Aviation psychology and human factors pdf

Research Paper For "Human Factors In Aviation Safety" Class

Human Factors SECOND ED IT ION

Series Editor

Barry H. Kantowitz Industrial and Operations Engineering

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Aviation Automation: The Search for a Human-Centered Approach Charles E. Billings

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Handbook of Aviation

Human Factors SECOND ED IT ION

Edited by

John A. Wise V. David Hopkin Daniel J. Garland

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Handbook of aviation human factors / edited by Daniel J. Garland, John A. Wise, and V. David Hopkin. -- 2nd ed.

p. cm. -- (Human factors in transportation) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8058-5906-5 (alk. paper) 1. Aeronautics Human factors--Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Aeronautics--Safety

measures--Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Garland, Daniel J. II. Wise, John A., 1944- III. Hopkin, V. David.

TL553.6.H35 2010 629.13--dc21 2009024331

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Dedication

To my family

John A. Wise

To Betty

V. David Hopkin

To Danny, Brianna, and Cody

Daniel J. Garland

* * *

Dedicated to those pioneers of aviation human factors who made this book possible.

In particular to: Lloyd Hitchcock and David Meister, our colleagues in the fi rst edition who died before the second edition was

completed. Th eir participation was very much missed.

vii

Contents

Preface....................................................................................................................... xi

PART I Introduction

1 A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation ................................. 1-1 Jeff erson M. Koonce and Anthony Debons

2 Aviation Research and Development: A Framework for the Eff ective Practice of Human Factors, or “What Your Mentor Never Told You about a Career in Human Factors…” ........................................................................................................2-1 John E. Deaton and Jeff rey G. Morrison

3 Measurement in Aviation Systems .................................................................3-1 David Meister and Valerie Gawron

4 Underpinnings of System Evaluation ............................................................4-1 Mark A. Wise, David W. Abbott, John A. Wise, and Suzanne A. Wise

5 Organizational Factors Associated with Safety and Mission Success in Aviation Environments ..............................................................................5-1 Ron Westrum and Anthony J. Adamski

II PART Human Capabilities and Performance

6 Engineering Safe Aviation Systems: Balancing Resilience and Stability ...................................................................................................6-1 Björn Johansson and Jonas Lundberg

7 Processes Underlying Human Performance .................................................. 7-1 Lisanne Bainbridge and Michael C. Dorneich

8 Automation in Aviation Systems: Issues and Considerations ......................8-1 Mustapha Mouloua, Peter Hancock, Lauriann Jones, and Dennis Vincenzi

viii Contents

9 Team Process ..................................................................................................9-1 Katherine A. Wilson, Joseph W. Guthrie, Eduardo Salas, and William R. Howse

10 Crew Resource Management ........................................................................ 10-1 Daniel E. Maurino and Patrick S. Murray

11 Fatigue and Biological Rhythms .................................................................. 11-1 Giovanni Costa

12 Situation Awareness in Aviation Systems .................................................... 12-1 Mica R. Endsley

III PART Aircraft

13 Personnel Selection and Training ................................................................ 13-1 D. L. Pohlman and J. D. Fletcher

14 Pilot Performance ......................................................................................... 14-1 Lloyd Hitchcock, Samira Bourgeois-Bougrine, and Phillippe Cabon

15 Controls, Displays, and Crew Station Design ............................................. 15-1 Kristen Liggett

16 Flight Deck Aesthetics and Pilot Performance: New Uncharted Seas ....... 16-1 Aaron J. Gannon

17 Helicopters .................................................................................................... 17-1 Bruce E. Hamilton

18 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles .......................................................................... 18-1 Nancy J. Cooke and Harry K. Pedersen

IV PART Air-Traffic Control

19 Flight Simulation .......................................................................................... 19-1 William F. Moroney and Brian W. Moroney

20 Air-Traffic Control .......................................................................................20-1 Michael S. Nolan

21 Air-Traffic Controller Memory.................................................................... 21-1 Earl S. Stein, Daniel J. Garland, and John K. Muller

22 Air-Traffic Control Automation ..................................................................22-1 V. David Hopkin

Contents ix

V PART Aviation Operations and Design

23 Air-Traffic Control/Flight Deck Integration ...............................................23-1 Karol Kerns

24 Intelligent Interfaces ....................................................................................24-1 John M. Hammer

25 Weather Information Presentation ..............................................................25-1 Tenny A. Lindholm

26 Aviation Maintenance ..................................................................................26-1 Colin G. Drury

27 Civil Aviation Security ................................................................................. 27-1 Gerald D. Gibb and Ronald John Lofaro

28 Incident and Accident Investigation ............................................................28-1 Sue Baker

29 Forensic Aviation Human Factors: Accident/Incident Analyses for Legal Proceedings ...................................................................................29-1 Richard D. Gilson and Eugenio L. Facci

Index ............................................................................................................... Index-1

xi

Preface

Nearly a decade ago, the authors of the fi rst edition of this book were writing their contributions. In the interim, much development and progress has taken place in aviation human factors, but they have been far from uniform. Th erefore, although the original authors, or their collaborators, and the new authors were all asked to update their chapters and references for this second edition, the actual work entailed in responding to this request diff ered markedly between chapters, depending on the pertinent develop- ments that had occurred in the meantime. At one extreme, represented by the continued application of human factors evidence to a topic with few major changes, this steady progress could be covered by short additions and amendments to the relevant chapter, and this applies to a few chapters. At the other extreme, major changes or developments have resulted in completely recast and rewritten chapters, or, in a few cases, even in completely new chapters. Many chapter revisions, though substantial, lie between these two extremes.

Human factors as a discipline applied to aviation has come of age and is thriving. Its infl uence has spread to other applications beyond aviation. Less eff ort now has to be expended on the advocacy of human factors contributions or on marketing them because the roles of human factors in aviation activities are accepted more willingly and more widely. Both the range of human factors techniques and the nature of human factors explanations have broadened. Th e relationships between the humans employed in aviation and their jobs are changing in accordance with evolving automation and techno- logical advances.

Th e demand for aviation continues to expand, and aviation must respond to that demand. Th e safety culture of aviation imposes a need, in advance of changes, for sound evidence that the expected benefi ts of changes will accrue, without hidden hazards to safety and without new and unexpected sources of human error. Th e human factors contributions to aviation must share its safety culture and be equally cautious. Safety ultimately remains a human responsibility, dependent on human cognitive capabilities exercised directly through aviation operations and indirectly through the constructs, planning, design, procurement, and maintenance of aviation systems. Human factors applied to aviation remains primar- ily a practical discipline, seeking real solutions and benefi ts and driven by requirements rather than theories. Th eory is not ignored, but theory building is seldom an end product. Th eories tend, rather, to be tools that can guide the interpretation and generalization of fi ndings and can infl uence the choice of measures and experimental methods.

Much of this book recounts human factors achievements, but some prospective kinds of expansion of human factors may be deduced from current discernible trends. Teams and training can furnish examples. Th e study of teams is extending the concept of crew resource management to encompass the organization of the broader aviation system and the cabin, though considerations of cockpit secu- rity may restrict the latter development. Team concepts relate to automation in several ways: machines may be treated as virtual team members in certain roles; functions may be fulfi lled by virtual teams that share the work but not the workspace; established hierarchical authority structures may wither and devolve into teams or multi-teams; close identifi cation with teams will continue to infl uence the

xii Preface

formation of attitudes and professional norms; and interpersonal skills within teams will gain in inter- est. Training is evolving toward training in teams, measuring team functioning, and judging success by measuring team achievements. Learning at work is becoming more formalized, with less reliance on incidental on-the-job learning and more emphasis on continuous lifelong planned learning and career development. Associated with this is a closer study of the implicit knowledge, which is an integral part of the individual’s professional expertise and skill.

Further future trends are emerging. Aviation human factors may benefi t from recent developments in the study of empowerment, since many jobs in aviation rely heavily on the self-confi dence of their personnel in the capability to perform consistently to a high standard. Th e introduction of human fac- tors certifi cation as a tool for evaluating designs in aviation may become more common. Th e recently increased interest in qualitative measures in human factors seems likely to spread to aviation, and to lead to more studies of such human attributes with no direct machine equivalent as aesthetic consid- erations and the eff ects of emotion on task performance. Th is seems part of a more general trend to move away from direct human–machine comparisons when considering functionality. While studies are expected to continue on such familiar human factors themes as the eff ects of stress, fatigue, sleep patterns, and various substances on performance and well-being, their focus may change to provide bet- ter factual evidence about the consequences of raising the retirement age for aviation personnel, which is becoming a topic of widespread concern. Th ere have been remarkably few cross-cultural studies in aviation despite its international nature. Th is neglect will have to be remedied sooner or later, because no design or system in aviation is culture free.

I-1

I Introduction

1 A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation Jeff erson M. Koonce and Anthony Debons ......................................................................................................1-1 Th e Early Days: Pre-World War I (Cutting Th eir Teeth) • World War I (Daring Knights in Th eir Aerial Steeds) • Barnstorming Era (Th e Th rill of It All) • Th e World War II Era (Serious Business) • Cold Weather Operation (Debons) • Th e Jet Era (New Horizons) • Th e Cold War: Arctic Research • References

2 Aviation Research and Development: A Framework for the Eff ective Practice of Human Factors, or “What Your Mentor Never Told You about a Career in Human Factors…” John E. Deaton and Jeff rey G. Morrison ....................................2-1 Th e Role of Human-Factors Research in Aviation • Development of an Eff ective R&D Program • Some Words of Wisdom Regarding Dealing with the Sponsor, Management, and User • Developing a Long-Term Research Strategy • Critical Technology Challenges in Aviation Research • Major Funding Sources for Aviation Research

3 Measurement in Aviation Systems David Meister and Valerie Gawron ......................3-1 A Little History • References

4 Underpinnings of System Evaluation Mark A. Wise, David W. Abbott, John A. Wise, and Suzanne A. Wise .............................................................................. 4-1 Background • Defi nitions • Certifi cation • Underpinnings • Human Factors Evaluation and Statistical Tools • How Would We Know Whether the Evaluation Was Successful? • References

5 Organizational Factors Associated with Safety and Mission Success in Aviation Environments Ron Westrum and Anthony J. Adamski .............................5-1 High Integrity • Building a High-Integrity Human Envelope • Th e Right Stuff : Getting Proper Equipment • Managing Operations: Coordination of High-Tech Operations • Organizational Culture • Maintaining Human Assets • Managing the Interfaces • Evaluation and Learning • Conclusion • Acknowledgments • References

1-1

1 A Historical Overview

of Human Factors in Aviation

1.1 Th e Early Days: Pre-World War I (Cutting Th eir Teeth) ............................................................ 1-1

1.2 World War I (Daring Knights in Th eir Aerial Steeds) ........................................................... 1-2

1.3 Barnstorming Era (Th e Th rill of It All) .............................. 1-3 1.4 Th e World War II Era (Serious Business) ........................... 1-4 1.5 Cold Weather Operations (Debons) ................................... 1-7 1.6 Th e Jet Era (New Horizons) ................................................. 1-7 1.7 Th e Cold War: Arctic Research ........................................... 1-8

Th e New Technology Era (Th e Computer in the Cockpit) References ........................................................................................... 1-9

Human factors in aviation are involved in the study of human’s capabilities, limitations, and behaviors, as well as the integration of that knowledge into the systems that we design for them to enhance safety, performance, and general well-being of the operators of the systems (Koonce, 1979).

1.1 The Early Days: Pre-World War I (Cutting Their Teeth)

Th e role of human factors in aviation has its roots in the earliest days of aviation. Pioneers in aviation were concerned about the welfare of those who fl ew their aircraft (particularly themselves), and as the capabilities of the vehicles expanded, the aircraft rapidly exceeded the human capability of directly sensing and responding to the vehicle and the environment, to eff ectively exert suffi cient control to ensure optimum outcome and safety of the fl ight. Th e fi rst fl ight in which Orville Wright fl ew at 540 ft was on Th ursday, December 17, 1903, for a duration of only 12 s. Th e fourth and fi nal fl ight of that day was made by Wilbur for 59 s, which traversed 825 ft !

Th e purposes of aviation were principally adventure and discovery. To see an airplane fl y was indeed unique, and to actually fl y an airplane was a daring feat! Early pioneers in aviation did not take this issue lightly, as venturing into this fi eld without proper precautions may mean fl irting with death in the fragile unstable craft s. Th us, the earliest aviation was restricted to relatively straight and level fl ight and fairly level turns. Th e fl ights were operated under visual conditions in places carefully selected for eleva- tion, clear surroundings, and certain breeze advantages, to get the craft into the air sooner and land at the slowest possible ground speed.

Jefferson M. Koonce University of Central Florida

Anthony Debons University of Pittsburgh

1-2 Handbook of Aviation Human Factors

Th e major problems with early fl ights were the reliability of the propulsion system and the strength and stability of the airframe. Many accidents and some fatalities occurred because of the structural failure of an airplane component or the failure of the engine to continue to produce power.

Although human factors were not identifi ed as a scientifi c discipline at that time, there were serious problems related to human factors in the early stages of fl ight. Th e protection of the pilot from the ele- ments, as he sat out in his chair facing them head-on, was merely a transfer of technology from bicycles and automobiles. Th e pilots wore goggles, topcoats, and gloves similar to those used when driving the automobiles of that period.

Th e improvements in the human–machine interface were largely an undertaking of the designers, builders, and fl iers of the machines (the pilots themselves). Th ey needed some critical information to ensure proper control of their craft and some feedback about the power plant. Initially, the aircraft did not have instrumentation. Th e operators directly sensed the attitude, altitude, and velocity of the vehicle and made their inputs to the control system to achieve certain desired goals. However, 2 years aft er the fi rst fl ight, the Wright brothers made considerable eff ort trying to provide the pilot with information that would aid in keeping the airplane coordinated, especially in turning the fl ight where the lack of coordi- nated fl ight was most hazardous. Soon, these early craft s had a piece of yarn or other string, which trailed from one of the struts of the airplane, providing yaw information as an aid to avoid the turn-spin threat, and the Wright brothers came up with the incidence meter, a rudimentary angle of attack, or fl ight-path angle indicator.

Nevertheless, as the altitude capabilities and range of operational velocities increased, the ability of the humans to accurately sense the critical diff erences did not commensurately increase. Th us, early instrumentation was devised to aid the operator in determining the velocity of the vehicle and the alti- tude above the ground. Th e magnetic compass and barometric altimeter, pioneered by balloonists, soon found their way into the airplanes. Additionally, the highly unreliable engines of early aviation seemed to be the reason for the death of many aviators. Th e mechanical failure of the engine or propeller, or the interruption of the fl ow of fuel to the engine owing to contaminants or mechanical problems, is presumed to have led to the introduction of tachometer and gauges, which show the engine speed to the pilot and critical temperatures and pressures of the engine’s oil and coolant, respectively.

1.2 World War I (Daring Knights in Their Aerial Steeds)

Th e advantages of an aerial view and the ability to drop bombs on ground troops from the above gave the airplane a unique role in World War I. Although still in its infancy, the airplane made a signifi cant con- tribution to the war on both the sides, and became an object of wonder, aspiring thousands of our nation’s youth to become aviators. Th e roles of the airplane were principally those of observation, attack of ground installations and troops, and air-to-air aerial combat. Th e aircraft themselves were strengthened to take the increased G-loads imposed by combat maneuvering and the increased weight of ordinance payloads.

As a result, pilots had to possess special abilities to sustain themselves in this arena. Th us, problems related to human factors in the selection of pilot candidates emerged. Originally, family background, character traits, athletic prowess, and recommendations from signifi cant persons secured an individual applicant a position in pilot training. Being a good hunter indicated an ability to lead and shoot at other moving targets, and strong physique and endurance signifi ed the ability to endure the rigors of altitude, heat and cold, as well as the forces of aerial combat. Additionally, the applicant was expected to be brave and show courage.

Later, psychologists began to follow a more systematic and scientifi c approach for the classifi cation of individuals and assignment to various military specialties. Th e aviation medics became concerned about the pilots’ abilities to perform under extreme climatic conditions (the airplanes were open cock- pits without heaters), as well as the eff ects of altitude on performance. During this period, industrial engineers began to utilize the knowledge about human abilities and performance to improve factory productivity in the face of signifi cant changes in the composition of the work force. Women began to

A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation 1-3

play a major role in this area. Frank Gilbreath, an industrial engineer, and his wife Lillian, a psychologist, teamed up to solve many questions about the improvement of human performance in the workplace, and the knowledge gained was useful to the industry as well as the armed forces.

Early in the war, it became apparent that the allied forces were losing far more pilots to accidents than to combat. In fact, two-thirds of the total aviation casualties were not due to engagement in combat. Th e failure of the airframes or engines, midair collisions, and weather-related accidents (geographical or spatial disorientation) took greater toll. However, the performance of individuals also contributed signifi cantly to the number of accidents. Fortunately, with the slower airspeeds of the airplanes at that time and owing to the light, crushable structure of the airframe itself, many aviators during initial fl ight training who crashed and totaled an airplane or two, still walked away from the crash(es) and later earned their wings. Certainly, with the cost of today’s airplanes, this would hardly be the case.

Th e major problems of the World War I era related to human factors were the selection and classifi - cation of personnel, the physiological stresses on the pilots, and the design of the equipment to ensure mission eff ectiveness and safety. Th e higher-altitude operations of these airplanes, especially the bomb- ers, resulted in the development of liquid oxygen converters, regulators, and breathing masks. However, owing to the size and weight of these oxygen systems, they were not utilized in the fi ghter aircraft . Cold- weather fl ying gear, fl ight goggles, and rudimentary instruments were just as important as improving the reliability of the engines and the strength and crash-worthiness of the airframes. To protect the pilots from the cold, leather fl ight jackets or large heavy fl ying coats, leather gloves, and leather boots with some fur-lining, were used. In spite of wearing all these heavy clothing, the thoughts of wearing a parachute were out. In fact, many pilots thought that it was not sporting to wear a parachute, and such technologies were not well developed.

Th e experience of the British was somewhat diff erent from other reported statistics of World War I: “Th e British found that of every 100 aviation deaths, 2 were by enemy action, 8 by defective airplanes, and 90 for individual defects, 60 of which were a combination of physical defects and improper train- ing” (Engle & Lott, 1979, p. 151). One explanation off ered is that, of these 60, many had been disabled in France or Flanders before going to England and joining the Royal Air Corps.

1.3 Barnstorming Era (The Thrill of It All)

Aft er the war, these aerial cavalrymen came home in the midst of public admiration. Stories of great heroism and aerial combat skills preceded them, such that their homecoming was eagerly awaited by the public, anticipating for an opportunity to talk to these aviators and see demonstrations of their aerial daring. Th is was the beginning of the post-World War I barnstorming era.

Th e airplanes were also remodeled such that they had enclosed cabins for passengers, and oft en the pilot’s cockpit was enclosed. Instead of the variations on the box-kite theme of the earliest airplanes, those aft er World War I were more aerodynamic, more rounded in design than the boxlike model. Radial engines became more popular means of propulsion, and they were air-cooled, as opposed to the earlier heavy water-cooled engines. With greater power-to-weight ratios, these airplanes were more maneuverable and could fl y higher, faster, and farther than their predecessors.

Flying became an exhibitionist activity, a novelty, and a source of entertainment. Others had visions of it as a serious means of transportation. Th e concept of transportation of persons and mails via air was in its infancy, and this brought many new challenges to the aviators. Th e commercial goals of aviation came along when the airplanes became more reliable and capable of staying aloft for longer durations, connecting distant places easily, but with relatively uncomfortable reach. Th e major challenges were the weather and navigation under unfavorable conditions of marginal visibility.

Navigation over great distances over unfamiliar terrain became a real problem. Much of the western United States and some parts of the central and southern states were not well charted. In older days, where one fl ew around one’s own barnyard or local town, getting lost was not a big concern. However, to fl y hundreds of miles away from home, pilots used very rudimentary maps or hand-sketched instructions

1-4 Handbook of Aviation Human Factors

and attempted to follow roads, rivers, and railway tracks. Th us, getting lost was indeed a problem. Th e IFR fl ying in those days probably meant I Follow Roadways, instead of Instrument Flight Rules!

Writing on water towers, the roofs of barns, municipal buildings, hospitals, or airport hangars was used to identify the cities. As pilots tried to navigate at night, natural landmarks and writing on build- ings became less useful, and tower beacons came into being to “light the way” for the aviator. Th e federal government had an extensive program for the development of lighted airways for the mail and pas- senger carriers. Th e color of the lights and the fl ashing of codes on the beacons were used to identify a particular airway that one was following. In the higher, drier southwestern United States, some of the lighted airway beacons were used even in the 1950s. However, runway lighting replaced the use of automobile headlights or brush fi res to indicate the limits of a runway at night. Nevertheless, under low visibility of fog, haze, and clouds, even these lighted airways and runways became less useful, and new means of navigation had to be provided to guide the aviators to the airfi elds.

Of course, weather was still a severe limitation to safe fl ight. Protection from icing conditions, thun- derstorms, and low ceilings and fog were still major problems. However, owing to the developments resulting from the war eff ort, there were improved meteorological measurement, plotting, forecasting, and dissemination of weather information. In the 1920s, many expected that “real pilots” could fl y at night and into the clouds without the aid of any special instruments. But, there were too many instances of pilots fl ying into clouds or at night without visual reference to the horizon, which resulted in them enter- ing a spiraling dive (graveyard spiral) or spinning out of the clouds too late to recover before impacting the ever-waiting earth. In 1929, Lt. James Doolittle managed to take off , maneuver, and land his airplane solely referring to the instruments inside the airplane’s cockpit. Th is demonstrated the importance of basic attitude, altitude, and turn information, to maintain the airplane right-side-up when inside the clouds or in other situations where a distinct external-world reference to the horizon is not available.

Many researches had been carried out on the eff ects of high altitude on humans (Engle & Lott, 1979), as early as the 1790s, when the English surgeon Dr. John Sheldon studied the eff ects of altitude on himself in balloon ascents. In the 1860s, the French physician, Dr. Paul Bert, later known as the “father of aviation medicine,” performed altitude research on a variety of animals as well as on himself in altitude chambers that he designed. During this post-World War I era, airplanes were capable of fl y- ing well over 150 miles/h and at altitudes of nearly 20,000 ft , but only few protective gears, other than oxygen- breathing bags and warm clothing, were provided to ensure safety at high altitudes. Respiratory physiologists and engineers worked hard to develop a pressurized suit that would enable pilots to main- tain fl ight at very high altitudes. Th ese technologies were “spinoff s” from the deep sea-diving industry. On August 28, 1934, in his supercharged Lockheed Vega Winnie Mae, Wiley Post became the fi rst per- son to fl y an airplane while wearing a pressure suit. He made at least 10 subsequent fl ights and attained an unoffi cial altitude of approximately 50,000 ft . In September 1936, Squadron Leader F. D. R. Swain set an altitude record of 49,967 ft . Later, in June 1937, Flight Lt. M. J. Adam set a new record of 53,937 ft .

Long endurance and speed records were attempted one aft er the other, and problems regarding how to perform air-to-air refueling and the stress that long-duration fl ight imposed on the engines and the operators were addressed. In the late 1920s, airplanes managed to fl y over the North and South Poles and across both the Atlantic and Pacifi c Oceans. From the endurance fl ights, the development of the early autopilots took place in the 1930s. Obviously, these required electrical systems on the aircraft and imposed certain weight increases that were generally manageable on the larger multiengine airplanes. Th is is considered as the fi rst automation in airplanes, which continues even till today.

1.4 The World War II Era (Serious Business)

Despite the hay day of the barnstorming era, military aviation shrunk aft er the United States had won “the war to end all wars.” Th e wars in Europe in the late 1930s stimulated the American aircraft design- ers to plan ahead, advancing the engine and airframe technologies for the development of airplanes with capabilities far superior to those that were left over from World War I.

A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation 1-5

Th e “necessities” of World War II resulted in airplanes capable of reaching airspeeds four times faster than those of World War I, and with the shift ed impellers and turbochargers altitude capabilities that exceeded 30,000 ft . With the newer engines and airframes, the payload and range capabilities became much greater. Th e environmental extremes of high altitude, heat, and cold became major challenges to the designers for the safety and performance of aircrew members. Furthermore, land-based radio trans- mitters greatly improved cross-country navigation and instrument-landing capabilities, as well as com- munications between the airplanes and between the airplane and persons on the ground responsible for aircraft control. Ground-based radar was developed to alert the Allied forces regarding the incoming enemy aircraft and was used as an aid to guide the aircraft to their airfi elds. Also, radar was installed in the aircraft to navigate them to their targets when the weather prevented visual “acquisition” of the targets.

Th e rapid expansion of technologies brought many more problems than ever imagined. Although the equipments were advanced, humans who were selected and trained to operate them did not signifi cantly change. Individuals who had not moved faster than 30 miles/h in their lifetime were soon trained to operate vehicles capable of reaching speeds 10 times faster and which were far more complex than any- thing they had experienced. Th erefore, the art and science of selection and classifi cation of individuals from the general population to meet the responsibilities of maintaining and piloting the new aircraft had to undergo signifi cant changes. To screen hundreds of thousands of individuals, the selection and classifi cation centers became a source of great amounts of data about human skills, capabilities, and limitations. Much of these data have been documented in a series of 17 “blue books” of the U.S. Army Air Force Aviation Psychology Program (Flanagan, 1947). Another broader source of information on the selection of aviators is the North and Griffi n (1977) Aviator Selection 1917–1977.

A great deal of eff ort was put forth in the gathering of data about the capabilities and limitations of humans, and the development of guidelines for the design of displays and controls, environmental sys- tems, equipment, and communication systems. Following the war, Lectures on Men and Machines: An Introduction to Human Engineering by Chapanis, Garner, Morgan, and Sanford (1947), Paul Fitts’ “blue book” on Psychological Research on Equipment Design (1947), and the Handbook of Human Engineering Data for Design Engineers prepared by the Tuft s College Institute for Applied Experimental Psychology and published by the Naval Special Devices Center (1949) helped to disseminate the vast knowledge regarding human performance and equipment design that had been developed by the early human- factors psychologists and engineers (Moroney, 1995).

Stevens (1946), in his article “Machines Cannot Fight Alone,” wrote about the development of radar during the war. “With radar it was a continuous frantic race to throw a better and better radio beam farther and farther out, and to get back a refl ection which could be displayed as meaningful pattern before the eyes of an operator” (p. 391). However, as soon as the technology makes a step forward, a human limitation may be encountered or the enemy might devise some means of degrading the refl ect- ing signal, so that it would be virtually useless. Oft en weather conditions may result in refl ections from the moisture in the air, which could reduce the likelihood of detecting a target. Furthermore, in addition to the psychophysical problems of detecting signals in the presence of “noise,” there was the well-known problem that humans are not very good at vigilance tasks.

Without pressurization, the airplanes of World War II were very noisy, and speech communications were most diffi cult in the early stages. At the beginning of the war, the oxygen masks did not have micro- phones built in them, and hence, throat microphones were utilized, making speech virtually unintel- ligible. Th e headphones that provided information to the pilots were “left overs” from the World War I era and did little to shield out the ambient noise of the airplane cockpit.

In addition to the noise problem, as one might expect, there was a great deal of vibration that contrib- uted to apparent pilot fatigue. Stevens (1946) mentioned that a seat was suspended such that it “fl oated in rubber” to dampen the transmission of vibrations from the aircraft to the pilot. Although technically successful, the seat was not preferred by the pilots because it isolated them from a sense of feel of the airplane.

1-6 Handbook of Aviation Human Factors

Protecting the human operator while still allowing maximum degree of fl exibility to move about and perform tasks was also a major problem (Benford, 1979). Th e necessity to protect aviators from antiaircraft fi re from below was initially met with the installation of seat protectors—plates of steel built under the pilot’s seat to defl ect rounds coming up from below. For protection from fi re other than the one below, B. Gen. Malcolm C. Grow, surgeon of the 8th Air Force, got the Wilkinson Sword Company, designer of early suits of armor, to make body armor for B-17 aircrew members. By 1944, there was a 60% reduction in men wounded among the B-17 crews with body armor.

Dr. W. R. Franks developed a rubber suit with a nonstretchable outer layer to counter the eff ects of high G-forces on the pilot. Th e Franks fl ying suit was worn over the pilot’s underwear and was fi lled with water. As the G-forces increased, they would also pull the water down around the lower extremi- ties of the pilot’s body, exerting pressure to help prevent pooling of blood. In November 1942, this was the fi rst G-suit worn in actual air operations. Owing to the discomfort and thermal buildup in wearing the Franks suit, pneumatic anti-G suits were developed. One manufacturer of the pneumatic G-suits, David Clark Co. of Worcester, Massachusetts, later became involved in the production of microphones and headsets. Th e Gradient Pressure Flying suit, Type NS-9 or G-1 suit, was used by the Air Force in the European theater in 1944.

Training of aviators to fl y airplanes soon included fl ight simulators in the program. Although fl ight sim- ulation began as early as 1916, the electromechanical modern fl ight simulator was invented by E. A. Link in 1929 (Valverde, 1968). Th e Link Trainer, aff ectionately known as the “Blue Box,” was used exten- sively during World War II, particularly in the training of pilots to fl y under instrument conditions.

Although the developments in aviation were principally focused on military applications during this period, civilian aviation was slowly advancing in parallel to the military initiatives. Some of the cargo and bomber aircraft proposed and built for the military applications were also modifi ed for civilian air transportation. Th e DC03, one of the most popular civil air-transport aircraft prior to the war, was the “workhorse” of World War II, used for the transportation of cargo and troops around the world. Aft er the war, commercial airlines found that they had a large experienced population from which they could select airline pilots. However, there were few standards to guide them in the selection of the more appropriate pilots for the tasks of commercial airline piloting: passenger com- fort, safety, and service. McFarland (1953), in Human Factors in Air Transportation, provided a good review on the status of the commercial airline pilots selection, training, and performance evaluation, as well as aviation medicine, physiology, and human engineering design. Gordon (1949) noted the lack of selection criteria to discriminate between airline pilots who were successful (currently employed) and those who were released from the airlines for lack of fl ying profi ciency.

Th e problems of air-traffi c control in the civilian sector were not unlike those in the operational theater. Th ough radar was developed and used for military purposes, it later became integrated into the civilian air-traffi c control structure. Th ere were the customary problems of ground clutter, precipitation attenuating the radar signals, and the detection of targets. Advances in the communications between the ground controllers and the airplanes, as well as communications between the ground control sites greatly facilitated the development of the airways infrastructure and procedures, till date. Hopkin (1995) provided an interesting and rather complete review on the history of human factors in air-traffi c control.

Following the war, universities got into the act with the institution of aviation psychology research programs sponsored by the government (Koonce, 1984). In 1945, the National Research Council’s Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots awarded a grant to the Ohio State University to establish the Midwest Institute of Aviation. In 1946, Alexander C. Williams founded the Aviation Psychology Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois, and Paul M. Fitts opened the Ohio State University’s Aviation Psychology Laboratory in 1949. Th ese as well as other university research pro- grams in aviation psychology and human engineering attracted veterans from the war to use the G.I. Bill to go to college, advance their education, and work in the area of human-factors psychology and engineering.

A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation 1-7

Although developed under the blanket of secrecy, toward the end of World War II, jet aircraft made their debut in actual combat. Th ese jet airplanes gave a glimpse to our imaginations on what was to come in terms of aircraft altitude and airspeed capabilities of military and civilian aircraft in the near future.

1.5 Cold Weather Operations (Debons)

In the vast wastelands of Alaska, climatic levels and day–night seasonal extremes can defi ne human performance and survival in the region. An understanding of the human–technological–climatic interface that prevails both in civil and military aviation activity thus became an important issue. Th e exploratory character of that eff ort was well documented and has been archived at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks. Only a few of the many programs of the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory (AAL) are described here. A close relationship was maintained between the Aeromedical Laboratory located at Right Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio (Grether & Baker, 1968), and the AAL located at Ladd Air Force Base, Fairbanks, Alaska. Th e AAL also collaborated with the ergonomic research activities of Paul M. Fitts, Human Engineering Laboratory, Ohio State University (Fitts, 1949). Th e studies undertaken by the AAL included the following:

1. Th e impact that short–long, day–night variations have on personnel work effi ciency 2. Diffi culties encountered by military personnel in their ability to engage and sustain work perfor-

mance import to ground fl ight maintenance 3. Signifi cant human factors faced by military personnel during arctic operations 4. Study of the human factors and ergonomic issues associated with nutrition and exposure to tem-

perature extremes 5. Optimal clothing to engage and sustain work effi ciency during survival operations

1.6 The Jet Era (New Horizons)

Th e military airplanes developed aft er World War II were principally jet fi ghters and bombers. Th e inventory was “mixed” with many of the left over piston engine airplanes, but as the United States approached the Korean War, the jet aircraft became the prominent factor in military aviation. Just before World War II, Igor Sikorsky developed a successful helicopter. During the Korean War, the heli- copters found widespread service. Th ese unique fl ying machines were successful, but tended to have a rather high incidence of mechanical problems, which were attributed to the reciprocating engines that powered them. Th e refi nement of the jet engine and its use in the helicopters made them much more reliable and in more demand, both within the armed forces as well as in the civilian sector.

Selection and classifi cation of individuals in the military hardly changed even aft er the advances made during the pressure of World War II. Furthermore, the jet era of aviation also did not produce a signifi cant eff ect on the selection and classifi cation procedures, until the advent of personal computers. Commercial air carriers typically sought their pilots from those who had been selected and trained by the armed forces. Th ese pilots had been through rigorous selection and training criteria, were very stan- dardized, had good leadership skills, and generally possessed a large number of fl ight house.

Boyne (1987) described the early entry of the jet airplanes into commercial air travel. In the United States, aircraft manufacturers were trying to develop the replacement for the fabled DC-3 in the form of various two- and four-radial-engine propeller airplanes. Th ere were advances made such that the airplanes could fl y without refueling, the speed was increased, and most of the airplanes soon had pressurization for passenger safety and comfort. In the meantime, Great Britain’s Vicker-Armstrong came out with the Vicount in 1950, a four-engine turboprop airplane that provided much faster, qui- eter, and smoother fl ight. Soon thereaft er, in 1952, the deHavilland Comet 1A entered commercial ser- vice. Th e Comet was an innovative full jet airliner capable of carrying 36 passengers at 500 miles/h between London and Johannesburg. Th ese advances in the jet era had a signifi cant impact on America’s

1-8 Handbook of Aviation Human Factors

long-standing prominence in airline manufacturing. Aft er two in-fl ight breakups of comets in 1954, deHavilland had diffi culty in promoting any airplane with the name Comet. Th us, the focus of interest in airliner production shift ed back to the United States, where Boeing, which had experience in develop- ing and building the B-47 and B-52 jet bombers, made its entry into the commercial jet airplane market. In 1954, the Boeing 367–80 prototype of the resulting Boeing 707 made its debut. Th e Boeing 707 could economically fl y close to Mach 1 and was very reliable but expensive. Later, Convair came out with its model 880 and Douglas made its DC-9, both closely resembling Boeing 707 (Josephy, 1962).

Th e introduction of jet airplanes brought varied responses from the pilots. A number of pilots who had served many years fl ying airplanes with reciprocating engines and propellers exhibited some “dif- fi culties” in transitioning to the jet airplanes. Th e jet airplanes had few engine instruments for the pilots to monitor, few controls for the setting and management of the jet engines, and with the advancement of technology, more simplistic systems to control. However, the feedback to the pilot was diff erent between piston propeller and jet airplanes. Th e time to accelerate (spool-up time) with the advance of power was signifi cantly slower in the jet airplanes, and the time with which the airplane transited the distances was signifi cantly decreased. Commercial airlines became concerned about the human problems in transi- tion training from propeller to jet airplanes. Today, that “problem” seems to be no longer an issue. With the advent of high sophisticated fl ight simulators and other training systems and jet engines that build up their thrust more rapidly, there have been very few reports on the diffi culties of transition training from propeller to jet airplanes.

Eventually, the jet era resulted in reductions in the size of the fl ight crews required to manage the airplanes. In the “old days,” the transoceanic airliners required a pilot, a copilot, a fl ight engineer, a radio operator, and a navigator. On the other hand, the jet airliners require only a pilot, copilot, and in some instances, a fl ight engineer. With the aid of computers and improved systems engineering, many of the jet airplanes that previously had three fl ight crew members eliminated the need for a fl ight engineer and now require only two pilots.

Th e earlier aircraft with many crew members, who were sometimes dispersed and out of visual con- tact with each other, required good communication and coordination skills among the crew and were “trained” during crew coordination training (CCD). However, with the reduction in the number of crew members and placing them all within hand’s reach of each other, lack of “good” crew coordina- tion, communication, and utilization of available resources became a real problem in the jet airline industry. Th e tasks of interfacing with the on-board computer systems through the fl ight management system (FMS), changed the manner in which the fl ight crewmembers interact. Reviews on accident data and reports on the Aviation Safety Reporting Systems (ASRS) (Foushee, 1984; Foushee & Manos, 1981) revealed crew coordination as a “new” problem. Since the mid-1980s, much has been written about crew resource management (CRM; Weiner, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued an Advisory Circular 120-51B (FAA, 1995) for commercial air carriers to develop CRM training. Despite over 10 years of research, programs, and monies, there still seems to be a signifi cant problem with respect to the lack of good CRM behaviors in the cockpits.

Th e jet engines have proven to be much more reliable than the piston engines of the past. Th is has resulted in the reliance on their safety, and sometimes a level of complacency and disbelief when things go wrong. With highly automatized systems and reliable equipment, the fl ight crew’s physical workload has been signifi cantly reduced; however, as a result, there seems to be an increase in the cognitive workload.

1.7 The Cold War: Arctic Research

1.7.1 The New Technology Era (The Computer in the Cockpit)

In the 1990s, and although many things have changed in aviation, many other things have not. Th e selection of pilots for the armed forces is still as accurate as it has been for the past 40 years. However, there have been new opportunities and challenges in selection and classifi cation, as women are now

A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation 1-9

permitted to be pilots in the military, and they are not restricted from combat aircraft . Th e selection and classifi cation tests developed and refi ned over the past 40 years on males might not be suitable for the females with the greatest likelihood of successfully performing as pilots (McCloy & Koonce, 1982). Th erefore, human-factors engineers should reconsider the design of aircraft cockpits based on a wider range of anthropometric dimensions, and the development of personal protective and life-support equipment with regard to females is a pressing need.

With the advent of the microcomputers and fl at-panel display technologies, the aircraft cockpits of the modern airplanes have become vastly diff erent from those of the past. Th e navigational systems are extremely precise, and they are integrated with the autopilot systems resulting in fully automated fl ight, from just aft er the takeoff to aft er the airplane’s systems, while the automation does the fl ying. Th us, a challenge for the designers is regarding what to do with the pilot during the highly automated fl ight (Mouloua & Koonce, 1997).

Recently, a great amount of attention has been paid to the concept of situation awareness in the advanced airplanes (Garland & Endsley, 1995). Accidents have occurred in which the fl ight crew members were not aware of their location with respect to dangerous terrains or were unaware of the current status of the airplane’s systems, when that knowledge was essential for correct decision-making. Numerous basic researches have been initiated to understand more about the individual diff erences in situation awareness, the potential for selection of individuals with that capability, and the techniques for improving one’s situation awareness. However, much of the studies have been reminiscent of the earlier research on attention and decision-making.

Th us, in future, human-factors practitioners will have numerous challenges, from the eff ects of advanced display technologies and automation at all levels of aviation, right down to the general aviation recreational pilot. Th e eff ectors to invigorate general aviation to make it more aff ordable, thus attracting a larger part of the public may include issues of selection and training down to the private pilot level, where, historically, a basic physical fl ight and a source of funds were all that were necessary to get into pilot training.

Economics is restructuring the way in which the airspace system works (Garland & Wise, 1993; Hopkin, 1995). Concepts such as data links between controlling agencies and the aircraft that they con- trol, free fl ight to optimize fl ight effi ciency, comfort and safety, automation of weather observation and dissemination, and modernization of the air-traffi c controllers’ workstations will all require signifi cant inputs from aviation human-factors practitioners in the near future.

Th e future supersonic aircraft , to reduce drag and weight costs, might not provide windows for for- ward visibility, but might provide an enhanced or synthetic visual environment that the pilots can “see” to maneuver and land their airplanes. Other challenges might include the handling of passenger loads of 500–600 persons in one airplane, the design of the terminal facility to handle such airplanes, waiting and loading facilities for the passengers, and the systems for handling the great quantity of luggage and associated cargo. In addition, planners and design teams including human-factors practitioners may also have to face the future problems in airport security.

References

Benford, R. J. (1979). Th e heritage of aviation medicine. Washington, DC: Th e Aerospace Medical Association.

Boyne, W. J. (1987). Th e Smithsonian book of fl ight. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books. Cattle, W. & Carlson, L. D. (1954). Adaptive changes in rats exposed to cold, coloric exchanges, American

Journal of Physiology, 178, 305–308. Chapanis, A., Chardner, W. R., Morgan, C. T., & Sanford, F. H. (1947). Lectures on men and machines:

An introduction to human engineering. Baltimore, MD: Systems Research Laboratory. Debons, A. (1951, March) Psychological inquiry into fi eld cases of frostbite during operation “Sweetbriar.”

Ladd AFB, AL: AAL.

1-10 Handbook of Aviation Human Factors

Debons, A. (1950) Personality predispositions of Infantry men as related to their motivation to endure tour in Alaska: A comparative evaluation: (Technical Report). Fairbanks, AL: Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory, Ladd Airforce Base.

Debons, A. (1950a, April) Human engineering research (Project no.22-01-022. Part 11, Progress E). Debons, A. (1950b, February) Gloves as factor in reduce dexterity. Individual reactions to cold (Project 212-

01-018. Phase 1. Program A., ATT 72-11). Deese, J. A. & Larzavus, R. (1952, June). Th e eff ects of psychological stress upon perceptual motor response.

San Antonio TX: Lackland AFB, Air Traibning Command. Human Resource Center. Engle, E. & Lott, A. S. (1979). Man in fl ight: Biomedical achievements in aerospace. Annapolis,

MD: Leeward. Federal Aviation Administration. (1995, March). Crew resource management training (Advisory Circular

AC 120-51B). Washington, DC: Author. Fitts, P. M. (1947). Psychological research on equipment design (Research Rep. No. 17). Washington,

DC: Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Program. Fitts, P. M. & K. Rodahl (1954). Modifi cation by Light of 24 hour activity of white rats. Proceedings of

lowa Academy Science, 66, 399–406 Flanagan, J. C. (1947). Th e aviation psychology program in the army air force (Research Rep. No. 1).

Washington, DC: Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Program. Foushee, C. J. (1984). Dyads and triads at 36,000 feet. American Psychologist, 39, 885–893. Foushee, C. J. & Manos, K. L. (1981). Information transfer within the cockpit: Problems in intracockpit

communications. In C. E. Billings, & E. S. Cheaney (Eds.), Information transfer problems in the avia- tion system (NASA Rep. No. TP-1875, pp. 63–71). Moff et Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.

Garland, D. J. & Endsley, M. R. (Eds.). (1995). Experimental analysis and measurement of situation aware- ness. Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press.

Gordon, T. (1949). Th e airline pilot: A survey of the critical requirements of his job and of pilot Evaluation and selection procedures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 33, 122–131.

Grether, W. F. (1968). Engineering psychology in the United States. American Psychologist, 23(10), 743–751.

Hopkin, V. D. (1995). Human factors in air traffi c control. London U.K.: Taylor & Francis. Jospehy, A. M., Jr. (Ed.). (1962). Th e American heritage history of fl ight. New York: American Heritage. Koonce, J. M. (1979, September). Aviation psychology in the U.S.A.: Present and future. In F. Fehler

(Ed.), Aviation psychology research. Brussels, Belgium: Western European Association for Aviation Psychology.

Koonce, J. M. (1984). A brief history of aviation psychology. Human Factors, 26(5), 499–506. McCollum, E. L. (1957). Psychological aspects of arctic and subarctic living. Science in Alaska, Selected

Papers of the Arctic Institute of America Fairbanks, AK. McCloy, T. M. & Koonce, J. M. (1982). Sex as a moderator variable in the selection and training of persons

for a skilled task. Journal of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 53(12), 1170–1173. McFarland, R. A. (1953). Human factors in air transportation. New York: McGraw-Hill. Moroney, W. F. (1995). Th e evolution of human engineering: A selected review. In J. Weimer (Ed.), Research

techniques in human engineering (pp. 1–19). Englewood Cliff s, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Mouloua, M. & Koonce, J. M. (Eds.). (1997). Human-automation interaction: Research and practice.

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Naval Special Devices Center. (1949, December). Handbook of human engineering data for design engineers.

Tuft s College Institute for applied Experimental Psychology (NavExos P-643, Human Engineering Rep. No. SDC 199-1-2a). Port Washington, NY: Author.

North, R. A. & Griffi n, G. R. (1977). Aviator selection 1917–1977. (Technical Rep. No. SP-77-2). Pensacola, FL: Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory.

Pecora, L. F. (1962). Physiological measurement of metabolic functions in man. Ergonomics, 5.7(1-1962).

A Historical Overview of Human Factors in Aviation 1-11

Rohdah, K. & Horvath, S. M. (1961, January). Eff ects of dietary protein on performance on man in cold environment (Rep. No.). Philadelphia, PA: Lankenau Hospital Research Institute.

Stevens, S. S. (1946). Machines cannot fi ght alone. American Scientist, 334, 389–400. Valverde, H. H. (1968, July). Flight simulators: A review of the search and development (Technical Rep.

No. AMRL-TR-68-97). Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory.

Weiner, E., Kanki, B. G., & Helmreich, R. (Eds.). (1993). Cockpit resource management. New York: Academic Press.

2-1

2 Aviation Research and Development:

A Framework for the Effective Practice of Human Factors, or

“What Your Mentor Never Told You

about a Career in Human Factors…”

2.1 Th e Role of Human-Factors Research in Aviation ........... 2-1 Focus Levels of RDT&E

2.2 Development of an Eff ective R&D Program .....................2-4 2.3 Some Words of Wisdom Regarding Dealing

with the Sponsor, Management, and User ......................... 2-7 2.4 Developing a Long-Term Research Strategy ...................... 2-7 2.5 Critical Technology Challenges in

Aviation Research ..................................................................2-8 2.6 Major Funding Sources for Aviation Research ............... 2-12

John E. Deaton CHI Systems, Inc.

Jeffrey G. Morrison Space Warfare Systems Center

2.1 The Role of Human-Factors Research in Aviation

Since its humble beginning in the chaos of World War II, human factors have played a substantial role in aviation. In fact, it is arguably in this domain that human factors have received their greatest acceptance as an essential part of the research, development, test, and evaluation cycle. Th is acceptance has come from the critical role that humans, notably pilots, play in these human–machine systems, the unique problems and challenges that these systems pose on human perception, physiology, and cognition, and the dire consequences of human error in these systems. As a result, there have been numerous opportunities for the development of the science of human factors that have contributed signifi cantly to the safety and growth of aviation.

2-2 Handbook of Aviation Human Factors

Times keep changing, and with the end of the Cold War, funding for human-factors research and development started shrinking along with military spending. Being a successful practitioner in the fi eld of human factors requires considerable skills that are beyond those traditionally taught as a part of a graduate curriculum in human factors. New challenges are being presented, which require a closer stra- tegic attention to what we do, how we do it, and what benefi ts accrue as a result of our eff orts. Th is chap- ter off ers snippets of the authors’ experience in the practice of human factors. It describes the questions and issues that the successful practitioner of human factors must bear in mind to conduct research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E) in any domain. A large part of the authors’ experi- ence is with the Department of Defense (DoD), and this is the basis of our discussion. Nonetheless, the lessons learned and advices made should be applicable across other endeavors related to the science of human factors.

2.1.1 Focus Levels of RDT&E

An important part in succeeding as a human-factors practitioner is recognizing the type of research being funded, and the expectancies that a sponsor is likely to have for the work being performed. Th e DoD identifi es four general categories of RDT&E, and has specifi c categories of funding for each of these categories.* Th ese categories of research are identifi ed as 6.1–6.4, where the fi rst digit refers to the research dollars and the second digit refers to the type of work being done (Table 2.1). Th e DoD sponsors are typically very concerned with the work being performed, as Congress mandates what needs to be done with the diff erent categories of funding, and has mechanisms in place for the diff erent categories of funding and to audit how it is spent. Th is issue is also relevant to the non-DoD practitioner as well, because regardless of the source of RDT&E funding, understanding the expectations that are attached to it is critical to successfully conclude a project. Th erefore, the successful practitioner should understand how their projects are funded and the types of products expected for that funding.

Basic research is the one typically thought of as being performed in an academic setting. Character- istically, a researcher may have an idea that he or she feels would be of some utility to a sponsor, and obtains funding to try to explore the idea further. Alternatively, the work performed may be derived from the existing theory, but may represent a novel implication of that theory. Human-factors work at the 6.1 level will typically be carried out with artifi cial tasks and naïve subjects, such as a university labo- ratory with undergraduate students as subjects. Products of such work may be theoretical development, a unique model, or theory, and the work typically may entail empirical research to validate the theory. Th is work is generally not focused on a particular application or problem, although it may be inspired by a real-world problem and may utilize a problem domain to facilitate the research. However, this research is not generally driven by a specifi c operational need; its utility for a specifi c application may only be speculated. Th is type of research might have to address questions such as

How do we model strategic decision-making?• How is the human visual-perception process aff ected by the presence of artifi cial lighting?• What impact do shared mental models have on team performance?•

Applied research is still very much at the research end of the research–development spectrum; however, it is typically where an operational need or requirement fi rst comes into the picture in a signifi cant way. Th is research can be characterized as the one considering established theories or models shown to have

* In fact, these categories are being redefi ned as a part of the downsizing and redefi nition of the DoD procurement process. For instance, there was until the early 1990s, a distinction in the 6.3 funding between core-funded prototype demon- strations (6.3a) and the actual fi eld demonstrations (6.3b) that received specifi c funding from the Congressional budget. However, this distinction has been eliminated. Th e authors were unable to locate a specifi c set of recent defi nitions that have been employed when this chapter was written. Th erefore, these defi nitions are based on the authors’ current under- standing of the DoD procurement system, based on the current practice rather than an offi cial set of defi nitions.

Aviation Research and Development 2-3

TABLE 2.1 Types and Characteristics of DoD Research and Development

Number Type Defi nition Research Questions Products

6.1 Basic research Research done to develop a novel theory or model, or to extend the existing theory into new domains. Th e work may be funded to solve a specifi c problem; however, there is typically, no single application of the research that drives the work

Can we take an idea and turn it into a testable theory?

Can we assess the utility of a theory in understanding a problem?

Th eoretical papers, describing empirical studies, mathematical models, recommendations for continued research, and discussion of potential applications

6.2 Applied research

Research done to take an existing theory, model, or approach, and apply it to a specifi c problem

Can we take this theory/ model and apply it to this problem to come up with a useful solution?

Rudimentary demonstrations, theoretical papers describing empirical studies, recommendations for further development

6.3 Advanced development

Move from research to development of a prototype system to solve a specifi c problem

Can we demonstrate the utility of technology in solving a real-world need?

What are the implications of a proposed technology?

Is the technology operationally viable?

Working demonstrations in operationally relevant environments

Assessment with intended users of the system

Technical papers assessing the operational requirements for the proposed system/technology

6.4 Engineering development

Take a mature technology and develop a fi eldable system

Can we integrate and validate the new technology into existing systems?

What will it cost? How will it be maintained?

Th e products of this stage of development would be a matured, tested system, ready for procurement— notably, detailed specifi cations and performance criteria, life-cycle cost estimates, etc.

6.5 System procurement

Go out and support the actual buying, installation, and maintenance of the system

Does it work as per the specifi cation?

How do we fi x the problems?

Defi ciency reports and recommended fi xes

some scientifi c validity, and exploring their use to solve a specifi c problem. Owing to its applied fl avor, it is common and advisable to have some degree of subject expertise involved with the project, and to utilize the tasks that have at least a theoretical relationship with those of the envisaged application being developed. Questions with regard to this type of human-factors research might include

How is command-level decision-making in tactical commanders aff ected by time stress and • ambiguous information? How should we use advanced automation in a tactical cockpit?• How do we improve command-level decision-making of Navy command and control staff ?• How can synthetic three-dimensional (3D) audio be used to enhance operator detection of sonar • targets?

Advanced development is the point when the work starts moving away from the research and toward development. Although demonstrations are oft en done as a part of 6.2 and even 6.1 research, there is an implicit understanding that these demonstrations are not of fi eldable systems to be used by specifi c