Loading...

Messages

Proposals

Stuck in your homework and missing deadline? Get urgent help in $10/Page with 24 hours deadline

Get Urgent Writing Help In Your Essays, Assignments, Homeworks, Dissertation, Thesis Or Coursework & Achieve A+ Grades.

Privacy Guaranteed - 100% Plagiarism Free Writing - Free Turnitin Report - Professional And Experienced Writers - 24/7 Online Support

Writings of marcus aurelius pdf

24/11/2021 Client: muhammad11 Deadline: 2 Day

HANDBOOK of

EPICTETUS

Translated, with introduction and annotations, by NICHOLAS WHITE

HACKETT PUBLISHING COMPANY Indianapolis/Cambridge

EPICTETUS: c. A.D. 50-130

Table of Contents

Copyright © 1983 by Nicholas P. White All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 99 98 7 8 9 10

Cover design by Richard L. Listenberger Interior design by James N. Rogers

For further information, please address Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. P.O. Box 44937, Indianapolis, IN 46244-0937

Introduction 1

HANDBOOK OF EPICTETUS 11

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Epictetus. The handbook of Epictetus.

(HPC philosophical classics series) Bibliography: p. 1. Ethics. I. White, Nicholas P., 1942—

II. Title, m. Series. B560.E5W54 1983 188 83-267 ISBN 0-915145-69-3 (pbk.) ISBN 0-87220-049-3 (cloth)

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Introduction

Stoic philosophy, of which Epictetus (c. A.D. 50-130) is a represent- ative, began as a recognizable movement around 300 B.C. Its founder was Zeno of Cytium (not to be confused with Zeno of Elea, who discovered the famous paradoxes). He was born in Cyprus about 336 B.C., but all of his philosophical activity took place in Athens. For more than 500 years Stoicism was one of the most influential and fruitful philosophical movements in the Graeco-Roman world. The works of the earlier Stoics survive only in fragmentary quotations from other authors, but from the Renaissance until well into the nineteenth cen- tury, Stoic ethical thought was one of the most important ancient influences on European ethics, particularly because of the descrip- tions of it by Cicero, through surviving works by the Stoics Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and also Epictetus—and also because of the effect that it had had in antiquity, and continued to have into the nine- teenth century, on Christian ethical views. Nowadays an under- graduate or graduate student learning about ancient philosophy in a university course may well hear only about Plato and Aristotle, along perhaps with the presocratics; but in the history of Western thought and education this situation is somewhat atypical, and in most periods a comparable student would have learned as much or more about Stoicism, as well as two other major ancient philosophical movements, Epicureanism and Scepticism. In spite of this lack of explicit acquaintance with Stoic philosophers and their works, however, most students will recognize in Epictetus various ideas that are familiar through their effects on other thinkers, notably Spinoza, in our intellectual tradition.

As one should expect in a philosophical tradition of as much as 500 years' active duration, Stoic philosophy varied a great deal, though its basic ideas remained the same. Although it is unclear to what extent Zeno was a theoretically oriented philosopher like Plato or Aristotle, or to what extent he was instead concerned mainly to dispense practical advice to people on how to live their lives, it is

2 / INTRODUCTION

clear that early Stoic philosophy, particularly as carried on by Chrysip- pus (c. 279-206 B.C.), the third head of the Stoic school at Athens, was very largely a theoretical and (in the modern sense) academic philosophical movement. In a philosopher like Epictetus, on the other hand, one has the sense that the practical advice-giving side dominates, and that interest in working through philosophical problems or arguments is relatively small. In varying degrees, the works of later Stoics such as Seneca (c. 5 B.C.-A.D. 65) and Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) are in this respect much like those of Epictetus. It is a dif- ficult and interesting question whether this difference reflects a dif- ference in philosophical doctrine between the earlier and the later writers, or rather simply a difference in the manner in which they chose to expound the same underlying doctrine.

We can both examine this question and take a first look at Epictetus' views at the same time. Perhaps the most succinct statement of his view of the best possible condition for a human being to be in is given by c. 8 of the Handbook:

Do not seek to have events happen as you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your life will go well.

Epictetus is here not claiming that if you adopt this attitude then external events in the world will go well for you, but that the best possible human condition, not being a matter of such external events but of one's state of mind, precisely is one of adopting just this at- titude. This appears to be much the same thought that motivated the statement by Zeno that the end or telos of a human being's life is to be in accord or agreement with nature (cf., e.g., cc. 4, 30). The problem, however, concerns just what this thought amounts to, and whether it is really the same in Epictetus as it was in Zeno.

If we look at it in the following way, which seems to me correct, it does appear to be the same idea in both, up to a point. The basic idea is that for a human being to be in an ideal state is to lack all dissatisfaction with anything about the world, while at the same time being conscious and intelligent. One way of doing this might be to satisfy all of one's desires; but the Stoics held, not unreasonably, that a human being is by nature unable to do this, both because one's powers are so limited and because desires, at least for certain things, are unlimited by anything except life span. Therefore, in the passage quoted, Epictetus recommends against this way. The other way, rather than altering the external world to bring it into

Introduction I 3

line with one's desires, is to set those desires so that they are in line with the way the external world actually is. This is the way that the Stoics recommend, and thus far Zeno and Epictetus seem to be in agreement.

The question, however, is how to put oneself into such a state, and what must be going on in one's mind, so to speak, to be actually in it. Both early and late Stoics seem to have agreed that this must be done by realizing that all events, at least in the external world, are completely determined by prior states of the universe as a whole. According to this form of determinism, anyone knowing all there is to know about the world prior to a given time would be able to predict with complete certainty what would happen at that time and later times. In addition, the Stoics seem to have viewed the world as organized by a perhaps even stronger sort of coherence than mere determination of future events by past events. For they held that the universe is an organic and perfect whole, exhibiting an orderliness that somehow links all of its parts together. As a result of these views about the coherence of the pattern exhibited by the cosmos, the Stoics believed that once one became aware of that pattern, one would see that the nature of any local occurrence was completely fixed by the rest of the pattern, so that it would be regarded as an impossibility that, the rest of the world being what it is, the local event might have been different.

Given this much, one can see something about the state of mind that the Stoics thought was involved in bringing desires into line completely with the way the world actually is. It was one of under- standing fully that nothing, and notably no event that might result in dissatisfaction, could possibly be otherwise than it actually is. Given the awareness of the place of such an event in the whole pattern of the cosmos, one could be quite unable to conceive of the events being any different. It is helpful to use an example (not one that the Stoics themselves used). Given a grasp of the series of positive integers, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., one can easily feel that it is quite impossible to conceive that, for example, 2 + 1 might have been equal to 4 or 17 or indeed anything other than 3. Given the inconceivability of any alternative, it seems reasonable to hold that there is no in- telligibility in the idea of wishing or desiring that 2 + 1 might not have been equal to 3, or might have been equal to anything other than what it is equal to. It is this sort of attitude that the Stoics thought one might be able to reach with regard to all events in the world. One would understand the pattern as well as we understand the pat- tern of 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. (or some finite segment of it—since the Stoics

4 / INTRODUCTION

believed that the universe is finite); and so just as we cannot regard as intelligible the idea of wishing that 2 + 1 were other than 3, so too one could not regard as intelligible the idea that any event might be otherwise than it is. The inconceivability of alternatives would thus rule out dissatisfaction with things as they actually are.

But the question then arises, once we have gone this far, what sort of understanding of the pattern of nature would be required for a person'to reach this complete lack of dissatisfaction. For exam- ple, would it suffice merely to be convinced that—in just these words—the universe is a perfectly organized whole governed by deter- minism? Or would one have to be familiar with, or even consciously aware of, a great many details of the pattern, or even of all of the details of it? (Likewise one can ask how well one would have to under- stand the series of natural numbers to be unable to conceive of alter- natives to, say, its being the case that 67 + 475 is equal to 542, and so on for more complicated facts.) There may have been some disagreement among the Stoics on this question. Some of them (in all likelihood Chrysippus and his predecessor Cleanthes) may well have thought that to be in a fully ideal and dissatisfaction-free state of mind, one would have to possess a completely detailed knowledge of all aspects of the organization of the cosmos, including a great deal of physics and also logic (it is possible that Cleanthes stressed the former and Chrysippus the latter). Alternatively, it may have been held by others—perhaps including Aristo of Chios, the somewhat heretical Stoic contemporary of Chrysippus, and quite possibly also many later Stoics, and perhaps even Epictetus (see c. 49)—that a simple acceptance of the proposition that the universe is an organized whole subject to determinism would be enough. If this is so, then perhaps there is an important disagreement within the Stoic move- ment on the nature of the ideal state of mind for a human being.

On the other hand, it is possible to suppose that the disagreement was not such a basic disagreement about doctrine, but was rather a matter of emphasis and intended audience. Even if one believed that the ideal state of mind—as sometimes attributed to the paragon of perfection, the Stoic "sage"—required a completely detailed knowledge of all aspects of the cosmic pattern, one could still hold that there were various different approaches to, or approximations of, that ideal state; and that important among them, especially for ordinary people, would be the simple acceptance of the idea, without all of the details, that the universe is a perfectly organized whole. If Epictetus is interpreted in this way, he would be regarded not as having differed with the earlier Stoics in matters of basic doctrine

Introduction I 5

about the ideal state of a human being, but as having a preference for concentrating on how ordinary people might begin to approx- imate it, rather than on describing the details of the state itself. (In- deed, as c. 49 suggests, one could reasonably think that the latter sort of description might actually get in the way of the former effort.)

Even when looked at sympathetically, the Stoic view has a number of features that are open to objections, as was pointed out by critics in antiquity and since. (1) For one thing, it has seemed to many that the Stoic belief in determinism raises problems, essentially the same problems familiar from present-day discussions of determinism. It is held, for example, that determinism is incompatible with or- dinary notions of moral responsibility, and with the possibility of praise and blame. It is also held that if determinism is true, then there is no point in anyone's making any effort to do anything or to accomplish any goals. The Stoics maintained that these objec- tions could be met, and indeed many philosophers nowadays agree (though many also do not) that determinism is in fact compatible with moral responsibility, and with the making of effort. Cicero's De Fato contains an account of Stoic views about this issue, though unfor- tunately not all of that work has come down to us. (2) Another ob- jection to the Stoic view is that, given their position on what the ideal state is for a human being, they had to regard all particular states of the external world as "indifferent," i.e., neither good nor bad (see cc. 32 and 1), since the best state to be in was one of not being dissatisfied with any external state at all. This view has seemed para- doxical to some opponents, who have held that some external states of the world themselves have positive or negative value. For exam- ple, some philosophers have believed that it is better if people in- crease each other's happiness than if they do not, or better if the world is beautiful than if it is not—and such philosophers have found it implausible to maintain, with the Stoics, that such states of the external world are neither good nor bad. (3) In another way, too, opponents have seen a difficulty in the Stoic contention that ex- ternal states are "indifferent." For such a contention might make it seem senseless, once again, to put any effort into doing anything to affect the external world, if nothing of genuine value could thereby be produced. The Stoics, however, generally denied that their view made ordinary human efforts pointless, and tried to explain how one might simultaneously both (a) regard all external states of af- fairs as indifferent, and (b) engage in efforts and actions as human beings ordinarily do. There is room for disagreement over how suc- cessful their explanation was. The reader of Epictetus' Handbook will

6 / INTRODUCTION

perhaps see in it a tension over this very issue. On the one side, he denies that anything not "up to us" is of value; but on the other side, although he presses us to accept this idea, he does not recom- mend that we refrain completely from all normal human efforts. The reader will find it interesting to ask whether there really is a conflict here. (4) A further difficulty resembles the previous two, but is perhaps even more acute. The Stoics apparently regarded as "indifferent" not only states that are plainly external to one's consciousness, but also many states of consciousness as well, including such feelings as pleasures and pains, to which most people are strongly inclined to assign some value or the contrary. On the Stoic view, these states are part of what is determined by the organization of the cosmos, and so are to be regarded as unchangeable and not appropriately to be desired to be otherwise than they are. Very roughly, if one feels a pain, then no matter how intense or severe it is, one is ideally sup- posed to be able to adopt the attitude that, given one's understand- ing of the organization of the cosmos, the pain really does not matter— that is, it is not really appropriately wished otherwise. Hedonists will obviously disagree, but one does not have to be an out-and-out hedonist to feel that there is something difficult to accept in this view. It seems to involve a dissociation of one's judgments of value from one's normal affective responses, and even from one's normal responses to those responses. It is rather difficult, and many would say impossible, to regard this dissociation as a part of an ideal human condition, or even perhaps of a conceivable one. The Stoic reaction was generally to emphasize that what they were describing was very much an ideal, and not a state that many or even any actual people have attained or can even imagine attaining, but this reaction has not always been felt to be satisfactory.

In spite of the possibility of these objections, the Stoic view has been felt to have strength arising from a number of considerations. One is that, as a matter of psychological fact, we often do find ourselves able to bear discomfort or pain apparently because of the thought that after all, the pain is not really important in the overall scheme of things. However one may be inclined to explain this phenomenon, it is not hard to see why the Stoics would have been tempted to extra- polate from it, to the conclusion than an ideal state would involve looking at all events in the world in this way. In addition, it is not inexplicable why they might have thought that this attitude could be maintained, as I have explained, by an understanding of the organization of the universe. There is something tempting in the idea, which has been taken very seriously by philosophers as con-

Introduction I 7

siderable as Plato and Spinoza and Kant, that the way to judge mat- ters of value correctly is by abstracting radically from all of the par- ticularities of one's own situation, and looking at matters from a purely impersonal point of view. The Stoics pressed this line of thought strongly, and insisted not only that this was the standpoint to adopt in correctly judging matters of value, but also that doing so con- stituted the best state of an individual human being. Indeed, they maintained that the ideal state of a human being was divine, in the sense that it was the point of view that ought to be ascribed to a god. The Stoic idea of the ideal human condition, therefore, can be fairly well approximated by saying that it attributes to that condi- tion many of the characteristics that many people attribute to God. This description of course raises questions about whether it can then be described as an ideal human condition, but at least it does indicate the line of thought that the Stoics were following.

It should be said at this point that there was within the Stoic move- ment, particularly during the Second and First Centuries B.C., an apparently strong tendency to qualify in some way this extreme account of the completely impersonal and non-self-referential character of the ideal viewpoint of the Stoic sage, and to suggest ways in which different people might aim at different ideals, each appropriate to one's own actual endowments and circumstances in life. This idea is particularly associated with the philosopher Panaetius (c. 185-105), some of whose views are expounded in Cicero's De Officiis. Panaetius especially emphasized the idea that the appropriate actions vary from circumstance to circumstance. It is not clear whether he thereby meant to be denying that there was a single, unitary ideal human condition, though some have taken him in this way. He may, for example, simply have been pointing to variations in the ways in which this ideal may be approximated, or variations in the ways in which a person in this single ideal condition might manifest it in action. If this is so, then he would, like Epictetus, have been em- phasizing not the description of the Stoic ideal, but aspects of how to act in the condition in which one actually finds oneself. But it does appear that he, more than Epictetus, stressed the differences that might obtain among various people all aiming at the same ideal. For although Epictetus is concerned, as I have said, with giving ad- vice to imperfect human beings, he tends to assume that generally speaking the same advice will do pretty well for all of us.

A word should be said about one of the better-known slogans of Stoic ethics, ' 'Nothing is good except moral virtue,' ' nihil bonum nisi honestum. It is misleading, especially when reading Epictetus, to think

8 / INTRODUCTION

of the Stoic ethical position as perfectly characterized by this saying, especially if it is taken in the way that we find natural. For the Stoics, early and late, identified living in accordance with virtue as living in accordance with nature, meaning by this the telos of human life that I have described in the first few pages of this introduction, and which is expressed in c. 8 of the Handbook (see, e.g., Diogenes Laer- tius, Lives of the Philosophers, VII. 87). Thus, in propounding the Greek sentence translated by, "Nothing is good except moral virtue,' ' they were not expressing the view that we might express by that sentence, but rather the claim, which I have said is characteristic of their view, that nothing is of value except an attitude adapted to the natural organization of the cosmos. They believed, in fact, that a person having such an attitude would in general live in accordance with established moral standards (though they allowed exceptions). But their main point was not this, but rather the contention about the ideal state of a human being that I have described.

As I have implied, Epictetus' own view has some features that do and some features that do not reflect the strict Stoic view of the ideal condition of a human being. To a great extent, he is interested mainly in explaining to people, not how they should understand an ideal condition, but how they can make their own condition somewhat better than it is. For this purpose, he adopts the strategy of persuading them that they should adjust their desires and their attitudes toward them in certain ways, which seem largely to be ways of setting their sights lower, not expecting to have certain desires satisfied, and living with the idea that such desires were not worth satisfying anyway. In many situations, of course, this is a sensible strategy, and Epictetus' remarks are often interesting in that light. Epictetus himself was a slave during the earlier part of his life, and must have known something of what it was like to have no other strategy available. At the same time, however, his advice is heavily influenced by his belief in the earlier Stoic view of the ideal condition for a human being, and will be regarded by many as open to the same objections to which that earlier view is open.

We do not possess any works actually written by Epictetus. What we do have is four books of Discourses compiled by Flavius Arrianus, some fragments reported by others, and the Handbook or Manual or Encheiridion translated here, which is made up of extracts from the Discourses. It appears that Epictetus wrote nothing for publication,

Introduction I 9

and that his activity was almost entirely as a teacher, mostly in Nicopolis on the northwest coast of Greece, after banishment from Rome by the emperor Domitian in A.D. 89 or 92. Someone who wants to get the flavor of his style and personality should read the Discourses, which reveal more about them than the highly condensed Handbook.

I have tried to translate the Handbook, in Oldfather's text, into a fairly straightforward sort of English, while staying quite close to the wording and phraseology of the Greek. Epictetus' style is not formal or ornate, but neither is it loose or easygoing; and although it is conversational and occasionally colloquial, it is the exact and careful colloquialism of the schoolteacher, with frequent use of ver- bal repetition to make its point clear and definite. The effect is in- evitably a bit stiff, though not in a bad way, and although I have tried to keep the tone from being archaic, I have equally tried not to impose on it a casualness that would have been misleading.

This is not the place for a large bibliography, and so I shall merely indicate where the interested reader may start in order to find out more about Epictetus and Stoic philosophy. For alternative ways of translating the Handbook, one should look particularly at the ver- sion by Oldfather (London, 1928), which is printed in the Loeb Classical Library edition along with the Discourses. One should also look at the translation by Matheson (Oxford, 1916), which is reprinted in Jason L. Saunders, Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle (New York, 1966). This book also contains a very useful brief selection of fragments of the earlier Stoics in translation, and is the best way now available for readers of English to read those fragments. For a general introduction to Stoic philosophy in its earlier form, one should read Ch. 4 of A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (New York, 1974); some later developments are discussed in Ch. 5. For brief accounts of the major Stoic philosophers, the most efficient course is to read the following articles in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1967): "Zenoof Cytium" (c. 336-c. 265 B.C.); "Cleanthes" (c. 331-232); "Chrysippus" (c. 279-206); "Panaetius of Rhodes" (c. 185-c. 105); "Posidonius" (135-c. 51); "Seneca" (c. 5 B.C.-A.D. 65); "Epictetus" (c. 50-A.D. 130); "Mar- cus Aurelius Antoninus" (121-180). All of these articles give bibliographical information. Two recent collections of essays that give some idea of the range and interest of Stoic thought are A. A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), and John M. Rist, ed. The Stoics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978). A recent collection of fragments of Stoic writings, translated into English, along with helpful

10 / INTRODUCTION

discussions of Stoic thought, is to be found in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press).

I am grateful to Professor Paul Woodruff for reading this translation and for making very helpful suggestions which led to its improvement. Of course, any remaining deficiencies are my responsibility.

Handbook of Epictetus

1. Some things are up to us and some are not up to us. Our opin- ions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions—in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices, or, that is, whatever is not our own doing. The things that are up to us are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; the things that are not up to us are weak, enslaved, hindered, not our own. So remember, if you think that things naturally enslaved are free or that things not your own are your own, you will be thwarted, miserable, and upset, and will blame both gods and men. But if you think that only what is yours is yours, and that what is not your own is, just as it is, not your own, then no one will ever coerce you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, you will not accuse anyone, you will not do a single thing unwillingly, you will have no enemies, and no one will harm you, because you will not be harmed at all.

As you aim for such great goals, remember that you must not undertake them by acting moderately,1 but must let some things go completely and postpone others for the time being. But if you want both those great goals and also to hold public office and to be rich, then you may perhaps not get even the latter just because you aim at the former too; and you certainly will fail to get the former, which are the only things that yield freedom and happiness.2

1. This may mean simply that the proposed undertaking is difficult (Oldfather's translation suggests this), or it may mean (as I believe) that the aim cannot be achieved by the Aristotelian policy of pursuing a mean or middle course between extremes.

2. Epictetus recommends aiming to have one's state of mind in accord with nature, in the sense explained in the previous paragraph and in c. 8 (cf. Introd.). His point here is that if you aim for that and also simultaneously for certain "exter- nals' ' like wealth, you will probably have neither and clearly will not have the former.

11

12 / HANDBOOK of EPICTETUS

From the start, then, work on saying to each harsh appearance,3

"You are an appearance, and not at all the thing that has the ap- pearance." Then examine it and assess it by these yardsticks that you have, and first and foremost by whether it concerns the things that are up to us or the things that are not up to us. And if it is about one of the things that is not up to us, be ready to say, "You are nothing in relation to me."

2. Remember, what a desire proposes is that you gain what you desire, and what an aversion proposes is that you not fall into what you are averse to. Someone who fails to get what he desires is unfor- tunate, while someone who falls into what he is averse to has met mwfortune. So if you are averse only to what is against nature among the things that are up to you, then you will never fall into anything that you are averse to; but if you are averse to illness or death or poverty, you will meet misfortune. So detach your aversion from everything not up to us, and transfer it to what is against nature among the things that are up to us. And for the time being eliminate desire completely, since if you desire something that is not up to us, you are bound to be unfortunate, and at the same time none of the things that are up to us, which it would be good to desire, will be available to you. Make use only of impulse and its contrary, rejection,4 though with reservation, lightly, and without straining.

3. In the case of everything attractive or useful or that you are fond of, remember to say just what sort of thing it is, beginning with the least little things. If you are fond of a jug, say "I am fond of a jug!" For then when it is broken you will not be upset. If you kiss your child or your wife, say that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset.

4. When you are about to undertake some action, remind yourself what sort of action it is. If you are going out for a bath, put before

3. The word '' appearance'' translates phantasia, which some translators render by "impression" or "presentation". An appearance is roughly the immediate ex- perience of sense or feeling, which may or may not represent an external state of affairs. (The Stoics held, against the Sceptics, that some appearances self-evidently do represent external states of affairs correctly.)

4. Impulse and rejection (horml and aphormt) are, in Stoic terms, natural and non-rational psychological movements, so to speak, that are respectively toward or away from external objects.

Handbook of Epictetus / 13

your mind what happens at baths—there are people who splash, people who jostle, people who are insulting, people who steal. And you will undertake the action more securely if from the start you say of it, ''I want to take a bath and to keep my choices in accord with nature;'' and likewise for each action. For that way if something happens to interfere with your bathing you will be ready to say, "Oh, well, I wanted not only this but also to keep my choices in accord with nature, and I cannot do that if I am annoyed with things that happen."

5. What upsets people is not things themselves but their judgments about the things. For example, death is nothing dreadful (or else it would have appeared dreadful to Socrates), but instead the judg- ment about death that it is dreadful—that is what is dreadful. So when we are thwarted or upset or distressed, let us never blame someone else but rather ourselves, that is, our own judgments. An uneducated person accuses others when he is doing badly; a partly educated person accuses himself, an educated person accuses neither someone else nor himself.

6. Do not be joyful about any superiority that is not your own. If the horse were to say joyfully, "I am beautiful," one could put up with it. But certainly you, when you say joyfully, "I have a beautiful horse," are joyful about the good of the horse. What, then, is your own? Your way of dealing with appearances. So whenever you are in accord with nature in your way of dealing with appearances, then be joyful, since then you are joyful about a good of your own.

7. On a voyage when your boat has anchored, if you want to get fresh water you may pick up a small shellfish and a vegetable by the way, but you must keep your mind fixed on the boat and look around frequently in case the captain calls. If he calls you must let all those other things go so that you will not be tied up and thrown on the ship like livestock. That is how it is in life too: if you are given a wife and a child instead of a vegetable and a small shellfish, that will not hinder you; but if the captain calls, let all those things go and run to the boat without turning back; and if you are old, do not even go very far from the boat, so that when the call comes you are not left behind.

8. Do not seek to have events happen as you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your life will go well.

14 / HANDBOOK of EPICTETUS

9. Illness interferes with the body, not with one's faculty of choice,5

unless that faculty of choice wishes it to. Lameness interferes with the limb, not with one's faculty of choice. Say this at each thing that happens to you, since you will find that it interferes with something else, not with you.

10. At each thing that happens to you, remember to turn to yourself and ask what capacity you have for dealing with it. If you see a beautiful boy or woman, you will find the capacity of self-control for that. If hardship comes to you, you will find endurance. If it is abuse, you will find patience. And if you become used to this, you will not be carried away by appearances.

11. Never say about anything, " I have lost i t ," but instead, " I have given it back." Did your child die? It was given back. Did your wife die? She was given back. "My land was taken." So this too was given back. "But the person who took it was bad!" How does the way the giver6 asked for it back concern you? As long as he gives it, take care of it as something that is not your own, just as travelers treat an inn.

12. If you want to make progress,7 give up all considerations like these: "If I neglect my property I will have nothing to live on," "If I do not punish my slave boy he will be bad." It is better to die of hunger with distress and fear gone than to live upset in the midst of plenty. It is better for the slave boy to be bad than for you to be in a bad state. Begin therefore with little things. A little oil is spilled, a little wine is stolen: say, "This is the price of tranquilli- ty; this is the price of not being upset." Nothing comes for free. When you call the slave boy, keep in mind that he is capable of not paying attention, and even if he does pay attention he is capable of not doing any of the things that you want him to. But he is not in such a good position that your being upset or not depends on him.

5. "Faculty of choice" translates " proairesis", which designates a rational faculty of the soul (cf. n. 4).

6. The "giver" can be taken to be nature, or the natural order of the cosmos, or god, which the Stoics identified with each other.

7. "Making progress" (prokopteiri) is the Stoic expression for movement in the direction of the ideal condition for a human being, embodied by the Stoic "sage" (cf. Introd. and c. 15, n.).

Handbook of Epictetus / 15

13. If you want to make progress, let people think you are a mindless fool about externals, and do not desire a reputation for knowing about them. If people think you amount to something, distrust yourself. Certainly it is not easy to be on guard both for one's choices to be in accord with nature and also for externals, and a person who concerns himself with the one will be bound to neglect the other.

Homework is Completed By:

Writer Writer Name Amount Client Comments & Rating
Instant Homework Helper

ONLINE

Instant Homework Helper

$36

She helped me in last minute in a very reasonable price. She is a lifesaver, I got A+ grade in my homework, I will surely hire her again for my next assignments, Thumbs Up!

Order & Get This Solution Within 3 Hours in $25/Page

Custom Original Solution And Get A+ Grades

  • 100% Plagiarism Free
  • Proper APA/MLA/Harvard Referencing
  • Delivery in 3 Hours After Placing Order
  • Free Turnitin Report
  • Unlimited Revisions
  • Privacy Guaranteed

Order & Get This Solution Within 6 Hours in $20/Page

Custom Original Solution And Get A+ Grades

  • 100% Plagiarism Free
  • Proper APA/MLA/Harvard Referencing
  • Delivery in 6 Hours After Placing Order
  • Free Turnitin Report
  • Unlimited Revisions
  • Privacy Guaranteed

Order & Get This Solution Within 12 Hours in $15/Page

Custom Original Solution And Get A+ Grades

  • 100% Plagiarism Free
  • Proper APA/MLA/Harvard Referencing
  • Delivery in 12 Hours After Placing Order
  • Free Turnitin Report
  • Unlimited Revisions
  • Privacy Guaranteed

6 writers have sent their proposals to do this homework:

High Quality Assignments
Math Specialist
Financial Assignments
Quick Mentor
Assignment Solver
Exam Attempter
Writer Writer Name Offer Chat
High Quality Assignments

ONLINE

High Quality Assignments

I will be delighted to work on your project. As an experienced writer, I can provide you top quality, well researched, concise and error-free work within your provided deadline at very reasonable prices.

$26 Chat With Writer
Math Specialist

ONLINE

Math Specialist

I have assisted scholars, business persons, startups, entrepreneurs, marketers, managers etc in their, pitches, presentations, market research, business plans etc.

$48 Chat With Writer
Financial Assignments

ONLINE

Financial Assignments

Being a Ph.D. in the Business field, I have been doing academic writing for the past 7 years and have a good command over writing research papers, essay, dissertations and all kinds of academic writing and proofreading.

$31 Chat With Writer
Quick Mentor

ONLINE

Quick Mentor

I have written research reports, assignments, thesis, research proposals, and dissertations for different level students and on different subjects.

$25 Chat With Writer
Assignment Solver

ONLINE

Assignment Solver

I have worked on wide variety of research papers including; Analytical research paper, Argumentative research paper, Interpretative research, experimental research etc.

$35 Chat With Writer
Exam Attempter

ONLINE

Exam Attempter

I am an academic and research writer with having an MBA degree in business and finance. I have written many business reports on several topics and am well aware of all academic referencing styles.

$42 Chat With Writer

Let our expert academic writers to help you in achieving a+ grades in your homework, assignment, quiz or exam.

Similar Homework Questions

A pitfall to avoid in pursuing a differentiation strategy is - Rexona stunt city full movie - Power in resistive electric circuits mastering physics solutions - A sales discount does not - Rain of gold discussion questions - Personal narrative - Commutative property addition worksheet - Martha stewart magazine canada - Role and Scope DQ6 - Macau shows cirque du soleil - Who moved my cheese questions - Leadership Behaviors - The chain rule worksheet - Teapot dome scandal political cartoon explanation - English 12 - Write a essay - August 10 Week 3 project - Bachelor of law monash course map - Word memo - HCP- 6710 Week 1 Assignment - Management information system book by james o brien - Disney's design case study answers - Jane's juice bar has the following cost schedules - C714 business strategy task 1 - How to add horizontal error bars in excel - They say i say chapter 1 - Strategic Management Case Study - Westpac balance transfer offer - How to pronounce yhvh - Resource pooling architecture in cloud computing - Following jesus the servant king - Rapid sand filter pdf - 16555 la gracia rancho santa fe - Competitive advantage case study coca cola - 1/20 as a percentage - Continuity equation for electrons and holes - Swot analysis disney parks and resorts - Social Psychology - Trinity guildhall speech and drama - Enron the smartest guys in the room worksheet answers - How to write a periodization essay - Taxonomy lab to show organism relationships - Download the file below - M cotteleer electronics supplies microcomputer circuitry to a company - Operational Exellence - Research Paper - Katy perry - firework - Ads b equipment manufacturers - Anglian water section 106 - Evidence why cell phones should be allowed in school - Cure for diabetes ielts reading answers - Health Care Delivery Systems Essay - Lin corporation has a single product - How to calculate days of working capital in capsim - Financial accounting chapter 4 comprehensive problem 1 - Chapter 16 international pay systems - Picot paper example - Paper - Hollow glass prism experiment - Osim massage chair hong kong price - Cambridge latin course unit 1 answers - Www udel edu biology ketcham microscope scope html - Ildasm protected module cannot disassemble - High crags primary school - Higher music concepts sqa - How effective is aarp in achieving its agenda - Chemistry - Intro to nursing-communication - What tenses where used in TED talk by Bettina Warburg at the TEDSUMMIT - Kingdom hearts ii guide - Parts of a bunsen burner - Braco and greenloaning life - Statistics - BUS 322 Week 3 Assignment 1 What Makes ____ the Best Place to Work and Why? - Pros and cons of slum tourism - How to replace caroma toilet seat with hidden bolts - Eric foner give me liberty volume 2 pdf - Psy 410 week 2 worksheet answers - Heart rate response nasm - Air conditioning license qld - Environmental invaders portfolio - Verify that the linear speed of an ultracentrifuge - Download servicemaxx j1708 software free - Nurse practitioner Assignment 1 page - Arabic doubly weak verbs - Difference between the role of the Nursing Professional (RN) and Advance Practice Register Nurse (APRN) - Module 2 Discussion - Ibm rational doors training ppt - Ideally though key and peele - Excel add ins data analysis plus - Multiguard snail and slug killer review - Pbv trunnion ball valves - Komodo dragon population graph - Starbucks: Venti Social Responsibility and Brand Strategy - Bath spa students union - Who determines ethical standards for advertising - Suzanne sataline new york times - The english school cairo - Gibbs reflective cycle example - Google play music 3 months free - Snort in ids mode