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A People’s History of Modern Europe

“A fascinating journey across centuries towards the world as we experience it today. ... It is the voice of the ordinary people, and women in particular, their ideas and actions, protests and sufferings that have gone into the making of this alternative narrative.”

——Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, former Surendra Nath Banerjee Professor of Political Science, University of Calcutta

“A history of Europe that doesn’t remove the Europeans. Here there are not only kings, presidents and institutions but the pulse of the people and social organizations that shaped Europe. A must-read.”

——Raquel Varela, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

“Lively and engaging. William A Pelz takes the reader through a thousand years of European history from below. This is the not the story of lords, kings and rulers. It is the story of the ordinary people of Europe and their struggles against those lords, kings and rulers, from the Middle Ages to the present day. A fine introduction.”

——Francis King, editor, Socialist History

“This book is an exception to the rule that the winner takes all. It highlights the importance of the commoners which often is only shown in the dark corners of mainstream history books. From Hussites, Levellers and sans-culottes to the women who defended the Paris Commune and the workers who occupied the shipyards during the Carnation revolution in Portugal. The author gives them their deserved place in history just like Howard Zinn did for the American people.”

——Sjaak van der Velden, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam

“The author puts his focus on the lives and historical impact of those excluded from power and wealth: peasants and serfs of the Middle Ages, workers during the Industrial Revolution, women in a patriarchic order that transcended different eras. This focus not only makes history relevant for contemporary debates on social justice, it also urges the reader to develop a critical approach.”

——Ralf Hoffrogge, Ruhr-Universität Bochum

“An exciting story of generations of people struggling for better living conditions, and for social and political rights. ... This story has to be considered now, when the very notions of enlightenment, progress and social change are being questioned.”

——Boris Kagarlitsky, director of Institute for globalization studies and social movements, Moscow, and author of From Empires to Imperialism

“A splendid antidote to the many European histories dominated by kings, businessmen and generals. It should be on the shelves of both academics and activists ... A lively and informative intellectual tour-de-force.”

——Marcel van der Linden, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam

A People’s History of Modern Europe

William A. Pelz

First published 2016 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA

www.plutobooks.com

Copyright © William A. Pelz 2016

The right of William A. Pelz to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 0 7453 3246 8 Hardback ISBN 978 0 7453 3245 1 Paperback ISBN 978 1 7837 1767 5 PDF eBook ISBN 978 1 7837 1769 9 Kindle eBook ISBN 978 1 7837 1768 2 EPUB eBook

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental standards of the country of origin.

Typeset by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England

Simultaneously printed in the European Union and United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgements vii

Introduction viii

chapter one “The King’s in His Castle … All’s Right with the World”:

The Collapse of the Middle Ages 1

chapter two “The Other Reformation”:

Martin Luther, Religious Dogma and the Common People 18

chapter three “The World Turned Upside Down”:

The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century and the English Revolution, 1640–49

30

chapter four The Rise of the Third Estate: The French People Revolt

40

chapter five Becoming an Appendage to the Machine: The Revolution in Production

52

chapter six From the Revolutions of 1848–49 to the First People ’s Democracy:

The Paris Commune 64

chapter seven The Rise of the Working Classes: Trade Unions and Socialism,

1871–1914 83

a people’s history of modern europe

chapter eight Protest and Mutiny Confront Mass Slaughter:

Europeans in World War I 103

chapter nine War Leads to Revolution:

Russia (1917), Central Europe (1918–19) 115

chapter ten Economic Collapse and the Rise of Fascism, 1920–33

127

chapter eleven Against Fascist Terror: War and Genocide, 1933–45

142

chapter twelve A New Europe? 1945–48

157

chapter thirteen Europeans in the Cold War: Between Moscow and Washington

171

chapter fourteen From the Berlin Wall to the Prague Spring:

A New Generation of Europeans 183

chapter fifteen Fighting for Peace in an Atomic Age, 1969–89

197

chapter sixteen Europe Falls into the Twenty-First Century

210

Notes 218

Index 261

vii

Acknowledgements

First, I must praise David Castle, my editor at Pluto Press, who treated my manuscript with a level of skill, care, understanding and sophistica- tion so sadly lacking in most modern editors. The book is only as good as it is because of David’s expertise and dedication. As authors often note, there are countless people who contribute to any book whether directly or indirectly. As is so often the case there are more than can be credited. So, I’d like to thank everyone whom I don’t name for their contribution to the writing of this book. Katie Stollenwerk, Secretary of the Institute of Working Class History (Chicago), was invaluable in correcting my often odd English (the author grew up in the working-class Englewood district of Chicago). If this book has sentences that contain verbs, much of the credit goes to Katie.

Embarrassing factual mistakes were discovered by Ian Birchall (London) and Boris Kagarlitsky (Moscow) when reviewing a draft of the book. These have been corrected but as they say “to err is human, to forgive divine.” I have gained information, have had insights sharpened, and new approaches suggested by countless talks with generous and committed colleagues. Among these are Ottokar Luban (Berlin), Francis King (East Anglia), Eric Schuster (Chicago), Ralf Hoffrogge (Berlin), Raquel Varela (Lisbon), Marcel van der Linden (Amsterdam), Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (India), Sjaak van der Velden (Amsterdam), Mark Lause (Cincinnati), Bruno Drweski (Paris), Axel Fair-Schulz (Potsdam), Steven McGiffen (Paris), Roger Johansson (Malmo), Kasper Braskén (Finland), Norman LaPorte (Wales), John Barzman (LeHavre) and Mario Kessler (New York/Berlin).

I owe the greatest debt to Adrienne L. Butler, my wife, who endured seemingly endless months of piles of papers piled upon stacks of books. There was a mess everywhere in the house. Yet, never once did she resort to physical violence against her obsessed husband. Last, and never least, is the cat, Sputnik, who took time out of his busy schedule of naps to hop onto my papers and rearrange them in a manner more to his liking. Sometimes, he was right. Needless to say, any mistakes of fact, interpreta- tion or imagination are solely Sputnik’s fault, not mine.

William A. Pelz

viii

Introduction

Imagine kings ruling without subjects, generals waging war without soldiers, or businesspeople making profits without workers. It’s hard to take seriously any such silly situations, right? Yet, history is often written as if rulers, war leaders and moneymakers are the only people in society or, at least, the only people who matter. The current author dissents from this idea. It will be argued in this book that the common people matter and that their history matters. That is to say, the commoners’ role in history is an integral, yet lacking, part of the story of modern Europe, that has too often been passed over. History allows us to see how societies develop and change while it points to various possible futures. It is the story of people struggling, often in dark times.

This book provides an alternative reading of European history starting with the Middle Ages. Instead of focusing on only the traditional themes and concerns that emphasize the rulers, this title highlights the dissidents, rebels and radicals who helped make Europe what it is. Most books focus on a rather conventional narrative with, more recently, a section on women or peasants included to add diversity. The average reader is in no doubt however as to who and what is important. That is, the rich and powerful are not only the most important subjects of serious study—they are typically the only worthwhile subjects of study.

A People’s History of Modern Europe offers a concise, readable alternative to mainstream textbooks and surveys while suggesting a different under- standing of the development and trajectory of European history. That is, history is presented as moving through conflicts between contending groups rather than as the result of brilliant insights by upper-class rulers and thinkers. To be sure, there are a number of specialized volumes that attempt this but typically they have a rather limited focus. The main problem is that these books often remain accessible solely to the scholar or the academic, as opposed to the general reader or student.

Starting with the decay and collapse of West European feudalism, this book traces in broad outline the contributions made by common people, rebels, dissenters and non-conformists. This book will give greater prominence to those individuals and events that are glossed over or ignored by other texts. For example, the reader here will have a more in-depth look at the role of John Hus during the Reformation and the Paris Commune

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in the nineteenth century. In addition to highlighting those lesser known individuals and events, this text will highlight alternative viewpoints to commonly understood events. World War I soldiers are shown rejecting the patriotism spread by their governments and at times even killing their own “superiors” if they thought them cruel. After the war, revolutions break out and reaction strives to crush them.

At the end of the 1920s, the winds of economic crisis hit the common people. Fascism develops, murders and tortures millions, but is fiercely resisted by countless average Europeans. Later, we see social movements crushed, distorted and subverted. Spies, clandestine operations, massive bribery and brutal military dictatorships are among only a few of the tactics employed to preserve the status quo and leave the ruling classes’ power unchanged. Yet, the common people return to movement, protest and resistance, again and yet again … and despite overwhelming odds, they often win … at least partial victories. It is these victories that allow us to live in a world with more rights and autonomy than our medieval precursors could dream of.

The guiding spirit of the book is informed by the view expressed in Brecht’s famous “A worker reads history” quoted below. In other words, this text will continually encourage the reader to ask “and what about the common people?” How did they regard this development? What were their thoughts? How did they feel? Above all, the reader will be prodded to question the mainstream narratives that they have been taught. One must understand history or we will never be mentioned in it, let alone make it. Unless you are the direct descendent of blood-thirsty feudal lords or a member of the top .01 percent, this book is about your people. After all, most humans are neither rich nor famous, but working people. Their story needs to be told.

The first step is to supply students and readers with some tools so that this history can be fairly examined. Regardless of intellectual influences or political viewpoints, there remain a number of methodological problems that need be discussed in regards to the study of history. What follows is far from a complete list, but will give some idea of the pitfalls the historian must avoid if they are to arrive at conclusions that may be deemed fair, if not completely scientific. After all, history, it can be argued, may be a science but it is not an exact science in the same way as physics or chemistry.

When exploring problems of history, we are not so concerned with the most obvious bias discussed in the media. That is, history being consciously abused to serve a contemporary personal or political end.1 Nonetheless, there are real problems that plague all those who venture into a study

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of the past with any degree of honesty, such as the problem of survival. Simply put, not all historical evidence makes it into the present (no matter when the present is). Often, documents or other facts are destroyed so as to hide crimes, eliminate alternative opinions or simply to make a group or personage look better to society. One famous example is the riots by fanatical Christians in ad 391 that destroyed countless irreplaceable books in Alexandria’s fabled library. The works that survived were largely destroyed in ad 641 by an equally fanatical Islamic ruler. The modern-day shredder may protect privacy but also complicates the historian’s task. In other cases, fire, war, or the ravages of time cause evidence to disappear.

An apparently contradictory problem concerns the bias of selection. The book you are holding is an example of this in as much as any history of modern Europe could easily run into dozens of volumes and tens of thousands of pages without exhausting the subject. So, the historian must pick and choose which topics to investigate and which to ignore, which facts are relevant and which are not. Further, the inherent human limitation of any historian adds to this problem. The current author knows not a word of Finnish, Portuguese, Icelandic, medieval Latin, or Greek among others and only a tiny number of words in, for example, Dutch, Italian, or Polish. This book depends too heavily on English, German and French sources—most obviously the former. Also, scholars tend to be drawn towards accounts and evidence that fit with their pre-existing thoughts on a subject.2 Of course, sometimes the selection bias may be motivated by not wanting to deal with the potentially controversial, leaving the historian to opt for the vacuous instead. As Tristram Hunt comments, “How much information about Anne Boleyn can modern Britain really cope with?”3

That this is a widespread problem is confirmed by a famous experiment conducted in 1999. Participants were shown a video presenting two teams of three persons each, one team in black and the other in white, as they moved around and passed basketballs to each other. The viewers were asked to count the number of passes made by the team dressed in white. During the video, a person in a gorilla suit walked across the screen pounding her chest for 5 seconds. In test after test, around 50 percent did not notice the gorilla. In fact, many participants insisted that there had been no gorilla even when told and shown the video a second time.4 For our purposes in this historical investigation, the common people are the “gorilla” that scholars and students often fail to see. After all, in any society at any given time, there is a generally dominant narrative that marginalizes all other views, relegating them to at best wrong and at worst, heresy. As Napoleon rather cynically commented, “What is the truth of history? A fable agreed upon.”5

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introduction

Another problem, that this book hopes to address, is class bias. As noted before, most history has been written as if only kings, queens, generals and later big businessmen—in brief, the rich and powerful—are the only fit subjects for history. This book sides with Bertolt Brecht who wryly noted in his poem, “A Worker Reads History,”6

Who built the seven gates of Thebes? The books are filled with names of kings. Was it the kings who hauled the craggy blocks of stone?

The point isn’t that rulers aren’t important but rather that so are the common people … and it is the average woman and man who are so often forgotten or ignored when history is written—forgotten because there are more written sources on the upper class, ignored because historians often did not consider them very important, unimportant or often even dangerous, as when the American Alexander Hamilton referred to the people as a “great beast”7 … and he did not mean it in a favorable way.

If the common people are ignored in general, it is fair to say that sexist bias causes women to be dismissed or trivialized in particular. This is not because there is any body of evidence to support the thesis that women are unimportant,8 but rather because it suits the ruling-class males who dominate the status quo. Sure, there have been discussions of Queen Elizabeth I or Margaret Thatcher, but these exceptions merely serve to prove the rule. If one looks at it dispassionately, it seems rather silly to think that half of the world’s population is not a worthy subject for the historian. In common with the class bias, this anti-woman prejudice has a long, and not very honorable, history. As Sheila Rowbotham demonstrated almost half a century ago, women’s oppression, and thus their exclusion from history, is part of the same ideology that holds that only the ruling class of any time or territory is important.9 It might be argued that this is no longer true and that feminism is now part of the mainstream in our best of all possible worlds in the West.10 The reality remains that, for all the growth of women’s studies programs and the like, “even within the field of woman’s history, feminism has an insecure and eroding foothold.”11

The unholy trinity12 of class and sexist prejudice is completed with racism or ethnic prejudice. Historians will talk about the conquest of the Western Hemisphere with only passing mention of the humans who lived there before conquest, while African slavery, when discussed in any detail, becomes merely a tragedy … not part of a larger problem that, for example, saw John Locke, often praised as an Anglo-Saxon philosopher of liberty,

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xii

investing heavily as a charter member of a British slave trading company.13 In his novel, The Great Gatsby, F. Scott Fitzgerald gives a fictional example of this racial view of history. He has a rich male argue, “It’s up to us, who are the dominant race, to watch out or these other races will control things … [as Nordics] we’ve produced all the things that go to make civilisation— oh, science and art, and all that.”14 Few would publicly be quite so crude about it these days but the attitude continues. Take, for example, Niall Ferguson’s Civilization: The West and Rest15 that argues it is no accident that the Westerners are ahead of the “Resterners,” but warns this may not last. In a glowing review, one US newspaper summed up the message of Ferguson’s book as “they’re gaining on us.”16 So, instead of world history being moved by class struggle17or gender conflict,18 we are told that humans are divided into distinct and warring subgroups based on the arbitrary and artificial category of race. We do well to remember race is a social concept, not a scientific one.19

There is an even trickier problem living historians must avoid since they, by definition, live in the present. Even with the best will in the world, as if such a thing could be, historians often think of the past in terms of the present. This bias of present-mindedness means at worst we see people who lived before us as exactly like us albeit having the habit of wearing funny clothes. At best, it subtlety warps the way we look at the past. An extreme, if rather obvious, example is the cartoon series/films “The Flintstones.” In this great creation of US culture in the late twentieth century, people from the Stone Age live like we do: they drive cars, have music systems, telephones and so on. If this was an isolated example, it would not matter but the media and Hollywood are infamous for this, and even respected historians often fail to place things in an accurate historical context.20

This brings to mind the obvious but often forgotten fact that historians are people who study people and there is a problem with people. Geologists are also people but they examine rocks. The convenient thing about rocks is that they are rather predictable. Diamonds always cut glass, regardless of whether the geologist had a rough night or is in a bad mood. The point is that people are very much unlike rocks. They are unpredictable, contradic- tory and quite capable not only of lying to others but also to themselves. It is common for people, even historians, to confuse their own petty personal situations with the flow of history. As the British scholar A.J.P. Taylor once noted, all sorts of talk about the decline of civilization really “means that university professors used to have domestic servants and now do their own washing-up.”21 One wonders what similar trauma has led to Professor

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Ferguson’s doom and gloom. It would be fair to note that it is not just university professors who have such tendencies.

People also have belief systems, that is, religions and ideologies. Even those who think they have neither religious nor ideological convictions continue to organize their life around some set of guiding ideas. None of this is wrong, particularly since some ideas are more valid than others.22 Still, what beliefs one holds will tend to influence one ’s view of the historical past. Whereas a Marxist like George Rudé23 would find evidence of reason in the behavior of crowds, a reactionary Catholic like Roland Mousnier24 would suspect the influence of original sin within peasant revolts.25 Harvard historian Niall Ferguson apparently thinks belated protests notwithstand- ing, gays and people who are childless don’t care about the future and somehow contribute to the decline of civilization.26 Since it is impossible to completely escape having ideas, it may well be best to acknowledge them so what impact they may have is more transparent.27

One area where the reader often fails to realize the need for a skeptical rationalism is the problem of translation. Most of the evidence for history, outside your own nation-state, may well be in a language you do not understand. Whether reading the Bible or the latest European Union directives, one often finds oneself at the mercy of translators. Being human, translators sometimes make mistakes. Or they may tend to read their own views into what they are rendering from one language to another. More than we imagine, they may be under pressure to come up with a certain spin or tone. So, it was with the King James Bible, a political project unleashed in 1611 by James Stuart, who was motivated by the increasing circulation of unauthorized English translations from Calvin or Luther’s versions.28 It was a project that it would be fair to say was not completely without bias or political purpose.

One final problem to be mentioned is that historians must be aware of disinformation. Besides honest mistakes or subtle bias, there are sometimes conscious efforts to fabricate history. One of the most notorious is the invention of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion29 by the Russian czar’s secret police in the late nineteenth century. This book claims to be a Jewish blueprint for world conquest. Although repeatedly shown to be a fake, numerous groups, from Hitler and the Nazis to various anti-Semites today, have promoted the Protocols as a true document. Henry Ford reprinted the book by the hundreds of thousands and publicly vouched for its accuracy.30 Sadly, this is not an isolated example, as the rich and powerful and their governments regularly churn out propaganda for their own purposes. During World War I, the British government even had the creator of

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Sherlock Holmes, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in their stable of tame authors producing books for the war effort … with little regard for truth or accuracy.31

So with all these pitfalls awaiting the historian, what is to be done? Above all else, be careful. As they used to say to starting journalists, “if your mother says she loves you, check it out.” Try to verify evidence and lines of argument from multiple sources. Also, ask yourself does this make any sense in this historical context? Figure out who gains from this version of history. Determine who pays for this type of history. (For example, would a biography of Stalin printed in the USSR in the 1940s likely be unbiased?) Remember the words of Christopher Hill, “Historians, like Humpty Dumpty, can make words mean anything they like.”32 Above all, we should think for ourselves.

1

chapter one

“The King’s in His Castle … All’s Right with the World”:

The Collapse of the Middle Ages

For about a thousand years after the collapse of the Roman Empire1 (the artificial date usually given is ad 476), Western Europe became decentralized and chaotic, struggling to reclaim some organizational structure in a more localized manner under what we may call the feudal system.2 This period is commonly referred to as the Middle Ages. Unlike the Roman governments before, this was a time when Europe had little centralized political authority. Laws, customs, even interpretations of Christianity might vary from place to place. Everywhere, the feudal period was a confusing socioeconomic soup made up from three main ingredients: Roman traditions, Christian beliefs and the customs of the Germanic tribal immigrants (barbarian invaders, if you must) who had settled in Western Europe.

The relative weight of each ingredient differed widely (and often wildly) from place to place. Still, there were some markedly regional tendencies. The Roman traditions were strongest in Italy, while those parts of Europe only lightly touched by the Romans were more prey to non-Roman, Germanic traditions. In places that had never been part of the Roman world, like Scandinavia, both Roman traditions and the veneer of Christianity could be spread rather thin. The Roman Catholic Church was formally accepted throughout Western Europe but, in practice, the clergy’s actual influence depended on the local strength of bishops and how much attention the region received from the Papal establishment in Rome.

Unlike the Roman Empire with its centralized government, feudal Europe was a decentralized world where local rulers were lords, in fact as well as in name. Particularly in the early Middle Ages, the will of the local barons was primary and the power of kings nominal outside their immediate holdings. It was a society crudely divided into three estates: those who fought (the warrior nobility), those who prayed (the churchmen),3 and those who worked (the vast majority of the population—mainly serfs who were tied

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2

to the land and a minority of free peasants.) This was a world quite different from the days of the Roman Empire. There were few cities and most were small, weak places in the early centuries. Once-mighty Rome, which during the third century boasted a population of over a million, fell during the Dark Ages. Its permanent population dwindled to around 50,000, and this persisted until around the eleventh century. At the same time, Paris was little more than a collection of shacks by the side of the River Seine.

Science, medicine and literacy were markedly less common, at least during the so-called “Dark Ages,” or about the first five hundred years of the feudal period, than during Roman rule. While concrete had been an accepted building material in the Roman Empire, the formula was lost and not rediscovered until the Renaissance. Book production during the length of the fifteenth century had reached 4,999,161 for Western Europe, while in the entire seventh century the area produced only 10,639 volumes with none recorded for Central Europe, Bohemia, Germany, Austria—almost half were from Italy.4 Of course, things were not necessarily “dark” for the common people of the time. Most continued to be born, live, love, farm and die more or less as their ancestors had. If their life was very hard, so had it been for their ancestors. Most historians no longer like to use the term “Dark Ages” with its judgmental connotations. This early period of feudalism was given this label because it suffered, in scholar’s minds at least, in comparison to the glories of Rome. Moreover, historians who are so wedded to written sources find it frustrating that at least until the ninth century ad there was little written documentation to work with. As one prominent French historian has proclaimed in frustration, “We are victims of our sources!”5 He went on to argue that if “a century is mute, as was the case from the fifth century to the eighth century and also of the tenth century, it has a bad reputation and we call it ‘black’—the Dark Ages, as the English say.”6