Krispy kreme donuts charlottesville va

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This case was prepared by Sean Carr (MBA ’03), under the direction of Robert F. Bruner of the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright  2005 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to sales@dardenbusinesspublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation.

KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC. As the millennium began, the future for Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. (Krispy Kreme),

smelled sweet. Not only could the company boast iconic status and a nearly cult-like following, it had quickly become a darling of Wall Street. Less than a year after its initial public offering, in April 2000, Krispy Kreme shares were selling for 62 times earnings and, by 2003, Fortune magazine had dubbed the company “the hottest brand in America.” With ambitious plans to open 500 doughnut shops over the first half of the decade, the company’s distinctive green-and-red vintage logo and unmistakable “Hot Doughnuts Now” neon sign had become ubiquitous.

At the end of 2004, however, the sweet story had begun to sour as the company made

several accounting revelations, after which its stock price sank. From its peak in August 2003, Krispy Kreme’s stock price plummeted more than 80% over the next 16 months. Investors and analysts began asking probing questions about the company’s fundamentals, but even by the beginning of 2005, many of those questions remained unanswered. Exhibits 1 and 2 provide Krispy Kreme’s financial statements for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. Was this a healthy company? What had happened to the company that some had thought would become the next Starbucks? If almost everyone loved the doughnuts, why were so many investors fleeing the popular doughnut maker?

Company Background

Krispy Kreme began as a single doughnut shop in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, in 1937, when Vernon Rudolph, who had acquired the company’s special doughnut recipe from a French chef in New Orleans, started making and selling doughnuts wholesale to supermarkets. Within a short time, Rudolph’s products became so popular that he cut a hole in his factory’s wall to sell directly to customers—thus was born the central Krispy Kreme retail concept: the factory store. By the late 1950s, Krispy Kreme had 29 shops in 12 states, many of which were operated by franchisees.

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After Rudolph’s death, in 1973, Beatrice Foods bought the company and quickly expanded it to more than 100 locations. Beatrice introduced other products, such as soups and sandwiches, and cut costs by changing the appearance of the stores and substituting cheaper ingredients in the doughnut mixture. The business languished, however, and by the early 1980s, Beatrice put the company up for sale.

A group of franchisees led by Joseph McAleer, who had been the first Krispy Kreme

franchisee, completed a leveraged buyout of the company for $24 million in 1982. McAleer brought back the original doughnut formula and the company’s traditional logo. It was also around this time that the company introduced the “Hot Doughnuts Now” neon sign, which told customers when fresh doughnuts were coming off the line. The company still struggled for a while, but by 1989, Krispy Kreme had become debt-free and had slowly begun to expand. The company focused on its signature doughnuts and added branded coffee in 1996. Scott Livengood, who became CEO in 1998 and chairman the following year, took the company public in April 2000 in what was one of the largest initial public offerings (IPO) in recent years; one day after the offering, Krispy Kreme’s share price was $40.63, giving the firm a market capitalization of nearly $500 million. Krispy Kreme’s Business

After the company’s IPO, Krispy Kreme announced an aggressive strategy to expand the number of stores from 144 to 500 over the next five years. In addition, the company planned to grow internationally, with 32 locations planned for Canada and more for the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Australia. Exhibit 3 provides an overview of the company’s store openings.

Krispy Kreme generated revenues through four primary sources: on-premises retail sales

at company-owned stores (accounting for 27% of revenues); off-premises sales to grocery and convenience stores (40%); manufacturing and distribution of product mix and machinery (29%); and franchisee royalties and fees (4%). In addition to the traditional domestic retail locations, the company sought growth through smaller “satellite concepts,” which relied on factory stores to provide doughnuts for reheating, as well as the development of the international market.

 On-premises sales: Each factory store allowed consumers to see the production of

doughnuts; Krispy Kreme’s custom machinery and doughnut-viewing areas created what the company called a “doughnut theater.” In that way, Krispy Kreme attempted to differentiate itself from its competition by offering customers an experience rather than simply a product. Each factory store could produce between 4,000 dozen and 10,000 dozen doughnuts a day, which were sold both on- and off-premises.

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 Off-premises sales: About 60% of off-premises sales were to grocery stores, both in stand-alone cases and on store shelves. The remainder were sold to convenience stores (a small percentage were also sold as private label). The company maintained a fleet of delivery trucks for off-premises sales.

 Manufacturing and distribution: Krispy Kreme’s Manufacturing and Distribution (KKM&D) division provided the proprietary doughnut mixes and doughnut- making equipment to every company-owned and franchised factory store. This vertical integration allowed the company to maintain quality control and product consistency throughout the system. The company maintained its own manufacturing facilities for its mixes and machines, and it provided quarterly service for all system units. All franchisees were required to buy mix and equipment from Krispy Kreme. KKM&D also included the company’s coffee- roasting operation, which supplied branded drip coffee to both company-owned and franchised stores.

 Franchise royalties and fees: In exchange for an initial franchise fee and annual royalties, franchisees received assistance from Krispy Kreme with operations, advertising and marketing, accounting, and other information-management systems. Franchisees that had relationships with the company before the IPO in 2000 were called associates, and they typically had locations in heritage markets in the southeastern United States. Associates were not responsible for opening new stores. New franchisees were called area developers, and they were responsible for developing new sites and building in markets with high potential. Area developers typically paid $20,000 to $50,000 in initial franchise fees and between 4.5% and 6% in royalties. Franchisees also contributed 1% of their annual total sales to the corporate advertising fund. Roughly 60% of sales at a Krispy Kreme store were derived from the company’s

signature product, the glazed doughnut. This differed from Dunkin’ Donuts, the company’s largest competitor, for which the majority of sales came from coffee. Holes in the Krispy Kreme Story

On May 7, 2004, for the first time in its history as a public company, Krispy Kreme announced adverse results. The company told investors to expect earnings to be 10% lower than anticipated, claiming that the recent low-carbohydrate diet trend in the United States had hurt wholesale and retail sales. The company also said it planned to divest Montana Mills, a chain of 28 bakery-cafés acquired in January 2003 for $40 million in stock, and would take a charge of $35 million to $40 million in the first quarter. In addition, Krispy Kreme indicated that its new Hot Doughnut and Coffee Shops were falling short of expectations and that it had plans to close three of them (resulting in a charge of $7 million to $8 million). Krispy Kreme’s shares closed down 30%, at $22.51 a share.

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Then, on May 25, the Wall Street Journal published a story describing aggressive accounting treatment for franchise acquisitions made by Krispy Kreme.1 According to the article, in 2003, Krispy Kreme had begun negotiating to purchase a struggling seven-store Michigan franchise. The franchisee owed the company several million dollars for equipment, ingredients, and franchise fees and, as part of the deal, Krispy Kreme asked the franchisee to close two underperforming stores and to pay Krispy Kreme the accrued interest on past-due loans. In return for those moves, Krispy Kreme promised to raise its purchase price on the franchise.

According to the Journal, Krispy Kreme recorded the interest paid by the franchisee as

interest income and, thus, as immediate profit; however, the company booked the purchase cost of the franchise as an intangible asset, under reacquired franchise rights, which the company did not amortize. Krispy Kreme also allowed the Michigan franchise’s top executive to remain employed at the company after the deal, but shortly after the deal was completed, that executive left. In accordance with a severance agreement, this forced Krispy Kreme to pay the executive an additional $5 million, an expense the company also rolled into the unamortized-asset category as reacquired franchise rights.

The company denied any wrongdoing with this practice, maintaining it had accounted for

its franchise acquisitions in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). On July 29, however, the company disclosed that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had launched an informal investigation related to “franchise reacquisitions and the company’s previously announced reduction in earnings guidance.” Observers remained skeptical. “Krispy Kreme’s accounting for franchise acquisitions is the most aggressive we have found,” said one analyst at the time. “We surveyed 18 publicly traded companies with franchise operations, four of which had reacquired franchises, and they had amortized them. That clearly seems like the right thing to do.”2 Over the previous three years, Krispy Kreme had recorded $174.5 million as intangible assets (reacquired franchise rights), which the company was not required to amortize. On the date of the SEC announcement, Krispy Kreme’s shares fell another 15%, closing at $15.71 a share. Analysts’ Reactions

Since the heady days of 2001, when 80% of the equity analysts following Krispy Kreme

were making buy recommendations for the company’s shares, the conventional wisdom about the company had changed. By the time the Wall Street Journal published the article about Krispy Kreme’s franchise-reacquisition accounting practices in May 2004, only 25% of the analysts following Krispy Kreme were recommending the company as a buy; another 50% had downgraded the stock to a hold. Exhibits 4 and 5 provide tables of aggregate analysts’ recommendations and EPS (earnings per share) estimates. As Krispy Kreme’s troubles mounted during the second half of 2004, analysts became increasingly pessimistic about the stock:

1 Mark Maremont and Rick Brooks, “Krispy Kreme Franchise Buybacks May Spur New Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2004.

2 Gretchen Morgenson, “Did Someone Say Doughnuts? Yes, the SEC,” New York Times, July 30, 2004.

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Analyst Comment Date John Ivankoe, J.P. Morgan Securities

In addition to the possibility of an earnings restatement, we believe many fundamental problems persist, exclusive of any “low-carb” impact. Declining new-store volumes are indicative of a worsening investment model, and we believe restructured store-development contracts, a smaller store format, and reduced fees charged for equipment and ingredients sold to franchises are necessary.

July 29, 2004

Jonathan M. Waite, KeyBanc Capital Markets

We believe that the challenges KKD faces, including margin compression, lower returns, an SEC investigation, and product saturation, currently outweigh the company’s positive drivers. In addition, shares of KKD are trading at 16.6× CY05 earnings versus its 15% growth rate. As such, we rate KKD shares HOLD.

Oct. 12, 2004

John S. Glass, CIBC World Markets

Krispy Kreme’s balance sheet became bloated over the past two years by acquisition goodwill that will likely need to be written down. As a result, KKD’s return on invested capital has plunged to about 10% versus 18% two years ago prior to these acquisitions. We’d view a balance sheet write-down, including eliminating a significant portion of the $170+ million in “reacquired franchise rights,” as a first step in the right direction.

Nov. 8, 2004

Glenn M. Guard, Legg Mason

In our opinion, management was not focused on operations the way it should have been. As a result, too many units were opened in poor locations as the company tripled its unit base since 2000. Additionally, we believe that franchisees were not trained properly as to how best to run their off-premises business. As a result, we believe many units are losing money off-premises, and franchisees are not motivated to grow that business. It also appears to us that basic blocking and tackling, execution, and cost discipline were seriously lacking in both the company and franchise systems, resulting in inefficiencies.

Nov. 23, 2004

As the headlines about the SEC investigation and Krispy Kreme’s other management

issues continued (e.g., Krispy Kreme’s chief operating officer stepped down on August 16, 2004), observers looked more critically at the fundamentals of Krispy Kreme’s business. In September, the Wall Street Journal published an article that focused attention on the company’s growth:

The biggest problem for Krispy Kreme may be that the company grew too quickly and diluted its cult status by selling its doughnuts in too many outlets, while trying to impress Wall Street. The number of Krispy Kreme shops has nearly tripled since early 2000, with 427 stores in 45 states and four foreign countries. Some 20,000 supermarkets, convenience stores, truck stops, and other outside locations also sell the company’s doughnuts.

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Another issue is that Krispy Kreme has relied for a significant chunk of profits on high profit-margin equipment that it requires franchisees to buy for each new store. Its profits have also been tied to growth in the number of franchised stores, because of the upfront fee each must pay.3

In September 2004, Krispy Kreme announced that it would reduce its number of new stores for the year to about 60 from the previously announced 120.

Restatement Announced

On January 4, 2005, Krispy Kreme’s board of directors announced that the company’s previously issued financial statements for the fiscal year ended February 1, 2004 (FY2004), would be restated to “correct certain errors.” The board determined that the adjustments, which principally related to the company’s “accounting for the acquisitions of certain franchisees,” would reduce pretax income for FY2004 by between $6.2 million and $8.1 million. The company also expected to restate its financial statements for the first and second quarters of FY2005.

Krispy Kreme also said it would delay the filing of its financial reports until the SEC’s

investigation had been resolved and the company’s own internal inquiry was complete. However, the failure of the company to provide its lenders with financial statements by January 14, 2005, could constitute a default under the company’s $150-million credit facility. In the event of such a default, Krispy Kreme’s banks had the right to terminate the facility and to demand immediate payment for any outstanding amounts. Krispy Kreme’s failure to file timely reports also placed the company at risk of having its stock delisted from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). By the end of the next day, Krispy Kreme’s shares were trading at less than $10 a share.

Most analysts felt that Krispy Kreme’s lenders would grant the company a waiver on its

credit-facility default, and few felt the company was truly at risk of being delisted from the NYSE. The board’s announcement, however, served only to raise more questions about the company. Since August 2003, the company had lost nearly $2.5 billion in its market value of equity. Exhibit 6 illustrates the stock-price patterns for Krispy Kreme relative to the S&P 500 Composite Index. Were the revelations about the company’s franchise accounting practices sufficient to drive that much value out of the stock? Were there deeper issues at Krispy Kreme that deserved scrutiny? Exhibits 7, 8, and 9 provide analytical financial ratios for Krispy Kreme and a group of comparable companies in the franchise food-service industry.

3 Rick Brooks and Mark Maremont, “Ovens Are Cooling at Krispy Kreme as Woes Multiply,” Wall Street

Journal, September 3, 2004.

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Exhibit 1 KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC.

Income Statements (in thousands, except per-share amounts)

1 Resulting from divestiture of Montana Mills.

Data source: Company filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Jan. 30, Jan. 28, Feb. 3, Feb. 2, Feb. 1, May 5, May 2, Aug 3, Aug. 1, 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004

Total revenues 220,243 300,715 394,354 491,549 665,592 148,660 184,356 159,176 177,448 Operating expenses 190,003 250,690 316,946 381,489 507,396 112,480 141,383 120,573 145,633 General and administrative expenses 14,856 20,061 27,562 28,897 36,912 8,902 10,664 9,060 11,845 Depreciation and amortization expenses 4,546 6,457 7,959 12,271 19,723 4,101 6,130 4,536 6,328 Arbitration award 9,075 (525) (525) Provision for restructuring Impairment charges and closing costs 7,543 1,802

Income from operations 10,838 23,507 41,887 59,817 102,086 23,702 18,636 25,007 11,840 Interest income 293 2,325 2,980 1,966 921 227 176 205 226 Interest expense (1,525) (607) (337) (1,781) (4,409) (866) (1,433) (997) (1,366) Equity loss in joint ventures (706) (602) (2,008) (1,836) (694) (575) (802) (399) Minority interest (716) (1,147) (2,287) (2,072) (616) (126) (616) 267 Other expense, net (20) (235) (934) (13) (25) (156) (343) 114

Income before income taxes 9,606 23,783 42,546 54,773 94,677 21,728 16,522 22,454 10,682 Provision for income taxes 3,650 9,058 16,168 21,295 37,590 8,588 6,675 9,014 4,438 Discontinued operations1 34,285 439 480

Net income 5,956 14,725 26,378 33,478 57,087 13,140 (24,438) 13,001 5,764

Diluted earnings per share 0.15 0.27 0.45 0.56 0.92 0.22 (0.38) 0.21 0.10

Number of shares outstanding (millions) 39.7 54.5 58.6 59.8 62.1 60.7 63.6 62.1 63.4

Three Months Ended Three Months Ended

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Exhibit 2 KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC.

Balance Sheets (in thousands)

Data source: Company filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Jan. 30, Jan. 28, Feb. 3, Feb. 2, Feb. 1, May 2, Aug. 1, 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2004

ASSETS Current Assets: Cash and cash equivalents 3,183 7,026 21,904 32,203 20,300 13,715 19,309 Short-term investments 0 18,103 15,292 22,976

Accounts receivable 17,965 19,855 26,894 34,373 45,283 47,434 44,329 Accounts receivable, affiliates 1,608 2,599 9,017 11,062 20,482 20,740 19,933 Other receivables 794 2,279 2,771 884 2,363 3,169 4,868 Notes receivable, affiliates 0 0 0 0 458 4,404 5,440 Inventories 9,979 12,031 16,159 24,365 28,573 32,974 33,076 Prepaid expenses 3,148 1,909 2,591 3,478 5,399 4,675 6,749 Income taxes refundable 861 2,534 1,963 7,946 7,449 8,139 Deferred income taxes 3,500 3,809 4,607 9,824 6,453 13,280 20,005 Assets held for sale 36,856 3,374 3,325 Total current assets 41,038 67,611 101,769 141,128 174,113 151,214 165,173 Property and equipment, net 60,584 78,340 112,577 202,558 281,103 301,160 297,154 Deferred income taxes 1,398 0 0 0 0 Long-term investments 0 17,877 12,700 4,344 0 Long-term notes receivable, affiliates 0 0 0 1,000 7,609 2,988 2,925 Investments in unconsolidated joint ventures 2,827 3,400 6,871 12,426 10,728 9,921 Reacquired franchise rights 0 0 16,621 49,354 175,957 176,078 176,045 Other assets 1,938 4,838 8,309 5,232 9,456 12,315 10,390

Total assets 104,958 171,493 255,376 410,487 660,664 654,483 661,608

LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY Current Liabilities: Accounts payable 13,106 8,211 12,095 14,055 18,784 18,866 18,817 Book overdraft 0 5,147 9,107 11,375 8,123 12,670 13,107 Accrued expenses 14,080 21,243 26,729 20,981 23,744 27,107 32,249 Arbitration award 0 0 0 9,075 0 Revolving line of credit 0 3,526 3,871 0 0 Current maturities of long-term debt 2,400 0 731 3,301 2,842 4,663 5,566 Short-term debt 0 0 0 900 0 Income taxes payable 0 41 0 0 0

Total current liabilities 29,586 38,168 52,533 59,687 53,493 63,306 69,739

Deferred income taxes 0 579 3,930 9,849 6,374 16,468 25,564 Compensation deferred (unpaid) 990 1,106 0 0 0 Revolving lines of credit 0 0 0 7,288 87,000 72,000 62,000 Long-term debt, net of current portion 20,502 0 3,912 49,900 48,056 58,469 50,135 Accrued restructuring expenses 4,259 3,109 0 0 0 Other long-term obligations 1,866 1,735 4,843 5,218 11,211 10,774 12,078

Total long-term liabilities 27,617 6,529 12,685 72,255 152,641 157,711 149,777

Minority interest 1,117 2,491 5,193 2,323 2,815 2,593

SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY: Common stock, no par value, 300,000 shares authorized; issued and outstanding 85,060 121,052 173,112 294,477 296,812 299,865 Common stock, 10 par value, 1,000 shares authorized; issued and outstanding 4,670 Paid-in capital 10,805 Unearned compensation (188) (186) (119) (62) (47) (31) Notes receivable, employees (2,547) (2,349) (2,580) (558) (383) (383) (383) Nonqualified employee benefit plan assets (126) (138) (339) (369) (264) (264) Nonqualified employee benefit plan liability 126 138 339 369 264 264 Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) 609 456 (1,486) (1,315) (783) (768) Retained earnings 34,827 42,547 68,925 102,403 159,490 135,052 140,816

Total shareholders' equity 47,755 125,679 187,667 273,352 452,207 430,651 439,499 Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 104,958 171,493 255,376 410,487 660,664 654,483 661,608

Fiscal Year Ended Three Months Ended

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Exhibit 3 KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC.

Store Growth

Jan. 30, Jan. 28, Feb. 3, Feb. 2, Feb. 1, 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Total company factory stores Beginning of period 61 58 63 75 99 Store openings 2 8 7 14 28 Store closings (5) (3) (2) (3) (2) Stores acquired from franchisees 0 0 7 13 16 End of period 58 63 75 99 141 Net change (3) 5 12 24 42 % year-over-year growth 9% 19% 32% 42%

Total franchised factory stores Beginning of period 70 86 111 143 177 Unit openings 19 28 41 49 58 Unit closings (3) (3) (2) (2) (3) Stores transferred to company 0 0 (7) (13) (16) End of period 86 111 143 177 216 Net change 16 25 32 34 39 % year-over-year growth 29% 29% 24% 22%

Total factory stores Beginning of period 131 144 174 218 276 Store openings 21 36 48 63 86 Store closings (8) (6) (4) (5) (5) End of period 144 174 218 276 357 Net change 13 30 44 58 81 % year-over-year growth 21% 25% 27% 29%

% of total Stores Company-owned 40.3% 36.2% 34.4% 35.9% 39.5% Franchised 59.7% 63.8% 65.6% 64.1% 60.5%

Data source: Company reports (case writer’s analysis).

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Exhibit 4 KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC.

Analysts’ Recommendations

Data source: I/B/E/S International Inc. (Thomson Financial/First Call).

Period Buy Sell Hold 14-Jun-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 19-Jul-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0%

16-Aug-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20-Sep-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 18-Oct-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0%

15-Nov-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20-Dec-01 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 17-Jan-02 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 14-Feb-02 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% 14-Mar-02 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 18-Apr-02 66.7% 33.3% 0.0%

16-May-02 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 20-Jun-02 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 18-Jul-02 71.4% 28.6% 0.0%

15-Aug-02 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 19-Sep-02 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 17-Oct-02 57.1% 28.6% 14.3%

14-Nov-02 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% 19-Dec-02 50.0% 12.5% 37.5% 16-Jan-03 50.0% 12.5% 37.5% 20-Feb-03 62.5% 12.5% 25.0% 20-Mar-03 62.5% 12.5% 25.0% 17-Apr-03 62.5% 12.5% 25.0%

15-May-03 55.6% 11.1% 33.3% 19-Jun-03 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 17-Jul-03 80.0% 0.0% 20.0%

14-Aug-03 83.3% 0.0% 16.7% 18-Sep-03 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16-Oct-03 66.7% 16.7% 16.7%

20-Nov-03 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 18-Dec-03 42.9% 14.3% 42.9% 15-Jan-04 42.9% 14.3% 42.9% 19-Feb-04 28.6% 14.3% 57.1% 18-Mar-04 28.6% 14.3% 57.1% 15-Apr-04 37.5% 25.0% 37.5%

20-May-04 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 17-Jun-04 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 15-Jul-04 33.3% 11.1% 55.6%

19-Aug-04 28.6% 28.6% 42.9% 16-Sep-04 25.0% 37.5% 37.5% 14-Oct-04 14.3% 42.9% 42.9%

18-Nov-04 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 16-Dec-04 14.3% 57.1% 28.6% 20-Jan-05 14.3% 57.1% 28.6%

Percent Recommending:

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Exhibit 5 KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC.

Analyst EPS Estimates

Data source: I/B/E/S International Inc. (Thomson Financial/First Call).

Estimate (Mean) Estimate Date 0.38$ 2-Jul-01 0.43$ 24-Aug-01 0.41$ 25-Oct-01 0.44$ 16-Nov-01 0.43$ 21-Dec-01 0.62$ 8-Mar-02 0.63$ 24-May-02 0.63$ 3-Jun-02 0.63$ 1-Jul-02 0.64$ 29-Aug-02 0.64$ 3-Sep-02 0.63$ 8-Oct-02 0.66$ 22-Nov-02 0.65$ 1-Jan-03 0.66$ 14-Feb-03 0.87$ 20-Mar-03 0.89$ 29-May-03 0.90$ 30-Jul-03 0.90$ 21-Aug-03 0.91$ 15-Sep-03 0.91$ 17-Dec-03 0.92$ 27-Jan-04 1.17$ 10-Mar-24 1.00$ 7-May-04 0.99$ 26-May-04 0.98$ 24-Jun-04 0.92$ 16-Aug-04 0.59$ 27-Aug-04 0.69$ 10-Sep-04 0.65$ 13-Sep-04 0.58$ 3-Nov-04 0.45$ 23-Nov-04

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R EM

E D

O U

G H

N U

TS , I

N C

. A

na ly

tic al

F in

an ci

al R

at io

s f or

K ris

py K

re m

e

D

at a

so ur

ce : C

om pa

ny re

po rts

.

Ja n

30 ,

Ja n

28 ,

Fe b

3, Fe

b 2,

Fe b

1, 20

00 20

01 20

02 20

03 20

04 Ra

tio d

ef ini

tio ns

Li qu

id ity

ra tio

s Q

uic k

(a cid

-te st)

ra tio

1. 05

1. 46

1. 63

1. 96

2. 72

(c ur

re nt

a ss

et s −

in ve

nt or

ie s)

/c ur

re nt

li ab

ili tie

s C

ur re

nt ra

tio 1.

39 1.

77 1.

94 2.

36 3.

25 cu

rre nt

a ss

et s/

cu rre

nt li

ab ili

tie s

Le ve

ra ge

ra tio

s D

eb t-t

o- eq

uit y

(b oo

k) 47

.9 6%

0. 00

% 2.

47 %

19 .4

6% 11

.2 6%

LT d

eb t/s

ha re

ho ld

er s’

e qu

ity D

eb t-t

o- ca

pi ta

l 32

.4 1%

0. 00

% 2.

41 %

16 .2

9% 10

.1 2%

LT d

eb t/(

sh ar

eh ol

de rs

’ e qu

ity +

d eb

t) Ti

m es

in te

re st

ea rn

ed 7.

11 38

.7 3

12 4.

29 33

.5 9

23 .1

5 EB

IT /in

te re

st e

xp en

se A

ss et

s t o

Eq uit

y 2.

20 1.

36 1.

36 1.

50 1.

46 to

ta l a

ss et

s/ sh

ar eh

ol de

rs ’ e

qu ity

A ct

iv ity

ra tio

s Re

ce iva

bl es

tu rn

ov er

10 .8

1 12

.1 6

10 .1

9 10

.6 1

9. 70

sa le

s/ ac

co un

ts re

ce iv

ab le

s In

ve nt

or y

tu rn

ov er

19 .0

4 20

.8 4

19 .6

1 15

.6 6

17 .7

6 co

st o

f g oo

ds s

ol d/

in ve

nt or

y A

ss et

tu rn

ov er

2. 10

1. 75

1. 54

1. 20

1. 01

sa le

s/ to

ta l a

ss et

s C

as h

tu rn

ov er

69 .1

9 42

.8 0

18 .0

0 15

.2 6

32 .7

9 sa

le s/

ca sh

a nd

c as

h eq

ui va

le nt

s Pr

of ita

bi lit

y ra

tio s

Re tu

rn o

n as

se ts

5. 67

% 8.

59 %

10 .3

3% 8.

16 %

8. 64

% ne

t i nc

om e/

as se

ts Re

tu rn

o n

eq uit

y 12

.4 7%

11 .7

2% 14

.0 6%

12 .2