Peter singer equality for animals summary

Question Description
Peter Singer, “A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation”

Here is a reconstruction of Singer’s Argument:

P1: At least some nonhuman animals, like human animals, have interests.

P2: Any being that has interests is entitled to moral consideration.

P3: Therefore, any nonhuman animal that has interests is entitled to moral consideration.

P4: Every genuine interest should be given the same consideration as other like interests,

regardless of whose interest it is.

C: Therefore, those nonhuman animals that have interests are entitled to equal moral

consideration.

Why believe premise 1?

At least some nonhuman animals have the capacity for suffering and enjoyment, i.e., at least some nonhuman animals are sentient (in Singer’s restricted sense of “sentient”).

Given that these nonhuman animals can experience suffering and enjoyment, it makes sense to think of their lives as going well or badly, better or worse, for them.

If their lives can go better or worse for them, then they have interests, as some things are in their interest, and some things are contrary to their interests.

The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for having interests at all.

“Equal Consideration”

What exactly does Singer mean by “equal consideration”? There are factual differences between human and nonhuman animals, which Singer recognizes. In particular, humans have certain “higher” mental faculties that give them more varied interests than nonhuman animals. Humans can enjoy reading a good book, for example, while nonhuman animals cannot. Humans can also suffer more types of discomforts, like feeling anxiety over the remote future. So some human interests are very different from any of the interests of nonhuman animals. Equal consideration for Singer just means taking equally seriously the like interests of humans and nonhuman animals to avoid suffering and to enjoy their lives.