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Modules Module II - Sea Power, joint and Combined Operations, and Irregular Warfare - The American War for IndependenceH

Module II - Sea Power, joint and Combined Operations, and Irregular Warfare - The American War for Independence

Module II: Sea Power, Joint and Combined Operations, and Irregular Warfare: The American War for Independence

A. Description

At dawn on 29 June, 1776, five days before the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence, the largest European maritime expedition in history thus far arrived outside of New York City to enable the British Empire to regain control of its rebellious colonies in North America. As the sun rose, citizens of New York gaped in awe as one ship after another appeared over the horizon. The greatest military power of the age had sent 10 ships of the line, 20 frigates, 40 other fighting vessels, 100 troop transports, 10,000 seamen, 23,000 British soldiers, and 10,000 Hessians to crush organized resistance in New York in a massive Joint operation. Another 500 auxiliary ships were strung out across the Atlantic behind the armada to tend to every logistical need. Within a month, much of New York would be burned to the ground, with thousands of refugees from the British fleeing Manhattan and Long Island for the interior. The recently constituted Continental Army under General George Washington, with only 10,000 Continental soldiers and 9,000 militia men, was outflanked and forced into hasty retreat. The new general was able to avoid complete envelopment and total destruction of his army only by slipping across the Hudson into New Jersey in an emergency evacuation that, ironically, anticipated the later British evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940.

Suffering from massive desertions, worn out by forced marches, and often without food, shoes, or shelter, Washington’s fleeing army was reduced to no more than 3,000 men by December, 1776, with many of the remaining soldiers’ enlistments due to expire at the end of the month. All hope seemed lost as organized resistance in the Middle States was about to collapse. British victory appeared complete and decisive. The British

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“shock and awe” campaign, led by two brothers, Admiral Lord Richard and General Sir William Howe, had spectacular operational success initially, but surprisingly failed to achieve the British political objective of restoring obedience to the Crown. This case explores why the British failed and the Americans, the weaker power by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a protracted revolutionary war that foreshadows many of the insurgencies against occupation forces of the modern era.

The American War for Independence is of historical interest to American military officers because the conflict of 1775-1783 brought their country and its military into being. It is of strategic interest because it provides an opportunity to study three different types of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war: an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the American people; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and a British army exploiting its advantages in Joint operations whenever possible; and a global maritime conflict among great powers that was fought in the English Channel, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of North America. The War for American Independence is of operational interest because its decisive battle, the Joint and Combined operation of French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the circumstances and conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield their desired strategic results.

A revolutionary war involves a struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the American War of the eighteenth century to more recent insurgencies. Nonetheless, the “liberal-republican” political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from that of more recent revolutions. It proved a major cultural obstacle to British efforts to understand the motivations of their enemy and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their political base.

The Patriots relied on a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders weighed the conventional and unconventional differently, however. Washington preferred the conventional while General Nathanael Greene’s Southern Campaign supplies a classic example of strategically effective operations mixing regular and irregular forces. The imperative to win popular political support and the triangular nature of the struggle were very much the same as in more recent revolutionary conflicts. Students are often surprised that American support for the revolution was not unanimous, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Insurgents had to earn such support and deny it to the enemy, which sought to do the same to them. Hence, the conflict requires an examination of how insurgents and counter-insurgents fight to sustain the loyalty of followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and marginalize the influence of adversaries.

This case also invites an effort to understand the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war. When France and Spain intervened against Britain, the coalition against the British gave a major material and morale boost to the Americans and threatened Britain’s global empire. The British had to reassess their strategic priorities, as the

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French and the Spanish sought to seize British colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India. The global naval conflict that ensued provides us with an opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. As a member of the faculty and President of the Naval War College, Mahan wrote his most famous book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. By examining Mahan’s critique of British naval strategy during the war, we confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics; commerce and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness; land versus sea power; naval concentration; when to risk a fleet; decisive battle; and, the uses and limits of blockades.

Most importantly, this case is an ideal laboratory for exploring the strategic effects of Joint and Combined operations. Whereas successful British operations using land and naval forces together in New York and the South failed to yield their desired strategic results, the only significant French and American Joint and Combined operation of the war, the siege of Yorktown by both land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. Jointness is not an end in itself, but a means among many to strategic and operational success. Understanding why the British failed, but the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of Joint operations that win wars and those that do not. Discerning when to open a theater in an ongoing war, and how to use naval forces to support it, is surely part of the strategic problem. Yet many other factors also deserve attention, such as the nature of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communications, the willingness of allies to cooperate, civil-military and intra-military relations, coherent command structures, coalition leadership, and keeping pressure on the enemy without passing the “culminating point of victory or the attack.”

This case might be subtitled “The Education of George Washington as an Operational and Strategic Leader.” It explores the evolution of his thought and practice as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War for American Independence, when humiliating defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Americans, to his greatest triumph at Yorktown. Washington’s partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership. After numerous mistakes, he adapted and matured enough to deny the British early victory, protract the war, and seek decisive battles, when opportunity allowed. As much by necessity as by choice, he employed a Fabian strategy to wear out the British. Although this approach required staying on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the Continental Army to survive. Tactical offensives supplied “incremental dividends” to keep hope alive until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. Even during the war, some questioned Washington’s skill both as a strategic planner and as an adaptive operator, however. Perhaps a purely guerilla strategy would have been better. Moreover, often lacking effective command and control to coordinate their far-flung forces, British political and military leaders made significant strategic and operational mistakes that sometimes prevented them from cashing in military victories for political results. Absent many British blunders waging a counter-insurgency campaign, fighting Washington’s conventional army, and employing Britain’s Royal Navy for optimal effect, perhaps Washington’s army would not

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have survived. Perhaps American resistance would have collapsed. A critical analysis of Washington’s leadership and the failures of the British may thus help us come to terms with the nature of strategic and operational leadership itself.

General George Washington faced the dilemma of fighting an organized and well-trained British army with an ill- trained Continental Army. Aside from poor preparation, the American army suffered two major disadvantages. First, it had a high turnover rate of personnel as soldiers' enlistments ended around Christmas each year. Second, it was supported by colonial militias, which aside from being more poorly trained than the Continental Army, were loyal to the colonies that supported them. Thus, for instance, Washington could not rely on having a Virginia militia at his disposal in New York if the colony of Virginia came under threat from British forces.

Despite these deficiencies, Washington made good use of his forces. Although he initially preferred to employ conventional European linear tactics to engage the British Army, the weaknesses of the Continental Army in conventional combat forced him into a strategic re-assessment by late 1776. He adopted a new strategy of defending key sites, called a "war of posts" that compelled the British to diffuse their forces and engage in multiple offensive actions designed to destroy the Continental Army in conventional operations. By 1778, Washington had evolved to a classic "Fabian" strategy or "attrition by strategic defensive" to sap the will of the British, both military and civil authority, to continue the war. An astute strategist, Washington realized he needed incremental victories to maintain his army's morale and to ensure continued Congressional and public support for what he correctly assumed would be a protracted war. He also overcame organizational problems by using the colonial militias to engage in selective engagements and irregular warfare. This combination of the Continental Army, colonial militias, and conventional and unconventional warfare eventually led to Washington's final victory at Yorktown.

Washington did not bear the responsibility of leadership alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress himself, he knew most of the political leaders of the revolution well, many of whom were well versed in the strategic uses of information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. The committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence, for example, had clear strategic purposes in mind: to mobilize domestic support for independence and war against the British; to persuade foreign powers to intervene; and to appeal to British public opinion to oppose the war. Reading the Declaration of Independence as a strategic document highlights the uses of strategic communications and public diplomacy in the first, most famous, and perhaps most effective information operation in American history. Nonetheless, the political organization of the Americans complicated winning the war enormously. Congress was a coalition of independent states jealous of any central authority that might become dangerous to liberty. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington’s rag-tag army in the field, with many wondering whether inflation, bankruptcy,

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desertion, and even mutinies in the army were a greater danger to American independence than the British themselves.

In this way, the American War for Independence is paradigmatic of virtually all other major wars in American history, with some sacrifice of liberty often being necessary for security, but great fears about sacrificing too much, lest liberty never recover. That Congress and Washington managed to win the war without losing the liberty for which it was fought was perhaps their greatest accomplishment.

Neither Sun Tzu, who lived centuries before the American War for Independence, nor Clausewitz, who focused on ground warfare, discussed the use of naval forces. Accordingly, the case study provides an excellent opportunity to examine Mahan's and Corbett's strategic maritime theories. A naval historian and maritime theorist who advocated large fleet engagements and their strategic exploitation to support policy, Mahan recognized the value of "Sea Power," which he defined as naval power and maritime economic power. He also coined the phrase "command of the seas," a term that encompasses naval forces as well as maritime commerce. These components, he argues, are essential to a nation’s war effort. According to Mahan, the only way for a nation to retain use of the sea for itself is to deny its use to an enemy, and this can be accomplished only by using large concentrated battle fleets capable of overwhelming an enemy's naval and/or maritime forces at decisive points.

Whereas Mahan wrote in the late nineteenth century to convince American politicians and citizens of the need for a large navy to protect the American homeland, Sir Julian Corbett (whom you’ll read in Module III) produced a coherent theory of maritime warfare, which many scholars believe to be more applicable to modern warfare than Mahan's. Corbett drew on Mahan's concepts and the same period of British history to argue that a navy is used most effectively when it is projecting power ashore. For Corbett, a nation need only control certain areas of the sea to maintain its economic well-being and to maximize the effectiveness of ground forces. Thus, one of the key differences between Corbett and Mahan is Corbett's contention that a navy's value rests in supporting and sustaining armies on land, rather than in engaging in a great sea battle. Corbett’s theories are especially applicable to the American War for Independence because Britain's persistent strategic dilemma was the need to transport, insert, and maintain limited forces on a distant continent against a predominantly hostile and potentially more numerous foe. Consequently, the British undertook a strategic re-prioritization in a global conflict when faced with a new and potent coalition while simultaneously attempting to suppress a revolutionary rebellion. The American War for Independence provides an excellent case study for evaluating strategic uses of sea power in light of the classic maritime theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett.

B. Points for Consideration

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In each case study “Points for Consideration” are included to help structure study. An attempt to come to grips with these questions should be made while completing reading assignments as such questions form the basis of understanding of Strategy and War concepts.

1. Assuming that the American War for Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies of American commanders and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

2. Was American success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to British blunders?

3. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War for American Independence. Do you agree or disagree with his critique? Evaluate the contribution of sea power to the achievement of American independence.

4. Why did British military successes in North America in 1776 fail to produce a favorable political result?

5. In 1778 after France entered the war, what strategy should the British have followed?

6. Given that the Continental Navy was far too small to challenge the Royal Navy in a Mahanian clash of “great battle fleets,” should the British have employed naval forces and assets in a more Corbettian fashion, and if so, how and when?

7. How “revolutionary” were the American colonial rebel forces in terms of their strategy against regular British forces? Was there a different strategy for defeating the Loyalist provincial or militia forces?

8. How might a coastal “enclave” strategy have fared in suppressing or ending the rebellion as opposed to the three phases of British strategy that relied on operational concepts of regional pacification and main force engagement with the Continental Army?

9. What was the nature of civil-military affairs between the Continental Congress (civilian authority) and the principal Continental Army officers (Washington and his major subordinate commanders such as Gates and Greene)?

10. How did geography and loyalty influence each side’s strategy? For example, did concentrations of Loyalists in New York, North Carolina, and Georgia have any bearing in determining British strategy?

11. What was the level of strategic and operational independence granted by the Crown to the field commanders?

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12. What was the impact of American commerce raiding and privateering against British merchant interests? Did this aspect of the war have any bearing on military strategy, political decisions or public support for efforts to suppress the rebellion?

13. How would one assess the British “divide and conquer” strategy of 1777 that ultimately resulted in the American victory at Saratoga? Was it founded in sound strategic thinking and, if so, why did it fail?

14. Lord Cornwallis never lost an engagement in which he directly commanded Crown forces in the field. How, then, does one explain the failure of the British Southern Strategy and Campaign of 1778-1781?

15. What were the “centers of gravity” of each side in the conflict and did these centers shift during the evolution of the struggle?

16. Could the British have formulated a strategy that would have been successful in achieving their policy objective of continued domination of the thirteen North American colonies?

17. George Washington is a classic example of a general who lost almost every battle but still won the war – or more importantly, the political objective for which he was fighting. Could Washington have followed a strategy that would have achieved his political objective more quickly?

C. Readings (Note: Some books may be different editions. If you have a different edition, the beginning and ending page numbers for the reading requirements may vary slightly.)

1. Allison, Robert J. The American Revolution: A Concise History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pages 1-73.

[Allison provides an overview of the American War for Independence that contains significant insights detailing the course of the war from both the British and American perspectives.]

2. Fischer, David Hackett. Washington’s Crossing. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pages 7-205, 346- 379.

[Fischer examines the strategic and operational planning and campaigns in 1776. He highlights the initial success of British Joint operations in New York and George Washington’s ability to learn from his mistakes in order to deny the British an early and decisive victory.]

3. Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. Third, Revised and Expanded Edition. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 255-276.

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[These two chapters compare and contrast the ideas of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini on military leadership and risk taking and are very useful for analyzing the indispensability of Washington’s generalship.]

4. Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39.

[Weigley considers American strategy from both conventional and partisan warfare perspectives, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two.]

5. Kurland, Philip B. and Ralph Lerner, editors. “Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution,” from The Founders’ Constitution. Vol. I. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, and University of Chicago, 1987; and Syrett, Harold G., editor. The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. (Selected Readings)

[These primary source documents aid in an understanding of Washington’s Fabian strategy against Britain and the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war.]

6. O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 165-203, 207-285, 320-361.. the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire

[O’Shaughnessy follows the course of the war from the perspectives of the British leadership, to include King George III, Prime Minister Lord North, and military leaders including General Burgoyne, the Earl of Sandwich, and others who, for the most part, led ably and even brilliantly. He offers a counter argument to the idea that British blunders were prevalent throughout the war years.]

7. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Pages 1-77; Preface, Introduction, Chapters 9-14. (Book or Selected Reading)

[Mahan examines the elements of sea power as well as provides an analysis of the naval dynamics of the War for American Independence.]

8. Mackesy, Piers. “British Strategy in the War of American Independence,” Yale Review, vol. 52 (1963). Pages 539-557. (Selected Readings)

[Mackesy explains the rationality of British governmental strategy, including the decisions by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]

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9. Pritchard, James. “French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal,” Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (Selected Readings)

[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

10. Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781.” Naval War College Paper, 2008. (Selected Reading)

[Carpenter examines the campaigns in the Southern Colonies with particular attention to the British strategic and operational decision-making and execution process and provides an account of the events in the South that led to the Combined Franco-American victory at Yorktown, Virginia.]

D. Summative Assessment Requirement

For the Formative Assessment, professors will use specific questions as guides for the discussions that will take place through the Course LMS Discussion Board. Although all of the Sub-competencies apply, the American War for Independence case study discussions particularly emphasize the following Competencies and Sub- Competencies:

2A, 2C, 2D, 3C

The professor will guide the discussion and make a determination as to whether or not the student has successfully demonstrated a sound comprehension and that the student has shown the ability to think strategically and critically about the dynamics of strategy and operations. Students who do not meet the standard as determined by the professor, will receive additional discussion questions until the professor determines that the student has validated the Competencies and Sub-Competencies established for that case study.

Students will be assigned an essay for either the Module II, American War for Independence or Module III, Russo- Japanese War.

The Summative Assessment requirement for this module is a five page essay (5 pages or roughly 1,250 to 1,500 words exclusive of front matter such as the title page and foot or endnotes) in Times New Roman 12-pitch font, with 1-inch margins, type-written, double-spaced on an essay question assigned by the instructor. The essay must validate the Competency and Sub-Competencies for this Module. Essays should include a cover sheet title page (template found in Annex B).

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This essay is 20% of the final grade. Students should thoroughly review all the material in the Module along with the “Points for Consideration” as well as ANNEX A “Guide to Essay Preparation,” the Essay Preparation Guidance and the S&W Writing Guide to ensure their written work meets the requirements for a successful S&W essay.

Professors will use a randomly generated assignment of essay questions. At the start of the second week of the Module, professors will advise each student which essay question that they are assigned for that module. Essays must be submitted by the student by the end of the final week of the module.

The essay must rate a minimum of a B- (80) grade. If the essay fails to achieve a B- (80), the professor can either allow the student to re-write the essay incorporating the recommendations of the professor for improvement so as to bring the essay to at least a B- standard, or give the student an alternate essay question. Until the essay has achieved a B- (80), the student will not be allowed to proceed to the following case study. If the essay for the culminating Module 4 is not up to the grade standard, the student cannot receive course credit until the standard is achieved. The essays for this module are:

1. Was Patriot success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?

2. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the American War for Independence?

3. In 1778, after France entered the war, what strategic course of action should the British have followed?

4. Why did British Joint operations in the South fail to win the war for Britain from 1778-1781?

E. Lectures

For this case study, the following lectures apply:

Professor George Satterfield – Red Team: Britain and the American War for Independence (view before starting the case study readings).

Professor Mike Pavkovic – The Challenge of Irregular Warfare (view before starting the case study readings).

Professor Marc Genest – The War for American Liberation (view after completing readings 1, 3, and 5).

Professor Jim Holmes – Seapower: Alfred Thayer Mahan (view after reading The Influence of Seapower upon

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