title: Strategies and Games : Theory and Practice author: Dutta, Prajit K.
publisher: MIT Press isbn10 | asin: 0262041693 print isbn13: 9780262041690 ebook isbn13: 9780585070223
language: English subject Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics)
publication date: 1999 lcc: HB144.D88 1999eb ddc: 330/.01/5193
subject: Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics) cover
Page III
Strategies and Games
Theory and Practice
Prajit K. Dutta
THE MIT PRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS LONDON, ENGLAND
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© 1999 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dutta, Prajit K. Strategies and games: theory and practice / Prajit K. Dutta. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-04169-3 1. Game theory. 2. Equilibrium (Economics). I. Title. HB144.D88 1999 330'.01'15193dc21 98-42937
CIP
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MA AAR BABA KE
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BRIEF CONTENTS
Preface XXI
A Reader's Guide XXIX
Part One Introduction 1
Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications 3
2 A First Look at the Theory 17
Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 33
3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 35
4 Dominance Solvability 49
5 Nash Equilibrium 63
6 An Application" Cournot Duopoly 75
7 An Application: The Commons Problem 91
8 Mixed Strategies 103
9 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 121
10 Zero-Sum Games 139
Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 155
11 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 157
12 An Application: Research and Development 179
13 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 193
14 Finitely Repeated Games 209
15 Infinitely Repeated Games 227
16 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 243
17 An Application: OPEC 257
18 Dynamic Games with an Application to the Commmons Problem 275
Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 291
19 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 293
20 Games with Incomplete Information 309
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21 An Application: Incomplete Information in a Cournot Duopoly 331
22 Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 349
23 An Application: Auctions 367
24 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 383
Five Foundations 401
25 Calculus and Optimization 403
26 Probability and Expectation 421
27 Utility and Expected Utility 433
28 Existence of Nash Equilibria 451
Index 465
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CONTENTS
Preface XXI
A Reader's Guide XXIX
Part One Indroduction 1
Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications 3
1.1 Gabes That We Play 3
1.2 Background 7
1.3 Examples 8
Summary 12
Exercises 12
Chapter 2 A First Look at the Theory 17
2.1 Rules of the Game: Background 17
2.2 Who, What, When: The Extensive Form 18
2.2.1 Information Sets and Strategies 20
2.3 Who What, When: The Normal (or Strategic) Form 21
2.4 How Much: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Function 23
2.5 Representation of the Examples 25
Summary 27
Exercises 28
Part Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 33
Chapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 35
3.1 Strategic Form Games 35
3.1.1 Examples 36
3.1.2 Equivalence with the Extensive Form 39
3.2 Case Study The Strategic Form of Art Auctions 40
3.2.1 Art Auctions: A Description 40
3.2.2 Art Auctions: The Strategic Form 40
3.3 Dominant Strategy Solution 41
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3.4 Cae Study Again A Dominant Strategy at the Auction 43
Summary 44
Exercises 45
Chapter 4 Dominance Solvability 49
4.1 The Idea 49
4.1.1 Dominated and Undominated Strategies 49
4.1.2 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies 51
4.1.3 More Examples 51
4.2 Case Study Electing the United Nations Secretary General 54
4.3 A More Formal Definition 55
4.4 A Discussion 57
Summary 59
Exercises 59
Chapter 5 Nash Equilibrium 63
5.1 The Concept 63
5.1.1 Intuition and Definition 63
5.1.2 Nash Parables 64
5.2 Examples 66
5.3 Case Study Nash Equilibrium in the Animal Kingdom 68
5.4 Relation Between the Solution Concepts 69
Summary 71
Exercises 71
Chapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 75
6.1 Background 75
6.2 The Basic Model 76
6.3 Cournot Nash Equilibrium 77
6.4 Cartel Solution 79
6.5 Case Study Today's OPEC 81
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6.6 Variants on the Main Theme I: A Graphical Analysis 82
6.6.1 The IEDS Solution to the Cournot Model 84
6.7 Variants on the Main Theme II: Stackelberg Model 85
6.8 Variants on the Main Theme III: Generalization 86
Summary 87
Exercises 88
Chapter 7 An Application: The Commons Problem 91
7.1 Background: What is the Commons? 91
7.2 A Simple Model 93
7.3 Social Optimality 95
7.4 The Problem Worsens in a Large Population 96
7.5 Case Studies Buffalo, Global Warming, and the Internet 97
7.6 Averting a Tragedy 98
Summary 99
Exercises 100
Chapter 8 Mixed Strategies 103
8.1 Definition and Examples 103
8.1.1 What Is a Mixed Strategy? 103
8.1.2 Yet More Examples 106
8.2 An Implication 107
8.3 Mixed Strategies Can Dominate Some Pure Strategies 108
8.3.1 Implications for Dominant Strategy Solution and IEDS 109
8.4 Mixed Strategies are Good for Bluffing 110
8.5 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium 111
8.5.1 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria in an Example 113
8.6 Case Study Random Drug Testing 114
Summary 115
Exercises 116
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Chapter 9 Tow Applications: Naturla Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 121
9.1 Chicken, Symmetric Games, and Symmetric Equilibria 121
9.1.1 Chicken 121
9.1.2 Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria 122
9.2 Natural Monopoly 123
9.2.1 The Economic Background 123
9.2.2 A Simple Example 124
9.2.3 War of Attrition and a General Analysis 125
9.3 Bankruptcy Law 128
9.3.1 The Legal Background 128
9.3.2 A Numerical Example 128
9.3.3 A General Analysis 130
Summary 132
Exercises 133
Chapter 10 Zero-Sum Games 139
10.1 Definition and Examples 139
10.2 Playing Safe: Maxmin 141
10.2.1 The Concept 141
10.2.2 Examples 142
10.3 Playing Sound: Minmax 144
10.3.1 The Concept and Examples 144
10.3.2 Two Results 146
10.4 Playing Nash: Playing Both Safe and Sound 147
Summary 149
Exercises 149
Part Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 155
Chapter 11 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 157
11.1 The Extensive Form 157
11.1.1 A More Formal Treatment 158
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11.1.2 Strategies, Mixed Strategies, and Chance Nodes 160
11.2 Perfect Information Games: Definition and Examples 162
11.3 Backward Induction: Examples 165
11.3.1 The Power of Commitment 167
11.4 Backward Induction: A General Result 168
11.5 Connection With IEDS in the Strategic Form 170
11.6 Case Study Poison Pills and Other Takeover Deterrents 172
Summary 174
Exercises 175
Chapter 12 An Application: Research and Development 179
12.1 Background: R&D, Patents, and Ologopolies 179
12.1.1 A Patent Race in Progress: High-Definition Television 180
12.2 A Model of R&D 181
12.3 Backward Induction: Analysis of the Model 183
12.4 Some Remarks 188
Summary 189
Exercises 190
Chapter 13 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 193
13.1 A Motivating Example 193
13.2 Subgames and Strategies Within Subgames 196
13.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 197
13.4 Two More Examples 199
13.5 Some Remarks 202
13.6 Case Study Peace in the World War I Trenches 203
Summary 205
Exercises 205
Chapter 14 Finitely Repeated Games 209
14.1 Examples and Economic Applications 209
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14.1.1 Three Repeated Games and a Definition 209
14.1.2 Four Economic Applications 212
14.2 Finitely Repeated Games 214
14.2.1 Some General Conclusions 218
14.3 Case Study Treasury Bill Auctions 219
Summary 222
Exercises 222
Chapter 15 Infinitely Repeated Games 227
15.1 Detour Through Discounting 227
15.2 Analysis of Example 3: Trigger Strategies and Good Behavior 229
15.3 The Folk Theorem 232
15.4 Repeated Games With Imperfect Detection 234
Summary 237
Exercises 238
Chapter 16 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market243
16.1 The Background 243
16.2 The Analysis 245
16.2.1 A Model of the NASDAQ Market 245
16.2.2 Collusion 246
16.2.3 More on Collusion 248
16.3 The Broker-Dealer Relationship 249
16.3.1 Order Preferencing 249
16.3.2 Dealers Big and Small 250
16.4 The Epilogue 251
Summary 252
Exercises 252
Chapter 17 An Application: OPEC 257
17.1 Oil: A Historical Review 257
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17.1.1 Production and Price History 258
17.2 A Simple Model of the Oil Market 259
17.3 Oil Prices and the Role of OPEC 260
17.4 Repteated Games With Demand Uncertainty 262
17.5 Unobserved Quota Violations 266
17.6 Some Further Comments 269
Summary 270
Exercises 271
Chapter 18 Dynamic Games With An Application to the Commons Problem 275
18.1 Dynamic Games: A Prologue 275
18.2 The Commons Problem: A Model 276
18.3 Sustainable Development and Social Optimum 278
18.3.1 A Computation of the Social Optimum 278
18.3.2 An Explanation of the Social Optimum 281
18.4 Achievable Development and Game Equilibrium 282
18.4.1 A Computation of the Game Equilibrium 282
18.4.2 An Explanation of the Equilibrium 284
18.4.3 A Comparison of the Socially Optimal and the Equilibrium Outcomes 285
18.5 Dynamic Games: An Epilogue 286
Summary 287
Exercises 288
Part Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 291
Chapter 19 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 293
19.1 Moral Hazard: Examples and a Definition 293
29.2 A Principal-Agent Model 295
19.2.1 Some Examples of Incentive Schemes 297
19.3 The Optimal Incentive Scheme 299
19.3.1 No Moral Hazard 299
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19.3.2 Moral Hazard 299
19.4 Some General Conclusions 301
19.4.1 Extensions and Generalizations 303
19.5 Case Study Compensating Primary Care Physicians in an HMO 304
Summary 305
Exercises 306
Chapter 20 Games with Incomplete Information 309
20.1 Some Examples 309
20.1.1 Some Analysis of the Examples 312
20.2 A Complete Analysis of Example 4 313
20.2.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 313
20.2.2 Pure-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria 315
20.2.3 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria 316
20.3 More General Considerations 318
20.3.1 A Modified Example 318
20.3.2 A General Framework 320
20.4 Dominance-Based Solution Concepts 321
20.5 Case Study Final Jeopardy 323
Summary 326
Exercises 326
Chapter 21 An Application: Incomplete Information in a Cournot Duopoly 331
21.1 A Model and its Equilibrium 331
21.1.1 The Basic Model 331
21.1.2 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 332
21.2 The Complete Information Solution 336
21.3 Revealing Costs to a Rival 338
21.4 Two-Sided Incompleteness of Information 340
21.5 Generalizations and Extensions 341
21.5.1 Oligopoly 341
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21.5.2 Demand Uncertainty 342
Summary 343
Exercises 343
Chapter 22 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Priciple, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer
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22.1 Mechanism Design: The Economic Context 349
22.2 A Simple Example: Selling to a Buyer With an Unknown Valuation 351
22.2.1 Known Passion 351
22.2.2 Unknown Passion 352
22.3 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle 356
22.3.1 Single Player 356
22.3.2 Many Players 357
22.4 A More General Example: Selling Variable Amounts 358
22.4.1 Known Type 359
22.4.2 Unknown Type 359
Summary 362
Exercises 362
Chapter 23 An Application: Auctions 367
23.1 Background and Examples 367
23.1.1 Basic Model 369
23.2 Second-Price Auctions 369
23.3 First-Price Auctions 371
23.4 Optimal Auctions 373
23.4.1 How Well Do the First- and Second-Price Auctions Do? 375
23.5 Final Remarks 376
Summary 377
Exercises 378
Chapter 24 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 383
24.1 Motivation and Two Examples 383
24.1.1 A First Analysis of the Examples 385
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24.2 A Definition, an Equilibrium Concept, and Examples 387
24.2.1 Definition 387
24.2.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 387
24.2.3 A Further Analysis of the Examples 389
24.3 Signaling Product Quality 391
24.3.1 The Bad Can Drive Out the Good 391
24.3.2 Good Can Signal Quality? 392
24.4 Case Study Used CarsA Market for Lemons? 394
24.5 Concluding Remarks 395
Summary 396
Exercises 396
Part Five Foundations 401
Chapter 25 Calculus and Optimization 403
25.1 A Calculus Primer 403
25.1.1 Functions 404
25.1.2 Slopes 405
25.1.3 Some Formulas 407
25.1.4 Concave Functions 408
25.2 An Optimization Theory Primer 409
25.2.1 Necessary Conditions 409
25.2.2 Sufficient Conditions 410
25.2.3 Feasibility Constraints 411
25.2.4 Quadratic and Log Functions 413
Summary 414
Exercises 415
Chapter 26 Probability and Expectation 421
26.1 Probability 421
26.1.1 Independence and Conditional Probability 425
26.2 Random Variables and Expectation 426
26.2.1 Conditional Expectation 427
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Summary 428
Exercises 428
Chapter 27 Utility and Expected Utility 433
27.1 Decision Making Under Certainty 433
27.2 Decision Making Under Uncertainty 436
27.2.1 The Expected Utility Theorem and the Expected Return Puzzle 437
27.2.2 Details on the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem 439
27.2.3 Payoffs in a Game 441
27.3 Risk Aversion 441
Summary 444
Exercises 444
Chapter 28 Existence of Nash Equilibria 452
28.1 Definition and Examples 451
28.2 Mathematical Background: Fixed Points 453
28.3 Existence of Nash Equilibria: Results and Intuition 458
Summary 460
Exercises 461
Index 465
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PREFACE
This book evolved out of lecture notes for an undergraduate course in game theory that I have taught at Columbia University for the past six years. On the first two occasions I took the straight road, teaching out of available texts. But the road turned out to be somewhat bumpy; for a variety of reasons I was not satisfied with the many texts that I considered. So the third time around I built myself a small bypass; I wrote a set of sketchy lecture notes from which I taught while I assigned a more complete text to the students. Although this compromise involved minimal costs to me, it turned out to be even worse for my students, since we were now traveling on different roads. And then I (foolishly) decided to build my own highway; buoyed by a number of favorable referee reports, I decided to turn my notes into a book. I say foolishly because I had no idea how much hard work is involved in building a road. I only hope I built a smooth one.
The Book's Purpose And Its Intended Audience
The objective of this book is to provide a rigorous yet accessible introduction to game theory and its applications, primarily in economics and business, but also in political science, the law, and everyday life. The material is intended principally for two audiences: first, an undergraduate audience that would take this course as an elective for an economics major. (My experience has been, however, that my classes are also heavily attended by undergraduate majors in engineering and the sciences who take this course to fulfill their economics requirement.) The many applications and case studies in the book should make it attractive to its second audience, MBA students in business schools. In addition, I have tried to make the material useful to graduate students in economics and related disciplinesPh.D. students in political science, Ph.D. students in economics not specializing in economic theory, etc.who would like to have a source from which they can get a self-contained, albeit basic, treatment of game theory.
Pedagogically I have had one overriding objective: to write a textbook that would take the middle road between the anecdotal and the theorem-driven treatments of the subject. On the one hand is the approach that teaches purely by examples and anecdotes. In my experience that leaves the students, especially the brighter ones, hungering for more. On the other hand, there is the more advanced approach emphasizing a rigorous treatment, but again, in my experience, if there are too few examples and applications it is difficult to keep even the brighter students interested.
I have tried to combine the best elements of both approaches. Every result is precisely stated (albeit with minimal notation), all assumptions are detailed, and at least a sketch of a proof is provided. The text also contains nine chapter-length applications and twelve fairly detailed case studies.
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Distinctive Features Of The Book
I believe this book improves on available undergraduate texts in the following ways.
Content a full description of utility theory and a detailed analysis of dynamic game theory
The book provides a thorough discussion of the single-agent decision theory that forms the underpinning of game theory. (That exercise takes up three chapters in Part Five.) More importantly perhaps, this is the first text that provides a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction (in Part Three). The theory of repeated games is studied over two and a half chapters, including discussions of finitely and infinitely repeated games as well as games with varying stage payoffs. I follow the theory with two chapter-length applications: market-making on the NASDAQ financial market and the price history of OPEC. A discussion of dynamic games (in which the game environment evolves according to players' previous choices) follows along with an application to the dynamic commons problem. I believe many of the interesting applications of game theory are dynamicstudent interest seems always to heighten when I get to this part of the courseand I have found that every other text pays only cursory attention to many dynamic issues.
Style emphasis on a parallel development of theory and examples
Almost every chapter that introduces a new concept opens with numerical examples, some of which are well known and many of which are not. Sometimes I have a leading example and at other times a set of (small) examples. After explaining the exam-pies, I go to the concept and discuss it with reasonable rigor. At this point I return to the examples and analyze the just introduced concept within the context of the examples. At the end of a sectiona set of chapters on related ideasI devote a whole chapter, and sometimes two, to economic applications of those ideas.
Length and Organization bite-sized chapters and a static to dynamic progression
I decided to organize the material within each chapter in such a fashion that the essential elements of a whole chapter can be taught in one class (or a class and a half, depending on level). In my experience it has been a lot easier to keep the students engaged with this structure than with texts that have individual chapters that are, for example, over fifty pages long. The topics evolve in a natural sequence: static complete information to dynamic complete information to static incomplete information. I decided to skip much of dynamic incomplete information (other than signaling) because the questions in this part of the subject are a lot easier than the answers (and my students seemed to have little stomach for equilibrium refinements, for example). There are a few advanced topics as well; different instructors will have the freedom to decide which subset of the advanced topics they would like to teach in their course. Sections that are more difficult are marked with the symbol . Depending on level, some instructors will want to skip
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these sections at first presentation, while others may wish to take extra time in discussing the material.
Exercises
At the end of each chapter there are about twenty-five to thirty problems (in the Exercises section). In addition, within the text itself, each chapter has a number of questions (or concept checks) in which the student is asked to complete a part of an argument, to compute a remaining case in an example, to check the computation for an assertion, and so on. The point of these questions is to make sure that the reader is really following the chapter's argument; I strongly encourage my students to answer these questions and often include some of them in the problem sets.
Case Studies and Applications
At the end of virtually every theoretical chapter there is a case study drawn from real life to illustrate the concept just discussed. For example, after the chapter on Nash equilibrium, there is a discussion of its usage in understanding animal conflicts. After a chapter on backward induction (and the power of commitment), there is a discussion of poison pills and other take-over deterrents. Similarly, at the end of each cluster of similar topics there is a whole chapter-length application. These range from the tragedy of the commons to bankruptcy law to incomplete information Cournot competition.
An Overview And Two Possible Syllabi
The book is divided into five parts. The two chapters of Part One constitute an Introduction. Part Two (Chapters 3 through 10) covers Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice, while Part Three (Chapters 11 through 18) concentrates on Extensive Form Games: Theory and Practice. In Part Four (Chapters 19 through 24) I discuss Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Practice. Finally, Part Five (Chapters 25 through 28) consists of chapters on Foundations.
I can suggest two possible syllabi for a one-semester course in game theory and applications. The first stresses the applications end while the second covers all the theoretical topics. In terms of mathematical requirements, the second is, naturally, more demanding and presumes that the students are at a higher level. I have consequently included twenty chapters in the second syllabus and only eighteen in the first. (Note that the numbers are chapter numbers.)
Syllabus 1 (Applications Emphasis)
1. A First Look at the Applications
3. Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies
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4. Dominance Solvability
5. Nash Equilibrium
6. An Application: Cournot Duopoly
8. Mixed Strategies
9.Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law
11. Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction
12. An Application: Research and Development
13. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
15. Infinitely Repeated Games
16. An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market
17. An Application: OPEC
19. Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory
20. Games with Incomplete Information
22. Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer
23. An Application: Auctions
24.Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem
Syllabus 2 (Theory Emphasis)
2. A First Look at the Theory
27. Utility and Expected Utility
3. Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies
4. Dominance Solvability
5. Nash Equilibrium
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6. An Application: Cournot Duopoly
7. An Application: The Commons Problem
8. Mixed Strategies
10. Zero-Sum Games
28. Existence of Nash Equilibria
11. Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction
13. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
14. Finitely Repeated Games
15. Infinitely Repeated Games
17. An Application: OPEC
18. Dynamic Games with an Application to the Commons Problem
20. Games with Incomplete Information
21. An Application: Incomplete Information in a Cournot Duopoly
22. Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer
23. An Application: Auctions
Prerequisites
I have tried to write the book in a manner such that very little is presumed of a reader's mathematics or economics background. This is not to say that one semester each of calculus and statistics and a semester of intermediate microeconomics will not help. However, students who do not already have this background but are willing to put in extra work should be able to educate themselves sufficiently.
Toward that end, I have included a chapter on calculus and optimization, and one on probability and expectation. Readers can afford not to read the two chapters if they already have the following knowledge. In calculus, I presume knowledge of the slope of a function and a familiarity with slopes of the linear, quadratic, log, and the square-root functions. In optimization theory, I use the first-order characterization of an interior
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optimum, that the slope of a maximand is zero at a maximum. As for probability, it helps to know how to take an expectation. As for economic knowledge, I have attempted to explain all relevant terms and have not presumed, for example, any knowledge of Pareto optimality, perfect competition, and monopoly.
Acknowledgments
This book has benefited from the comments and criticisms of many colleagues and friends. Tom Gresik at Penn State, Giorgidi Giorgio at La Sapienza in Rome, Sanjeev Goyal at Erasmus, Matt Kahn at Columbia, Amanda Bayer at Swarthmore, Rob Porter at Northwestern, and Charles Wilson at NYU were foolhardy
enough to have taught from preliminary versions of the text, and I thank them for their courage and comments. In addition, the following reviewers provided very helpful comments:
Amanda Bayer, Swarthmore College
James Dearden, Lehigh University
Tom Gresik, Penn State
Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University
David Levine, UCLA
Michael Meurer, SUNY Buffalo
Yaw Nyarko, NYU
Robert Rosenthal, Boston University
Roberto Serrano, Brown University
Rangarajan Sundaram, NYU
A second group of ten referees provided extremely useful, but anonymous, comments.
My graduate students Satyajit Bose, Tack-Seung Jun, and Tsz-Cheong Lai very carefully read the entire manuscript. Without their hawk-eyed intervention, the book would have many more errors. They are also responsible for the Solutions Manual, which accompanies this text. My colleagues in the community, Venky Bala, Terri Devine, Ananth