All in the education of general david petraeus pdf

US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY Master Leader Course

The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq



In late April 2003, Major General David Petraeus and the US Army's 101 st

Airborne Division entered

the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, capital of Nineveh Province. It was less than a month since the start of

the US invasion of Iraq. But US troops had already captured Baghdad, dictator Saddam Hussein had fled

and, while security was still an overriding concern, the US military was no longer in full battle mode. In

Mosul, Petraeus quickly found himself confronting the question: What next?

The city of 1.7 million was a shambles as much from looting as from war. US Marines had just killed

17 Iraqis during a riot. The streets were in chaos, with police and other security forces nowhere to be seen.

The city had no electricity, running water or garbage removal. Shops were closed. Most public buildings

and factories lay in ruins. There was no administrative or economic infrastructure; ministries in

Baghdad which under Saddam had controlled all economic activity were now inoperative. Those who had

led the old Iraq had vanished: political leaders, judges, university faculty, teachers, factory managers,

ministry directors. The most senior of them were anyway suspect as members of the reviled former ruling

Baath, Party.

Addressing these deficiencies was hardly standard military business. But there was no one else to do

it. As Petraeus saw it, his task was to provide the building blocks for a new Iraqi society. How, the

general wondered, could he and his "Screaming Eagles" --as the division had been known since World

War II--reestablish conditions for normal daily life and help create the norms of a democratic society?

Whom could he trust? What was most urgent? What message should he give his troops? What was the

trade-offs between security and building bridges to the local population?

Petraeus found himself arbitrating a dizzying array of questions: How could he involve Iraqis in the

rebuilding? Should there be elections? If so, who should stand? Could some Baath Party officials retain

their jobs? If so, which ones? How and who should pay the thousands of unemployed civil servants?

What about controlling inflation? Should border crossings reopen for trade? How could he re-start the

university, open banks, and foster the creation of new businesses? What about the media? Underlying

these operational dilemmas lay a deeper uncertainty: could Petraeus establish himself as a leader whose

decisions were not only appropriate--but whose style would command the respect of a society not his

own?

Run-up to Mosul

When the 101 st

Airborne first crossed into Iraq from Kuwait on Friday, March 21, 2003, Petraeus had

not known that the division would be sent to Mosul. In fact, the entire short war, like its lead-up, had been

one of continual adaptation to changing circumstances. Petraeus had gotten word only on February 6 that

the division, based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, would deploy to Kuwait for possible hostilities against

 Reproduced with permission and may not be further reproduced. Kennedy School of Government Case Program C1S-06-1834.0Q This case was

written by Kirsten Lundberg for Assistant Professor Hannah Riley Bowles and Senior Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman, John F. Kennedy

School of Government, Harvard University. (0306)

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Iraq. Though long anticipated, that gave him barely six weeks to move more than 18,000 soldiers, over

5,000 vehicles, hundreds of containers, and 256 helicopters (including 72 Apaches valued at $20 million

each) to Kuwait. The campaign known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, which US policymakers characterized