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Computer Ethics

Analyzing Information Technology

Deborah G. Johnson University of Virginia with contributions from

Keith W. Miller University of Illinois–Springfield

Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River, New Jersey

Columbus, Ohio

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Johnson, Deborah G.

Computer ethics: analyzing information technology/Deborah G. Johnson with Keith W. Miller.

—4th ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-13-111241-4 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-13-111241-4 (alk. paper)

1. Electronic data processing—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Miller, Keith, II. Title.

QA76.9.M65J64 2008 303.48’34–dc22

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Contents Preface

Acknowledgments

About the Authors

Chapter 1 Introduction to Sociotechnical Computer Ethics Chapter Outline Scenarios 1.1 A Virtual Rape 1.2 Surprises About Social Networking 1.3 RFID and Caring for the Elderly Introduction: Why Computer Ethics? The Standard Account New Possibilities, a Vacuum of Policies, Conceptual Muddles An Update to the Standard Account The Sociotechnical Systems Perspective Reject Technological Determinism/Think Coshaping Reject Technology as Material Objects/Think Sociotechnical Systems Reject Technology as Neutral/Think Technology Infused with Value Sociotechnical Computer Ethics Micro- and Macro-Level Analysis Return to the “Why Computer Ethics?” Question Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 2 Ethics and Information Technology Chapter Outline Introduction: “Doing” Ethics Descriptive/Normative The Dialectic Method “Ethics is Relative”

Ethical Theories and Concepts Utilitarianism Intrinsic and Instrumental Value Acts versus Rules Critique of Utilitarianism Case Illustration Deontological Theory Case Illustration Rights Rights and Social Contract Theory Virtue Ethics Analogical Reasoning in Computer Ethics Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 3 Ethics in IT-Configured Societies Chapter Outline Scenarios 3.1 Google in China: “Don’t Be Evil” 3.2 Turing Doesn’t Need to Know 3.3 Turnitin Dot Com Introduction: IT-Configured Societies Technology as the Instrumentation of Human Action Cyborgs, Robots, and Humans Three Features of IT-Configured Activities Global, Many-to-Many Scope Distinctive Identity Conditions Reproducibility IT-Configured Domains of Life Virtuality, Avatars, and Role-Playing Games Friendship and Social Networking Education and Plagiarism Detection Democracy and the Internet What Is Democracy? The Arguments Is the Internet a Democratic Technology?

Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 4 Information Flow, Privacy, and Surveillance Chapter Outline Scenarios 4.1 Email Privacy and Advertising 4.2 Workplace Spying: The Lidl Case 4.3 Data Mining and e-Business Introduction: Information Flow With and Without Information Technology Why Care About Privacy? “No Need to Worry” The Importance of Privacy Privacy as an Individual Good Privacy as Contextual Integrity Privacy as a Social Good Essential for Democracy Autonomy, Democracy, and the Panoptic Gaze Data Mining, Social Sorting, and Discrimination Crude Categories Summary of the Arguments for Privacy and Against Surveillance Is Privacy Over? Strategies for Shaping Personal Information Flow Fair Information Practices Transparency Opt-In versus Opt-Out Design and Computer Professionals Personal Steps for All IT Users A Note on Privacy and Globalization Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 5 Digital Intellectual Property Chapter Outline Scenarios 5.1 Obtaining Pirated Software Abroad

5.2 Free Software that Follows Proprietary Software 5.3 Using Public Domain Software in Proprietary Software Introduction: The Complexities of Digital Property Definitions Setting the Stage Protecting Property Rights in Software Copyright Trade Secrecy Patent Protection Free and Open Source Software The Philosophical Basis of Property Natural Rights Arguments Critique of the Natural Rights Argument A Natural Rights Argument Against Software Ownership PS Versus FOSS Is it Wrong to Copy Proprietary Software? Breaking Rules, No Rules, and New Rules Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 6 Digital Order Chapter Outline Scenarios 6.1 Bot Roast 6.2 Wiki Warfare 6.3 Yahoo and Nazi Memorabilia Introduction: Law and Order on the Internet Sociotechnical Order Online Crime Hackers and the Hacker Ethic Sociotechnical Security Who Is to Blame in Security Breaches? Trade-Offs in Security Wikipedia: A New Order of Knowledge Production Freedom of Expression and Censorship John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression

Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 7 Professional Ethics in Computing Chapter Outline Scenarios 7.1 Software Safety 7.2 Security in a Custom Database 7.3 Conflict of Interest Introduction: Why Professional Ethics? Therac-25 and Malfunction 54 The Paradigm of Professions Characteristics of Professions Sorting Out Computing and its Status as a Profession Mastery of Knowledge Formal Organization Autonomy Codes of Ethics The Culture of Computing Software Engineering Professional Relationships Employer–Employee Client–Professional Other Stakeholders–Professional Professional–Professional Conflicting Responsibilities A Legal Perspective on Professionalism in Computing Licensing Selling Software Selling–Buying and the Categorical Imperative Torts Negligence A Final Look at the State of the Profession Guns-for-Hire or Professionals Efficacy, Public Trust, and the Social Contract Conclusion

Study Questions

Websites

References

Index

Preface When I first began thinking and writing about computer ethics, I often found myself taking on the role of someone who counters hype. At the time, there seemed to be a good deal of hype about how computers were going to revolutionize the world. Of course, there were some thoughtful treatments of the potential of computers to transform the world as we know it and some intriguing and deep accounts of the social changes that seemed to be underway. My job—so it seemed—was to sort out the hype from the serious analyses. One of my strategies was to identify and emphasize that which remained the same—aspects of society that were unaffected or being reinforced and solidified. As I reflect back on that time and what has happened since, it does seem that some pretty dramatic changes have occurred. And the challenge of sorting out the significant changes from those that are superficial is all the more daunting. Changes of many different kinds have occurred and these changes have been influenced by many factors, only one of which is the development and widespread use of computers, information technology, and the Internet. As argued in Chapter 1, we should be careful not to think that the forces of change have been in only one direction. Computers and information technology have shaped the world of today but social, political, economic, and cultural conditions have also shaped the development of computers, information technology, and the Internet. This edition of Computer Ethics attempts to take into account the complex, multidirectional relationship between technology and society.

Computers and information technology are now so fundamental to the information societies that many of us live in, that the exercise of trying to identify a domain of life in which information technology does not play a role is both enlightening and challenging. We tried with this new edition to rethink the field of computer ethics so as to capture the powerful role that computers and information technology now play in so many aspects of everyday life. However, because the field is now so broad, tough choices had to be made, choices about what to include and what to leave out. In the end, we developed a structure that, we believe, serves as a framework for addressing an array of issues, some of which we have addressed

extensively, others we have treated in a cursory fashion, and yet others we have not even mentioned.

The 4th edition contains several important new features. Perhaps most importantly, this edition includes the voice of Keith Miller. Keith and I met when he first began teaching a course on computer ethics over twenty years ago. As one of the first computer scientists to take on the responsibilities of such a course, Keith is a pioneer and veteran of the field. He brought his knowledge and experience to each chapter of the book. Working together was an enormous boon for this edition. Whether we agreed or disagreed on a particular issue—and we did disagree—we worked through the presentation of material together. At times it seemed that Keith was protecting the interests of computer science students and teachers, and I was concerned about accessibility to the less technically sophisticated readers. We believe we have achieved a good balance.

As we began working on this edition, we were confronted with a complicated question about terminology. Although the field continues to be called “computer ethics,” the attention of computer ethicists has expanded to include a much broader range of technologies more often now referred to as information technology. We debated whether to consider our focus to be that of information and communication technologies and use the acronym ITC, or computers and information technology and use CIT; we tried other alternatives as well. In the end we came to a complicated decision. Because Chapter 1 focuses on the field and its goals, methods, and mission, we stayed with the term “computer ethics” for that chapter. After Chapter 1 and throughout the rest of the book, we use the phrase “information technology’ or the acronym “IT.” Finally, we added a new subtitle to the title of the book to reflect the broader scope of the book and the field.

This edition includes a new theoretical approach. We have incorporated concepts and insights from the field of science and technology studies (STS). STS theories frame technology as sociotechnical systems and this, in turn, brings the connection between ethics and technology into sharper perspective. The new approach is explained in Chapter 1.

As in earlier editions, all but one of the chapters begin with a set of scenarios designed to draw readers into the chapter topic. The scenarios

present the issues in what we hope is an engaging and practical form. The scenarios illustrate the significance of the broader, more abstract matters addressed in the chapter. With a few exceptions, the scenarios are new and many of them are real cases. In our selection of scenario topics we have been mindful of the experiences of college-age students.

For those familiar with the 3rd edition, an explanation of the new organization may be helpful. As in the 3rd edition, there are separate chapters on ethical concepts and theories, privacy, property rights, and professional ethics. As before, the introductory chapter discusses the scope of the field. However, in this edition we have moved somewhat away from theorizing about the uniqueness of computer ethical issues and have, instead, framed the issues as part of a broader enterprise of understanding the connections between ethics and technology. As mentioned above, the introductory chapter also introduces important new ideas from STS. Chapters 3 and 6 represent a significant reorganization of material. Each of these chapters combines material from the 3rd edition with entirely new material. The overarching theme in Chapter 3 is that information societies are constituted with, and configured around, information technology, and this means that ethical issues have distinctive characteristics. The overarching theme of Chapter 6 is what we call “digital order.” The chapter focuses on several different issues that affect activities on the Internet. Order, we emphasize, is created by law, markets, social norms, and architecture. The chapter on professional ethics has been moved to the end of the book. Computer science students may well want to read this chapter early on, but it no longer serves as the motivation for subsequent chapters.

As the book goes to press, we have plans for a website to supplement the material presented in the book. The website will include additional scenarios, podcast discussions, links to other sites, and more. It should be available and easy to find by the time the book is published.

Deborah G. Johnson June 16, 2008

Acknowledgments I am particularly grateful to the University of Virginia’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences for granting me a sesqui leave for the spring semester of 2008. Were it not for this leave, I would not have been able to complete this edition.

During the leave I served as a fellow in residence at two locations of the Erasmus Mundus Master of Applied Ethics program. I spent three weeks in the Department of Philosophy at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, Norway and three weeks in Linköping University’s Centre for Applied Ethics in Linköping, Sweden. During this time I had the opportunity to present drafts of several of the chapters in student seminars, faculty seminars, and public lectures. It is difficult to overstate the value of the honest and helpful responses that I received in both places. And, it was not just the helpfulness of the comments, it was also the warmth and enthusiasm of those whom I met.

I would also like to thank the following reviewers for their helpful suggestions: Karine Barzilai-Nahon, of the University of Washington, Seattle, WA; Xiang Chen, of California Lutheran University, Thousand Oaks, CA; Demetria Enis-Cole, of the University of North Texas, Denton, TX; Peter Madsen, of Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA; and Day W. Radebaugh, of Wichita State University, Wichita, KS.

About the Authors Deborah G. Johnson is the Anne Shirley Carter Olsson Professor of Applied Ethics and Chair of the Department of Science, Technology, and Society at the University of Virginia. Johnson has devoted her career to understanding the connections between ethics and technology. She received the John Barwise prize from the American Philosophical Association in 2004, the Sterling Olmsted Award from the Liberal Education Division of the American Society for Engineering Education in 2001, and the ACM SIGCAS Making A Difference Award in 2000.

Keith W. Miller (Contributor) is a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield. His work in software engineering and computer ethics provide complementary perspectives to questions that challenge computer professionals. He is the editor in chief of IEEE Technology and Society, and helped develop the Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice. He was named a University of Illinois Scholar in 2000–2003 and received the ACM SIGCAS Outstanding Service Award in 2006.

Chapter 1 Introduction to Sociotechnical Computer Ethics

Chapter Outline

Scenarios

1.1 A Virtual Rape

1.2 Surprises About Social Networking

1.3 RFID and Caring for the Elderly

Introduction: Why Computer Ethics?

The Standard Account

New Possibilities, a Vacuum of Policies, Conceptual Muddles

An Update to the Standard Account

The Sociotechnical Systems Perspective

Reject Technological Determinism/Think Coshaping Thesis

Reject Technology as Material Objects/Think Sociotechnical Systems

Reject Technology as Neutral/Think Technology Infused with Value

Sociotechnical Computer Ethics

Micro- and Macro-Level Analysis

Return to the “Why Computer Ethics?” Question

Conclusion

Study Questions

Scenarios

Scenario 1.1 A Virtual Rape

Background

The following incident took place in the early 1990s and was described by Julian Dibbell in 1993. LambdaMOO is a multiuser designed (MUD) object-oriented program, a complex database maintained inside Xerox Corporation in Palo Alto, California, and open to public access via the Internet. Today there are many more games of this kind with significantly enhanced capabilities. Nevertheless, LambdaMOO remains an intriguing exemplar of the complicated conceptual and ethical issues that arise around computers and information technology.

Case

It happened in the living room in LambdaMOO. The program allows users to create and design the interaction space; a user can create a character with any number of attributes and can build spaces and objects. As users interact with one another as the characters that they have created, they see streams of text, both dialogue and stage descriptions.

One night Bungle entered LambdaMOO and used a subprogram, Voodoo doll, to take control of other characters. Using the Voodoo doll subprogram, Bungle took control of legba and Starspinner, and had the two engage in sadistic actions, with one eating pubic hair and sodomizing the other. Legba and Starspinner were helpless throughout the entire incident. The episode ended when another character, Zippy, used a subprogram to freeze Bungle’s commands.

This virtual rape caused enormous ripples across the community of LambdaMOOers. One of the victims, legba, wanted Bungle to be “toaded”—that is, to have his account removed from LambdaMOO.

Opinion was divided over what should be done to Bungle. On the evening of the third day after the incident, the users gathered in LambdaMOO to discuss Bungle’s fate. There were four arguments: (1) The techno libertarians argued that rape in cyberspace was a technical inevitability, and that a solution would be to use defensive software tools to filter out the offender’s words. (2) The legalists argued that Bungle could not legitimately be “toaded” because the MOO had no explicit rules at all; they proposed the establishment of rules and virtual institutions to exercise the control required. (3) The third group believed that only the programmers, or wizards as they are known in MOO, have the power to implement rules. (4) The anarchists, on the other hand, wanted to see the matter resolved without the establishment of social control. There was no agreement between these groups. To Bungle, who joined midway through the conference, the incident was simply a sequence of events in virtual reality that had no consequences for his real life existence.

After weighing the arguments, one of the programmers, the Wizard JoeFeedback, decided to “toad” Bungle and banish him from the MOO. As a result of this incident, the database system was redesigned so that the programmers could make changes based on an action or a petition of the majority of the LambdaMOO community. Eight months and 11 ballots later, widespread participation produced a system of checks and capabilities to guard against the type of violence that had occurred. As for Bungle, he is believed to be reincarnated as the character, Dr Jest.

Did Bungle (or the person controlling Bungle) do anything wrong? Who is responsible for what happened? Should anyone suffer “real-world” consequences?

[Revised from a scenario written for Computer Ethics 3rd Edition by Marc Quek Pang, based on J. Dibbell, “A Rape in Cyberspace” Village Voice (December 21, 1993), pp. 36–42]

Scenario 1.2 Surprises About Social Networking

Background

Facebook has been wildly popular from its beginning. Although generally identified as a “social networking” site, in recent years users have been surprised by a series of incidents and practices suggesting that the site is much more. A few years ago the company decided to change the architecture of the site so that any time a user added a friend to his or her list of friends, all of the user’s friends were alerted to the change. Users didn’t like the change and complained so much that Facebook changed the architecture of the site, making the new feature an option but not the default option. A second incident occurred when Facebook introduced a new feature that would generate advertising revenue for the company. The new schema, called Beacon, automated notification of a Facebook member’s friends when the member made an online purchase. This advertised the product that the member bought, but it also generated some surprises. One of the stories told in the media was that of a man who was planning to surprise his wife with a ring. The man’s plans were ruined when everyone in the man’s network was notified of the purchase before the man had a chance to give the ring to his wife. Again users protested and Facebook dismantled Beacon. The third surprise is not associated with any single event. Facebook members have gradually—through a series of incidents— become aware that the site is being used by recruiters and law enforcement agencies to gather information for nonsocial networking purposes. For example, employers search Facebook for information on potential employees, and law enforcement agencies search for information and evidence related to crimes. They look for photos as well as communication related to social events before and after they occur.

Are there any ethical issues here? Did Facebook do anything wrong? Are employers and law enforcement agencies doing anything wrong when they use the site for their purposes?

Hypothetical Situation

Ashley joined Facebook many years ago and now has a site with much information and many pictures from her activities. Shawn, who works for a big company, has also been on Facebook for some years. He was recently employed by a big company in their human resources office. Shawn’s job is to interview applicants for jobs; once an applicant has made it through the

interview process, Shawn solicits references in writing as well as by phone. Recently Shawn’s unit has been brainstorming about better ways to find out about applicants and in a meeting that Shawn didn’t attend, the unit decided it would be a good idea to check out applicants on their websites. Shawn is asked to follow up on Ashley who made it through the interview with flying colors; Ashley was highly rated by the interviewers who believe she would be ideal for the job for which she is applying. Shawn easily finds Ashley on Facebook and reports to the interviewers that Ashley appears to party often, and that many of the pictures show her drinking. Fearing that Ashley might not take her job seriously enough, the company decides not to offer the job to Ashley. Ashley is surprised when, weeks later, she discovers that someone else has gotten the job.

Is there anything wrong here?

Scenario 1.3 RFID and Caring for the Elderly

Background

Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that uses small, passive devices as chips that can be detected from a short distance away from the tag. Some RFID chips are sufficiently small so that the circuitry can be painted directly on an object such as an item of clothing. RFID chips are often used in inventory control. “Computer chips” used to track family pets are RFID chips. A high-profile application of RFID chips is drive- through toll collections and public transportation cards. For almost a decade, a controversial application has been RFID chips placed under people’s skin for identification purposes. (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFID (accessed January 7, 2007).)

Hypothetical Situation

Kathy Pascal is the legal guardian of her elderly mother, Ada. Ada is in the late stages of Alzheimer’s disease, and lives at Golden Oaks, a comfortable nursing home near Kathy’s home. Ellen Eiffel, an administrator from Golden Oaks, has contacted Kathy about the possibility of placing an RFID tag under Ada’s skin. The tag would be the size of a grain of rice, and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFID
Golden Oaks has sensors in many places on their grounds. These sensors record the location of all patients who have an RFID tag whenever they are near a sensor. Ms. Eiffel explains that the RFID tag would help Golden Oaks ensure Ada’s safety if and when she started to wander off; it would also help in double checking medical records each time Ada received medicines or therapy. The administrator emphasizes that using the RFID tag would allow Golden Oaks to ensure Ada’s safety without confining her to her room. Kathy is sad that her mother requires this kind of marking, but she also sees the advantages as her mother loses more and more of her mental capacity.

What should Kathy do?

Introduction: Why Computer Ethics?

These scenarios illustrate the complex and fascinating character of the ethical and social issues that arise around computers and information technology.1 Together the scenarios suggest a broad range of issues: Scenario 1.1 presents us with a form of behavior that didn’t exist before computers and, thus, requires some analysis just to figure out whether there is any wrongdoing and who did it. Scenario 1.2 raises questions about privacy, uses and abuses of technology, and the obligations of companies to inform their customers about changes in the operation of the business. Scenario 1.3 raises more personal, although no less complicated, issues about how to treat someone who is not capable of making her own decisions, especially when the decision involves a new technology that may affect the kind of care the person will receive. The scenarios suggest that living in a world constituted in part by computers may involve distinctive and especially challenging ethical issues.

1 Although the focus of this book is broadly on ethics and computers and information technology, because the field of study has traditionally been referred to as “computer ethics,” we use “computers” and “computer ethics” in this chapter. In subsequent chapters, we shift to using “information technology” and “IT.”

The scenarios point to a future that will be powerfully shaped by computers and information technology, assuming that is, that computers and information technology (IT) continue to develop at the speed and with the success it has in the past. If we have any hope of steering the development of future technologies in a direction that is good for humanity, that hope lies in understanding the social and ethical implications of our choices about IT. This book is devoted to just that. The ideas discussed here are intended to provide insight into the social and ethical implications of computers. Those insights should help us think more deeply about the future development of IT.

Although the three scenarios illustrate the range and complexity of ethical issues surrounding IT, some might argue that it is not exactly the technology that poses the ethical challenges but rather the uses of the technology, that is, the humans and human behavior around the technology. In the past, it was common to hear people say that technology is neutral— value neutral—and, therefore, ethics doesn’t have anything directly to do with technology. As the old adage goes, “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” The field of computer ethics developed when statements of this kind were still quite common and, as a result, much of the literature in the field struggles with questions of the following kind: Why do computers raise ethical issues? What is the connection between ethics and IT? Computer ethicists have struggled with the question of whether IT creates new ethical issues—issues that never existed before—or new versions of old ethical issues, issues that persist over centuries but take on new dimensions as the world changes.

At first glance, it seems that IT creates situations in which common or prevailing moral rules and principles don’t seem to apply nor seem helpful in figuring out what one should do. For example, in Scenario 1.1, it takes some analysis just to identify what behavior or whose behavior, if any, could be considered unethical. Because Bungle is a virtual figure, how can it be his behavior? Is it the behavior of the person controlling Bungle? Should we even distinguish the behavior of Bungle from the behavior of the person controlling Bungle? Either way, what exactly was the wrongdoing? Was it Bungle’s rape of legba and Starspinner? Was it the use of a subprogram to control the behavior of other characters? What moral norms

or principles were violated? The prohibition on rape is clear and powerful, but in this case no flesh-and-blood person was raped. Rather, a flesh-and- blood person manipulated a virtual (should we say “fictitious”?) character to enact a text-based rape of another virtual character in front of a community of observers who had no expectation that they would witness such behavior.

The other two scenarios also raise challenging questions. Did Facebook violate the privacy of its members when it introduced changes to the architecture of Facebook? Was this unethical, or simply bad business? Have Facebook members been misled into thinking the site is more private than it is? Has Facebook misled users by offering membership for free when, in fact, Facebook is a for-profit company that must find a way of making money from the site? Are recruiters and law enforcement agencies abusing the site when they use it for other than social networking purposes? As for the nursing home case, although children with elderly parents have often had to make difficult decisions with regard to parents who become incapable of making their own decisions, is the decision about implantation of an RFID chip somehow different than other such decisions? Are such implants dehumanizing and demeaning? Or are the chips the means to a compassionate end?

We will consider these questions in due course but for now, we have to step back and ask a set of larger questions about questions (“meta-questions”) regarding the field of computer ethics. Scholars in this field have spent a lot of time trying to understand whether and how ethical issues surrounding IT are distinctive. They have asked whether the issues are so different that new moral theories are needed, or whether traditional theories might be extended to apply. As well, they have considered whether a new kind of methodology is needed for the field. We shall refer to this cluster of issues as the “why computer ethics?” question. The cluster includes: Why does IT create ethical issues? Do we need a special field of study for IT ethics? Why isn’t this just applied ethics, plain and simple? In other words, why say that the ethical issues described in Scenarios 1.1–1.3 are computer or IT ethical issues, and not just ethical issues, period? What is the best way to understand and resolve ethical issues that involve IT?

The “why computer ethics?” question is complex. Part of the puzzle has to do with technology in general, because technologies other than computers have also posed complex ethical issues. Consider, for example, all of the concern that was expressed about the power of the atomic bomb during World War II. Should such a powerful tool be created, let alone used? What would it mean for world politics? Or consider, more recently, the public debates about nanotechnology, cloning, stem cell research, and mind- alternating pharmacology. All of these technologies have stirred fear and apprehension as well as fascination and hope. In each case, the literature expressing concern about the new technology has suggested that humanity has acquired a new capacity that takes us into new ethical territory. Part of the “why computer ethics?” question, thus, has to do with technology in general. Why do new technologies give rise to ethical issues? What exactly is the connection between ethics (be it moral theory or moral behavior) and technology?

The other part of the “why computer ethics?” puzzle has to do specifically with IT and whether there is something special about this set of technologies that gives rise to a distinctive kind of ethical issue. On the surface, IT seems to create many more ethical issues than other kinds of technology such as automobiles, electricity, and bridges. Perhaps there is something in particular about IT that disrupts and challenges prevailing moral norms and principles. We will return to this question in a moment.

The “why computer ethics?” question is what we might characterize as a metaquestion, a question about how we are asking our questions. The “why computer ethics?” question calls upon us to step back from engagement with the issues and reflect on our engagement. It asks us to reflect on what we are looking for, and on what we do when we analyze computer ethical issues. On the one hand, this kind of reflection is ideally done after one has some familiarity with the field and some experience analyzing computer ethical issues. For this reason, it would be best to wait until the end of the book to consider the question. On the other hand, an answer to the “why computer ethics?” question also provides a framework for identifying and understanding the issues. As well, an answer to the question points in the direction of an appropriate methodology to use in analyzing computer

ethical issues. Hence, we need at least a preliminary answer to the question before we jump into the substance of the topic.

In the next sections, we will provide a preliminary answer to the “why computer ethics?” question, set the scene for subsequent chapters, and suggest a methodology for analyzing computer ethics issues. The answer we will propose recommends that we keep an eye on the connection between ethics and technology in general as the back-drop—the framework —in which computer ethics issues can best be understood.

The Standard Account

New Possibilities, a Vacuum of Policies, Conceptual Muddles

A survey of the literature in the field of computer ethics suggests that there is now something like a consensus answer to the “why computer ethics?” question. Computer ethicists seem to accept the general parameters of an account that James Moor provided in a 1985 article entitled, “What is Computer Ethics?” We will refer to this account as the standard account. According to Moor, computers create new possibilities, new opportunities for human action. All three of the scenarios at the beginning of this chapter illustrate this idea. Virtual environments like LambdaMOO didn’t and couldn’t exist before IT, not, at least, before the Internet had been created. The invention of Facebook created new possibilities for keeping in touch with friends no matter how far away they are or how long ago you last saw each other. Similarly, new possibilities for tracking and monitoring the movements of individuals were created with the invention of RFID. Of course, IT doesn’t just create new possibilities for individuals acting alone; new forms of collective and collaborative action are made possible as well. Interest groups on any topic imaginable can form online and take action collectively; companies can operate globally with a relatively high degree of control and speed of action because of the Internet. Families can stay in close communication (maintaining strong bonds) while members are living in geographically distant places.

According to the standard account, these new possibilities give rise to ethical questions. Should we pursue the new possibility? How should we

pursue it? Who will gain if the possibility is realized? Who will lose? Will pursuit of the new possibility affect fundamental human values? Computer ethicists have risen to the challenge of these new possibilities by taking up tough questions. Is data mining morally acceptable? Should software be proprietary? Are Internet domain names being distributed fairly? Who should be liable for inaccurate or slanderous information that appears in electronic forums? What should we do about child pornography on the Web? Some of these questions have been resolved (or, at least, concern has waned); some have been addressed by law; others continue to be controversial. New questions continue to arise as new possibilities are created. What will Second Life2 mean? Should we build robots to take care of the elderly as the Japanese are doing? Should we delegate health decisions to artificially intelligent robot doctors? Should we insert intelligence chips in our brains?

2 Created in 2003, Second Life is a popular 3-D virtual world site in which users interact through avatars. Because of the advanced capabilities of the site, users sometimes strongly identify with their avatars and become intensely involved in their virtual lives.

That the new possibilities give rise to ethical questions seems to make sense, although we can press further. Why do ethical questions arise from new possibilities? Of course, part of the answer is simply that the new possibilities are “new.” But part of the answer is also that new possibilities are not always or necessarily good (or purely good). They can affect different individuals differently. They can be disruptive and threatening to the status quo. The potential for good and ill often comes in a tangled package. Good consequences come along with negative consequences, trade-offs have to be made, and the technology has to be modified in response to political, social, and cultural conditions.

For example, virtual reality systems have enormous potential for good. Aside from the rich, entertainment value of gaming, virtual systems used for scientific modeling and simulation help in understanding the world and in training. But virtual systems could also lead, some fear, to a world in which individuals escape into fantasy worlds and have difficulty dealing

with the “real world” of flesh and blood people. Similarly, a world in which RFID is used to monitor and track those who are hospitalized could mean a world in which the elderly are much better cared for than they are now, or it could mean the elderly have less and less human contact and nurses and doctors become deskilled and lose first-hand knowledge of illness and aging.

Thus, according to the standard account of computer ethics, the field’s raison de trios (reason for being) is to evaluate the new possibilities from an ethical perspective. To be sure, the implications of adoption and use of a particular technology can and should be examined from a variety of perspectives, including economics and politics, but the ethical perspective is especially important because it is normative. When it comes to economics and politics, the point is often to describe and predict the likely consequences of adopting a new technology. This informs but does not address whether the new technology should be adopted. Ethical analysis considers the should-question and how a new possibility fits (or doesn’t fit) moral values, notions, and practices.

Moor (1985) describes the task of computer ethics as that of filling policy vacuums. According to Moor, when computers create new possibilities, there is a vacuum of policies. The new possibilities take us into uncharted territory, situations in which it is unclear what is at issue or which moral norms are relevant. Moor’s notion of a policy vacuum captures the uncertainty that often surrounds the invention and adoption of new technologies. Here an example from the early days of computer technology illustrates Moor’s point. When the first computers were installed, individuals began storing files on them, but there were no institutional or legal policies with regard to access and use. From our perspective today, it may seem obvious that most computer files should be treated as personal or private property, but the status of computer files was initially unclear (in part because the first computers were large mainframes located in buildings and owned by companies, agencies, and universities). Thus, when remote access became possible and hackers began roaming around and trying to get access, the moral and legal status of the files on mainframe computers was unclear. Whether or not hackers were committing crimes was unclear. Were they stealing? Perhaps, but the files that hackers accessed (and copied) were

not removed. Were they trespassing? Hackers who gained access were nowhere near the physical location where the files were stored. As already indicated, at the time there were no laws explicitly addressing access to computer files. In Moor’s terms, there was a policy vacuum with regard to the status of acts involving access to computer files. A new possibility had been created and there was a policy vacuum.

On Moor’s account, the task of computer ethics is to fill policy vacuums, and he acknowledges that the task is far from easy. Filling the policy vacuum involves sorting out what Moor refers to as conceptual muddles. To illustrate a conceptual muddle, consider another case from the early days of computing, computer software. When computer software was first created, the challenge was to figure out how best to conceptualize it. The problem had to do with fitting computer software to prevailing intellectual property law; copyright and patent seemed the best possibilities. Copyright law specifies that abstract ideas cannot be copyrighted, only expressions of ideas. Typically this means expressing an idea in a written language. Patent law also prohibits ownership of abstract ideas, as well as laws of nature, and mathematical algorithms. Because abstract ideas are the building blocks of science and technology, giving an individual ownership has the potential to significantly dampen progress in the technological arts and sciences. New inventors would have to get permission from a private owner to use one of the building blocks. When it came to software it wasn’t clear whether a copyright on a computer program would be granting ownership of an expression of an idea or the building blocks of the electronic world. In patent law the issue was even trickier because patent law specifies that abstract ideas, laws of nature, and mental steps cannot be owned. Although enormously large and complex, software can be thought of as a series of mental steps. That is, in principle a person can go through the steps in a program and mentally do what the program specifies. If someone were granted ownership of mental steps, then they could legally prohibit others from going through those steps in their minds. This would interfere with freedom of thought.

The question of whether to grant copyright or patents for computer programs was, then, deeply linked to the conceptualization of computer programs. That is, the policy vacuum couldn’t be filled without a

conceptualization of software. Could software be characterized as an expression of ideas? an application of abstract ideas? Could it be understood as something other than mental steps or mathematical algorithms? Or did a whole new set of laws have to be created specifically for computer software? If so, what should the new laws look like? Again, the conceptual muddle had to be sorted out in order to fill the policy vacuum.

In summary, then, according to the standard account of computer ethics: (1) ethical issues arise around IT because IT creates new possibilities for human action and there is a vacuum of policies with regard to the new possibilities, (2) the task of computer ethics is to evaluate the new possibilities and fill the policy vacuums, and (3) a significant component of this task is addressing conceptual muddles.