Us army problem solving flowchart

45MILITARY REVIEW l July-August 2001

RUDIMENTARY military staff organizationand procedures have developed since 2000 B.C., beginning probably with the armies of early Egypt. But, according to James D. Hittle, a histo- rian of the military staff, the modern staff system did not emerge until late in the 19th century, even later for the US Army. Hittle postulates that mod- ern staff systems have certain features: l A regular education system for training staff

officers. l Delegation of authority from the commander. l Supervised execution of orders issued by or

through the staff. l A set method of procedure by which each part

performs specific duties.1 Hittle’s proposed characteristics would certainly

describe the successful formation of the Prussian Generalstab (general staff) under General Helmuth von Moltke in the latter 19th century. The General- stab was largely responsible for orchestrating Germany’s rapid defeat of France in 1870. During the industrial age, military theory began viewing armies as machines of the nation-state. Detailed al- gorithms of mobilization, rail schedules and troop

movements became the business of army staffs as keys to decisive victory. In von Moltke’s time, the Germans proved that an army that could plan de- tailed requirements, orchestrate capabilities rapidly and implement them precisely would win large-scale wars of national mobilization.

The Generalstab’s power eventually usurped ci- vilian policy because the exhaustive, inflexible mili- tary decisionmaking process (MDMP) and planning actually drove political decisions. The best example of this was at the beginning of World War I when Germany executed the Schlieffen plan. Named for Alfred von Schlieffen, head of the Generalstab from 1892 to 1906, the Schlieffen plan called for swift victory against France through a flanking attack across neutral Belgium. The greatest flaw in the plan was the Generalstab’s assumption that vic- tory would come in six weeks, thereby allowing Germany to respond to the expected sluggish Rus- sian mobilization on a potential eastern front.2 The Schlieffen plan case shows that excellence in planning alone will not overcome a flawed military strategy or concept of operations; operations “may fail not only by being unsuccessfully implemented,

After tracing the history of Army decisionmaking doctrine, the author proposes wide-ranging examination of our procedures, organizations and culture. In the end, the military decisionmaking process emerges as a valuable tool for coordinating intuition with analysis, task with purpose, plans with operations, and the present with the future.

46 July-August 2001 l MILITARY REVIEW

but also by being successfully implemented then proven inadequate.”3

The US form of government makes forming a Generalstab-like military staff unlikely, even dis- tasteful. Civil authority over the military is vested in the US Constitution, making the military pur- posely subservient to civilian decisionmakers and the Constitution itself. Nevertheless, modern nations have adopted ideas from the German staff model.

History of Modern US Army Staff Officers’ Doctrine

As the Schlieffen plan was being developed and the world drew closer to World War I, the US Army lacked published staff doctrine. The 1910 publica- tion, Regulations for Field Maneuvers, did not in- clude a description of staff processes; a 1914 field service regulation (FSR) mentioned the need for a commander and staff estimating process but did not describe one.4

Following World War I, the 1924 version of the FSR included doctrinal formatted orders with re- quired annexes, maps and tables. Still, the FSR stated only that leaders should “first make an esti- mate of the situation, culminating in a decision upon a definite plan of action.”5 No procedural steps were provided to explain this process.

In 1932 the Staff Officers’ Field Manual compiled “principles, information and data to be used as a guide for the operation of staffs of all units and ter- ritorial commands, in peace and war, rather than a set of rules and regulations to be rigidly and blindly followed.”6 The manual provided a comprehensive command and staff doctrine on which modern pro- cedures are based. Orders formats were more de- tailed than in the 1924 FSR, and explanations of staff functions and the commander’s estimate were more complete.

In 1940 the Army began expanding to prepare for World War II, growing to more than eight million soldiers by the end of the war. The scale and com- plexity of military decisionmaking and planning made staff work proportionately more intricate; thus, staff doctrine expanded with the Army. The August

1940 US Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Of- ficers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders, increased the scope and depth of staff doctrine be- yond the 1932 version.

A new method of using draft staff officers’ doc- trine emerged after World War II. The US Army Com- mand and General Staff College (CGSC) published draft staff officers’ doctrine to update frequently changing terms and procedures. The 1949 CGSC draft, for example, emphasized the planning process rather than the orders format. Later CGSC versions were published as numbered reference books and student texts under various titles and formats.7

The July 1950 FM 101-5, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures, the next officially published staff doctrine, added the ad- ministrative commander’s estimate, focusing on analysis for supporting an operation.8 This manual was a logical evolution of the 1949 CGSC draft FM 101-5.

The November 1954 FM 101-5 made the com- mander’s estimate a part of an overall estimate of the situation and added specific staff estimates for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil af- fairs, military government and deception. Interest- ingly, the deception estimate fell out as a stand-alone estimate in the next version and has not reappeared in staff doctrine. The manual adopted the basic five- step analysis associated with the commander’s es- timate process and added conclusions or recommen- dations to paragraph five to supplement the decision step. This version also added atomic weapons and chemical, biological and radiological effects as fac- tors of analysis.9

In June 1968 more detailed procedures were pub- lished while preserving the basic doctrinal concepts. Wiring diagrams and process flowcharts depicted multiple players with plans, orders and estimate pro- cesses occurring simultaneously. Estimate proce- dures were presented as military problem-solving techniques and further shown to be Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2118; hence, US Army doc- trine for staff planning took on an allied flavor for the first time. Additionally, for the first time, pro- cedures differentiated between the operation order (OPORD) and operation plan (OPLAN). Also note- worthy was the introduction of planning assump- tions to “fill the gaps in knowledge of what condi- tions probably will be.”10

While the July 1972 FM 101-5 contained few substantive changes from the 1968 version, it intro- duced the administrative staff study to separate the MDMP for administration from combat opera- tions.11 Replacing the administrative commander’s estimate, the staff study outlined six steps to admin- istrative problem solving: problem, assumptions,

Commander’s intent, along with initial guidance and concept of operations, introduced innovation and initiative to the traditional, analytically oriented MDMP.

Thus, for the first time, this edition emphasized synthesis (integrating elements into a cohesive

whole) in the MDMP as a complementary mental attribute to the traditional analysis

(successively decomposing into parts).

47MILITARY REVIEW l July-August 2001

facts, discussion, conclusions and action recom- mended.12 It also introduced a model showing the sequence of commander and staff actions that more clearly developed the idea of simultaneous and in- teractive staff and commander’s MDMP actions. The model flowchart separated nine staff and commander’s actions. Actions that involved mak- ing synthesized decisions were on the commander’s side of the chart; actions requiring detailed analysis were primarily on the staff’s.13

The 1984 version, retitled Staff Organization and Operations, implemented no fewer than eight STANAGs, indicating more purposeful NATO interoperability. For the first time, Army staff doc- trine discussed the joint planning process and in- cluded a more comprehensive discussion of special- ized staff roles and organization. MDMP changes included adding rehearsals as a new doctrinal step and expanding the MDMP flowchart to show feed- back to the staff estimate, mission analysis and commander’s estimate. The MDMP doctrine now recognized that while supervising decision execu- tion, emergent factors influence changes in mission and commander’s concept—a decision that remains a continuous and interactive process within the MDMP.

Finally, the 1984 edition added a special appen- dix, “Emerging Staff Techniques and Procedures,” which provided a “forum for brief discussion of Armywide initiatives in staff techniques and proce- dures developed to enhance the effectiveness of staff operations in the face of emerging doctrine and rap- idly changing technology.”14 This was an official invitation to open discussion and dialogue, espe- cially about up-and-coming information technolo- gies such as the maneuver control system, micro- processor systems, teleconferencing, facsimiles and decision graphics.

After many CGSC student text drafts, FM 101-5 was again updated and published in 1997. It devoted a chapter to staff officer characteristics, reflecting contemporary management influences; it explained the most intricate procedural aspects of MDMP with a complex, 38-step procedure; it contained more detailed examples for completing plans, orders and annexes; it had a separate appendix on information management; it introduced the concept of the commander’s critical information requirements; and it detailed the concepts, duties and responsibilities of liaison officers based on lessons learned from coalition operations in the Gulf War. Also notewor- thy was the absence of any link to STANAGs.15

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The Schlieffen plan case shows that excellence in planning alone will not overcome a flawed military strategy or concept of operations; operations “may fail not only by being unsuccessfully

implemented, but also by being successfully implemented then proven inadequate.”

German stormtroopers in France, circa 1916. The failed Schlieffen plan aimed for a swift victory against France through a flanking attack across neutral Belgium. A contemporary observer stated that when the operation broke down, shell holes became trenches and the trenches eventually became an elaborate defen- sive system several miles deep.

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The 1997 edition introduced commander’s intent in Army staff doctrine, a concept that had been ex- perimented with at length at CGSC and in Army operations and training. Commander’s intent, along

with initial guidance and concept of operations, in- troduced innovation and initiative to the traditional, analytically oriented MDMP. Thus, for the first time, this edition emphasized synthesis (integrating elements into a cohesive whole) in the MDMP as a complementary mental attribute to the traditional analysis (successively decomposing into parts).

Modern MDMP’s Multiple Dimensions Modern MDMP is a multidimensional undertak-

ing with the decisionmaker, environment, organiza- tion (vertical and horizontal), planning, learning and procedures its major aspects. Many decisionmaking models (most are procedural) have been developed to assist decisionmakers in other than military or- ganizations. However, researchers studying decision- making in civilian organizations have found that decisions appear to be somewhat arbitrary and not necessarily based on the best possible course of action. Hence, one purpose of the Army’s doc- trinal MDMP is to ensure that defining a problem and choosing the best course of action is not ran- domly matching variables but a deliberate action.

The decisionmaker is the central MDMP element. Effective military decisionmakers do not necessar- ily occupy formal leadership positions or have se- nior rank. Future military operations in a dispersed and noncontiguous battle space will likely distrib- ute authority and decisionmaking. Soldiers operat- ing remote sensing devices, uninhabited vehicles or precision-guided munitions, for example, may op- erate autonomously and make critical decisions af- fecting the outcome of military operations.

Good decisionmakers can employ both intuitive and analytic skills. Intuition is an unconscious ap- preciation of patterns of operations—a synthesis process. It reflects understanding that fosters the ability to achieve workable solutions even when in-

formation for making that decision is inadequate or unavailable. Conversely, analysis is conscious rea- soning based on decomposition and manipulation of a situation. It is a methodical process that seeks knowledge in complex environments and involves a step-by-step, systematic procedure.16 Decision- makers display sound judgment—a blend of intu- ition and analysis—when they chose well among options despite uncertainty and ambiguity.17

Good decisionmakers tend to use heuristics or speculative general rules that aid in problem solv- ing by directing the search or decreasing the amount of information searched.18 While Army profession- als are likely to develop similar heuristics, educa- tion, experience, intelligence and personality will affect differences among decisionmakers.19 Military educational institutions use historical analogies and case studies to foster heuristic decisionmaking, for- mulate creative stratagems and develop critical thinking skills.20

Visualization, a related concept to heuristics, is a decisionmaker’s ability to picture what lies ahead. Good decisionmakers, like good chess players, think downboard to envision second- and third-order effects of decisions and develop branches and sequels to current or planned opera- tions. Often specialized staffs—think tanks or fu- tures groups—assist decisionmakers in the visu- alization process.21

Army decisionmakers rely on learned values that affect decisions and planning: l Truth (through analysis—the scientific

method). l Power (in being part of a team that creates the

national element of power). l Goodness and virtue (high ethical and moral

standards). l Aesthetics (appreciation for the art of decision-

making, the satisfaction and beauty of formulating

Modes generally reflect patterns of military planning and when coupled with the

types of planning (detailed, functional and conceptual) give a better picture of the full scope of planning required. The old adage “plan early and plan twice” is based on failure to recognize

proper modes of planning required— committing too early rather than formulating

contingencies or orienting on the threat or opportunity.

49MILITARY REVIEW l July-August 2001

creative solutions to complex problems).22 The environment. MDMP addresses three en-

vironmental settings—the past, present and future. Future environments exist under varying conditions of certainty, so decisions have varying degrees of flexibility and risk. Flexibility flows from available choices—how much force should remain in reserve and where; how many concept plans for branches and sequels should be developed; what kind of ma- neuver (attack or defend) should be employed. Risk is the residual variance of rational choice or the decision’s stability —whether underlying assump- tions about the environment or the effects of the de- cision on the environment hold true. Risk may be accepted, for example, by some measure of avail- able force readiness or the enemy’s known readi- ness. Less flexibility (stronger commitment to a single choice) and less risk (more stability) are char- acteristics of decisions made with certainty, while the opposites may be true under conditions of greater uncertainty. The availability and quality of information about the environment—past, present

and future—produce variances in knowledge and understanding of what has happened, what is hap- pening and what will happen.

Vertical aspects of MDMP. Decisionmakers must understand how decisions concerning tactics, operations, strategies or policy nest in higher-level organizations. The same MDMP principle applies to ensuring that subordinates understand the com- mander’s intent. A recent MDMP study demon- strated that successful commanders best impart their intent through a healthy command climate, telling subordinates what and not how (mission-type or- ders), explaining how they arrived at their decision (their thinking process), good feedback mecha- nisms (subordinate access to the superior’s MDMP) and being familiar with their subordinates (a mea- sure of trust).23

Status is another aspect of vertical organizational influence on MDMP. Especially under conditions of stress, those with less military rank or on a lower organizational level tend to defer to others of higher rank and organizational level. The result may be overcentralized decisionmaking.24

Horizontal (group) aspects of MDMP. Group military decisionmaking is a corollary to conflict management in various organizations. Conflict is eliminated, often incrementally, through consensus and through loosely coupled decisionmaking

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Visualization, a related concept to heuristics, is a decisionmaker’s ability to picture what lies ahead. Good decisionmakers, like good chess players, think downboard to

envision second- and third-order effects of decisions and develop branches and sequels to current or planned operations. Often specialized staffs—think tanks or futures groups—

assist decisionmakers in the visualization process.

Members of Lockheed’s Advanced Development Projects Division, or “Skunk Works,” prepare the first F-117 stealth aircraft for an engine test, spring 1981. This team carried the project from concept to design to prototype.

50 July-August 2001 l MILITARY REVIEW

systems when efforts to seek consensus fail.25 In op- erations involving joint and combined military or- ganizations or other agencies and nongovernment organizations, consensus building and a more loosely coupled MDMP have proven useful.

Loosely coupled processes try to make sense of seemingly random systems using decentralization,

delegation, vague language, vague expectations, and coaching and educating through talk and action.26 Loosely coupled operations permit greater freedom of action and variation in execution—allowing par- ticipants broader latitude without adversely affect- ing the operation.

Planning aspects of MDMP. In large Army or- ganizations, such as corps and divisions, near-term decisions (current operations) are always nested in long-term decisions (plans). To plan is to design a desired future (ends) and orchestrate effective ways and means of bringing it about. A plan is anticipa- tory decisionmaking that involves a set of interde- pendent decisions. The process is continuous and has no conclusion or end point. What separates stra- tegic planning from operational and tactical plan- ning is largely the difficulty of reversing its effects during execution.27

Military planning shifts the decisionmaking load to earlier periods of relative inactivity.28 This was certainly true with the XVIII Airborne Corps dur- ing Operation Desert Shield where planners focused MDMP on incremental defensive planning during the force buildup phase. That plan changed as more military capability deployed into the maturing the- ater. In addition, through implementing a viable defense, ample time was assured to plan extensively for the XVIII Airborne Corps’ ground offensive against Iraq.29

US Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5 (MCDP 5), Planning, provides an extensive and valuable dis- cussion of the nature of planning, including plan- ning theory and what makes planning effective. It defines planning as “the art and science of envision- ing a desired future and laying out effective ways to bring it about, influencing events before they oc- cur.”30 Categories of Marine planning include force

planning (creating and maintaining military capabili- ties) and operation planning (what the Army would associate with the MDMP type of planning). MCDP 5 describes a planning continuum from: l Detailed planning (the lowest level; focuses on

“how-to” instructions for control measures and movement tables, for example). l Functional planning (the medium level; sup-

ports plans with discrete functional activities such as logistics, security and intelligence). l Conceptual planning (the highest level; opera-

tional concepts, commander’s intent, goals and ob- jectives).31

The levels are interactive; concepts will drive functional and detailed planning, and details will influence functional and conceptual planning. This hierarchy may be processed at any level of organi- zation or war. MCDP 5 describes planning modes as another dimension of planning and also along a continuum of risk and time: l Commitment planning (resources are physi-

cally prepared under conditions of greater certainty with a shorter time horizon). l Contingency planning (resources are pro-

grammed for several projected circumstances—but not physically committed—under conditions of mod- erate uncertainty with an increased time horizon). l Orientation planning (resources are in rough

concept—continually assessing and designing pre- liminary plans allows response to a broad variety of circumstances over longer periods).32

Modes generally reflect patterns of military plan- ning and when coupled with the types of planning (detailed, functional and conceptual) give a better picture of the full scope of planning required. The old adage “plan early and plan twice” is based on failure to recognize proper modes of planning re- quired—committing too early rather than formulat- ing contingencies or orienting on the threat or op- portunity. Another planning adage, “the truth changes,” applies as well. Over time interpretations of the situation change. While each change may be small and immediate, the cumulative drift can lead to transformation large enough that few will recog- nize history’s relationship to the current situation. Without recognizing patterns, projecting the future situation is difficult if not impossible.

Learning aspects of MDMP. C.S. Forester’s his- torical novel, The General, portrays World War I British leaders as simple- and single-minded. In what today’s US Army would call an after-action review (AAR), Forester depicts a British army corps commander and his division commanders discuss- ing the battle of Loos, a failed allied offensive.

The September 1915 offensive was based on an allied delusion that “artillery could blast a hole through the opposing wall for infantry and thereby

One danger in MDMP is being overanalytical, creating a tendency toward

premature closure in the process of formulating stratagems. Decisionmakers may be more

comfortable or competent conducting MDMP’s procedural aspects. They may give inadequate

attention to the less-structured, but more important, step of generating stratagems

in the first place.

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assure success.”33 British killed in action totaled 60,000 and the breakthrough failed. Forester de- scribes the World War I AAR: “In some ways it was like the debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of wood. Accustomed only to nails, they had made one effort to pull out the screw by main force, and now that it had failed they were devising methods of applying more force still, of obtaining more efficient pincers, of using levers and fulcrum so that more men could bring their strength to bear. They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come out after the exertion of far less effort; it would be so different that they would laugh at the man who suggested it.”34

Even in a learning organization that conducts AARs and harvests lessons and observations, ap- proaches can be deadly wrong if they are based on faulty MDMP devoid of creative thinking. Based on such reasoning, British generals later planned an even larger fiasco—the Somme offensive in sum- mer 1916—where again more than 60,000 British soldiers perished. Caught in “paralysis through analysis” they decided through a commander and staff estimate process that they could attain victory by merely improving on the same concept of op- erations from the previous offensive. This sort of behavior has been called a “competency trap,” which “arises in various forms in many adaptive systems and reflects the ways in which improving capabilities with one rule, technology, strategy or practice interferes with changing that rule, technol- ogy, strategy or practice to another that is potentially superior (but with which the decisionmaker has little current competence).”35