and failed to preserve the positive lessons of previous years — especially those from the highly regarded James Lee Witt years of 1992 to 2000. In 2005, the failed response to Hurricane Katrina confirmed such fears, and it had the effect of recalibrating our comprehensive approach to all-hazards risk assessment by reminding all emergency management practitioners that regardless of the public, policy, and media agendas, emergency management must be guided by scientific and statistical risk analysis.

Since the third edition of this book was published, FEMA has regained many of the programs and offices it lost as a result of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Secretary Chertoff’s Six-Point Agenda. FEMA has regained its status as the agency responsible for the bulk of the nation’s emergency management policy, direction, and federal-level operations, yet it remains stifled under the umbrella of an organization dedicated to security-based con- cerns. Within DHS, FEMA is subject not only to indirect access to the president and a diminished decision-making authority, but it must also conform to the strategic focus of an agency whose fundamental mission is markedly different from its own.

In 2005, we saw a national system of emergency management — once regarded as one of the most effective and emulated systems in the world — proven incompetent in responding to an event that had been long predicted, planned for, and studied: Hurricane Katrina. Five years later, FEMA is still struggling to rediscover its role while the recovery along the Gulf Coast

xviii Introduction

steadily progresses. This edition examines how FEMA has evolved as a result of the legisla- tion enacted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and how a change in administrations and political ideologies has helped to direct these changes.

While the book emphasizes the U.S. domestic system of emergency management, many of the experiences discussed, lessons learned, and emerging trends are replicable to emergency management systems around the world. Emergency management in the United States has experienced every form of disaster: natural, man-made, and intentional. The lessons learned from these experiences, the changes made in response to these events, and how the system continues to evolve because of climate changes and other emerging threats provide a solid landscape to examine what emergency management is or could be.

This book, however, does not focus exclusively on FEMA. State and local emergency man- agement organizations are the subjects of many of the case studies, and their collaborative affiliations with FEMA are discussed at length throughout the text. One full chapter, in fact, is dedicated to how emergencies are managed at the international level when the capacity of whole countries or regions falls short of what is required to manage the disaster at hand. With greater frequency, events such as the 2004 Asian earthquake and tsunami, cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2008, and the Sichuan earthquake that same year have highlighted the need for a more robust international emergency management system, and governments across the globe have focused more attention on the issue. A detailed case study of the response to the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India, is provided to illustrate these systems.

Chapter 1 includes a brief discussion of the historical, organizational, and legislative evolu- tion of emergency management in the United States by tracing the major changes triggered by disasters or other human or political events, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The chapter includes an analysis of the organizational, legislative, and pol- icy changes made in emergency management both pre - and post - Hurricane Katrina. Chapter 2 identifies and defines the hazards confronting emergency management. Chapter 3 discusses the function of mitigation and the strategies and programs emergency management or other disciplines use to reduce the impacts of disaster events. Chapter 4 catalogues the broad range of programs and processes that comprise the preparedness function of modern emergency management. Chapter 5 breaks from the more traditional approach to emergency manage- ment and focuses on why communication with the public, the media, and partners is criti- cal to emergency management of the twenty-first century. Chapter 6 focuses on the essential functions and processes of responding to a disaster event. Chapter 7 describes the broad range of government and voluntary programs available to assist individuals and communities in rebuilding in the aftermath of a disaster. Chapter 8 provides an overview of current activity in international emergency management through an examination of selected international orga- nizations. Chapter 9 describes how the events of September 11, 2001, have altered the tradi- tional perceptions of emergency management. Chapter 10 looks at the post-9/11, post-Katrina environment and provides insights, speculations, recommendations, and three options on where emergency management is or should be headed in the future.

Our goal in writing this book was to provide readers with an understanding of emergency management, insight into how events have shaped the discipline, and thoughts about the

Introduction xix

future direction of emergency management. The events of September 11 and the failures of Hurricane Katrina demonstrate the critical need for and value of emergency management. The evolving threats, the realities of global climate change, and our changing social, economic, and political environment demand new and innovative approaches and leadership. We hope this text will motivate each reader to accept the challenge.

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The Historical Context of Emergency Management

What You’ll Learn ● The early roots of emergency management ● The modern history of emergency management in the United States ● How FEMA came to exist and how it evolved during the 1980s, 1990s, and the early

twenty-first century ● The sudden changes to modern emergency management that resulted from the 9/11

terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina ● Changes made by post-Hurricane Katrina legislation and a new administration in

Washington, D.C.

Introduction Emergency management has its roots in ancient history. Early hieroglyphics depict cave dwellers trying to deal with disasters. The Bible speaks of the many disasters that befell civilizations. In fact, the account of Moses parting the Red Sea could be interpreted as the first attempt at flood control. As long as there have been disasters, individuals and com- munities have tried to find ways to fix them, but organized attempts at disaster recovery did not occur until much later in modern history.

This chapter discusses the historical, organizational, and legislative history of modern emergency management in the United States. Some of the significant events and people that have shaped the emergency management discipline over the years are reviewed. Understanding the history and evolution of emergency management is important because at different times, the concepts of emergency management have been applied differently. The definition of emergency management can be extremely broad and all-encompassing. Unlike other, more structured disciplines, it has expanded and contracted in response to events, congressional desires, and leadership styles.

Recently , events and leadership, more than anything else, have brought about dramatic changes to emergency management in the United States. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to massive organizational changes and programmatic shifts in emergency management. Many believe that these changes undermined the effective national system of emergency management that had evolved during the 1990s and led to the profound fail- ure of all levels of emergency management in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

1

2 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

A simple definition for emergency management is “ a discipline that deals with risk and risk avoidance. ” Risk represents a broad range of issues and includes an equally diverse set of players. The range of situations that could possibly involve emergency manage- ment or the emergency management system is extensive. This supports the premise that emergency management is integral to the security of everyone’s daily lives and should be integrated into daily decisions and not just called on during times of disasters.

Emergency management is an essential role of government. The Constitution gives the states the responsibility for public health and safety — hence the responsibility for public risks — with the federal government in a secondary role. The federal role is to help when the state, local, or individual entity is overwhelmed. This fundamental philosophy continues to guide the government function of emergency management.

Based on this strong foundation, the validity of emergency management as a govern- ment function has never been in question. Entities and organizations fulfilling the emer- gency management function existed at the state and local levels long before the federal government became involved. But as events occurred, as political philosophies changed, and as the nation developed, the federal role in emergency management steadily increased.

In the aftermath of the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, extensive discussion about emergency management, particularly the response and recovery functions, has taken place. An ever-increasing presence of nonprofit organizations delivering support to their particular constituencies after Katrina has given rise to interest on the part of the nonprofit community to take on increased responsibilities for disaster response. To date this has not materialized, but steps have been taken at the federal level to apply a top-down approach to emergency management functions, particularly relative to planning for disasters. While the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act detailed changes to how federal emer- gency management functioned, many of the changes included in this legislation were over- looked or were slow to be adopted by the leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With the election of Barack Obama as president in 2008, both Congress and the emergency management com- munity looked forward to positive changes and support for a struggling discipline.

Early History: 1800 – 1950 In 1803, a congressional act was passed that provided financial assistance to a New Hampshire town that had been devastated by fire. This was the first example of the federal government becoming involved in a local disaster. It was not until Franklin Roosevelt’s administration used government as a tool to stimulate the economy that the federal gov- ernment began to make significant investments in emergency management functions.

During the 1930s, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Bureau of Public Roads were both given the authority to make disaster loans available for repair and recon- struction of certain public facilities after disasters. The Tennessee Valley Authority was created during this time to produce hydroelectric power and, as a secondary purpose, to reduce flooding in the region.

Chapter 1 ● The Historical Context of Emergency Management 3

A significant piece of emergency management legislation was passed during this time. The Flood Control Act of 1934 gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers increased authority to design and build flood-control projects. This act has had a significant and long-lasting impact on emergency management in this country. This act reflected the philosophy that humans could control nature, thereby eliminating the risk of floods. Although this program would promote economic and population growth patterns along the nation’s rivers, history has proven that this attempt at emergency management was both shortsighted and costly.

The Cold War and the Rise of Civil Defense: the 1950s The next notable time frame for the evolution of emergency management was during the 1950s. The era of the Cold War presented the principal disaster risk as the potential for nuclear war and nuclear fallout. Civil defense programs proliferated across communities during this time. Individuals and communities were encouraged to build bomb shelters to protect themselves and their families from nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.

Almost every community had a civil defense director, and most states had someone who represented civil defense in their state government hierarchy. By profession, these individuals were usually retired military personnel, and their operations received little political or financial support from their state or local governments. Equally often, their civil defense responsibilities were in addition to other duties.

Federal support for these activities was vested in the Federal Civil Defense Adminis- tration (FCDA), an organization with little staff or financial resources whose main role was to provide technical assistance. In reality, the local and state civil defense directors were the first recognized face of emergency management in the United States.

A companion office to the FCDA, the Office of Defense Mobilization was established in the Department of Defense (DOD). The primary functions of this office were to allow for quick mobilization of materials and production and stockpiling of critical materials in the event of a war. It included a function called emergency preparedness . In 1958, these two offices were merged into the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

The 1950s were a quiet time for large-scale natural disasters. Hurricane Hazel, a Cate- gory 4 hurricane, inflicted significant damage in Virginia and North Carolina in 1954; Hurricane Diane hit several mid-Atlantic and northeastern states in 1955; and Hurricane Audrey, the most damaging of the three storms, struck Louisiana and North Texas in 1957. Congressional response to these disasters followed a familiar pattern of ad hoc legislation to provide increased disaster assistance funds to the affected areas.

As the 1960s started, three major natural disaster events occurred. In a sparsely popu- lated area of Montana, the Hebgen Lake earthquake, measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale, was proof that states other than California were at risk for severe earthquakes. Also in 1960, Hurricane Donna hit the west coast of Florida, and Hurricane Carla blew into Texas in 1961. The incoming Kennedy administration decided to make a change to the federal approach to such disasters. In 1961 it created the Office of Emergency Preparedness inside

4 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

the White House to deal with natural disasters. Civil defense responsibilities remained in the Office of Civil Defense within the DOD.

Changes to Emergency Management: the 1960s As the 1960s progressed, the United States would be struck by a series of major natural disasters. The Ash Wednesday storm in 1962 devastated more than 620 miles of shoreline on the East Coast, producing more than $300 million in damages. In 1964, an earthquake measuring 9.2 on the Richter scale in Prince William Sound, Alaska, became front-page news throughout America and the world. This quake generated a tsunami that affected beaches as far down the Pacific Coast as California and killed 123 people. Hurricane Betsey in 1965 and Hurricane Camille in 1969 killed and injured hundreds of people and caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage along the Gulf Coast.

As with previous disasters, the response was passage of ad hoc legislation for funds. However, the financial losses resulting from Hurricane Betsey’s path across Florida and Louisiana raised the issue of disaster insurance against future floods and a potential method to reduce continued government assistance after such disasters. Congressional interest was prompted by the unavailability of flood protection insurance on the stan- dard homeowner policy. If this type of insurance was available, it was cost-prohibitive. These discussions eventually led to the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, which created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).

Congressman Hale Boggs of Louisiana is appropriately credited with steering this unique legislation through Congress. Unlike previous emergency management/disaster legislation, this bill sought to do something about the risk before the disaster struck. It brought the con- cept of community-based mitigation into the practice of emergency management. In sim- ple terms, when a community joined the NFIP, in exchange for making federally subsidized, low-cost flood insurance available to its citizens, the community had to pass an ordinance restricting future development in its floodplains. The federal government also agreed to help local communities by producing maps of their community’s floodplains.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

In October 2006, a report entitled Costs and Consequences of Flooding and the Impact of the National Flood Insurance Program was issued, which provided an overview of what the NFIP had accomplished. It is available at www.fema.org .

The NFIP began as a voluntary program as part of a political compromise that Boggs reached with the then senator Tom Eagleton of Missouri. As a voluntary program, few communities joined. After Hurricane Camille struck the Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi coasts in 1969, the goals of the NFIP to protect people’s financial investments and to reduce government disaster expenditures were not being met. Change would not occur until Hurricane Agnes devastated Florida in 1972.

Chapter 1 ● The Historical Context of Emergency Management 5

The Call for a National Focus on Emergency Management: the 1970s In the 1970s, the responsibility for emergency management functions was evident in more than five federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Commerce (weather, warning, and fire protection), the General Services Administration (continuity of government, stockpiling, and federal preparedness), the Treasury Department (import investigation), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (power plants), and HUD (flood insur- ance and disaster relief).

With the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which was prompted by the previ- ously mentioned hurricanes and the San Fernando earthquake of 1971, HUD possessed the most significant authority for natural disaster response and recovery through the NFIP under the FIA and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (disaster response, tem- porary housing, and assistance). On the military side were the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (nuclear attack) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (flood control); however, taking into account the broad range of risks and potential disasters, more than 100 federal agencies were involved in some aspect of risk and disasters.

This pattern continued down to the state and, to a lesser extent, local levels. Parallel organizations and programs added to the confusion and the turf wars that especially occurred during disaster response efforts. The states and the governors grew increas- ingly frustrated over this fragmentation. In the absence of one clear federal lead agency

CRITICAL THINKING

Can you think of any positive or negative aspects of disaster-driven evolutionary changes in the United States ’ emergency management system? What about for changes that occur in the absence of initiating disaster events?

George Bernstein, who was brought down from New York by President Nixon to run the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), proposed linking the mandatory purchase of flood insurance to all homeowner loans that were backed by federal mortgages. This change created an incen- tive for communities to join the NFIP because a significant portion of the home mortgage market was federally backed. This change became the Flood Insurance Act of 1972.

It is important to note how local and state governments chose to administer this flood risk program. Civil defense departments usually had the responsibility to deal with risks and disasters. Although the NFIP dealt with risk and risk avoidance, responsibilities for the NFIP were sent to local planning departments and state Departments of Natural Resources. This reaction is one illustration of the fragmented and piecemeal approach to emergency management that evolved during the 1960s and 1970s.

6 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

in emergency management, a group of state civil defense directors led by Lacy Suiter of Tennessee and Erie Jones of Illinois launched an effort through the National Governors Association to consolidate federal emergency management activities in one agency.

With the election of a fellow state governor, President Jimmy Carter of Georgia, the effort gained steam. President Carter came to Washington committed to streamlining all government agencies and seeking more control over key administrative processes. The state directors lobbied the National Governors Association (NGA) and Congress for a con- solidation of federal emergency management functions. When the Carter administration proposed such an action, it was met with a receptive audience in the Senate. Congress already had expressed concerns about the lack of a coherent federal policy and the inabil- ity of states to know whom to turn to in the event of an emergency.

The federal agencies involved, however, were not as excited about the prospect. A fun- damental law of bureaucracy is a continued desire to expand control and authority, not to lose control. In a consolidation of this sort, there would be both losers and winners. There was a question of which federal department/agency should house the new con- solidated structure. As the debate continued, the newly organized National Association of State Directors of Emergency Preparedness championed the creation of a new inde- pendent organization, an idea that was quickly supported by the Senate.

In the midst of these discussions, an accident occurred at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, which added impetus to the consolidation effort. This accident brought national media attention to the lack of adequate off-site prepared- ness around commercial nuclear power plants and the role of the federal government in responding to such an event.

On June 19, 1978, President Carter transmitted to Congress the Reorganization Plan Number 3 (3 CFR 1978, 5 U.S. Code 903). The intent of this plan was to consolidate emer- gency preparedness, mitigation, and response activities into one federal emergency man- agement organization. The president stated that the plan would establish the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and that the FEMA director would report directly to the president.

Reorganization Plan Number 3 transferred to FEMA the National Fire Prevention Control Administration (Department of Commerce), the Federal Insurance Administra- tion (HUD), the Federal Broadcast System (Executive Office of the President), the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Department of Defense), the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (HUD), and the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA). The following emer- gency preparedness and mitigation functions were also transferred to FEMA:

● Oversight of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (Office of Science and Technology Policy)

● Coordination of dam safety (Office of Science and Technology Policy) ● Assistance to communities in the development of readiness plans for severe weather-

related emergencies ● Coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems

Chapter 1 ● The Historical Context of Emergency Management 7

● Coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents

Reorganization Plan Number 3 articulated the following fundamental organizational principles:

1. Federal authorities who were to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official who is responsible to the president and given attention by other officials at the highest levels.

2. An effective civil defense system requires the most efficient use of all available resources.

3. Whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of federal agencies.

4. Federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely linked with emergency preparedness and response functions.

Subsequent to congressional review and concurrence, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was officially established by Executive Order 12127 of March 31, 1979 (44 FR 19367, 3 CFR, Comp., p. 376). A second Executive Order, 12148, mandated the reassignment of agencies, programs, and personnel into the new entity, FEMA.

Creating the new organization made sense, but integrating the diverse programs, operations, policies, and people into a cohesive operation was a much bigger task than realized when the consolidation began. It would take extraordinary leadership and a com- mon vision. The consolidation also created immediate political problems. By consolidat- ing these programs and the legislation that created them, FEMA would have to answer to 23 committees and subcommittees in Congress with oversight of its programs. Unlike most other federal agencies, it would have no organic legislation to support its operations and no clear champions to look to during the congressional appropriations process.

In addition, President Carter had problems finding a director for this new organiza- tion. No large constituent group was identified with emergency management, and at the time the administration was facing major problems with Congress and the public because of the Iranian hostage crisis. President Carter finally reached into his own cabi- net and asked John Macy, then head of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), to become director of FEMA.

John Macy’s task was to unify an organization that was not only physically separated — parts of the agency were located in five different buildings around Washington — but also philosophically separate. Programs focused on nuclear war preparations were combined with programs focused on a new consciousness of the environment and floodplain man- agement. Macy focused his efforts by emphasizing the similarities between natural haz- ards preparedness and civil defense by developing a new concept called the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS). This system was an all-hazards approach that included direction, control, and warning as functions common to all emergencies from small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency of nuclear attack. For all his good

8 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

efforts, FEMA continued to operate as individual entities pursuing their own interests and answering to their own congressional bosses. It was a period of few major disasters, so virtually nobody noticed this problem of disjointedness.

Civil Defense Reappears as Nuclear Attack Planning: the 1980s The early and mid-1980s saw FEMA facing many challenges but no significant natural disasters. The absence of the need for a coherent federal response to disasters, as was called for by Congress when it approved the establishment of FEMA, allowed FEMA to continue to exist as an organization of many parts.

In 1982, President Reagan appointed Louis O. Giuffrida as director of FEMA. Mr. Giuffrida, a California friend of Ed Meese, who was one of the president’s closest advi- sors, had a background in training and terrorism preparedness at the state government level. General Giuffrida proceeded to reorganize FEMA consistent with administration policies and his background. Top priority was placed on government preparedness for a nuclear attack. Resources within the agency were realigned, and additional budget author- ity was sought to enhance and elevate the national security responsibilities of the agency. With no real role for the states in these national security activities, the state directors who had lobbied for the creation of FEMA saw their authority and federal funding declining.

Giuffrida also angered one of the only other visible constituents of the agency: the fire services community. Giuffrida diminished the authority of the U.S. Fire Administration by making it part of FEMA’s Directorate of Training and Education. The newly acquired campus at Emmitsburg, Maryland, was intended to become the preeminent National Emergency Training Center (NETC).

During Giuffrida’s tenure, FEMA faced several unusual challenges that stretched its authority, including asserting FEMA into the lead role for continuity of civilian govern- ment in the aftermath of a nuclear attack, managing the federal response to the contami- nation at Love Canal and Times Beach, Missouri, and the Cuban refugee crisis. Although Giuffrida managed to bring the agency physically together in a new headquarters build- ing in Washington, D.C., severe morale problems persisted.

Dislike of Giuffrida’s style and questions about FEMA’s operations came to the atten- tion of U.S. Representative Al Gore of Tennessee, who then served on the House Science and Technology Committee. As the congressional hearings proceeded, the Department of Justice and a grand jury began investigations of senior political officials at FEMA. These inquiries led to the resignation of Giuffrida and top aides in response to a variety of charges, including misuse of government funds, but the shake-up marked a milestone of sorts: FEMA and emergency management had made it into the comic strip “ Doonesbury. ”

President Reagan then selected General Julius Becton to be director of FEMA. General Becton, a retired military general and former director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the State Department, is credited uniformly with restoring integrity to

Chapter 1 ● The Historical Context of Emergency Management 9

the operations and appropriations of the agency. From a policy standpoint, he contin- ued to emphasize the programs of his predecessor, only in a less visible manner. Becton expanded the duties of FEMA when he was asked by the DOD to take over the program dealing with the off-site cleanup of chemical stockpiles on DOD bases. This program was fraught with problems, and bad feelings existed between the communities and the bases over the funds available to the communities for the cleanup. FEMA had minimal techni- cal expertise to administer this program and was dependent on the DOD and the Army for the funding. This situation led to political problems for the agency and did not lead to significant advancements in local emergency management operations, as promised by the DOD.

At one point in his tenure, General Becton ranked the programs in FEMA by level of importance. Of the more than 20 major programs, the earthquake, hurricane, and flood programs ranked near the bottom. This priority seems logical based on the absence of any significant natural hazards, but this situation is noteworthy in the context that it con- tinued the pattern of isolating resources for national security priorities without recogniz- ing the potential of a major natural disaster.

This issue was raised by then senator Al Gore in hearings on FEMA’s responsibili- ties as lead agency for the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP). Senator Gore, reacting to a scientific report that up to 200,000 casualties could result from an earthquake on the New Madrid fault, believed that FEMA’s priorities were misplaced. The legislation that created the NEHRP called on FEMA to develop a plan for how the federal government would respond to a catastrophic earthquake. This Federal Response Plan would later become the standard for all of the federal agencies ’ response operations. Senator Gore concluded that FEMA needed to spend more time working with its federal, state, and local partners on natural hazards planning.

An Agency in Trouble: 1989 – 1992 As Congress debated, and finally passed, major reform of federal disaster policy as part of the Stewart McKinney – Robert Stafford Act, FEMA’s potential and its ability to support a national emergency management system remained in doubt. As the 1980s closed, FEMA was an agency in trouble. It suffered from severe morale problems, disparate leadership, and conflicts with its partners at the state and local levels over agency spending and priorities.

With a new administration in place, President George H.W. Bush named Wallace Stickney as director of FEMA. Mr. Stickney was from New Hampshire and was a friend of John Sununu, who was Bush’s chief of staff. Mr. Stickney came to the director’s posi- tion having been a staff person at the New England Regional Office of the Environmental Protection Agency and as a volunteer firefighter. His emergency management creden- tials were minimal, and his selection was poorly received by many of the state directors. At the same time, the political appointees who were named to FEMA’s regional director

10 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

positions — the first line of FEMA’s response system — were equally lacking in emergency management experience. These appointments would prove to have dire consequences for both FEMA and the American public.

In 1989, two devastating natural disasters called the continued existence of FEMA into question. In September, Hurricane Hugo slammed into North Carolina and South Carolina after first hitting Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It was the worst hurricane in a decade, with more than $15 billion in damages and 85 deaths. FEMA was slow to respond, waiting for the process to work and for the governors to decide what to do. Less than a month later, the Bay Area of California was rocked by the Loma Prieta earthquake as the 1989 World Series got under way in Oakland Stadium. FEMA was not prepared to deal with the catastrophe.

A few years later, FEMA was not so lucky. In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida and Louisiana, and Hurricane Iniki struck Hawaii only a few weeks later. Again, FEMA wasn’t ready, but with Hurricane Andrew, it was not only FEMA that failed the people of Florida, but the process and the system as well. Starting with Hurricane Hugo, public concern over natural disasters was high. People wanted, and expected, their gov- ernment to be there to help in their time of need. FEMA seemed incapable of carrying out the essential government function of emergency management.

In the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, there were calls for abolishing FEMA. But the incoming Clinton administration realized how important an effective response and quick recovery were to communities and to voters and was determined to fix the emergency management system.

The Witt Revolution: 1993 – 2001 When President Clinton nominated James Lee Witt to be director of FEMA, Witt breathed new life into FEMA and brought a new style of leadership to the troubled agency. Witt was the first director of FEMA with emergency management experience. He was from the constituency who had played a major role in creating FEMA but had been forgotten: the state directors. With Witt, President Clinton had credibility and, more important, a skilled politician who knew the importance of building partnerships and serving customers.

Witt came in with a mandate to restore the trust of the American people that their gov- ernment would be there for them during times of crisis. He initiated sweeping reforms inside and outside the agency. Inside FEMA, he reached out to all employees, imple- mented customer service training, and reorganized the agency to break down bottlenecks. He supported the application of new technologies to the delivery of disaster services and focused on mitigation and risk avoidance. Outside the agency, he strengthened the relation ships with state and local emergency managers and built new ones with Congress, within the administration, and with the media. Open communications, both internally and externally, were the hallmarks of the Witt years at FEMA.

Witt ’s leadership and the changes he made were quickly tested as the nation experi- enced an unprecedented series of natural disasters. The Midwest floods in 1993 resulted

Chapter 1 ● The Historical Context of Emergency Management 11

in major disaster declarations in nine states. FEMA’s successful response to these floods brought the opportunity to change the focus of postdisaster recovery by initiating the largest voluntary buyout and relocation program to date in an effort to move people out of the floodplain and out of harm’s way.

The Northridge, California, earthquake quickly followed the Midwest floods in 1994. Northridge tested all of the new streamlined approaches and technology advancements for delivery of services and created some more. Throughout the next several years, FEMA and its state and local partners would face every possible natural hazard, including killer tornadoes, ice storms, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and drought.

When President Clinton made Witt a member of his cabinet, the value and importance of emergency management was recognized. Witt used this promotion as an opportunity to lobby the nation’s governors to include their state emergency management directors in their cabinets.

The Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995 represented a new phase in the evolution of emergency management. This event, following the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1992, raised the issue of America’s preparedness for terrorism events. Because emergency management responsibilities are defined by risks and the consequences of those risks, responding to terrorist threats was included. The Oklahoma City bombing tested this thesis and set the stage for interagency disagreements over which agency would be in charge of terrorism.

While this debate continued, FEMA took an important step in its commitment to disaster mitigation by launching a national initiative to promote a new community- based approach called Project Impact: Building Disaster-Resistant Communities. This project was designed to mainstream emergency management and mitigation practices into every community in America. It went back to the roots of emergency management. It asked a community to identify risks and establish a plan to reduce those risks. It asked communities to establish partnerships that included all of the stakeholders in the com- munity, including, for the first time, the business sector.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

“ Project Impact Initiative to Create Disaster Resistant Communities Demonstrates Worth in Kansas Years Later ” ( www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/ProjectImpact-Initiative-to.html ). This article documents how preventive measures, taken by communities in Kansas as part of the Project Impact program, saved lives years later when devastating tornadoes struck across Kansas.

By building a disaster-resistant community, the community would promote sustain- able economic development, protect and enhance its natural resources, and ensure a better quality of life for its citizens. Figure 1-1 shows the effects of mitigation during Hurricane Ike. As the decade came to an end, FEMA was still recognized as the preemi- nent emergency management system in the world. It was adopted in other countries, and Witt became an ambassador for emergency management overseas.

12 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Terrorism: 2001 With the election of George W. Bush, a new FEMA director, Joe Allbaugh, was named to head the agency. As a former chief of staff to Bush when he was governor of Texas and Bush’s campaign manager in the 2000 presidential race, Allbaugh had a close personal relationship with the president. As demonstrated by Witt and Clinton, this was viewed as a positive for the agency. His lack of emergency management background was not an issue during his confirmation hearings.