Air assault phase 2 homework answers

US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY Master Leader Course (MLC)

Operations Learning Competency

Lesson M446 OPORD 1st AD OPORD 17-01 (ATROPIAN IRON)

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HQ, 1st Armored Division TBLISI, REPUBLIC OF GORGAS

28 February 2017

1st AD OPORD 17-01 (ATROPIAN IRON)

(U) References

a. JOG-A series 1:250,000 scale NJ 38-3, NJ 38-4, NJ 38-7, NJ 39-1, NJ 39-5, NK 38-8, NK 38-9, NK 38-11, NK 38-12, NK 39-7, NK-39-10, NK 39-11

b. FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-1 (20 JAN 10).

c. III Corps OPLAN.

d. World Equipment Guide.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

(U) Task Organization: Refer to Annex A

1. (U) Situation.

A. (U) Area of Interest. The 1st AD area of interest includes the airways and land areas of the provinces surrounding the Vetlia, Erdabil, and Hackzi Provinces in Atropia and the Gilan Province in Donovia, (Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). In the west are the Atropian provinces of Agdash and Muhksa through which 1AD’s lines of communication and supply pass. Further west is the nation of Gorgas, where the Corps’ SPODs and APODs are located. To the east are the provinces of Hachzi and Sirvaki, both critical as 1st AD considers the protection of its eastern flank. Vetlia contains the Gabala Airport which serves as a major airbase for the Air Component, while Sirvaki Province, experiencing a low-level Lezgin insurgency, poses a threat to the Division’s right flank and rear areas.

B. (U) Area of Operations. The 1st AD area of operations includes the land areas and airways of the Atropian provinces of Vetlia, Erdabil, the eastern portion of Agdash, the western portion of Hackzi and the southern part of the Donovian Gilan Province where additional heavy Donovian (DON) ground forces are assembling. Refer to Tab B (1AD Area of Operations Map) to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

(1) (U) Terrain. For details refer to Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

(2) (U) Weather. From October - March, the weather in the 1st AD AO impacts military operations in four ways. First, the average daytime temperatures from October - March range in the high 30s at night and mid 50s during the day. If Soldiers and Leaders do not ensure proper hydration and regular meals, the likelihood of cold weather injuries greatly increases. In addition, long term use of vehicles and power generation equipment during cold temperatures can result in equipment breakdown. With regard to chemical weapons employment, non-persistent chemical attacks will dissipate more quickly during high temperature time periods. During the colder and wetter months between November and March, non-persistent chemicals will linger for longer periods. The second weather impact on military operations is winds. During the months of October - March units can expect periods of high winds that restrict rotary wing and UAS operations. Winds will also restrict the use of certain communications equipment that becomes unstable as winds increase. The third weather impact on military operations is precipitation. Between the months of October and March Northern Atropia and southern Donovia experience their highest yearly rainfall. Although not much compared to other areas in the world, rain in the region can result in flash flooding that will damage unimproved roads and wash-out equipment located in wadis. In addition, the increased rainfall can result in the increased likelihood of cold weather injuries including immersion foot. Soldiers must be prepared for rapid and unexpected shifts in weather conditions between October and March. Finally, the dry environment in the 1st

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AD AO results in the high likelihood of dusty conditions. Large formations of mechanized and wheeled vehicles traveling off road produce dust trails that can be observed over long distances. Vehicles traveling in close proximity can create dusty conditions that can result in vehicle collisions and damage to equipment or injury to personnel. During aviation operations, dusty conditions can result in damage to equipment, and additional risk while taking off and landing. For greater detail on the impact weather has on military operations refer to Tab B (Weather) (TAB B is not provided. Instead use local light and weather data) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

C. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Tab D (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

(1) (U) Drivers of Instability.

(a) (U) Donovian Influence: Donovia’s political objectives are to reclaim territory which was previously held by the Donovian Empire, to establish control of key areas containing strategic natural resources, and to unify the ethnic Bilasuvian people found in the three northern provinces of Vetlia, Erdabil, and Hachzi. Perceiving the international community possesses little will to contest its ambitions in the region; Donovia boldly seeks to shape conditions in those provinces through a combination strategy employing a comprehensive INFOWAR campaign, political and armed proxies, Commando actions inside neighboring states, and conventional forces. The end state is Donovian control of the disputed area with sufficient military force to ensure a favorable diplomatic solution resulting in a negotiated annexation of the provinces. Maintaining strong historical, ethnic, religious, and economic motivations to overthrow or subvert Atropia control of the Vetlia, Erdabil, and Hachzi Provinces, the Donovian Government has made multiple public statements revealing their desire to re-unify the three provinces with the homeland. To that end, the Donovian leadership will continue to politically pressure Atropia, both regionally and internationally; support separatist and destabilizing forces inside Atropia; and seek an opportunity to inject Donovian armed forces inside the disputed provinces as a precursor to annexation. In shaping the conditions for intervention, the Donovian Government will support its’ proxies inside Atropia in order to foment violence and increase consternation. Donovia’s desired result is to destabilize the region, demonstrate the inability of the Atropian security forces to provide security and order, prevent the growth of Western influence in the region, and discredit the government of Atropia.

(b) (U) Donovian Military Forces. Indications point to deterrence failing; DON Army forces have been conducting combined arms maneuver exercises for the past five months. Recently these exercises have risen in scale to multidivisional-level offensive exercises integrating both surface-to-surface and joint fires. There are also indications that the DON Army is establishing the infrastructure for tactical assembly areas in numerous locations throughout the Gilan Province. These indications and warnings support the assessment that the Donovian military is reaching the peak of offensive preparations. Based on Army-level exercises over the past ten years and current reporting, Donovia has organized their forces facing Atropia into one Operational-Strategic Command (OSC), the OSC-South (OSC-S), under the control of the Southern Army, headquartered in Stavropol. OSC-S is currently comprised of the following Division Tactical Groups (DTG); 81st Mechanized DTG (APC), 98th Armored DTG, 86th Motorized Infantry DTG, 80th Mechanized Infantry DTG (IFV), 76th Airborne Infantry DTG, and 84th Motorized Infantry DTG.

(1) (U) Composition. OSC-S’s equipment and weapons largely reflect a Tier I capability throughout. OSC-S possesses the equipment to operate in all terrain with the ability to conduct successful day and night operations.

(2) (U) Movement and Maneuver. The 81st Mechanized Division is OSC-S’s best equipped unit, consisting of three Mechanized Infantry Brigades, and one Tank Brigade. The 81st Division’s primary maneuver systems are BTR-90A’s and T-90’s.

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(3) (U) Intelligence. The 879th Information Warfare Brigade is OSC-S’s primary intelligence collection and analysis element. The 879th Information Warfare Brigade is comprised of an integration battalion, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) battalion, Signals Reconnaissance battalion and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) battalion. OSC-S has not established an OSC-level reconnaissance element, but all subordinate DTGs have reconnaissance battalions.

(4) (U) Fires. OSC-S has extensive Fires capabilities organized under an Integrated Fires Command (IFC) comprised of the 82nd Combat Helicopter Brigade (HIND-E), 382nd Artillery Brigade (G5, 2S5, 2S3) and the 388th Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade (FAJR-3, WM-80, FADJR-3). OSC-S also possesses Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities from the 879th IW Brigade’s EW battalion (TRC 274, R-330K, Aviaconversia GPS/GLONASS Jammer).

(5) (U) Sustainment. Each Division in OSC-S has an organic Material Support Brigade, with no significant shortages at this time.

(6) (U) Command and Control. Each Division has an organic Signal battalion while the 876th Signal brigade supports at the OSC-S level.

(7) (U) Protection. Donovia has a significant chemical warfare capability, which it may employ at the onset of hostilities or to cover a withdrawal. OSC-S IFC possesses several hundred artillery rounds filled with non-persistent nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. The 187th Air Defense Brigade provides OSC-S Air Defense with SA-15’s.

(8) (U) Disposition. OSC-S is positioned close to the international border with Atropia and its units are conducting extensive sustainment type operations, e.g. refitting units, receiving new equipment, conducting re-supply and increasing manning levels. Donovia previously activated the 98th Armor Division (reserve) in Gilan Province. It is assessed that if the 98th Armor Division can achieve full mobilization prior to an offensive action into Atropia and the 98th Armor Division will be allocated to OSC-S to act as a reserve. In the event that the 98th Armor Division cannot reach full mobilization, OSC-S will still be capable of conducting sustained offensive cross- border operations within 30 days. It is believed that Donovian (DON) Commando (CMDO) forces have begun infiltrating into Atropia in order to augment DON Special Operations Service (SOS) agents, conduct unconventional warfare alongside Bilasuvar irregular elements, collect strategic intelligence, conduct route reconnaissance and assess the capabilities and limitations of Atropian Border and conventional forces.

(9) (U) Strength. OSC-S has recently completed aggressive offensive training and maintains an overall 85% operational readiness rate. Reports indicate that current Donovian Army morale is high.

(c) (U) Irregular Threats in Atropia.

(1) (U) The Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB). The BFB is a nationalist separatist militant faction operating within the Atropian border provinces, which supports Donovian expansionist political ambitions. The BFB is centered in Erdabil and received direction/support from Donovia for the following functions: operational direction, financial aid, tactical training, and equipment (specifically with low-tech, high-payoff weapons). They are conducting a campaign of violence and intimidation intended to expel non-Bilasuvars and establish a Bilasuvar voting majority in all three provinces. The radical BFB leader, Arash Golzar, won the provincial governorship following the January 2014 elections. Since his win, the Bilasuvar nationalist fervor has spread to Vetlia and Hachzi Provinces. In Erdabil, as a result of the continuing displacement of non-Bilasuvars out of the province, Golzar appears ready to make

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good on his campaign promise to initiate a provincial referendum aimed at gaining political legitimacy for secession.

(a) (U) The BFB primarily attacks soft targets such as relief convoys, government offices in district capitals, economic targets, and non-Bilasuvar ethnic communities, mostly in Erdabil Province and the northern portion of Vetlia Province.

(b) (U) From training camps inside Donovia’s Gilan Province, Donovian Commandos (CMDO) train, organize, assist, and otherwise support insurgents for operations in Atropia modeled after Hezbollah and its’ successful operations in Southern Lebanon. It is assessed that Donovia will use the BFB as a surrogate force to augment and complement their conventional military capability in the event of conflict with Atropian and potentially U.S. forces.

(2) (U) Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL). The PAL is a small group of militants operating within the Atropian provinces of southern Erdabil and western Hackzi. The PAL is made up of ethnic Lezgins, primarily from southern Donovia, who are opposed to what they perceive as unfair treatment of minority groups within Atropia and corruption within the Atropian Government. The PAL conducts attacks in order to intimidate ethnic Atropians and government officials, and influence on regional political issues.

(a) (U) The PAL primarily attacks soft targets such as convoys, government offices, economic targets, and Atropian ethnic communities, mostly in southern Erdabil and western Hackzi Provinces. Attacks are usually carried out with a combination of improvised explosive devices and small arms.

(b) (U) The PAL does not receive training or aid from foreign states, but they often work with elements of organized crime so that they can fund their operations and acquire weapons from black market weapons dealers. Training camps in the mountains of western Hackzi are utilized to instruct new recruits in basic ambush techniques and IED building.

(3) (U) Organized Criminal Enterprises.

(a) (U) Al Iksir Cartel: The Al Iksir Cartel is an organized crime entity that operates a transnational smuggling operation that is based in Gilan Province, Donovia. The cartel uses Atropia as the crossroads for smuggling drugs into Donovia and other Western countries. Their enterprise primarily focuses on drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and illegal weapons transportation. The cartel maintains major branches in Akhty, Donovia and Anykh in Erdabil Province, Atropia. The cartel deals with the BFB and PAL as profit opportunities arise. Many of those involved in illegal activities in Atropia live in IDP camps and blend in with the ethnic Atropians who fled from southern Donovia. Al Iksir is divided into three groups who operate primarily within Erdabil Province. Those groups are known as Səbəkəsi (The Network), Qardaşlığı “The Brotherhood”, and Yasaqlığı (The Sanctuary). All of the groups are capable of conducting a range of smuggling operations, but each group specializes in certain areas. The Network focuses on narcotics smuggling and weapons trafficking. The Brotherhood deals in opium and weapons smuggling, but also is involved in the hydrocarbon black market that includes hijacking oil trucks. The Sanctuary group is responsible for much of Al Iksir’s recruiting efforts and human trafficking, and they prey on the population of the refugee camps. The members of The Sanctuary solicit money from their targets for transportation from Atropia into neighboring countries or into European Union countries. They guarantee jobs and a brighter future outside of Atropia. After receiving payment, they are then sold into bondage or prostitution. They also use the refugees as mules for their illicit narcotics trade and for the smuggling of small arms and IED

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components. It is likely the criminal elements in the region will initially lay low upon 1st AD’s entry but will eventually openly oppose the 1st AD as the profits from illicit activity dwindles as a result of increased security.

(b) (U) Atropian Organized Crime (AOC): The AOC operates mainly in the capital city of Baku, but use the Atropian and Donovian border as a transit point for smuggling drugs into Donovia and Western Countries. AOC is involved in illegal narcotics, smuggling, and human trafficking. Like the Al Iksir Cartel, the AOC recruits IDPs living in refugee camps to transport narcotics and other black market goods across the Donovian border.

(d) (U) Commandos. Donovia will employ Special Purpose Forces (SPF) Commandos (CMDO) in advance of an invasion to carry out direct action attacks against command and control nodes, logistics capabilities, and population centers. Also, these forces will carry out sabotage operations against transportation infrastructure in order to delay deployments into theater and to deal a psychological blow to the U.S. and Host Nation images and to publicize an instance of a military force defeat. The CMDOs will defend all sensitive material sites in southern DON.

(2) (U) Enemy Courses of Action (COA). Refer to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B.

(a) (U) Enemy Most Likely COA (MLCOA). OSC-S attacks with exploitation force (one DTG) advancing from the east along AA5 IOT seize Vetlia, Erdabil and Hachzi Provinces.

(b) (U) Enemy Most Dangerous COA (MDCOA). OSC-S conducts a dispersed attack utilizing 2 DTGs assaulting along AA’s 1 and 5 to seize Vetlia, Erdabil and Hachzi Provinces.

(3) (U) Endstate. OSC-S mechanized and armor forces establish defensive positions along key terrain in Vetlia Province. A disruption zone is established to protect the main battle forces and to select and destroy specific 1st AD systems (engineer, recon, and C2) critical for offensive operations. The road intersections around Akdas and Goycay are secured denying 1st AD forces LOCs in Vetlia Province and preventing a counter-attack into Erdabil Province.

(4) (U) Enemy Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities. OSC-S’s operational center of gravity is the 81st Mechanized Infantry DTG.

(a) (U) Critical Capabilities. The 81st Mechanized Infantry DTG’s Critical Capabilities are its ability to conduct rapid armored maneuver and protection of its forces with organic and attached Air Defense systems.

(b) (U) Critical Requirements. The 81st Mechanized Infantry DTG’s Critical Requirements include fuel (for offensive in depth), Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS),maintaining operational tempo while retaining the initiative prior to Coalition forces completing Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (RSO&I) and maintaining the active support of the local Bilasuvar population along the axis of advance.

(c) (U) Critical Vulnerabilities. The 81st Mechanized Infantry DTG’s Critical Vulnerabilities include logistical elements ability to keep pace with main combat forces, extended Lines of Supply (LOS), digital and voice communication systems susceptibility to electronic attack and lack of civilian popular support in southern Vetlia and Hackzi Province.

D. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) Higher Headquarters Mission and Intent.

(a) (U) Combined Joint Task Force – Caucasus (CJTF-C) (two levels up).

(1) (U) Mission. As requested by the Government of the Republic of Atropia (GoRA) CJTF-C executes Flexible Deterrent Options to ensure Atropian sovereignty against Donovian aggression. On order (O/O), CJTF-C deploys additional forces to the area of operations and conducts unified action to deter Donovian aggression and, if deterrence fails, conduct decisive action to restore regional security.

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(2) (U) Commander’s Intent.

(a) (U) Expanded Purpose. The initial purpose of CJTF-C operations is the deterrence of an attack against Atropia and, if deterrence fails, the defeat of offensive hostile military forces, the expulsion of those forces from Atropian territory, and restoration of the Atropia – Donovian internationally recognized border which includes a demilitarized zone (DMZ) free of WMD sites in southern Donovia. The CJTF-C is also charged to support the GoRA’s National Development Strategy (NDS), 2014-2020, especially, in training and advising Atropian military forces to develop security force capacity. The Atropian population must see Atropian forces as a fair and just instrument of a legitimate GoRA. The military is only one part of the NDS, and the CJTF-C will be in support of the US embassy in Baku during all phases of the campaign. The CJTF will assist other US government agencies, NGOs and PVOs at the direction of the Ambassador, in supporting GoRA to develop security, infrastructure, and economic capacity, and to provide humanitarian aid.

(b) (U) End state. Regional States support Coalition intervention, Donovia deterred from aggression and participating in diplomatic engagement with Atropia. If deterrence fails, Donovian forces are defeated and expelled from and are incapable of violating Atropian territory, thus, maintaining Atropia’s sovereignty. Regional State support to irregular threats has ceased and such threats are neutralized. Regional transnational threat networks and groups are unable to disrupt legitimate Atropian governance and society. Regional States increase security force capacity (training, equipping, and manning). Regional oil and gas infrastructure protected ensuring future economic prosperity.

(b) (U) III Corps (US) - Joint Task Force – Phantom (JTF-P).

(1) (U) JTF-P Mission. O/O, JTF-P deploys forces within Atropia to deter Donovian aggression. If deterrence fails, defend Atropian territory against aggressing Donovian forces that violate Atropian territorial integrity and attack to expel aggressing forces in order to restore Atropian international borders. O/O, establish a DMZ free of WMD sites in southern Donovia. O/O conduct stability operations ICW GoRA to neutralize irregular threat organizations and disrupting transnational threat networks and groups in order to enable legitimate GoRA governance. O/O, transition full security responsibilities to Atropian Security Forces and develop Friendly State security capacity to promote regional stability.

(2) (U) Higher Intent. JTF-P will rapidly deploy forces into Atropia, array arriving force packages, initially, in a manner portraying strength so as to deter Donovian aggression. As JTF-P builds combat power, forces will position and posture to conduct decisive action operations, in the event deterrence fails. Upon restoring Atropian sovereignty, JTF-P forces will support the GoRA’s National Development Strategy (NDS), 2014-2020, especially, security force assistance and the effort to neutralize internal irregular threats. The Atropian population must see GoRA as capable and caring, possessing security forces that are fair and just instruments of a legitimate GoRA. The military is only one part of the NDS, and the JTF-P will be in support of the US Embassy in Baku during deterrence all phases of the campaign. The JTF-P will assist other US government agencies, NGOs and PVOs at the direction of the Ambassador, in supporting GoRA to develop security, infrastructure, and economic capacity, and to provide humanitarian aid.

(a) (U) Concept of the Operations. JTF-P forces conduct decisive action in four phases, with stability operations occurring throughout: (I) Deter Donovian aggression into Atropia through the build-up of forces into theater, (II) Seize the initiative by conducting defensive operations to defeat Donovian attack into Atropia in order to set the conditions to assume the offensive, (III) Dominate the AO by conducting offensive operations to expel Donovian forces in order to restore Atropian territorial integrity and establish a DMZ free of WMD sites in southern Donovia, and (IV) Stabilize the regional operational environment assisting GoRA and other aid organizations in re-

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establishing Atropia’s internal security by neutralizing irregular threats, restoring essential services to the Atropian population, and providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees. The phases of the operation may overlap.

(b) (U) Phases of the Operation.

(1) (U) Phase I (Deter – Force Build-Up) Phase I begins with JTF-P arrival at the APOD and SPOD (N-Day) and ends with Donovia deterred, Unambiguous Warning of a Donovian attack issued (W-Day), or a Donovian Attack without warning (D-Day).

(U) The purpose of this phase is to rapidly deploy forces into Atropia, array arriving force packages, initially, in a manner portraying strength so as to deter Donovian aggression. JTF-P sets conditions to conduct decisive actions in order to maintain Atropia’s territorial integrity in the event that deterrence fails. This phase ends with the JTF-P postured inside Atropia with either Donovia adhering to UNSCRs and no longer threatening Atropia, or declaration of W-Day or D-Day.

(2) (U) Phase II (Seize the Initiative – Defense) Phase II begins with W-Day or D- Day declared (O/A W/D+10), and ends when Donovian forces attacking south into Atropia are no longer capable of offensive operations.

(U) The purpose of this phase is to defeat any Donovian attacks into Atropia IOT allow JTF-P and 1AD to seize the initiative and conduct offensive operations.

(3) (U) Phase III (Dominate – Offense – Decisive Operations) Phase III begins when Donovian forces are no longer capable of offensive operations (estimated as 20 days from O/A D+10 to O/A D+30). Phase III ends when Donovian forces are expelled from Atropia, 1AD hold key terrain and infrastructure in southern Donovia (DMZ established), and sensitive site exploitation has been completed.

(U) The purpose of this phase is to clear all Donovian forces from Atropian territory and set the conditions for Phase IV by preventing Donovian ground counterattacks (DMZ) or use of WMD (site seizure and exploitation.

(4) (U) Phase IV (Stabilize - Establish Security/Restore Essential Services) Phase IV begins when the DMZ is established, WMD site exploitation completed and Donovia no longer can threaten Atropia via ground or WMD attack from Gilan province, Donovia. Phase IV ends with 1AD units redeploying to home station.

(U) The purpose of this phase is to set the conditions that will allow Atropian and/or UN forces to provide for the security of GoRA. This includes military and police training/mentoring, support to NGOs and PVO wrt providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs, and in returning IDPs to population centers, and other stability tasks as assigned by the US Ambassador.

(3) (U) Missions of Adjacent Units.

(a) (U) Atropian Land Forces. (Initially, under control of Atropian National Command Authority – During Phase I, TACON to JTF-P).

(1) (U) 344th Mechanized Infantry Brigade – The 344 MECH is currently conducting a screen mission along the international border in the eastern portion of the 1AD AO. During Phase I operations, 344 MECH becomes TACON to 1 AD.

(2) (U) 346th Mechanized Infantry Brigade – The 346 MECH is currently conducting a screen mission along the international border in the western portion of the 1AD AO. During Phase I operations, 346 MECH becomes TACON to 1 AD.

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(3) (U) 358th Aviation Brigade – The 358th is in TAA Samaxi in the southeastern portion of 1AD AO. During Phase I operations, 358th AVN becomes TACON to 1 AD.

(b) (U) U.S. Ground Forces.

(1) (U) 1st Calvary Division – Occupies TAAs southwest of 1st AD AO in Agdash, Mukhsa, Janga, and Agstafa Provinces. O/O, 1st Calvary Division conducts strategic deployment to Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) ALEXANDRIA in the Republic of Gorgas (ROG), marshals, and prepares for forward tactical movement to AO SHIELD in the Republic of Atropia (ROA). O/O, Division deploys into AO SHIELD to posture for decisive operations to defeat regional threats (Ariana, Donovia, and Minaria, respectively) and neutralize insurgent threats IOT preserve or restore sovereignty and integrity of Atropia. O/O, Division transitions control of AO SHIELD to ASF control and initiates redeployment operations.

(2) (U) 4th Infantry Division – Occupies TAAs southeast of 1st AD AO in Tramaz Province. O/O, 4th Infantry Division conducts decisive operations in vicinity of TRAMAZ Province to deter aggression by Arianan forces or Donovian irregular threats, and if deterrence fails, conducts defensive, offensive, and stability operations to restore and maintain internationally recognized boundaries, while safeguarding critical populations and resources. 4th ID is the JTF-P reserve throughout the campaign.