Titanic ethics

A GENERAL SEMANTICS ANALYSIS OE THE RMS TITANIC DISASTER MARTIN H . LEVINSON

...And as the smart ship grew In stature, grace, and hue. In shadowy silent distance

grew the Iceberg too. From The Convergence of the Twain by Thomas Hardy

Introduction

RMS Titanic, the largest moving object of its time, began its maiden voyage from Southampton, England, to New York City on Wednesday, April 10, 1912. On Sunday, April 14, the temperature of the Atlantic Ocean fell to near freezing; the night was clear and calm. The ship's captain had received various ice warnings from other vessels, some of which reached him while others did not.

At 11:40 PM, while sailing about 400 miles south of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, lookouts spotted a large iceberg directly in the Titánicas path The ship turned left to avoid the berg, but the massive chunk of ice openec mortal holes on the vessel's starboard side. The captain ordered lifeboats deployed and distress signals sent out.

Many of the lifeboats were launched at less than full capacity and a woman-and-children-first policy was the rule for coming aboard. At 2:20 AM.

Martin H. Levinson, PhD, is the president of the Institute of General Semantics, vice presi- dent of the New York Society for General Semantics, and a member of the Titanic Histori- cal Society. He is the author of numerous articles and several books on general semantics and other subjects. His latest book is Brooklyn Boorher: Growing Up in the Fifties (2011). He can be contacted at mandklevin@aol.com.

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the Titanic sank beneath the waves, a sinking that ended in the deaths of over 1,500 people and the start of a public fascination with a disaster filled with hubris, heartbreak, and heroism. This article will examine many significant aspects of that disaster through the formulations of general semantics.

/. The Map IsJVot the Territory

An Unsinkable Ship—Not Really

In 1912, the year it sank, the Titanic was known as the finest ship afloat. It weighed over 46,000 tons, was as high as an 11-story building, and was 883-feet long from bow to stem (about a sixth of a mile). It had 29 boilers, 159 furnaces, and a maximum speed of 24 knots. The Titanic was consid- ered so well constructed that many nautical experts thought the ship vir- tually unsinkable.

The Titanic was reported to be watertight. It had a double bottom (the hull was built with two coats of steel) and was divided into 16 watertight compart- ments separated by bulkheads pierced by a series of doors that were controlled either by automatic floating switches or by command from the bridge.

On the night of April 14, when the Titanic hit the iceberg, water begun flooding into at least five of its "watertight compartments" that were any- thing but watertight as the bulkhead walls did not rise appreciably .above the waterline. Water coming over the bulkhead walls could cascade into other compartments, which is what happened the night the Titanic went under. (The Titanic was designed to stay afloat with any two watertight compartments or its first four bow compartments flooded, but that number was exceeded in the collision. As its forward compartments filled, the Titanic began to go down at the head, and water rose and spilled into successive "watertight" compartments, much like water spilling into adjoining sections of a tilted ice-cube tray. Sinking became inevitable.)

Another factor that contributed to the Titanic'?, foundering was that the ship's builder had not used the highest quality wrought-iron rivets in welding the vessel's steel plates, so when the Titanic hit the iceberg, its rivet heads were more easily sheared off causing the plates that the rivets were holding to sepa- rate. Also, the expansion joints (mechanical assemblies that allow a ship's cas- ing to flex in heavy seas) on the Titanic were poorly designed, which, even if the vessel had not struck an iceberg, made the ship vulnerable to stresses on its superstructure. Unsinkable the Titanic defiinitely was not, and sink it did.

Following the Titanic disaster, the company that operated the Titanic, the White Star Line, modified the design of the Titanic's sister ships in two

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ways: the double bottoms were extended up the sides of the hull, and the transverse bulkheads of the watertight compartments were raised.

All the News Isn't Necessarily Fit to Print Radio communication was in its formative years in 1912, and there was a great deal of confusion in England and the United States over the fate of the Titanic. Because of garbled messages, several newspapers published sketchy information as unvarnished truth by reporting that all the passengers had been saved and that the ship was being towed to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Both the New York Evening Sun and the Boston Evening Transcript made this error. William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal, which had the boldest headline of any newspaper, declared "ALL SAFE ON THE TITANIC."

But one paper put out information that was highly accurate from the start. The New York Times headline on April 15, the day of the sinking, read "NEW LINER TITANIC HITS ICEBERG; SINKING BY THE BOW AT MIDNIGHT; WOMEN PUT OFF IN LIFEBOATS; LAST WIRELESS AT 12:27 A.M. BLURRED" and its enure front page was devoted to as many of the details as were known. The Times went on to earn national and international notice for its meticulous and comprehensive coverage of the "story of the century." The April 15th edition is considered by many media mavens to be the most important single issue leading to the creation of the Times as a global authority.

Seeing Should Not Always Be Believing Although only three funnels were needed, a fourth "dummy" funnel was added to the Titanic by the White Star Line, so the public would not perceive the four-funnel ships Mauritania and Lusitania, which were faster than the Titanic and the pride and joy of the Cunard Line, as being more powerful.

//. The Value of Delayed Reactions Slapdash Supervision Binoculars were issued to the lookouts on the Titanic on its trip from Belfast to Southampton. But during a last minute shakeup of personnel, they were removed from the crow's nest and not replaced for the transatlantic voyage; thus, the lookouts were unable to scour the sea for icebergs with field glasses during the crossing. When the ship's Second Officer, Charles Lightoller, was questioned at an inquiry about the lookouts not having binoculars he down- played the matter saying that binoculars can be a liability in maintaining a

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sharp vigil. However, other experts, including the renowned Arctic explorer Admiral Robert Peary, disagreed.

While it is impossible to go back and test the binoculars that were issued to the Titanic, to see how they would have performed in the low- light conditions that were prevalent the night the ship took its last dive, they may have proven helpful to the lookouts in spotting dangers on the sea. That is what Frederick Fleet, the lookout who reported the iceberg to the Titanic's bridge, said at a Senate hearing on the disaster. He maintained if he had been equipped with binoculars the night of the tragedy, the colli- sion could have been avoided, which leads one to wonder if the Titanic might have had a different fate if the officers responsible for supplying the lookouts with binoculars would have taken some extra moments to consider the merits of such devices and made sure the lookouts had them.

Reckless Speed

At the time of the calamity, it is thought the Titanic was at its normal cruis- ing speed of around 22 knots (approximately 25.3 mph), which was a bit under its top speed of about 24 knots (approximately 27.6 mph). However, not all ships were traveling at such a rapid pace in the area contiguous to the Titanic on its luckless night. The skipper of the 55 Californian, which was anchored less than 20 miles from where the Titanic went down, had prudently decided to heave to.

But the captain of the Titanic, Edward J. Smith, elected to sprint toward his final port of call on the evening of April 14, even though there was no moon, wind, or swell to help spot icebergs and the Titanic had received a number of wireless warnings earlier in the day from ships in front of it about bergs ahead—it seems Smith did not appreciate the value of wireless as a constant, continuous navigation aid. Captain Smith clearly wanted to reach New York City on schedule. (Some reasons for that: There was lots of com- petition for sea-going passengers in 1912, and punctual performance was a good selling point. J. Bruce Ismay, the head of the White Star Line, was aboard the Titanic, and Smith's boss would certainly have been happy about getting to New York on or ahead of time. This was Captain Smith's last trip before retiring, and he may have wanted to finish his career with a flourish.)

If Captain Smith had delayed his reflexive desire to maintain normal cruising speed and instead had given added thought to the risks of moving qviickly on iceberg-laden waters, perhaps he would have concluded that slow- ing his ship down would be a wise thing to do. Such a conclusion might have resulted in a more beneficial outcome for the Titanic, as a slower speed would

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have given the ship's lookouts a better chance to see the iceberg and the ship a better chance of surviving the crash. With more thought. Smith might have also decided to alter his course further to the south, post extra lookouts, and warn his engineers to be ready for emergency engine orders from the bridge. Regrettably, and to the great detriment of the crew and passengers aboard the Titanic, such actions were never taken.

///. The Importance of Accurate Assumptions

Foolhardy Pre-Sail Assumptions

The operators of the Titanic assumed that the technology and leadership on board the vessel was of such high quality that rigorous preparation for the ship's maiden voyage was unnecessary. Evidence of that lack of rigor includes the following: The sea trials of the Titanic took place just ten days before its initial trip and lasted no more than 12 hours over the course of a day (the Olympic, a sister ship to the Titanic, received two days of sea trials). During these trials, the ship was never run at full speed (the Olympic's sea trials included several high-speed runs). A number of the crew did not join the ship until hours before its first, and last, commercial voyage. There were no life- boat drills before the Titanic set sail for New York.

Had the White Star Line been less confident and more vigilant in their preparations for the Titanic's transatlantic journey it is likely more lives would have been saved after the ship struck the iceberg because its crew would have had added training in dealing with emergency situations. More- over, if the Titanic's officers had been given further time to practice steering the ship during its sea trials, the crash with the iceberg might have been avoided altogether as they would have had a better chance to fathom that a huge vessel like the Titanic does not respond quickly to the helm. That thought might have led the captain to cut back speed when he was informed of bergs ahead on April 14.

The Titanic may have also been able to miss the iceberg if First Officer William Murdoch, who was on bridge duty when the berg was sighted, had not requested the engines be reversed, prior to steering the ship to the left, as reversing the engines decreased the forward motion of the Titanic causing it to turn more slowly. Additionally, if Murdoch had opted to collide head on with the iceberg, the Titanic's bow would have undoubtedly sustained major damage, but the ship almost certainly would not have sunk—in 1907 the Kronprinz Wilhelm, a German liner, rammed an iceberg but was able to com- plete its voyage despite suffering a crushed bow.

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Flawed Signal Readings

The night the Titanic sank, crewmembers on the Californian (a cargo stea- mer that Lord Mersey, the man in charge of the British Board of Trade Inquiry into the Titanic disaster, surmised was five to ten miles from the Titanic) observed lights from a "mystery ship." The sighting was made known to the Californian's captain, Stanley Lord, who concurred that a Morse-lamp signal be send to that ship. The other vessel never replied.

A short while later, at 1:15 AM. Captain Lord was stirred from slumber and informed that rockets were being fired from a ship in the vicinity of the Californian. Lord asked the crewman who had seen the rockets if they had been a company signal. The crewmember replied he didn't know. Lord said to keep signaling the ship by Morse lamp but did not request the vessel be contacted by wireless. He then went back to sleep.

Ships in the Titanic era sometimes fired flares and Roman candles at night for communication. By firing these in various colors each ship was iden- tified. The night the Titanic went under, it sent up eight white-exploding flares over the course of an hour at regular intervals. No company had as distress signals only white rockets or white rockets throwing off stars. Furthermore, rockets fired off one at a time at short intervals were internationally agreed to be distress signals.

Had Lord given the situation the benefit of a doubt he could have discov- ered if the mystery ship's rockets were distress signals by waking his radio operator and having him ascertain whether distress messages were coming in over the wireless. He then would have known of the Titanic's plight and could have steamed off to help rescue its passengers. Alas, Captain Lord chose not to rouse his radio operator, or himself; hence he did not learn of the tragedy until 6 AM, when he heard from another ship about the sinking and when it was far too late to save anyone in the water. The Carpathia, which had rushed at top speed from 58 miles away, was already picking up survivors.

After the Titanic disaster, it was agreed that rockets at sea would be interpreted as distress signals oniy, thus removing any possible misinterpre- tation from other vessels. Lamentably, that agreement came too late to help the poor souls on the Titanic.

"Women and Children First" Conjectures

Second Officer Charles Lightoller was in charge of loading the lifeboats on the port side of the Titanic, and First Officer William Murdoch was in com- mand on the starboard side. Both officers filled the boats using Captain

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Smith's policy directive of women and children first. However, each man interpreted the evacuation order differently; Murdoch took it to mean women and children first while Lightoller thought it meant women and chil- dren only. Consequently, Lightoller lowered lifeboats with empty seats if there were no women and children waiting to board, while Murdoch allowed a limited number of men to board if all the nearby women and children had embarked.

The women and children first rule, which was honored by most men on the ship and produced an overall death toll of nine men for every one woman, dealt a serious blow to the women's suffrage movement and the related cause of women's rights, both up-and-coming ideas in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The cry of "Votes for women!" seemed not so compelling when set against that of "Women and children first," a decree that was put into practice and went unchallenged by nearly all the women aboard the Titanic (some feminists were outraged that women may have let themselves be treated as helpless objects). Equality of rights also brought with it equality of risks, a notion that the suffragettes and women's rights advo- cates of the time, unlike second-wave feminists 50 years afterward, had not adequately considered.

The Assumptions of George Bernard Shaw and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle George Bernard Shaw and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle published a series of let- ters in the Daily News and Leader in May 1912, expressing opposing views on the Titanic disaster. The first letter was written by Shaw, who railed against the British press for "outrageous romantic lying" on matters regarding the sinking. He specifically argued that the women and children first policy was not strictly followed; that Captain Smith, rather than being a superhero for going down with the ship, had been the precipitator of the accident by having his vessel speed through an ice field and having no binoculars for the lookouts; that lifeboats did not rescue people in the water because their occu- pants were afraid they would jeopardize their own lives by doing that; and that it was wrong to elevate preventable tragedies into badges of national honor. (Shaw particularly objected to the "canonizing" of Captain Smith for his supposed heroism and the myth that all the Englishmen aboard the ship had met death without a tremor.)

Doyle replied to Shaw by accusing him of deliberate misrepresentation and perversity. Yes, Captain Smith had made a mistake, but he had given his life in recompense. The women and first policy was for the most part observed. The conduct of the American males aboard the ship was every bit