The case for torture summary

Critical Analysis Michael Levin’s“The Case For Torture”

THE CASE FOR TORTURE

It is generally assumed that torture is impermissible, a throwback to a more brutal age. Enlightened societies reject it outright, and regimes suspected of using it risk the wrath of the United States.

I believe this attitude is unwise. There are situations in which torture is not merely permissible but morally mandatory. Moreover, these situations are moving from the realm of imagination to fact.

Death: Suppose a terrorist has hidden an atomic bomb on Manhattan Is-1 land which will detonate at noon on July 4 unless . . . (here follow the usual demands for money and release of his friends from jail). Suppose, further, that he is caught at 10 a.m. of the fateful day, but— preferring death to fail- ure— won’t disclose where the bomb is. What do we do? If we follow due process— wait for his lawyer, arraign him— millions of people will die. If the only way to save those lives is to subject the terrorist to the most excruciating possible pain, what grounds can there be for not doing so? I suggest there are none. In any case, I ask you to face the question with an open mind.

Torturing the terrorist is unconstitutional? Probably. But millions of lives surely outweigh constitutionality. Torture is barbaric? Mass murder is far more barbaric. Indeed, letting millions of innocents die in deference to one who flaunts his guilt is moral cowardice, an unwillingness to dirty one’s hands. If you caught the terrorist, could you sleep nights knowing that mib lions died because you couldn’t bring yourself to apply the electrodes?

Once you concede that torture is justified in extreme cases, you have ad-1 mitted that the decision to use torture is a matter of balancing innocent lives against the means needed to save them. You must now face more realistic cases involving more modest numbers. Someone plants a bomb on a jumbo jet. He alone can disarm it, and his demands cannot be met (or if they can, we refuse to set a precedent by yielding to his threats). Surely we can, we must, do anything to the extortionist to save the passengers. How can we tell 300, or 100, or 10 people who never asked to be put in danger, “I’m sorry, you’ll have to die in agony, we just couldn’t bring ourselves to . . .”

Here are the results of an informal poll about a third, hypothetical, case. Suppose a terrorist group kidnapped a newborn baby from a hospital. I asked four mothers if they would approve of torturing kidnappers if that were nec- essary to get their own newborns back. All said yes, the most “liberal” adding that she would like to administer it herself.

I am not advocating torture as punishment. Punishment is addressed to deeds irrevocably past. Rather, I am advocating torture as an acceptable measure for preventing future evils. So understood, it is far less objectionable

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Originally published in Newsweek in the “My Turn” column on June 7> 1982. The magazine in¬ troduced the column in 1972 to encourage members of the general public, as well as profes¬ sional writers, to voice their views on current events and issues.

407

408 MICHAEL LEVIN

than many extant punishments. Opponents of the death penalty, for ex¬ ample, are forever insisting that executing a murderer will not bring back his victim (as if the purpose of capital punishment were supposed to be resur¬ rection, not deterrence or retribution). But torture, in the cases described, is intended not to bring anyone back but to keep innocents from being dispatched. The most powerful argument against using torture as a punish-1 ment or to secure confessions is that such practices disregard the rights of the individual. Well, if the individual is all that important—and he is— it is cor¬ respondingly important to protect the rights of individuals threatened by ter¬ rorists. If life is so valuable that it must never be taken, the lives of the innocents must be saved even at the price of hurting the one who endangers them.

Better precedents for torture are assassination and pre-emptive attack. No Allied leader would have flinched at assassinating Hitler, had that been pos¬ sible. (The Allies did assassinate Heydrich.)l Americans would be angered to learn that Roosevelt could have had Hitler killed in 1943—thereby shorten- ing the war and saving millions of lives— but refused on moral grounds. Sim¬ ilarly, if nation A learns that nation B is about to launch an unprovoked attack, A has a right to save itself by destroying B’s military capability first. In the same way, if the police can by torture save those who would otherwise die at the hands of kidnappers or terrorists, they must.

Idealism: There is an important difference between terrorists and their vic¬ tims that should mute talk of the terrorists’ “rights.” The terrorist's victims are at risk unintentionally, not having asked to be endangered. But the terrorist knowingly initiated his actions. Unlike his victims, he volunteered for the risks of his deed. By threatening to kill for profit or idealism, he renounces civilized standards, and he can have no complaint if civilization tries to thwart him by whatever means necessary.

Just as torture is justified only to save lives (not extort confessions or recan¬ tations), it is justifiably administered only to those known to hold innocent lives in their hands. Ah, but how can the authorities ever be sure they have the right malefactor? Isn’t there a danger of error and abuse? Won’t We turn into Them?

Questions like these are disingenuous in a world in which terrorists pro¬ claim themselves and perfonn for television. The name of their game is pub¬ lic recognition. After all, you can’t very well intimidate a government into releasing your freedom fighters unless you announce that it is your group that has seized its embassy. “Clear guilt” is difficult to define, but when 40 mil¬ lion people see a group of masked gunmen seize an airplane on the evening news, there is not much question about who the perpetrators are. There will be hard cases where the situation is murkier. Nonetheless, a line demarcating the legitimate use of torture can be drawn. Torture only the obviously guilty, and only for the sake of saving innocents, and the line between Us and Them will remain clear.

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1. Reinhard Heydrich (1904-1942), Gennan head of the Nazi SS who sistance fighters.

shot by Czech re-

THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 409

There is little danger that the Western democracies will lose their way if they choose to inflict pain as one way of preserving order. Paralysis in the face of evil is the greater danger. Some day soon a terrorist will threaten tens of thousands of lives, and torture will be the only way to save them. We had bet-1 ter start thinking about this.

QUESTIONS

1. Locate Levin’s hypothetical cases and invent hypothetical countercases. Does context complicate Levin’s argument? What are the advantages and disadvantages of arguing from hypothetical and decontextualized cases?

2. What constitutes an ethical decision? Must it be absolute? Could a decision to torture and a decision not to torture, in the same instance, both be ethi- cal?

3. Write an essay in which you make a persuasive case either for or against ton ture in a particular context, with the aim of having readers understand your position whether or not they agree with it.

Tom Regan

THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS

I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights— as a part of the animal rights movement. That movement, as I conceive it, is committed to a num- her of goals, including:

•the total abolition of the use of animals in science; •the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; •the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.

There are, I know, people who profess to believe in animal rights but do not avow these goals. Factory farming, they say, is wrong— it violates animals’ rights— but traditional animal agriculture is all right. Toxicity tests of cosmet- ics on animals violates their rights, but important medical research— cancer research, for example— does not. The clubbing of baby seals is abhorrent, but not the harvesting of adult seals. I used to think I understood this reason¬ ing. Not any more. You don’t change unjust institutions by tidying them up.

What’s wrong—fundamentally wrong— with the way animals are treated isn’t the details that vary from case to case. It’s the whole system. The for- lomness of the veal calf is pathetic, heart-wrenching; the pulsing pain of the chimp with electrodes planted deep in her brain is repulsive; the slow, tortu-

From In Defense of Animals (1985), one of several books Regan has published on this ethical is¬ sue. Others include The Case for Animal Rights (1983) and Defending Animal Rights (2001).