Virtue ethics stance on abortion

D O I N G E T H I C S

‘’ Moral Reasoning and Contemporary Issues

Fourth Edition

Lewis Vaughn

BW. W. NORTON & COMPANY Independent and Employee-Owned New York . London

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page i

W. W. Norton & Company has been independent since its founding in 1923, when William Warder Norton and Mary D. Herter Norton first published lectures delivered at the People’s Institute, the adult education division of New York City’s Cooper Union. The firm soon expanded its program beyond the Institute, publishing books by celebrated academics from America and abroad. By midcentury, the two major pillars of Norton’s publishing program—trade books and college texts—were firmly established. In the 1950s, the Norton family transferred control of the company to its employees, and today—with a staff of four hundred and a comparable number of trade, college, and professional titles published each year—W. W. Norton & Company stands as the largest and oldest publishing house owned wholly by its employees.

Copyright © 2016, 2013, 2010, 2008 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

Editor: Peter J. Simon Project Editor: Rachel Mayer Assistant Editor: Gerra Goff Manuscript Editor: Barbara Curialle Managing Editor, College: Marian Johnson Managing Editor, College Digital Media: Kim Yi Production Manager: Ben Reynolds Media Editor: Erica Wnek Assistant Media Editor: Cara Folkman Marketing Manager, Philosophy: Michael Moss Design Director: Rubina Yeh Permissions Manager: Megan Jackson Permissions Clearer: Elizabeth Trammell Composition: Jouve International—Brattleboro, VT Manufacturing: RR Donnelley Crawfordsville

Permission to use copyrighted material is included as a footnote on the first page of each reading.

ISBN 978-0-393-26541-5

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110-0017

wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page ii

iii

C O N T E N T S

‘’ P R E F A C E xvi i

PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS

CHAPTER 1 Ethics and the Examined Life 3

The Ethical Landscape 5

The Elements of Ethics 6

The Preeminence of Reason 6

QUICK REVIEW 7

The Universal Perspective 7

The Principle of Impartiality 8

The Dominance of Moral Norms 8

Religion and Morality 8

Believers Need Moral Reasoning 9

When Conflicts Arise, Ethics Steps In 9

CRITICAL THOUGHT: ETHICS, RELIGION, AND TOUGH MORAL ISSUES 10

Moral Philosophy Enables Productive Discourse 10

Summary 12

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions 12

READINGS

from What Is the Socratic Method? by Christopher Phillips 13

from The Euthyphro by Plato 16

CHAPTER 2 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism 20

Subjective Relativism 21

QUICK REVIEW 21

JUDGE NOT? 22

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page iii

Cultural Relativism 23

CRITICAL THOUGHT: “FEMALE CIRCUMCISION” AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM 24

Emotivism 28

Summary 30

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions 31

READINGS

from Anthropology and the Abnormal by Ruth Benedict 32

Trying Out One’s New Sword by Mary Midgley 35

PART 2: MORAL REASONING

CHAPTER 3 Evaluating Moral Arguments 41

Claims and Arguments 41

Arguments Good and Bad 43

CRITICAL THOUGHT: THE MORALITY OF CRITICAL THINKING 44

Implied Premises 47

QUICK REVIEW 47

Deconstructing Arguments 48

Moral Statements and Arguments 51

Testing Moral Premises 53

Assessing Nonmoral Premises 55

QUICK REVIEW 55

Avoiding Bad Arguments 56

Begging the Question 56

Equivocation 56

Appeal to Authority 57

Slippery Slope 57

APPEAL TO EMOTION 57

Faulty Analogy 58

Appeal to Ignorance 58

Á CONTENTSiv

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page iv

Straw Man 59

Appeal to the Person 59

Hasty Generalization 59

QUICK REVIEW 60

Writing and Speaking about Moral Issues 60

Summary 62

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions / Argument Exercises 62

PART 3: THEORIES OF MORALITY

CHAPTER 4 The Power of Moral Theories 67

Theories of Right and Wrong 67

MORAL THEORIES VERSUS MORAL CODES 68

Major Theories 69

Consequentialist Theories 69

Nonconsequentialist Theories 70

QUICK REVIEW 71

Evaluating Theories 72

Criterion 1: Consistency with Considered Judgments 73

CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS 73

Criterion 2: Consistency with Our Moral Experiences 74

CRITICAL THOUGHT: A 100 PERCENT ALL-NATURAL THEORY 74

Criterion 3: Usefulness in Moral Problem Solving 75

QUICK REVIEW 75

Summary 76

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions 76

CHAPTER 5 CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES: MAXIMIZE THE GOOD 78

Ethical Egoism 78

Applying the Theory 79

Evaluating the Theory 80

CONTENTS Á v

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page v

CAN ETHICAL EGOISM BE ADVOCATED? 82

QUICK REVIEW 84

Utilitarianism 84

Applying the Theory 88

PETER SINGER, UTILITARIAN 88

QUICK REVIEW 89

Evaluating the Theory 89

Learning from Utilitarianism 93

CRITICAL THOUGHT: CROSS-SPECIES TRANSPLANTS: WHAT WOULD A UTILITARIAN DO? 94

Summary 94

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions 95

READING

from Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill 96

CHAPTER 6 Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do Your Duty 102

Kant’s Ethics 102

CRITICAL THOUGHT: SIZING UP THE GOLDEN RULE 104

Applying the Theory 106

Evaluating the Theory 106

THE KANTIAN VIEW OF PUNISHMENT 107

Learning from Kant’s Theory 109

Natural Law Theory 109

Applying the Theory 111

QUICK REVIEW 111

CRITICAL THOUGHT: DOUBLE EFFECT AND THE “TROLLEY PROBLEM” 112

Evaluating the Theory 113

Learning from Natural Law 114

Summary 114

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions 115

Á CONTENTSvi

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page vi

READINGS

from Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals by Immanuel Kant 116

from Summa Theologica by St. Thomas Aquinas 125

CHAPTER 7 Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person 136

The Ethics of Virtue 136

CRITICAL THOUGHT: LEARNING VIRTUES IN THE CLASSROOM 137

Virtue in Action 138

Evaluating Virtue Ethics 138

CRITICAL THOUGHT: WARRIOR VIRTUES AND MORAL DISAGREEMENTS 140

The Ethics of Care 141

QUICK REVIEW 141

Learning from Virtue Ethics 141

FEMINIST ETHICS 142

Summary 143

Exercises: Review Questions / Discussion Questions 144

READINGS

from Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle 145

The Need for More Than Justice by Annette C. Baier 153

PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES

CHAPTER 8 Abortion 163

Issue File: Background 163

ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES 164

MAJORITY OPINION IN ROE V. WADE 166

Moral Theories 166

ABORTION AND THE SCRIPTURES 168

QUICK REVIEW 169

Moral Arguments 169

CRITICAL THOUGHT: LATE-TERM ABORTIONS 170

Summary 174

CONTENTS Á vii

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page vii

READINGS

A Defense of Abortion by Judith Jarvis Thomson 175

On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion by Mary Anne Warren 185

Why Abortion Is Immoral by Don Marquis 194

Virtue Theory and Abortion by Rosalind Hursthouse 205

Cases for Analysis 211

CHAPTER 9 Altering Genes and Cloning Humans 213

Issue File: Background 213

GENE THERAPY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 216

Moral Theories 218

CRITICAL THOUGHT: LONGER LIFE THROUGH GENE THERAPY? 219

Moral Arguments 219

QUICK REVIEW 221

Summary 221

READINGS

Genetic Enhancement by Walter Glannon 222

Is Gene Therapy a Form of Eugenics? by John Harris 226

The Wisdom of Repugnance by Leon R. Kass 232

Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con by Dan W. Brock 249

Cases for Analysis 260

CHAPTER 10 Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 263

THE DEATH OF KAREN ANN QUINLAN 264

Issue File: Background 264

LANDMARK COURT RULINGS 266

QUICK REVIEW 267

Moral Theories 267

Á CONTENTSviii

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page viii

CRITICAL THOUGHT: DR. KEVORKIAN AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 269

Moral Arguments 269

PUBLIC OPINION AND EUTHANASIA 271

Summary 273

READINGS

Active and Passive Euthanasia by James Rachels 274

The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia by J. Gay-Williams 278

From Voluntary Active Euthanasia by Dan W. Brock 281

Euthanasia by Philippa Foot 289

Killing and Allowing to Die by Daniel Callahan 304

Cases for Analysis 306

CHAPTER 11 Capital Punishment 310

Issue File: Background 310

Moral Theories 312

CRITICAL THOUGHT: MEDICATED FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 313

QUICK REVIEW 315

CRITICAL THOUGHT: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS 316

Moral Arguments 318

CRITICAL THOUGHT: DIFFERENT CASES, SAME PUNISHMENT 319

Summary 320

READINGS

The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense by Ernest van den Haag 321

from Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag by Jeffrey H. Reiman 326

Against the Death Penalty: The Minimal Invasion Argument by Hugo Adam Bedau 332

In Defense of the Death Penalty by Louis P. Pojman 337

Cases for Analysis 347

CONTENTS Á ix

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page ix

CHAPTER 12 Drug Use, Harm, and Personal Liberty 350

Issue File: Background 351

DIVERSE VIEWS IN THE UNITED STATES ON USING MARIJUANA 352

Moral Theories 353

CRITICAL THOUGHT: DOES LEGALIZING MEDICAL MARIJUANA ENCOURAGE USE AMONG TEENAGERS? 354

Moral Arguments 354

QUICK REVIEW 356

Summary 357

READINGS

The Ethics of Addiction by Thomas Szasz 357

The Fallacy of the “Hijacked Brain” by Peg O’Connor 366

Against the Legalization of Drugs by James Q. Wilson 368

Cases for Analysis 377

CHAPTER 13 Sexual Morality 380

Issue File: Background 380

VITAL STATS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 381

Moral Theories 382

Moral Arguments 383

VITAL STATS: SEX AND RELATIONSHIPS 384

QUICK REVIEW 385

Summary 386

READINGS

Plain Sex by Alan H. Goldman 386

Sexual Morality by Roger Scruton 395

Sexual Perversion by Thomas Nagel 402

Feminists against the First Amendment by Wendy Kaminer 409

“The Price We Pay?”: Pornography and Harm by Susan J. Brison 416

Cases for Analysis 426

Á CONTENTSx

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page x

CHAPTER 14 Same-Sex Marriage 429

Issue File: Background 429

Moral Theories 430

OPINION POLLS: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 431

VITAL STATS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND SAME-SEX COUPLES 432

Moral Arguments 432

QUICK REVIEW 433

Summary 433

READINGS

On Gay Rights by Richard D. Mohr 434

What Marriage Is For: Children Need Mothers and Fathers by Maggie Gallagher 442

Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay Marriage by Andrew Sullivan 446

Cases for Analysis 449

CHAPTER 15 Environmental Ethics 451

Issue File: Background 451

SOME MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 454

Moral Theories 456

QUICK REVIEW 456

CRITICAL THOUGHT: SHOULD PANDAS PAY THE PRICE? 457

Moral Arguments 458

Summary 460

READINGS

People or Penguins by William F. Baxter 461

The Ethics of Respect for Nature by Paul W. Taylor 465

Are All Species Equal? by David Schmidtz 480

The Land Ethic by Aldo Leopold 488

Cases for Analysis 492

CONTENTS Á xi

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xi

CHAPTER 16 Animal Rights 495

Issue File: Background 496

CRITICAL THOUGHT: SHOULD WE ABOLISH DOG RACING? 498

Moral Theories 499

CRITICAL THOUGHT: SHOULD WE EXPERIMENT ON ORPHANED BABIES? 501

QUICK REVIEW 502

Moral Arguments 502

Summary 504

READINGS

All Animals Are Equal by Peter Singer 505

The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan 515

Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position by Mary Anne Warren 522

Speciesism and the Idea of Equality by Bonnie Steinbock 528

Cases for Analysis 535

CHAPTER 17 Political Violence: War, Terrorism, and Torture 539

Issue File: Background 539

CRITICAL THOUGHT: PREEMPTIVE WAR ON IRAQ 542

CRITICAL THOUGHT: TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS? 549

Moral Theories 550

Moral Arguments 552

QUICK REVIEW 556

Summary 557

READINGS

Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists by James P. Sterba 558

Against “Realism” by Michael Walzer 566

Can Terrorism Be Morally Justified? by Stephen Nathanson 577

The Case for Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist by Alan M. Dershowitz 585

Cases for Analysis 594

Á CONTENTSxii

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xii

CHAPTER 18 Equality and Affirmative Action 597

Issue File: Background 597

CRITICAL THOUGHT: ARE LEGACIES RACIST? 599

Moral Theories 600

CRITICAL THOUGHT: ARE WHITES-ONLY SCHOLARSHIPS UNJUST? 601

QUICK REVIEW 602

Moral Arguments 603

Summary 605

READINGS

Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified by Lisa H. Newton 606

The Case against Affirmative Action by Louis P. Pojman 609

Affirmative Action and Quotas by Richard A. Wasserstrom 622

In Defense of Affirmative Action by Tom L. Beauchamp 625

Cases for Analysis 634

CHAPTER 19 Global Economic Justice 637

Issue File: Background 637

Moral Theories 639

VITAL STATS: THE PLANET’S POOR AND HUNGRY 639

Moral Arguments 641

QUICK REVIEW 643

Summary 643

READINGS

On Justice by John Rawls 644

The Entitlement Theory of Justice by Robert Nozick 651

Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer 660

Lifeboat Ethics by Garrett Hardin 665

Cases for Analysis 672

CONTENTS Á xiii

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xiii

G L O S S A R Y 674

F U R T H E R R E A D I N G 678

A N S W E R S T O A R G U M E N T E X E R C I S E S 684

I N D E X 685

Á CONTENTSxiv

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xiv

xv

This fourth edition of Doing Ethics brings another set of substantial improvements to a text that had already been greatly expanded and improved. The aims that have shaped this text from the begin- ning have not changed: to help students (1) see why ethics matters to society and to themselves; (2) understand core concepts (theories, principles, values, virtues, and the like); (3) be familiar with the background (scientific, legal, and otherwise) of contemporary moral problems; and (4) know how to apply critical reasoning to those problems—to assess moral judgments and principles, construct and evaluate moral arguments, and apply and cri- tique moral theories. This book, then, tries hard to provide the strongest possible support to teachers of applied ethics who want students, above all, to think for themselves and competently do what is often required of morally mature persons—that is, to do ethics.

These goals are reflected in the book’s extensive introductions to concepts, cases, and issues; its large collection of readings and exercises; and its chapter-by-chapter coverage of moral reasoning— perhaps the most thorough introduction to these skills available in an applied-ethics text. This latter theme gets systematic treatment in five chapters, threads prominently throughout all the others, and is reinforced everywhere by “Critical Thought” text boxes prompting students to apply critical thinking to real debates and cases. The point of all this is to help students not just to study ethics but to become fully involved in the ethical enterprise and the moral life.

P R E F A C E

‘’

NEW FEATURES

• A new chapter on the morality of personal use of illicit drugs and the laws and policies that pertain to that use: Chapter 12, Drug Use, Harm, and Personal Liberty. It includes three new readings by major figures in the debates on illegal drugs.

• A new chapter on the moral permissibility of affirmative action: Chapter 18, Equality and Affirmative Action. It includes four readings by prominent commentators on the issue.

• A revamped chapter on sexual morality that includes two new readings on pornography: Chapter 13, Sexual Morality.

• Six new readings to supplement the already extensive collection of essays.

ORGANIZATION

Part 1 (“Fundamentals”) prepares students for the tasks enumerated above. Chapter 1 explains why ethics is important and why thinking critically about ethical issues is essential to the examined life. It introduces the field of moral philosophy, defines and illustrates basic terminology, clarifies the connection between religion and morality, and explains why moral reasoning is crucial to moral maturity and personal freedom. Chapter 2 investigates a favorite doctrine of undergraduates—ethical relativism—and examines its distant cousin, emotivism.

Part 2 (“Moral Reasoning”) consists of Chapter 3, which starts by reassuring students that moral rea- soning is neither alien nor difficult but is simply

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xv

ordinary critical reasoning applied to ethics. They’ve seen this kind of reasoning before and done it before. Thus, the chapter focuses on iden- tifying, devising, diagramming, and evaluating moral arguments and encourages practice and competence in finding implied premises, testing moral premises, assessing nonmoral premises, and dealing with common argument fallacies.

Part 3 (“Theories of Morality”) is about apply- ing critical reasoning to moral theories. Chapter 4 explains how moral theories work and how they are related to other important elements in moral experience: considered judgments, moral argu- ments, moral principles and rules, and cases and issues. It reviews major theories and shows how students can evaluate them by applying plausible criteria. The rest of Part 3 (Chapters 5 through 7) covers key theories in depth—utilitarianism, ethi- cal egoism, Kant’s theory, natural law theory, and the ethics of virtue. Students see how each theory is applied to moral issues and how those issues’ strengths and weaknesses are revealed by applying the criteria of evaluation.

In Part 4 (“Ethical Issues”), each of twelve chap- ters explores a timely moral issue through discussion and relevant readings: abortion, genetic manipula- tion and human cloning, euthanasia and physician- assisted suicide, drug use, capital punishment, sexual morality, same-sex marriage, environmental ethics, animal rights, affirmative action, political violence, and global economic justice. Every chapter supplies legal, scientific, and other background information on the issue; discusses how major theo- ries have been applied to the problem; examines arguments that have been used in the debate; and includes additional cases for analysis with questions. The readings are a mix of well-known essays and sur- prising new voices, both classic and contemporary.

PEDAGOGICAL FEATURES

In addition to the “Critical Thought” boxes and “Cases for Analysis,” there are other pedagogical devices:

• “Quick Review” boxes that reiterate key points or terms mentioned in previous pages

• Text boxes that discuss additional topics or issues related to main chapter material

• End-of-chapter review and discussion questions

• Chapter summaries

• Suggestions for further reading for each issues chapter

• Glossary

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have helped make this third edition a great deal better than its previous incarnations. Among these I think first of my editor at W. W. Norton, Pete Simon, who believed in the project from the outset and helped me shape and improve it. Others at Norton also gave their time and talent to this text: Marian Johnson, managing editor; Rachel Mayer, project editor; Barbara Curialle, copy editor; Benjamin Reynolds, production man- ager; Megan Jackson, permissions manager; and Gerra Goff, assistant editor.

The silent partners in this venture are the many reviewers who helped in countless ways to make the book better. They include Harry Adams (Prairie View A&M University), Alex Aguado (Uni- versity of North Alabama), Edwin Aiman (Univer- sity of Houston), Daniel Alvarez (Colorado State University), Peter Amato (Drexel University), Robert Bass (Coastal Carolina University), Ken Beals (Mary Baldwin College), Helen Becker (Shep- herd University), Paul Bloomfield (University of Connecticut), Robyn Bluhm (Old Dominion Uni- versity), Vanda Bozicevic (Bergen Community College), Brent Braga (Northland Community and Technical College), Mark Raymond Brown (Uni- versity of Ottawa), Matthew Burstein (Washington and Lee University), Gabriel R. Camacho (El Paso Community College), Jay Campbell (St. Louis Community College at Meramec), Jeffrey Carr (Illinois State University), Alan Clark (Del Mar College), Andrew J. Cohen (Georgia State Univer-

Á PREFACExvi

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xvi

sity), Elliot D. Cohen (Indian River State College), Robert Colter (Centre College), Timothy Conn (Sierra College), Guy Crain (University of Okla- homa), Sharon Crasnow (Norco College), Kelso Cratsley (University of Massachusetts, Boston), George Cronk (Bergen Community College), Kevin DeCoux (Minnesota West Community and Technical College), Lara Denis (Agnes Scott Col- lege), Steve Dickerson (South Puget Sound Com- munity College), Nicholas Diehl (Sacramento City College), Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University), Peter Dlugos (Bergen Community College), Matt Drabek (University of Iowa), David Drebushenko (University of Southern Indiana), Clint Dunagan (Northwest Vista College), Paul Eckstein (Bergen Community College), Andrew Fiala (California State University, Fresno), Stephen Finlay (Univer- sity of Southern California), Matthew Fitzsim- mons (University of North Alabama), Tammie Foltz (Des Moines Area Community College), Tim Fout (University of Louisville), Dimitria Gatzia (University of Akron), Candace Gauthier (Univer- sity of North Carolina, Wilmington), Mark Greene (University of Delaware), Kevin Guilfoy (Carroll University), Katherine Guin (The College at Brock- port: SUNY), Don Habibi (University of North Car- olina, Wilmington), Barbara M. Hands (University of North Carolina, Greensboro), Craig Hanks (Texas State University), Jane Haproff (Sierra Col- lege), Ed Harris (Texas A&M University), Blake Heffner (Raritan Valley Community College), Marko Hilgersom (Lethbridge Community Col- lege), John Holder III (Pensacola Junior College), Mark Hollifield (Clayton College and State Univer- sity), Margaret Houck (University of South Carolina), Michael Howard (University of Maine, Orono), Frances Howard-Snyder (Western Wash- ington University), Kenneth Howarth (Mercer County Community College), Louis F. Howe, Jr. (Naugatuck Valley Community College), Kyle Hubbard (Saint Anselm College), Robert Hull (Western Virginia Wesleyan College), Amy Jeffers (Owens Community College), Timothy Jessen (Ivy Tech Community College, Bloomington), John

Johnston (College of the Redwoods), Marc Jolley (Mercer University), Frederik Kaufman (Ithaca College), Thomas D. Kennedy (Berry College), W. Glenn Kirkconnell (Santa Fe College), Donald Knudsen (Montgomery County Community Col- lege), Gilbert Kohler (Shawnee Community Col- lege), Thomas Larson (Saint Anselm College), Matt Lawrence (Long Beach City College), Clayton Lit- tlejohn (Southern Methodist University), Jessica Logue (University of Portland), Ian D. MacKinnon (The University of Akron), Tim Madigan (St. John Fisher College), Ernâni Magalhães (West Virginia University), Daniel Malotky (Greensboro College), Ron Martin (Lynchburg College), Michael McKeon (Barry University), Katherine Mendis (Hunter Col- lege, CUNY), Joshua Mills-Knutsen (Indiana Uni- versity Southeast), Michael Monge (Long Beach City College), Eric Moore (Longwood University), Jon S. Moran (Southwest Missouri State Univer- sity), Dale Murray (Virginia Commonwealth Uni- versity), Elizabeth Murray (Loyola Marymount University), Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson Col- lege), Jay Newhard (East Carolina University), Charles L. North (Southern New Hampshire Uni- versity), Robert F. O’Connor (Texas State Univer- sity), Jeffrey P. Ogle (Metropolitan State University of Denver), Don Olive (Roane State Community College), Leonard Olson (California State Univer- sity, Fresno), Jessica Payson (Bryn Mawr College), Gregory E. Pence (University of Alabama), Donald Petkus (Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs), Trisha Philips (Mississippi State University), Thomas M. Powers (University of Delaware), Marjorie Price (University of Alabama), Netty Provost (Indiana University, Kokomo), Elisa Rapaport (Molloy College), Michael Redmond (Bergen Community College), Daniel Regan (Vil- lanova University), Joseph J. Rogers (University of Texas, San Antonio), John Returra (Lackawanna College), Robert M. Seltzer (Western Illinois Uni- versity), Edward Sherline (University of Wyoming), Aeon J. Skoble (Bridgewater Commu- nity College), Eric Snider (Lansing Community College), Eric Sotnak (University of Akron), Piers

PREFACE Á xvii

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xvii

H.G. Stephens (University of Georgia), Grant Ster- ling (Eastern Illinois University), John Stilwell (University of Texas at Dallas), Tyler Suggs (Vir- ginia Tech), Michele Svatos (Eastfield College), David Svolba (Fitchburg State University), Allen Thompson (Virginia Commonwealth University), Peter B. Trumbull (Madison College), Donald Turner (Nashville State Community College), Julie C. Van Camp (California State University, Long Beach), Michelle Rehwinkel Vasilinda (Talla- hassee Community College), Kris Vigneron (Columbus State Community College), Christine Vitrano (Brooklyn College, CUNY), Mark Vopat

(Youngstown State University), Matt Waldschlagel (University of North Carolina, Wilmington), Steve Wall (Hillsborough Community College), Bill Warnken (Granite State College), Jamie Carlin Watson (Young Harris College), Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College), Cheryl Wertheimer (Butler Community College), Monique Whitaker (Hunter College, CUNY) Phillip Wiebe (Trinity Western University), Jonathan Wight (University of Rich- mond), John Yanovitch (Molloy College), Steven Zusman (Waubonsee Community College), and Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego). Thank you all.

Á PREFACExviii

213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as.qxp:213006_00_i-xviii_r2_as 8/6/15 1:25 AM Page xviii

P A R T 1

‘’ Fundamentals

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 1

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 2

C H A P T E R 1

‘’ Ethics and the Examined Life

3

Even if you try to remove yourself from the ethical realm by insisting that all ethical concepts are irrelevant or empty, you assume a particular view, a theory in the broadest sense, about morality and its place in your life. If at some point you are intel- lectually brave enough to wonder whether your moral beliefs rest on some coherent supporting considerations, you will see that you cannot even begin to sort out such considerations without— again—doing ethics. In any case, in your life you must deal with the rest of the world, which turns on moral conflict and resolution, moral decision and debate.

What is at stake when we do ethics? In an important sense, the answer is everything we hold dear. Ethics is concerned with values—specifically, moral values. Through the sifting and weighing of moral values we determine what the most impor- tant things are in our lives, what is worth living for and what is worth dying for. We decide what is the greatest good, what goals we should pursue in life, what virtues we should cultivate, what duties we should or should not fulfill, what value we should put on human life, and what pain and perils we should be willing to endure for notions such as the common good, justice, and rights.

Does it matter whether the state executes a criminal who has the mental capacity of a ten- year-old? Does it matter who actually writes the term paper you turn in and represent as your own? Does it matter whether we can easily save a drown- ing child but casually decide not to? Does it matter whether young girls in Africa undergo painful

Ethics, or moral philosophy, is the philosoph- ical study of morality. Morality refers to beliefs concerning right and wrong, good and bad— beliefs that can include judgments, values, rules, principles, and theories. They help guide our actions, define our values, and give us reasons for being the persons we are. (Ethical and moral, the adjective forms, are often used to mean simply “having to do with morality,” and ethics and morality are sometimes used to refer to the moral norms of a specific group or individual, as in “Greek ethics” or “Russell’s morality.”) Ethics, then, addresses the powerful question that Socrates for- mulated twenty-four hundred years ago: how ought we to live?

The scope and continued relevance of this query suggest something compelling about ethics: you cannot escape it. You cannot run away from all the choices, feelings, and actions that accom- pany ideas about right and wrong, good and bad— ideas that persist in your culture and in your mind. After all, for much of your life, you have been assimilating, modifying, or rejecting the eth- ical norms you inherited from your family, com- munity, and society. Unless you are very unusual, from time to time you deliberate about the right- ness or wrongness of actions, embrace or reject particular moral principles or codes, judge the goodness of your character or intentions (or some- one else’s), perhaps even question (and agonize over) the soundness of your own moral outlook when it conflicts with that of others. In other words, you are involved in ethics—you do ethics.

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 3

1Paul W. Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975), 9–10.

4 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS

safe route. To not do ethics is to stay locked in a kind of intellectual limbo, where exploration in ethics and personal moral progress are barely possible.

The philosopher Paul Taylor suggests that there is yet another risk in taking the easy road. If some- one blindly embraces the morality bequeathed to him by his society, he may very well be a fine embodiment of the rules of his culture and accept them with certainty. But he also will lack the ability to defend his beliefs by rational argu- ment against criticism. What happens when he encounters others who also have very strong beliefs that contradict his? “He will feel lost and bewildered,” Taylor says, and his confusion might leave him disillusioned about morality. “Unable to give an objective, reasoned jus tification for his own convictions, he may turn from dogmatic certainty to total skepticism. And from total skepticism it is but a short step to an ‘amoral’ life. . . . Thus the person who begins by accepting moral beliefs blindly can end up denying all morality.”1

There are other easy roads—roads that also bypass critical and thoughtful scrutiny of moral- ity. We can describe most of them as various forms of subjectivism, a topic that we closely examine in the next chapter. You may decide, for example, that you can establish all your moral beliefs by simply consulting your feelings. In situations call- ing for moral judgments, you let your emotions be your guide. If it feels right, it is right. Alternatively, you may come to believe that moral realities are relative to each person, a view known as subjective relativism (also covered in the next chapter). That is, you think that what a person believes or approves of determines the rightness or wrongness of actions. If you believe that abortion is wrong,

genital mutilation for reasons of custom or reli- gion? Do these actions and a million others just as controversial matter at all? Most of us—regardless of our opinion on these issues—would say that they matter a great deal. If they matter, then ethics matters, because these are ethical concerns requir- ing careful reflection using concepts and reason- ing peculiar to ethics.

But even though in life ethics is inescapable and important, you are still free to take the easy way out, and many people do. You are free not to think too deeply or too systematically about ethi- cal concerns. You can simply embrace the moral beliefs and norms given to you by your family and your society. You can just accept them without question or serious examination. In other words, you can try not to do ethics. This approach can be simple and painless—at least for a while—but it has some drawbacks.

First, it undermines your personal freedom. If you accept and never question the moral beliefs handed to you by your culture, then those beliefs are not really yours—and they, not you, control the path you take in life. Only if you critically examine these beliefs yourself and decide for yourself whether they have merit will they be truly yours. Only then will you be in charge of your own choices and actions.

Second, the no-questions-asked approach increases the chances that your responses to moral dilemmas or contradictions will be incomplete, confused, or mistaken. Sometimes in real life, moral codes or rules do not fit the situations at hand, or moral principles conflict with one another, or entirely new circumstances are not covered by any moral policy at all. Solving these problems requires something that a hand- me- down morality does not include: the intellectual tools to critically evaluate (and reevaluate) exist- ing moral beliefs.

Third, if there is such a thing as intellectual moral growth, you are unlikely to find it on the

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 4

CHAPTER 1: ETHICS AND THE EXAMINED LIFE Á 5

Science also studies morality, but not in the way that moral philosophy does. Its approach is known as descriptive ethics—the scientific study of moral beliefs and practices. Its aim is to describe and explain how people actually behave and think when dealing with moral issues and concepts. This kind of empirical research is usually conducted by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists. In contrast, the focus of moral phi- losophy is not what people actually believe and do, but what they should believe and do. The point of moral philosophy is to determine what actions are right (or wrong) and what things are good (or bad).

Philosophers distinguish three major divisions in ethics, each one representing a different way to approach the subject. The first is normative ethics—the study of the principles, rules, or theo- ries that guide our actions and judgments. (The word normative refers to norms, or standards, of judgment—in this case, norms for judging rightness and goodness.) The ultimate purpose of doing normative ethics is to try to establish the soundness of moral norms, especially the norms embodied in a comprehensive moral system, or theory. We do normative ethics when we use crit- ical reasoning to demonstrate that a moral princi- ple is justified, or that a professional code of conduct is contradictory, or that one proposed moral theory is better than another, or that a per- son’s motive is good. Should the rightness of actions be judged by their consequences? Is happi- ness the greatest good in life? Is utilitarianism a good moral theory? Such questions are the preoc- cupation of normative ethics.

Another major division is metaethics—the study of the meaning and logical structure of moral beliefs. It asks not whether an action is right or whether a person’s character is good. It takes a step back from these concerns and asks more fun- damental questions about them: What does it mean for an action to be right? Is good the same

then it is wrong. If you believe it is right, then it is right.

But these facile ways through ethical terrain are no better than blindly accepting existing norms. Even if you want to take the subjectivist route, you still need to critically examine it to see if there are good reasons for choosing it— otherwise your choice is arbitrary and therefore not really yours. And unless you thoughtfully consider the merits of moral beliefs (including subjectivist beliefs), your chances of being wrong about them are substantial.

Ethics does not give us a royal road to moral truth. Instead, it shows us how to ask critical ques- tions about morality and systematically seek answers supported by good reasons. This is a tall order because, as we have seen, many of the ques- tions in ethics are among the toughest we can ever ask—and among the most important in life.

THE ETHICAL LANDSCAPE

The domain of ethics is large, divided into several areas of investigation and cordoned off from related subjects. So let us map the territory care- fully. As the term moral philosophy suggests, ethics is a branch of philosophy. A very rough character- ization of philosophy is the systematic use of criti- cal reasoning to answer the most fundamental questions in life. Moral philosophy, obviously, tries to answer the fundamental questions of morality. The other major philosophical divisions address other basic questions; these are logic (the study of correct reasoning), metaphysics (the study of the fundamental nature of reality), and epistemology (the study of knowledge). As a division of philoso- phy, ethics does its work primarily through critical reasoning. Critical reasoning is the careful, system- atic evaluation of statements, or claims—a process used in all fields of study, not just in ethics. Mainly this process includes both the evaluation of logical arguments and the careful analysis of concepts.

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 5

6 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS

things such as televisions, rockets, experiences, and artwork (things other than persons, inten- tions, etc.) are good, but we mean “good” only in a nonmoral way. It makes no sense to assert that in themselves televisions or rockets are morally good or bad. Perhaps a rocket could be used to per- form an action that is morally wrong. In that case, the action would be immoral, while the rocket itself would still have nonmoral value only.

Many things in life have value for us, but they are not necessarily valuable in the same way. Some things are valuable because they are a means to something else. We might say that gasoline is good because it is a means to make a gas-powered vehicle work, or that a pen is good because it can be used to write a letter. Such things are said to be instrumen- tally, or extrinsically, valuable—they are valu- able as a means to something else. Some things, however, are valuable in themselves or for their own sakes. They are valuable simply because they are what they are, without being a means to some- thing else. Things that have been regarded as valu- able in themselves include happiness, pleasure, virtue, and beauty. These are said to be intrinsically valuable—they are valuable in themselves.

THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

We all do ethics, and we all have a general sense of what is involved. But we can still ask, What are the elements of ethics that make it the peculiar enterprise that it is? We can include at least the following factors:

The Preeminence of Reason Doing ethics typically involves grappling with our feelings, taking into account the facts of the situation (including our own observations and relevant knowledge), and trying to understand the ideas that bear on the case. But above all, it involves, even requires, critical reasoning—the consideration of reasons for whatever statements

thing as desirable? How can a moral principle be justified? Is there such a thing as moral truth? To do normative ethics, we must assume certain things about the meaning of moral terms and the logical relations among them. But the job of metaethics is to question all these assumptions, to see if they really make sense.

Finally, there is applied ethics—the applica- tion of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases, particularly those in a profession such as medicine or law. Applied ethics in these fields goes under names such as medical ethics, journalistic ethics, and business ethics. In applied ethics we study the results derived from applying a moral principle or theory to specific circumstances. The purpose of the exercise is to learn something important about either the moral characteristics of the situation or the adequacy of the moral norms. Did the doctor do right in performing that abortion? Is it morally permissible for scientists to perform experiments on people without their con- sent? Was it right for the journalist to distort her reporting to aid a particular side in the war? Ques- tions like these drive the search for answers in applied ethics.

In every division of ethics, we must be careful to distinguish between values and obligations. Sometimes we may be interested in concepts or judgments of value—that is, about what is morally good, bad, blameworthy, or praiseworthy. We prop- erly use these kinds of terms to refer mostly to per- sons, character traits, motives, and intentions. We may say “She is a good person” or “He is to blame for that tragedy.” Other times, we may be inter- ested in concepts or judgments of obligation—that is, about what is obligatory or a duty or what we should or ought to do. We use these terms to refer to actions. We may say “She has a duty to tell the truth” or “What he did was wrong.”

When we talk about value in the sense just described, we mean moral value. If she is a good person, she is good in the moral sense. But we can also talk about nonmoral value. We can say that

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 6

’ QUICK REVIEW ethics (or moral philosophy)—The philosophical

study of morality.

morality—Beliefs concerning right and wrong, good and bad; they can include judgments, rules, principles, and theories.

descriptive ethics—The scientific study of moral beliefs and practices.

normative ethics—The study of the principles, rules, or theories that guide our actions and judgments.

metaethics—The study of the meaning and logi- cal structure of moral beliefs.

applied ethics—The application of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases, particularly those in a profession such as medicine or law.

instrumentally (or extrinsically) valuable— Valuable as a means to something else.

intrinsically valuable—Valuable in itself, for its own sake.

CHAPTER 1: ETHICS AND THE EXAMINED LIFE Á 7

moral judgment is or is not justified, that a moral principle is or is not sound, that an action is or is not morally permissible, or that a moral theory is or is not plausible.

Our use of critical reasoning and argument helps us keep our feelings about moral issues in perspective. Feelings are an important part of our moral experience. They make empathy possible, which gives us a deeper understanding of the human impact of moral norms. They also can serve as internal alarm bells, warning us of the possibility of injustice, suffering, and wrongdoing. But they are unreliable guides to moral truth. They may simply reflect our own emotional needs, prej- udices, upbringing, culture, and self-interests. Careful reasoning, however, can inform our feel- ings and help us decide moral questions on their merits.

The Universal Perspective Logic requires that moral norms and judgments follow the principle of universalizability—the idea that a moral statement (a principle, rule, or judg- ment) that applies in one situation must apply in all other situations that are relevantly similar. If you say, for example, that lying is wrong in a par- ticular situation, then you implicitly agree that lying is wrong for anyone in relevantly similar sit- uations. If you say that killing in self-defense is morally permissible, then you say in effect that killing in self-defense is permissible for everyone in relevantly similar situations. It cannot be the case that an action performed by A is wrong while the same action performed by B in relevantly sim- ilar circumstances is right. It cannot be the case that the moral judgments formed in these two sit- uations must differ just because two different peo- ple are involved.

This point about universalizability also applies to reasons used to support moral judgments. If rea- sons apply in a specific case, then those reasons also apply in all relevantly similar cases. It cannot be true that reasons that apply in a specific case do

(moral or otherwise) are in question. What- ever our view on moral issues and whatever moral outlook we subscribe to, our commonsense moral experience suggests that if a moral judg- ment is to be worthy of acceptance, it must be supported by good reasons, and our delibera- tions on the issue must include a consideration of those reasons.

The backbone of critical reasoning generally and moral reasoning in particular is logical argu- ment. This kind of argument—not the angry- exchange type—consists of a statement to be supported (the assertion to be proved, the conclu- sion) and the statements that do the supporting (the reasons for believing the statement, the prem- ises). With such arguments, we try to show that a

213006_01_001-019_r1_el.qxp:213006_01_001-019_r1_el 8/3/15 9:42 AM Page 7

8 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS

sophisticated care than other patients receive. The situation is a matter of life and death—a good rea- son for not treating everyone the same and for pro- viding the heart attack patient with special consideration. This instance of discrimination is justified.

The Dominance of Moral Norms Not all norms are moral norms. There are legal norms (laws, statutes), aesthetic norms (for judg- ing artistic creations), prudential norms (practical considerations of self-interest), and others. Moral norms seem to stand out from all these in an inter- esting way: they dominate. Whenever moral princi- ples or values conflict in some way with nonmoral principles or values, the moral considerations usu- ally override the others. Moral considerations seem more important, more critical, or more weighty. A principle of prudence such as “Never help a stranger” may be well justified, but it must yield to any moral principle that contradicts it, such as “Help a stranger in an emergency if you can do so without endangering yourself.” An aesthetic norm that somehow involved violating a moral princi- ple would have to take a backseat to the moral considerations. A law that conflicted with a moral principle would be suspect, and the latter would have to prevail over the former. Ultimately the jus- tification for civil disobedience is that specific laws conflict with moral norms and are therefore invalid. If we judge a law to be bad, we usually do so on moral grounds.

RELIGION AND MORALITY

Many people believe that morality and religion are inseparable—that religion is the source or basis of morality and that moral precepts are simply what God says should be done. This view is not at all surprising, since all religions imply or assert a per- spective on morality. The three great religions in the Western tradition—Christianity, Judaism, and