Half a century ago, a young social psychologiS[ named Leon Fes tinget and twO associates infiluared a group of people who believed the world would end on December 21.1 They wanted to know what would happen to the group when (they hoped!) the propheey failed. The group's leader, whom the researchers called Marian Keech, prom ised that the Faithful would be picked up by a Hying saucer and ele vated to safety at midnight on December 20. Many of her followers quit their jobs, gave away their homes, and dispersed their savings, waiting for the end. Who needs money in outer space? Others waited in fear or resignation in their homes. (Mrs. Keech's own husband, a nonbeliever, went [Q bed early and slept soundly through the night as his wife and her followers prayed in the living room.) Festinger made his own prediction: The believers who had not made a strong com mitment [Q the prophecy-who awaited the end of the world by memselves at home, hoping they weren't going to die at midnight would quiedy lose their faith in Mrs. Keech. But those who had given away their possessions and were waiting with the others for the space ship would increase their belief in her mystical abilities. In Fact, they would now do everything they could to get others to join them.
At midnight, with no sign of a spaceship in the yard, the group felt a little nervous. By 2 A.M., they were getting seriously worried.
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bur nOl by me) 13
Ar 4:45 A.M., Mrs. Keech had a new vision: The world had been spared, she said, because of the impressive faith of her lircie band.
"And mighty is the word of God," she told her followers, "and by his word have ye been saved-for from the mouth of death have ye been delivered and at no time has there been such a force loosed upon [he Earth. Not since the beginning of rime upon this Earth has there been such a force of Good and light as now floods this room."
The group's mood shifted from despair to exhilararion. Many of (he group's members, who had nor felt the need to proselytize before December 21, began calling rhe press to report the miracle, and soon they were ou( on the streets. buttonholing passersby, trying to convert them. Mrs. Keech's prediction had failed, but nor Leon Fesringer's .
• • •
The engine rhar drives self-jusrificarion. the energy rhat produces the need {Q justify our actions and decisions-especially me wrong ones-is an unpleasant feeling thar Festinger called "cognitive disso nance." Cognitive dissonance is a stare of tension that occurs when ever a person holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) [har are psychologically inconsistent, such as "Smoking is a dumb thing to do because it could kil1 me" and "I smoke two packs a day." Dissonance produces mental discomfort, ranging from minor pangs {o deep anguish; people don't rest easy until they find a way to re
duce it. In this example. the moS( direct way for a smoker to reduce dissonance is by quitting. But if she has cried to quit and failed, now she must reduce dissonance by convincing herself that smoking isn't really so harmful. or that smoking is worth the risk because it helps her relax or prevents her from gaining weight (and after all, obesity is a health risk, too), and so on. Most smokers manage to reduce dissonance in many such ingenious. if self-deluding, ways.
Dissonance is disquieting because to hold twO ideas that con tradict each other is to flirt wirh absurdity and, as Albert Camus observed. we humans are creatures who spend our lives crying to
CAROL TAVRIS and ELLIOT ARONSON
convince ourselves that our existence is nO{ absurd. At the hean of it, Festinger's theory is about how people strive to make sense our of
contradictory ideas and lead lives that are, at least in their own
minds, consistent and meaningful. The theory inspired more man 3,000 experiments that, taken together. have transformed psycholo gists' understanding of how the human mind works. Cognitive dis sonance has even escaped academia and entered popular culcure. The term is everywhere. The twO of us have heard it in TV newscasts, po litical columns, magazine articles, bumper srickers, even on a soap opera. AJex Trebek used it on Jeopardy, Jon Stewart on The Daily Show, and President Bartlet on The west Wlng. Almough the expres sion has been thrown around a lot, few people fully understand its meaning or appreciate its enormous motivational power.
In 1956, one of us (Elliot) arrived at Stanford University as a graduate student in psychology. Festinger had arrived that same year as a young professor, and they immediately began working together,
designing experiments to test and expand dissonance theory.3 T heir
thinking challenged many notions that were gospel in psychology and among the general public. such as the behaviorist's view that people do things primarily for the rewards they bring, the econo mist's view that human beings generally make rational decisions. and me psychoanalyst's view that acting aggressively gets rid of ag
gressive impulses. Consider how dissonance theory challenged behaviorism. At the
time, most scientific psychologists were convinced that people's ac tions are governed by reward and punishment. It is cerrainiy true that if you feed a rat at the end of a maze, he will learn the maze faster than if you don't feed him; if you give your dog a biscuit when she gives you her paw. she will learn that nick faster than if you sit around hoping she wiU do it on her own. Conversely, if you punish
your pup when you carch her peeing on the carpet, she will soon stop doing it. Behaviorists funher argued that anything that was
merely associared with reward would become more attractive-your
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but 1'101 by me) 15
puppy will like you because you give her biscuits-and anything as sociated with pain would become noxious and undesirable.
Behavioral laws do apply to human beings. too, of course; no one
would stay in a boring job wimout pay, and if you give your toddler a cookie to stop him from having a rantrum, you have taught him ro have another tantrum when he wants a cookie. Bm, for better or worse, the human mind is more complex than the brain of a rat or a puppy. A dog may appear conttite for having been caught peeing on the carpet, but she will not try to think up justifications for her mis behavior. Humans think; and because we think, dissonance theory demonstrated that our behavior transcends the effects of rewards and punishments and often contradicts memo
For example, Elliot predicted that if people go through a great deal of pain, discomfort, effort, or embarrassment to get something, they will be happier with that "something" than if it came to them easily. For behaviorists, (his was a preposterous prediction. Why would people like anything associated with pain? But for Elliot, the
answer was obvious: self-justification. The cognition that I am a sen sible, competent person is dissonant with the cognition that I went through a painful procedure [0 achieve something-say, joining a group that curned om to be boring and worthless. Therefore. I would distort my perceptions of the group in a positive direction, rrying to find good things about them and ignoring the downside.
It might seem that the easiest way to test this hypothesis would be to rate a number of college fraternities on the basis of how severe their initiations are, and then interview members and ask them how much they like their fraternity. If the members of severe-initiation fraterni ties like their frat brmhers more than do members of mild-initiation
fraternities, does this prove that severity produces the liking? It does not. It may be just (he reverse. If the members of a fraternity regard themselves as being a highly desirable, elite group, they may require
a severe initiation to prevent the riffraff from joining. Only those who are highly attracted to the severe-initiation group to begin with
-
16 CAROL TAVRIS II"d ELLIOT ARONSON
would be willing to go through the iniriation to get into it. Those who are not excited by a particular fraternity but just want to be in one, any one, will choose fraternities that require mild initiacions.
That is why if is essential to conduct a controlled experiment. The beauty of an experiment is the random assignment of people to conditions. Regardless of a person's degree of inreresr ar the outset in joining the group. each participant would be randomly assigned (0 either the severe-initiation or the mild·iniriarion condition. If people who go through a cough rime [Q get ima a group later find that group to he more atcracrive than those who get in with no effort, then we
know that it was the effof[ that caused it, not differences in initial levels of interest.
And so Elliot and his colleague Judson Mills conducted just such an experiment.· Stanford students were invited to join a group that would be discussing the psychology of sex, bur before they could qualify for admission. they would first have to pass an entrance re
quirement. Some of me students were randomly assigned to a severely
embarrassing initiation procedure: They had to recite. out loud to the experimenter. lurid, sexually explicit passages from Lady Chatlerlty} Lover and other racy novels. (For conventional 19505 students. this was a painfully embarrassing thing to do.) Others were randomly as signed to a mildly embarrassing initiation procedure: reading aloud sexual words from the dictionary.
After the initiation. each of the students listened to an identical rape
recording of a discussion allegedly being held by the group of people they had just joined. Actually. the audiotape was prepared in advance so that the discussion was as boring and worthless as it could be. The ruscussants talked haltingly, with long pauses, about the secondary sex characteristics of birds-changes in plumage during courtship, that sort of thing. The taped discussants hemmed and hawed. frequently interrupted one another, and left sentences unfinished.
Finally, the students rated the discussion on a number of dimen sions. Those who had undergone only a mild initiation saw the dis-
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bul AO( by me) 17
cussion for what it was, worthless and dull, and they correctly rated me group members as being unappealing and boring. One guy on the tape, stammering and mutrering, admitted that he hadn't done the required reading on the courtship practices of some rare bird, and the mild iniciation listeners were annoyed by him. What an irresponsible idiot! He rudn'[ even do the basic reading! He let the group down! Who'd wane to be in a group wim him? But those who had gone through a severe initiation rated the discussion as imeresting and exciting and me group members as attractive and sharp. They forgave the irrespon sible idiot. His candor was refreshing! Who wouldn't want to be in a group with such an honest guy? It was hard to believe that they were listening to the same rape recording. Such is the power of dissonance.
This experimenc has been replicated several times by other scien tists who have used a variety of initiation techniques, from electric shock to excessive physical exertion.' The results are always me same: Severe initiations increase a member's liking for the group. These findings do not mean that people enjoy painful experiences, such as filling Out their income-tax forms, or that people enjoy things be cause they are associated with pain. Whar they do show is mat if a person voluntarily goes through a difficult or a painful experience in order to attain some goal or object, that goal or object becomes more amacrive. If, on your way to join a discussion group, a flowerpot fell from the open window of an apartment building and hit you on the head, you would not like thar discussion group any better. But if you volunteered to get hit on the head by a flowerpot to become a mem ber of the group, you would definitely like the group more.
Believing Is Seeing
I will look at any additional evidence to confirm the opinion to which I have already come.
-Lord Molson, British politidan (1903-199\)
18 CAROL TAVRIS !Hld elliOT ARONSON
Dissonance clteory also exploded the self-fl.atrering idea that we humans, being Homo sapims, process information logically. On the contrary: If the new information is consonant with our beliefs, we think it is well founded and useful: "Just what I always said!" But if the new information is dissonant, then we consider it biased or fool ish: "What a dumb argumend" So powerful is the need for conso nance that when people are forced [0 look at disconfirming evidence, they will find a way to criticize. distort. or dismiss it so chat they can maintain or even strengthen their existing belief. This men[3] con tortion is called the "confirmation bias. "6 Lenny Bruce, the legendary American humorist and social commentator, described it vividly as he watched the famous 1960 confrontation between Richard Nixon and John Kennedy, in the nation's very first televised presidential debate:
I would be with a bunch of Kennedy fans watching the debate and
their comment would be. "He's really slaughtering Nixon." Then
we would all go to another apartment, and the Nixon fans would say, "How do you like the shellacking he gave Kennedy?" And then
I reaJized that each group loved their candidate so that a guy would
have to be this blatant-he would have (0 look into the camera and
say: "I am a thief, a crook, do you hear me, I am the worst choice you could ever make for the Presidency!" And even men his follow
ing would say. "Now there's an honest man for you. It takes a big guy to admit that. There's the kind of guy we need for President."1
In 2003, after it had become abundantly clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Americans who had suppOrted the war and President Bush's reason for launching it were thrown into dissonance: We believed the president, and we (and he) were wrong. How to resolve this? For Democrats who had thought Saddam Hus sein had WMDs, the resolution was relatively easy: The Republicans were wrong again; the president lied. or at least was too eager to lis-
M I STAKES WERE M A D E (but not by me) 19
ten [Q faulty information; how foolish of me to believe him. For Re publicans, however, the dissonance was sharper. More than haJf of them resolved it by refusing to accept the evidence, telling a Knowlp
edge Networks poll that they believed the weapons had been found. The survey's director said, "For some Americans, their desire to sup port the war may be leading them to screen out information that weapons of mass destruction have not been found. Given the inren sive news coverage and high levels of public attention to the (opic, this level of misinformation suggests that some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." You ber.'
Neuroscienrists have recently shown that these biases in thinking are built into the very way the brain processes information-all brains, regardless of their owners' political affiliation. For example, in a study of people who were being monitored by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) while they were trying to process dissonant or con sonant information about George Bush or John Kerry, Drew Westen and his colleagues found that the reasoning areas of the brain virtu
ally shut down when participanrs were confronred with dissonant in formation, and the emotion circuits of the brain lit up happily when consonance was restored.' These mechanisms provide a neurological basis for the observation that once our minds are made up, it is hard to change them.
Indeed, even reading information that goes against your point of view can make you aJl the more convinced you are right. In one ex periment, researchers selected people who either favored or opposed capital punishment and asked them [Q read twO scholarly, well documented articles on the emotionaJly charged issue of whether the death penaJty deters violent crimes. One article concluded that it did; {he other that it didn't. If the readers were processing informa tion rationally, they would ac least realize thac me issue is more com plex than they had previously believed and would therefore move a bit closer to each other in their beliefs about capical punishment as a deterrence. But dissonance theory predicts that the readers would
20 CAROL TAVRIS (lI!d ELLIOT ARONSON
find a way ro distort the twO anicles. They would find reasons to clasp the confirming article fO their bosoms, hailing it as a higWy competent piece of work. And they would be supercritical of the dis confirming mide. finding minor Raws and magnifying them into major reasons why they need. not be influenced by it. This is precisely what happened. Not only did each side discredit me other's argu ments; each side became even more committed to its own.1Q
The confirmation bias even sees to it that no evidence-the ab sence of evidence-is evidence for what we believe. When the FBI and orner investigators Failed to find any evidence whatsoever for the belief that the nation had been infiirrared by Satanic cults that were ritually slaughtering babies. believers in these cults were unfazed. The absence of evidence. they said, was confirmation of how clever and evil the cult leaders were: They were eating those babies, bones and all. Ir's not JUSt fringe cultists and proponents of pop psychology who fall prey to this reasoning. When Franklin D. Roosevelt made the terrible decision to uproot thousands of Japanese Americans and put them in incarceration camps for the duration of World War II, he did so emirely on the basis of rumors that Japanese Americans were planning to sabotage the war effort. There was no proof then or later to suppOrt this rumor. Indeed. the Army's West Coast com mander, General John DeWitt, admitted that they had no evidence of sabotage or treason against a single Japanese-American citizen. "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place," he said, "is a dis turbing and confirming indication mat such action wi/l be taken."u
Ingrid's Choice. N ick's Mercedes, and El l iot's Canoe
Dissonance theory came to explain far more than the reasonable no tion that people are unreasonable at processing information. It also showed why they cominue to be biased after they have made impor-
MISTAKES WERE M A D E (but n.Ot by me) 21
tant decisions.12 Social psychologist Dan Gilbert, in his illuminating book Stumbling on Happintss, asks us to consider what would have happened at the end of Casablanca if Ingrid Bergman did not patri otically rejoin her Nazi-fighting husband but instead remained with
Humphrey Bogart in Morocco. L.I Would she, as Bogan tells her in a hean-wrenching speech, have regretted it-"maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but soon, and for the rest of your life"? Or did she forever regret leaving Bogart? Gilber[ marshals a wealth of data to show chat the answer to both questions is no, that either decision
would have made her happy in the long run. Bogart was eloquent bur wrong, and dissonance theory telis us why: lngrid would have found reasons to justify eicher choice, along with reasons to be glad she did not make the orher.
Once we make a decision, we have all kinds of tools at our dis� posal to bolster it. When our frugal, unflashy friend Nick traded in his eight�year�old Honda Civic on a sudden impulse and bought a new. fully loaded Mercedes. he began behaving oddly (for Nick). He
started criticizing his friends' cars, saying things like "Isn't it about time you traded in that wreck? Don't you think you deserve the plea� sure of driving a well�engineered machine?" and "You know, it's
really unsafe to drive little cars. If you got in an accident, you could be killed. Isn't your life worth an extra few thousand dollars? You have no idea how much peace of mind it brings me to know that my family is safe because I'm driving a solid automobile."
It's possible chat Nick simply got bitten by the safety bug and decided, coolly and rationally, char it would be wonderful if every one drove a great car like the Mercedes. But we don't think so. His behavior. both in spending all that money on a luxury car and in nagging his friends to do the same, was so uncharacteristic that we suspected that he was reducing me dissonance he must have felt over impulsively spending a big chunk of his life's savings on what he would once have referred ro as "just a car." Besides, he was doing this JUSt when his kids were about to go ro college, an event mat would
22 CAROL TAVRIS lind ELLIOT ARONSON
pur a strain on his hank accounr. So Nick began marshalling argu� menrs to justify his decision: "The Mercedes is a wonderful ma chine; I've worked hard all my life and I deserve it; besides. it's so safe." And if he could persuade his cheapskate friends to buy one toO, he would feel doubly justified. Like Mrs. Keech's converts, he began to proselytize.
Nick's need to reduce dissonance (like Ingrid's) was increased by me irrevocability of his decision; he could not unmake that decision without losing a lot of money. Some scientific evidence for che power of irrevocability comes from a clever study of the mental maneuvec ings of gamblers at a racetrack. The racetrack is an ideal place to study irrevocability because once you've placed your bet, you can't go back and tell the nice man behind the window you've changed your mind. In this srudy, the researchers simply imercepted people who were standing in line to place two-dollar bets and other people who had just left the window. The investigacors asked everyone how cer tain they were that their horses would win. The bettors who had placed their betS were far more certain about their choice than were the folks waiting in line.14 But, of course, nothing had changed ex cept the finality of placing the bet. People become more certain they are right about something they just did if they can't undo it.
You can see one immediate benefit of understanding how disso* oance works: Don't listen co Nick. The more costly a decision, in terms of time, money, effort, or inconvenience, and the more irrev* ocable its consequences, the greater the dissonance and the greater the need co reduce it by overemphasiz.ing the good things about the choice made. Therefore, when you are about to make a big purchase or an importam decision-which car or computer to buy. whether to undergo plastic surgery, or whether to sign up for a cosdy self-help program-don't ask someone who has just done it. That person will be highly motivated to convince you that it is the right thing to do. Ask people who have spem twelve years and $50,000 00 a particu* lar therapy if it helped, and most will say, "Dr. Weltschmerz. is won*
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but nOt by me) 23
derful! J would nroer have found true love [got a new job 1 [lost weight] ifit hadn't been for him." After all mat time and money, they aren't likely to say, "Yeah, J saw Dr. Weltschmen for twelve years, and boy, was it ever a waste." If you want advice on what product to buy, ask someone who is still garhering information and is srill open minded. And if you want to know whether a program will help you, don't rely on testimonials: Get the data from controlled experiments.
Self-justification is complicated enough when jt follows our con scious choices; at least we know we can expeCt it. But it also occurs
in the aftermath of things we do for unconscious reasons, when we haven't a due about why we hold some belief or cling to some cus tom but are (00 proud to admit it. For example, in the introduction we described the custom of the Dinka and Nuer tribes of the Sudan. who exuact several of the permanent front teeth of their children a painful procedure, done with a fish hook. Anthropologists suggest that this tradition originated during an epidemic of lockjaw; missing front teeth would enable sufferers to get some nourishment. But if
that were the reason, why in the world would the villagers continue
this custom once the danger had passed? A practice that makes no sense at all to outsiders makes perfect
sense when seen through the lens of dissonance theory. During the epidemic, the villagers would have begun extracting the front teeth of all meir children, so that if any later contracted tetanus, the adults would be able to feed them. But this is a painful thing to do to chil dren, especially since only some would become affiicted. To further justify their actions, to themselves and their children, the villagers would need to bolster the decision by adding benefits to the proce dure after the fact. For example, they might convince themselves that pulling teeth has aesthetic value-say, that sunken-chin look is really quite attractive-and they might even turn the surgical ordeal into a rite of passage into adulthood. And. indeed, that is just what hap pened. "The [Qorhless look is beautiful," the villagers say. "People who have all their teeth are ugly: They look like cannibals who
24 CAROL TAVRIS lind ELLIOT ARONSON
would eat a person. A full set of teeth makes a man look like a don key." The toothless look has other aesthetic advantages: "We like the hissing sound it creates when we speak." And adults reassure fright
ened children by saying, "This ritual is a sign of maturity."'s The original medical justification for the practice is long gone. The psy chological self-justification remains.
People wane (0 believe that, as smart and rational individuals. they know why they made the choices they did, so they are not al
ways happy when you tell chern the actual reason for their actions. ElI.ior learned this firsthand after that initiation experiment. "After
each participam had finished, It he recalls, "I explained [he scudy in detail and went over the theory carefully. Although everyone who went through the severe initiation said that they found the hypoth esis intriguing and that they could see how mOSt people would be af fected in the way I predicted, they all took pains to assure me that their preference for the group had nothing to do with the severity of
the inidation. They each claimed that they liked the group because
mat's the way they really felt. Yet almost all of them liked the group more than any of the people in the mild-initiation condition did."
No one is immune to the need to reduce dissonance, even those who know the theory inside out. Elliot cells this story: "When I was a young professor at the University of Minnesota, my wife and I tired of renting apartments; so, in December, we set out £0 buy our
first home. We could find only twO reasonable houses in our price range. One was older, charming, and within walking distance from
the campus. I liked it a lot, primarily because it meant that I could have my students over for research meetings, serve beer, and play the role of the hip professor. But that house was in an industrial area, without a lor of space for our children to play. The other choice was a tract house, newer but £Otally without distinction. It was in the
suburbs, a thiny-minute drive from campus but only a mile from a lake. After goi ng back and forth on mat decision for a few weeks, we
decided on the house in the suburbs.
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by me) 25
"Shortly after moving in, I noeiced an ad in [he newspaper for a
used canoe and immediareiy boughr ir as a surprise for my wife and
kids. When I drove home on a freezing, bleak January day with the canoe lashed to rhe roof of my car, my wife took one look and burst into laughter. 'What's so funny?' I asked. She said, 'Ask Leon Fes tinger!' Of course! I had felr so much dissonance abour buying the house in me suburbs mat I needed to do something righr away to justify mat purchase. I somehow managed to forget that it was the middJe of winter and mat, in Minneapolis, i[ would be months be fore the frozen lake would thaw am enough for rhe canoe to be us able. But, in a sense, without my quire realizing it, I used that canoe anyway. All wimer, even as it sar in the garage, its presence made me feel bener abom our decision."
Spirals of Violence -and Vi rUie
Feeling Stressed? One Internet source teaches you how to make your own little Damn It Doll, which "can be rhrown. jabbed, sromped and even strangled rill all the frusrration leaves you." A little poem
goes wim it:
When you want to kick the desk or rhrow the phone and shout
Here's a little damnir doll you cannot do witham. JUSt grasp it firmly by the legs. and find a place to slam it. And as you whack its stuffing out, yell, "damnit, damnir,
damnit!"
The Damn Ir Doll reflects one of rhe most entrenched convictions
in our culture. fostered by the psychoanalytic belief in the benefirs of catharsis: rhat expressing anger or behaving aggressively gets rid of anger. Throw that doll, hit a punching bag, shout at your spouse;
26 CAROL TAVRIS Qnd EllIOT ARONSON
you'll feel bettcr afterward. Actually, decades of experimental re search have found exacdy the opposite: that when people vent their feelings aggressively they often fed worse, pump up their blood pres sure, and make themselves even angrier.16
Venting is especially likely to backfire if a person commies an aggressive act against anomer person directly, which is exactly what cognitive dissonance theory would predict. When you do anything that harms someone else-get them in trouble. verbaHy abuse them, or punch them our-a powerful new factor comes into play: the need to justify what you did. Take a boy who goes aJong with a group of his fellow seventh graders who are taunting and bullying a weaker kid who did them no harm. The hoy likes being part of the gang but his heart really isn't in me bullying. Later, he feels some dissonance about what he did. "How can a decent kid like me," he wonders, "have done such a cruel thing to a nice, in nocent little kid like him?" To reduce dissonance, he will try to convince himself that the victim is neither nice nor innocem: "He is such a nerd and cry�
baby. Besides, he would have done the same to me if he had the chance.» Once the boy starts down the path of blaming the victim, he becomes more likely (0 beat up on the victim with even greater ferocity (he next chance he gets. Justifying his first hurrful act sets the stage for more aggression. That's why the catharsis hypothesis is wrong.
The first experiment that demonstrated this actually came as a complete surprise to the investigawr. Michael Kahn, then a graduate student in clinical psychology at Harvard, designed an ingenious experiment that he was sure would demonstrate the benefits of catharsis. Posing as a medical technician, Kahn took polygraph and blood pressure measurements from college students, one at a time, allegedly as parr of a medical experiment. As he was taking these measurements, Kahn feigned annoyance and made some insulting remarks to the students (having to do with their mothers). The Stu� dents got angry; their blood pressure soared. In the experimental
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by me) 27
condition, the students were allowed to vent their anger by inform� ing Kahn's supervisor of his insules; thus, they believed they were get ting him into big trouble. In the control condition, ehe students did
nOt get a chance [0 express their anger. Kahn, a good Freudian, was astonished by the results: Catharsis
was a [Otal Aop. The people who were allowed to express their anger about Kahn fele far greater animosity toward him than did those who were not given that opportunity. In addition, expressing their anger increased their already heightened blood pressure; ehe high blood pressure of those who were not allowed to express their anger soon returned to normal.17 Seeking an explanation for this unex
pecred pacrern, Kahn discovered dissonance theory, which was JUSt gening attention at the time, and realized it could beautifully ac count for his results, Because the students thought they had gorren
him into serious trouble, they had to justify their action by convinc ing themselves that he deserved it, thus increasing their anger against him-and their blood pressure.
Children learn to justify their aggressive actions early: They hit a younger sibling, who starts [0 cry, and immediately claim, "But he started it! He deserved it!" Most parents find these childish self justifications to be of no great consequence, and usually they aren't. But ie is sobering (0 realize that the same mechanism underlies the behavior of gangs who bully weaker children, employers who mis treat workers, lovers who abuse each other, police officers who con tinue beating a suspeCt who has surrendered, tyrancs who imprison and torture ethnic minorities, and soldiers who commit atrocities against civilians. In all these cases, a vicious circle is created: Aggres sion begets self-justification, which begets more aggression. Fyodor Doseoevsky understood perfectly how this process works. In The Brothers Karamazov, he has Fyodor Paviovitch, the brothers' scoundrel of a father, recall "how he had once in the past been asked, 'Why do you hate so and so, so much?' And he had answered them, with his shameless impudence, 'I'll tell you. He has done me no
28 CAIWL TAVRIS and ElLIOT ARONSON
harm. But I played him a dirty trick, and ever since I have hated him.'"
Fortunately, dissonance theory also shows us how a person's gen
erous actions can create a spiral of benevolence and compassion, a "virruous cirde." When people do a good deed, panicularly when
they do it on a whim or by chance. they will come to see the benefi ciary of their generosity in a warmer light. Their cognition mar they wem out of cheir way to do a favor for this person is dissonant with any negative feelings they might have had about him. In effect, after doing the favor, they ask themselves: "Why would I do something nice for a jerk? Therefore. he's not as big a jerk as r thought he was
as a manee of fact. he is a pretty nice guy who deserves a break." Several experiments have supported this prediction. In one, col
lege scudents participated in a contest where they won a substantial
sum of money. Afterward, the experimenter approached one third of them and explained that he was using his own funds for the experi ment and was running shan, which meant he might be forced to
close down the experiment prematurely. He asked, "As a special favor to me, would you mind returning the money you won?" (They all agreed.) A second group was also asked to return the money, but this rime it was the departmental secretary who made the request, ex plaining that the psychology department's research fund was run
ning low. (They still all agreed.) The remaining participants were not asked to return their winnings at all. Finally, everyone filled out a
questionnaire thar included an opportunity to rate the experimenter. Participants who had been cajoled into doing a special favor for him liked him the best; they convinced themselves he was a particularly
nne, deserving fellow. The others thought he was preay nice but not anywhere near as wonderful as the people who had done him a per sonal favor believed. II
Although scientific research on the virtuous circle is new, the general idea may have been discovered in the eighteenth century by
Benjamin Franklin, a serious student of human nature as well as
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bllt not by me) 29
science and politics. While serving in the Pennsylvania legislamre,
Franklin was disturbed by the opposition and animosity of a fellow legislator. So he set out to win him over. He didn't do it, he wrote,
by "paying any servile respect to him"-that is, by doing the other
man a favor-but by inducing his target to do a favor for him loaning him a rare book from his library:
He sem it immediately and I relUrned it in about a week with an·
other nOtc, expressing strongly my sense of the favor. When we next
met in the House, he spoke to me (which he had never done be·
fore), and with great civility; and he ever after manifested a readi·
ness to serve me on all occasions, SO that we became great friends, and our friendship continued to his death. This is another instance
of the truth of an old maxim I had learned, which says, "He that has once done you a kindness will be more ready to do you another
(han he whom you yoursdfhave obliged.""
o o o
Dissonance is bothersome under any circumstance, but it is most
painful to people when an important element of their self-concept is threatened-typicaJly when they do something that is inconsistent with their view of themselves,lO If an athlete or celebrity you admire
is accused of rape, child molestation, or murder. you will feel a pang of dissonance. The more you identify with this person, the greater
the dissonance. because more of yourself would be involved. Bur you
would feel a much more devastating rush of dissonance if you re·
garded yourself as a person of high integrity and you did something
criminaL After all, you can always change your allegiance to a celebrity
and find another hero. But if you violated your own values, you
would feel much greater dissonance because. at the end of the day,
you have to go on living with yourself.
Because most people have a reasonably positive self·concept. be· lieving themselves to be competent, moral, and smart, their efforts
30 CAROL TAVRIS lind ELLIOT ARONSON
at reducing dissonance will be designed to preserve their positive self_irnages.21 When Mrs. Keech's doomsday predictions failed, for example, imagine the excruciating dissonance her commined follow ers felt: "I am a smart person" clashed with '" just did an incredibly stupid thing: I gave away my house and possessions and quit my job because I believed a crazy woman," To reduce that dissonance, her followers could either have modified their opinion of their intelli gence or justified the "incredibly stupid" thing they did. It's nOt a close COntest; i['s justification by three lengths. Mrs. Keech's true be lievers saved their self-esteem by deciding they hadn't done anything stupid; in fact, they had been really smart to join this group because their faith saved the world from descruction. In fact, if everyone else were smarr, they would join, (00. Where's that busy streer corner?
None of us is off the hook on this one. We might feel amused at them, those foolish people who believe fervently in doomsday pre dictions; bur, as political scientist Philip Tetlock shows in his book Expert Political Judgmmt: How Good Is It? How Can W( Know? even professional "experts" who are in the business of economic and po litical forecasting are usually no more accurate than us umrained folks-or than Mrs. Keech, for that matter.12 Hundreds of studies have shown that predictions based on an experr's "personal experi ence" or "years of training" are rarely better than chance. in comraS[ to predictions based on actuarial data. But when experrs are wrong, the cemerpiece of their professional idemiry is threatened. There fore, as dissonance theory would predict. rhe more self-confident and famous they are, the less likely they will be to admit mistakes. And that is just what Tetlock found. Experrs reduce the dissonance caused by their failed forecascs by coming up with explanations of why they would have been right "if only"-if only that improbable calamity had not imervened; if only the timing of events had been different; if only blah blah blah.
Dissonance reduction operates like a thermostat, keeping our self-esteem bubbling along on high. That is why we are usually obliv-
MIST .... KES WERE M .... D E (but not by me) 31
ious to the self�justifications, the little lies [0 ourselves that prevem
us from even acknowledging that we made mistakes or foolish deci� sions. But dissonance theory applies to people with low self�esteem,
too, to people who consider themselves (Q be schnooks. crooks. or
incompetems. They are not surprised when their behavior confirms their negative self�image. When they make a wrongheaded predic� tion or go through a severe initiation (Q get into a dull group. they merely say, "Yup. I screwed up again; that's just like me." A used�car salesman who knows that he is dishonest does not feel dissonance when he conceals the dismal repair record of the car he is trying CO
unload; a woman who believes she is unlovable does not feel disso nance when men reject her; a con man does not experience disso nance when he cheats an old man out of his life's savings.
Our convictions about who we are carry us through che day, and we are constantly imerpreting the things that happen to us through
the filter of those core beliefs. When they are violated. even by a good experience, it causes us discomfort. An appreciation of the
power of self-justificarjon helps us understand, therefore, why people who have low self-esteem, or who simply believe chat they are in
competem in some domain, are not totally overjoyed when they do something well; why, on the contrary, they often feel like frauds. If the woman who believes she is unlovable meets a terrific guy who
starts pursuing her seriously, she will feel momemarily pleased, but that pleasure is likely to be tarnished by a rush of dissonance: "What does he see in me?" Her resolution is unlikely to be "How nice; I must be more appealing than I thought I was." More likely, it will be "As soon as he discovers the real me, he'll dump me." She will pay a high psychological price to have that consonance restored.
Indeed, several experiments find that mOSt people who have low self-esteem or a low estimate of their abilities do feel uncomfortable
with their dissonant successes and dismiss them as accidents or anom� a1ies.:tl This is why they seem so stubborn to friends and family members who try to cheer them up. "Look, you JUSt won the Pulitzer
32 CAROL TAVRIS and ELLIOT ARONSON
Prize for literature! Doesn't that mean you're good?" "Yeah, ie's nice, but just a Auke. I'll never be able to write another word, you'll see." Self-justification, therefore. is nO[ only about protecting high self esteem; it's also about protecting low self-esteem if that is how a per son sees himself.
The Pyramid of Choice
Imagine two young men who are identical in terms of attitudes, abil ities, and psychological heaJrh. They are reasonably honest and have the same middling attitude toward. say, cheating: They think it is not a good thing to do, but there are worse crimes in the world. Now they are both in the midst of taking an exam that will determine whether they will get into graduate school. They each draw a blank on a crucial essay question. Failure looms . . . at which point each
one gets an easy opportunity [Q cheat, by reading another studem's answers. The two young men struggle with the temptation. After a long momem of anguish, one yields and the other resists. Their de cisions are a hair's breadth apart; it could easily have gone {he other way for each of them. Each gains something importam. but at a cOSt: One gives up imegrity for a good grade, the other gives up a good grade to preserve his integrity.
Now me question is: How do they feel about cheating a week
later? Each student has had ample time to justify the course of action he [Ook. The one who yielded to temptation will decide that chear ing is nor so great a crime. He will say to himself: "Hey, everyone cheats. It's no big deal. And I really needed [0 do this for my furure career." But the one who resisted rhe remprarion will decide rhat cheating is far more immoral man he originally rhought: "In fact. people who chear are disgracefuL In faa. people who cheat should be permanendy expelled from school. We have [Q make an example
of them."
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bul nOI by me) 33
By the time the srudems are mrough wim their increasingly in cense levels of self-justification, two mings have happened: One, mey are now very far apart from one another; and twO, they have inter nalized their beliefs and are convinced mat mey have always felt that way.l4 It is as if mey had started off at the tOP of a pyramid, a mil limeter apart; but by the time they have finished justifying their individual actions, they have slid to the bottom and now stand at op posite corners of its base. The one who didn't cheat considers the other to be totally immoral, and che one who cheated thinks the other is hopelessly puritanical. This process illustrates how people who have been sorely tempted, hattled temptation, and almost given in [0 it-hut resisted at the eleventh how-come to dislike, even despise. those who did not succeed in the same effort. It's the people who almost decide to live in glass houses who throw the first stones.
The metaphor of the pyramid applies to most important deci sions involving moral choices or life options. Instead of cheating on an exam, for example. now substitute: deciding to begin a casual af fair (or nor), sample an illegal drug (or not), take steroids [0 improve your athletic ability (or not), stay in a troubled marriage (or not). name names ro the Howe Un-American Activities Committee (or not), lie to prorect your employer and job (or not), have children (or not), pursue a demanding career (or stay home wich me kids). When the person ar the top of the pyramid is uncertain, when there are benefits and costs of bath choices, then he or she will feel a particu lar urgency to jwtify the choice made. But by the time the person is at rhe bottom of me pyramid, ambivalence will have morphed into certainty. and he or she will be miles away from anyone who took a diffetent route.
This process blurs the distinction mar people like to draw be tween "us good guys" and "chose bad guys." Often. standing at the top of the pyramid, we are faced not with a black-and-white, gol no-go decision. but with a gray choice whose consequences are shrouded. The first steps along the path are morally ambiguous. and
34 CAROL TAVRIS lind ELLIOT ARONSON
the right decision is not always clear. We make an early, apparently inconsequencial decision, and then we justify it to reduce the ambi· guity of the choice. This stares a process of entrapment-action, justification, further action-that increases our intensity and com· mitmenr, and may end up taking us far from our original intentions or principles.
It certainly worked that way for Jeb Stuart Magruder, Richard Nixon's special assistant, who was a key player in the plot to burglar· ize the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Water gate complex, concealed the White House's involvement, and lied under oath to protect himself and others responsible. When Ma gruder was first hired, Nixon's adviser Bob Haldeman did not tell him that perjury, cheating. and breaking the law were pan of the job description. If he had, Magruder almost certainly would have re fused. How, then, did he end up as a central player in the Watergate scandal? It is easy, in hindsight, to say "He should have known" or "He should have drawn me line the first time they asked him to do something illegal."
In his autobiography, Magruder describes his first meeting with Bob Haldeman at San Clemente. Haldeman flattered and charmed him. "Here you're working for something more than just to make money for your company," Haldeman told him. "You're working to solve the problems of the country and the world. Jeb, I sat with the President on the night the first astronauts stepped onto the moon . . . I'm pan of hisrory being made." At the end of a day of meetings, Haldeman and Magruder left the compound to go to the president's house. Haldeman was enraged that his golf cart was not right there awaiting him, and he gave his assistant a "brmal chewing out," threatening to fire the guy if he couldn't do his job. Magruder couldn't believe what he was hearing, especially since it was a beau tiful evening and a short walk to their destination. At first Magruder thought Haldeman's tirade was rude and excessive. But before long, wanting the job as much as he did, Magruder was justifying Halde-
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but nol by me) 35
man's behavior: "In JUSt a few hours at San Clemente I had been struck by the sheer perfection of life there . . . Afrer you have been spoiled like that for a while, something as minor as a missing golf cart can seem a major affront. "lS
And so, before dinner and even before having been offered a job, Magruder is hooked. Ie is a tiny first step, but he is on the road to Watergate. Once in the White House, he went along with all of the small ethical compromises that just about all politicians justify in the goal of serving their party. Then, when Magruder and others were working to reelect Nixon, G. Gordon Liddy entered the picture, hired by Attorney General John Mitchell to be Magruder's general counsel. Liddy was a wild card, a James Bond wannabe. His first plan to ensure Nixon's reelection was to spend one million dollars to hire "mugging squads" that would rough up demonstrators; kidnap ac tivists who might disrupt the Republican convention; sabotage the Democratic convention; use "high-class" prostitutes to entice and then blackmail leading Democrats; break into Democratic offices;
and use electronic surveillance and wiretapping on their perceived enemies.
Mitchell disapproved of the more extreme aspects of this plan; besides, he said, it was too expensive. So Liddy returned with a pro posal merely to break into the DNC offices at the Watergate com plex and install wiretaps. This time Mitchell approved, and everyone went along. How did they juStify bteaking the law? "If [Liddy] had come to us at the outset and said, 'I have a plan to burglarize and wiretap Larry O'Brien's office,' we might have rejected the idea out of hand," wrote Magruder. "Instead. he came to us with his elab orate call girllkidnappinglmugging/sabotage/wiretapping scheme, and we began to tone it down. always with a feeling that we should leave Liddy a little something-we felt we needed him. and we were reiucrant to send him away with nothing." Finally, Magruder added, Liddy's plan was approved because of the paranoid climate in the White House: "Decisions that now seem insane seemed at the time
36 CAROL TAVR IS and ELLIOT ARONSON
(0 be rational . . . . We were past the point of halfway measures or gendemanly tacriCS,"!6
When Magruder first entered the White House, he was a decent man. But. one small step at a time. he went along with dishonest ac tions, justifying each one as he did. He was entrapped in pretty much the same way as were the 3,000 people who took part in the famous experiment created by social psychologist Stanley Milgram,l1 In Milgram's original version, cwo-chirds of the parcicipants admin is[ered what they thought were life-threatening levels of electric shock to another person, simply because the experimenter kept say ing, "The experiment requires that you continue.» This experiment is almost always described as a study of obedience [0 authority. In deed it is. But it is more than that: It is also a demonsrration of long rerm resulrs of self-jusrificarion.2&
Imagine thar a distinguished-looking man in a whire lab coar walks up CO you and offers you twenty dollars to participate in a sci entific experiment. He says, "I want you to inflict 500 volrs of in credibly painful shock to anomer person to help us understand the role of punishment in learning." Chances are you would refuse; the money isn'r worth it to harm another person, even for science. Of course, a few people would do it for twenty bucks and some would not do it for twenty thousand, but most would tell the scientist where he could stick his money.
Now suppose the scientist lures you along more gradually. Sup pose he offers you twenty dollars to administer a minuscule amount of shock, say 10 volts, to a fellow in the adjoining room, to see if this zap will improve rhe man's ability to learn. The experimenter even tries the 10 volrs on you, and you can barely feel ie So you agree. It's harmless and the study seems pretty interesting. (Besides, you've al ways wanted to know wherner spanking your kids will get them to shape up.) You go along for the moment, and now the experimenter tdls you that if the learner ge[S the wrong answer, you must move to the next toggle switch, which delivers a shock of 20 volts. Again,
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bur not by me) 37
it's a small and harmless jolt. Because you JUSt gave the learner to,
you see no reason why you shouldn't give him 20. And because you just gave him 20, you say to yourself, 30 isn't much more than 20. so I'll go to 30. He makes another mistake, and the scientist says,
"Please administer the next level-40 volts." Where do you draw the line? When do you decide enough is
enough? Will you keep going [Q 450 volts. or even beyond that, to a
switch marked XXX DANGER? When people are asked in advance how far (hey imagine they would go, almost no one says they would go
to 450. But when they are actually in the situation, two-thirds of
them go all the way to the maximum level they believe is dangerous. They do this by justifying each step as they went along: This small shock doesn't hurt; 20 isn't much worse than 10; if I've given 20, why not 3D? As (hey justified each step, they committed themselves fur ther. By the time people were administering what they believed were
strong shocks, most found it difficult to justify a sudden decision to quit. Participants who resisted early in the study, questioning the
very validity of the procedure, were less likely to become entrapped by it and more likely to walk out.
The Milgram experiment shows us how ordinary people can end up doing immoral and harmful things through a chain reaction of beha\'ior and subsequent self-justification. When we, as observers, look at them in puzz.lement or dismay, we fail to realiz.e that we are
often looking at the end of a long, slow process down that pyramid. At his sentencing, Magruder said to Judge John Sirica: "I know what I have done, and Your Honor knows what I have done. Somewhere between my ambition and my ideals, I lost my ethical compass." How do you get an honest man [0 lose his ethical compass? You get him to take one step at a time, and self-justification will do the rest .
• • •
Knowing how dissonance works won't make any of us automatically immune to the allure of self-justification, as Elliot learned when he
38 CAROL TAVRIS alld ELLIOT ARONSON
bought chat canoe in January. You can't JUSt say to people. as he did after the initiation experiments, "See how you reduced dissonance?
Isn't that interesting?" and expect chern to reply, "Oh, thank you for showing me the real reason I like the group. That sure makes me feel smart!" All of us, to preserve our belief that we are smart, will occa sionally do dumb things. We can't help it. We are wired that way.
But trus does not mean that we are doomed to keep striving to justify our actions after the fact-like Sisyphus. never r�ching the
(OP of the hill of self-acceptance. A richer undersranding of how and
why our minds work as they do is the first step toward breaking the self-justification habit. And char, in turn, requires us to be more
mindful of our behavior and the reasons for our choices. It takes time, sdf-reflection, and willingness.
The conservative columnist William Saflre once described the
"psychopolitical challenge" that voters face: "how to deal with cog nitive dissonance."� He began with a story of his own such chal
lenge. During the Clinton administration, Safire recounted, he had
criticized Hillary Clinton for trying to conceaJ the identity of the members of her health-care task force. He wrote a column castigat ing her effores at secrecy, which he said were toxic to democracy. No dissonance there; those bad Democrats are always doing bad things. Six years later, however, he found that he was "afflicted" by cognitive dissonance when Vice President Dick Cheney, a fellow conservative Republican whom Safire admires, insisted on keeping the identity of his energy-policy task force a secret. What did Safire do? Because of his awareness of dissonance and how it works. he took a deep breath, hitched up his trousers, and did the tough but virtuous thing: He wrote a column publicly criticizing Cheney's actions. The irony is that because of his criticism of Cheney, Safire received several lauda
tory leners from liberals-which, he admitted, produced enormous dissonance. Oh, Lord, he did something those people approved of?
Saflre's ability to recognjze his own dissonance, and resolve it by doing the fait thing, is rare. As we will see, his willingness to concede
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by me) 39
that his own side made a miscake is something that few are prepared co share. Instead. people will bend over backward to reduce disso nance in a way that is favorable to them and their team. The specific ways vary. but our efforts at self-justification are all designed to serve our need to feel good about what we have done, what we believe. and who we are.
CHAPTE R 2
o o o
Pride and Prejudice . . . and Orher Blind Spots
And why do you look at the speck in your brother's eye, bur do nor consider the plank in your own eye?
-Matthew 7:3 (New King James version)
WI-lEN THE PUBLIC LEARNED that Supreme Court Justice An (onin Scalia was Hying to Louisiana on a government plane to go duck hunting with Vice President Dick Cheney. despite Cheney's having a pending case before the Supreme Coun. there was a Rurry of protest at Scalia's apparent conAicr of interest. Scalia himself was indignant at the suggestion that his ability ro assess the constitution ality of Cheney's claim-that the vice president was legally entitled to keep the details of his energy task force secret-would be tainted by the ducks and the perks. In a letter ro the Los Angeles Timts ex
plaining why he would not recuse himself, Scalia wrote, "I do not think my impartiality could reasonably be questioned."
MISTAKES WERE MADE (bu[ no[ by mt) 41
Neuropsychologist Stanley Berent and neurologist James Albers were hired by CSX Transportation Inc. and Dow Chemical to investigate railroad workers' claims mat chemical exposure had caused perma nent brain damage and other medical problems. More than 600 rail road workers in fifteen states had been diagnosed with a form of brain damage following heavy exposure to cWorinared hydrocarbon solvents. CSX paid more man $170,000 to Berent and Albers' con sulting firm for research that eventually disputed a link berween ex posure ro the company's industrial solvents and brain damage. While conducting their study, which involved reviewing the workers' med ical files without the workers' informed consent, the rwo scientists served as expert wi messes for law firms representing CSX in lawsuits filed by workers. Berent saw nothing improper in his research, which he claimed "yielded importam information about solvent exposure." Berent and Albers were subsequently reprimanded by the federal Of fice of Human Research Protections for their conflict of interest in chis case.l
• • •
When you enter the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles, you nnd yourself in a room of interactive exhibits designed to identify the people you can't tolerate. The familiar targets are there (blacks, women, Jews. gays), but also short people, fat people, blond-female people, disabled people, . . . You watch a video on the vast variety of prejudices, designed to convince you thar everyone has at least a few, and then you are invited to enter the museum proper through one of rwo doors: one marked PREJUDICED, the other marked UN PREJUDICED. The latter door is locked, in case anyone misses the poim, but occasionally some people do. When we were visiting the museum one afternoon, we were treated to the sight of four Hasidic Jews pounding angrily on the Unprejudiced door, demanding to be let in.
42 CAROL TAVRIS and ELLIOT ARONSON
The brain is designed with blind spots, optical and psychologica1, and one of its cleverest tricks is to confer on us the comforting de lusion that we, personally, do not have any. In a sense. dissonance meory is a theory of blind spots-of how and why people unimen tionally blind themselves so that they fail to notice vital events and information that might make them question their behavior or their convictions. Along with the confirmation bias, the brain comes packaged with other self-serving habits that allow us ro justify our
own perceptions and beliefs as being accurate, realistic, and un biased. Social psychologist � Ross calls this phenomenon "naive
realism," the inescapable conviction that we perceive objects and events clearly, "as they really are."2 We assume that ocher reasonable people see things the same way we do. If they disagree with us, they obviously aren't seeing clearly. NaiVe realism creates a logical labyrinth because it presupposes two things: One, people who are open minded and fair ought to agree with a reasonable opinion. And two, any opinion I hold must be reasonable; if it weren't, I wouldn't
hold it. Therefore, if I can just get my opponents to sit down here
and listen to me, so I can tell them how things really are, they will agree with me. And if they don't, it must be because they are biased.
Ross knows whereof he speaks, from his laboratory experimems
and from his efforts to reduce the bitter conRict between Israelis and Palestinians. Even when each side recognizes that the other side per ceives the issues differently, each thinks that the other side is biased while they themselves are objective, and that their own perceptions of reality should provide the basis for settlement. In one experiment, Ross took peace proposals created by Israeli negotiators, labeled them as Palestinian proposals, and asked Israeli citizens to judge them. "The Israelis liked the Palestinian proposal attributed (0 Israel more than they liked the Israeli proposal attributed to the Palestini ans," he says. "If your own proposal isn't going to be attractive to you
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by mtl 43
when it comes from the other side, what chance is there that the other side's proposal is going co be attractive when it actually comes from the other side?"j Closer to home, social psychologist Geoffrey Cohen found that Democrats will endorse an extremely restrictive welfare proposaJ, one usually associated with Republicans, if they think it has been proposed by the Democratic Party, and Republi cans will suppon a generous welfare policy if they think it comes from the Republican Party.4 Label the same proposal as coming from the orner side, and you might as well be asking people if they will
favor a policy proposed by Osama bin Laden. No one in Cohen's study was aware of theif blind spot-that they were being influ
enced by their parry's posicion. Insread, they all claimed thar their beliefs followed logically from their own careful study of the policy at hand, guided by their general philosophy of government.
Ross and his colleagues have found thar we believe our own judg ments are less biased and more independent than those of others pardy because we rely on introspection to tell us what we are think
ing and feeling, but we have no way of knowing what others are really thinking.s And when we introspect, looking into OUf souls and hearts, the need to avoid dissonance assures us that we have only the best and most honorable of motives. We rake our own involvement in an issue as a source of accuracy and enlightenment-"l've felt strongly about gun control for years; therefore, I know what I'm talk ing about"-but we regard such personal feelings on the parr of oth ers who hold different views as a source of bias-"She can't possibly be imparrial about gun control because she's felt strongly about it for years."
AU of us are as unaware of our blind SpOts as fish are unaware of the water they swim in, but those who swim in the waters of privilege have a parcicuiar motivation ro remain oblivious. When Marynia Farnham achieved fame and forrune during the late 1940s
and 1950s by advising women co stay at home and raise children,
44 CAROL TAVRIS and elLIOT ARONSON
otherwise risking frigidity, neurosis, and a loss of femininity, she saw no inconsistency (or irony) in the fact thar she was privileged to be a physician who was nor staying at home raising children, in cluding her own two. When amuent people speak of the underpriv ileged, they rarely bless their lucky stars that they are privileged, let alone consider that they might be overprivileged. Privilege is their blind spot.' It is invisible; they don't think twice about it; they jus tify their social position as something they are emided to. In one way or another, all of us are blind to whatever privileges life has handed us, even if those privileges are temporary. Most people who normally By in what is euphemistically called the "main cabin" re gard me privileged people in business and firsc class as wasteful snobs, if enviable ones. Imagine paying all that extra money for a shorr, six-hour Right! But as soon as they are the ones paying for a busi ness seat or are upgraded, mat attitude vanishes, replaced by a self justifying mixture of piey and disdain for meir fellow passengers, forlornly trooping pase them inca steerage.
Drivers cannot avoid having blind spots in their field of vision, but good drivers are aware of them; they know they had better be careful backing up and changing lanes if they don't want to crash imo fire hydrants and other cars. Our innate biases are, as two legal scholars put it, "like optical illusions in twO important respects they lead us to wrong conclusions from data, and meir apparent rightness persists even when we have been shown the trick. "7 We cannot avoid our psychological blind spots, but if we are unaware of them we may become unwittingly reckless, crossing ethical lines and making foolish decisions. Introspection alone will not help our vision, because it will simply confirm our self-justifying beliefs that we, personally, cannm be coopted or corrupted, and that our dislikes or hatreds of orner groups are not irrational but reasoned and legitimate. Blind spots enhance our pride and activate our prejudices.
MISTAKES WERE MADE (but not by me) 45
The Road to Sr. Andrews
The greatest of faules, I should say, is to be conscious of none.
-historian and essayist Thomas Carlyle
The New York Times edirorial writer Dorothy Samuels summarized [he thinking of most of us in the aftermath of learning that Con gressman Toni Delay, former leader of the House Republicans, had
accepted a trip to the legendary St. Andrews golf course in Scotland
with Jack Abramoff, the corrupt lobbyist-tumed-informer in the congressional corruption scandal that ensued. "I've been writing
abom the foibles of powerful public officials for more years man I care to reveal without a subpoena," she wrote, "'and I still don't get
it: why wouJd someone risk his or her reputation and career for a
lobbyist-bestowed freebie like a vacation at a deluxe resort?"8 Dissonance theory gives us the answer: one step at a time. Al
though there are plenty of unashamedly corrupt politicians who sell
their votes to the largest campaign contributor, most politicians,
thanks to their blind sPOtS, believe they are incorruptible. When they
first enter politics, they accept lunch with a lobbyist, because, after all, that's how politics works and it's an efficient way to get infor
mation about a pending bill, isn't it? "Besides," the politician says.
"lobbyists, like any mher citizens. are exercising their right to free
speech. 1 only have to listen; I'll decide how to vote on the basis of whether my parry and constituents support [his bill and on whether
it is the right thing to do for the American people."