Us army problem solving flowchart

45MILITARY REVIEW l July-August 2001

RUDIMENTARY military staff organizationand procedures have developed since 2000 B.C., beginning probably with the armies of early Egypt. But, according to James D. Hittle, a histo- rian of the military staff, the modern staff system did not emerge until late in the 19th century, even later for the US Army. Hittle postulates that mod- ern staff systems have certain features: l A regular education system for training staff

officers. l Delegation of authority from the commander. l Supervised execution of orders issued by or

through the staff. l A set method of procedure by which each part

performs specific duties.1 Hittle’s proposed characteristics would certainly

describe the successful formation of the Prussian Generalstab (general staff) under General Helmuth von Moltke in the latter 19th century. The General- stab was largely responsible for orchestrating Germany’s rapid defeat of France in 1870. During the industrial age, military theory began viewing armies as machines of the nation-state. Detailed al- gorithms of mobilization, rail schedules and troop

movements became the business of army staffs as keys to decisive victory. In von Moltke’s time, the Germans proved that an army that could plan de- tailed requirements, orchestrate capabilities rapidly and implement them precisely would win large-scale wars of national mobilization.

The Generalstab’s power eventually usurped ci- vilian policy because the exhaustive, inflexible mili- tary decisionmaking process (MDMP) and planning actually drove political decisions. The best example of this was at the beginning of World War I when Germany executed the Schlieffen plan. Named for Alfred von Schlieffen, head of the Generalstab from 1892 to 1906, the Schlieffen plan called for swift victory against France through a flanking attack across neutral Belgium. The greatest flaw in the plan was the Generalstab’s assumption that vic- tory would come in six weeks, thereby allowing Germany to respond to the expected sluggish Rus- sian mobilization on a potential eastern front.2 The Schlieffen plan case shows that excellence in planning alone will not overcome a flawed military strategy or concept of operations; operations “may fail not only by being unsuccessfully implemented,

After tracing the history of Army decisionmaking doctrine, the author proposes wide-ranging examination of our procedures, organizations and culture. In the end, the military decisionmaking process emerges as a valuable tool for coordinating intuition with analysis, task with purpose, plans with operations, and the present with the future.

46 July-August 2001 l MILITARY REVIEW

but also by being successfully implemented then proven inadequate.”3

The US form of government makes forming a Generalstab-like military staff unlikely, even dis- tasteful. Civil authority over the military is vested in the US Constitution, making the military pur- posely subservient to civilian decisionmakers and the Constitution itself. Nevertheless, modern nations have adopted ideas from the German staff model.

History of Modern US Army Staff Officers’ Doctrine

As the Schlieffen plan was being developed and the world drew closer to World War I, the US Army lacked published staff doctrine. The 1910 publica- tion, Regulations for Field Maneuvers, did not in- clude a description of staff processes; a 1914 field service regulation (FSR) mentioned the need for a commander and staff estimating process but did not describe one.4

Following World War I, the 1924 version of the FSR included doctrinal formatted orders with re- quired annexes, maps and tables. Still, the FSR stated only that leaders should “first make an esti- mate of the situation, culminating in a decision upon a definite plan of action.”5 No procedural steps were provided to explain this process.

In 1932 the Staff Officers’ Field Manual compiled “principles, information and data to be used as a guide for the operation of staffs of all units and ter- ritorial commands, in peace and war, rather than a set of rules and regulations to be rigidly and blindly followed.”6 The manual provided a comprehensive command and staff doctrine on which modern pro- cedures are based. Orders formats were more de- tailed than in the 1924 FSR, and explanations of staff functions and the commander’s estimate were more complete.

In 1940 the Army began expanding to prepare for World War II, growing to more than eight million soldiers by the end of the war. The scale and com- plexity of military decisionmaking and planning made staff work proportionately more intricate; thus, staff doctrine expanded with the Army. The August

1940 US Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Of- ficers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders, increased the scope and depth of staff doctrine be- yond the 1932 version.

A new method of using draft staff officers’ doc- trine emerged after World War II. The US Army Com- mand and General Staff College (CGSC) published draft staff officers’ doctrine to update frequently changing terms and procedures. The 1949 CGSC draft, for example, emphasized the planning process rather than the orders format. Later CGSC versions were published as numbered reference books and student texts under various titles and formats.7

The July 1950 FM 101-5, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures, the next officially published staff doctrine, added the ad- ministrative commander’s estimate, focusing on analysis for supporting an operation.8 This manual was a logical evolution of the 1949 CGSC draft FM 101-5.

The November 1954 FM 101-5 made the com- mander’s estimate a part of an overall estimate of the situation and added specific staff estimates for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil af- fairs, military government and deception. Interest- ingly, the deception estimate fell out as a stand-alone estimate in the next version and has not reappeared in staff doctrine. The manual adopted the basic five- step analysis associated with the commander’s es- timate process and added conclusions or recommen- dations to paragraph five to supplement the decision step. This version also added atomic weapons and chemical, biological and radiological effects as fac- tors of analysis.9

In June 1968 more detailed procedures were pub- lished while preserving the basic doctrinal concepts. Wiring diagrams and process flowcharts depicted multiple players with plans, orders and estimate pro- cesses occurring simultaneously. Estimate proce- dures were presented as military problem-solving techniques and further shown to be Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2118; hence, US Army doc- trine for staff planning took on an allied flavor for the first time. Additionally, for the first time, pro- cedures differentiated between the operation order (OPORD) and operation plan (OPLAN). Also note- worthy was the introduction of planning assump- tions to “fill the gaps in knowledge of what condi- tions probably will be.”10

While the July 1972 FM 101-5 contained few substantive changes from the 1968 version, it intro- duced the administrative staff study to separate the MDMP for administration from combat opera- tions.11 Replacing the administrative commander’s estimate, the staff study outlined six steps to admin- istrative problem solving: problem, assumptions,

Commander’s intent, along with initial guidance and concept of operations, introduced innovation and initiative to the traditional, analytically oriented MDMP.