Divorce and remarriage recovering the biblical view

BlBLlOTHECA SACRA 165 (January-March 2008): 68-85

THE BETROTHAL VIEW OF

DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE

David W. Jones

FEW WOULD DISAGREE WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT the issue of divorce and remarriage is one of the most pressing social concerns today. The demonstrable deterioration of the insti- tutions of marriage and the family in modern society has prompted many within the church to engage in moral evaluation of the prac- tice of divorce and remarriage. Given the possible ramifications of divorce and remarriage, which range from matters related to basic sanctification on a personal level to ministerial qualification on a corporate level,1 such ethical assessment is commendable. Yet in spite of the attention given to divorce and remarriage, scholars have not been able to construct a standard moral framework for this issue—that is, there is no unanimity of thought on what the Scriptures teach on divorce and remarriage.

Proposals for a Christian ethic of divorce and remarriage are numerous, and several surveys of the major positions are avail- able.2 What separates the majority of divorce and remarriage views

David W. Jones is Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Wake Forest, North Carolina.

Two of the best works on divorce and remarriage with an emphasis on personal sanctification are Andrew Cornes, Divorce and Remarriage: Biblical Principles and Pastoral Practice (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993); and Johann Christoph Arnold, Sex, God and Marriage (Farmington, PA: Plough, 1996). Ed Glasscock has written a good survey of views on the "husband of one wife" clause in 1 Timothy 3:2 and its implications for ministerial qualification (" The Husband of One Wife' Requirement in 1 Timothy 3:2," Bibliotheca Sacra 140 [July-August 1983]: 244-58).

For example H. Wayne House, ed., Divorce and Remarriage: Four Christian Views (Grand Rapids: InterVarsity, 1990); and Mark L. Strauss, ed., Remarriage after Divorce in Today's Church: Three Views (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2006). With the exception of a few passing references the betrothal view is largely absent from both of these sources. Bruce Vawter has a shorter yet well-written summary of the major views of divorce and remarriage in "The Divorce Clauses in Mt 5.32 and 19.9," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 16 (1954): 155-67.

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 69

is their interpretation of the so-called "exception clause" in Mat­ thew's Gospel (5:32; 19:9), and more specifically their understand­ ing of the word πορνβια within this clause.3 In many books on di­ vorce and remarriage one view that is mentioned, though usually just in passing, is the betrothal view.4 This interpretation holds that with the exception clause Jesus was referring to the unique Jewish practice that allowed for a marriage to be annulled if evi­ dence of infidelity was manifest during the betrothal period. Advo­ cates of this view, then, believe that the Bible prohibits marriage partners from actively seeking a divorce, since the exception clause refers to a nuptial custom not followed today.

A review of the citations of the betrothal view in the divorce and remarriage literature reveals that, with very few exceptions,5

d While most of the major views of divorce and remarriage focus on the interpre­ tation of the term πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, there are some notable excep­ tions. For example the inclusivist view and the preterative view (also known as the exclusivist view or the Augustinian view) focus on the words preceding the term πορνεία (i.e., παρεκ-ròs λόγου in 5:32 and μη επί in 19:9), with the inclusivist view giving the translation "not even in the case of πορνεία" and the preterative view rendering "setting aside the matter of πορνεία" (cf. Michael Brunec, "Tertio de clausulis divortii," Verbum domini 27 [1949]: 3-16; and Vawter, "The Divorce Clauses in Mt. 5:32 and 19:9," 16&-65).

Moreover, the interpolation view (also known as the traditio-historical view) focuses on the legitimacy of the presence of the exception clause in Matthew, while the assumption view deals with the legitimacy of the exception clause being absent from Mark and Luke. See Robert H. Stein, "Is It Lawful for a Man to Divorce His Wife?" Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 22 (June 1979): 116-20; and R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Mark's Gospel (Columbus, OH: Wartburg, 1946; reprint, Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1961), 420. Some advocates of the patristic view focus more on word order and the placement of the exception clause in Jesus' teaching, as opposed to the precise meaning of the clause itself (e.g., Gordon J. Wenham and William E. Heth, Jesus and Divorce, 2nd ed. [Carlisle, UK: Paternos­ ter, 2002]; and Henri Crouzel, L'eglise primitive face au divorce du premier au cin­ quième siècle [Paris: Beauchesne, 1971]). 4 Brian C. Labosier accurately observes that the betrothal view is "found with moderate frequency in the [divorce and remarriage] literature" ("Matthew's Excep- tion Clause in the Light of Canonical Criticism: A Case Study in Hermeneutics" [Ph.D. diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 1990], 238). The betrothal view is known as the "espousal view" or somewhat misleadingly the "engagement view" (ibid., 116; Paul E. Steele and Charles C. Ryrie, Meant to Last [Wheaton, IL: Victor, 1983], 96; and John Coblentz, What the Bible Says about Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage [Harrisonburg, VA: Christian Light, 1992], 33-38). 5 While most authors in the field indicate that they consider the betrothal view a plausible interpretation, an exception is Timothy Crater, who asserts that the view is "an erroneous and dangerous position. . . . an artificial interpretation . . . [which] suggests that a pre-determined view has been carried into the text" ("Bill Gothard's View of the Exception Clause," Journal of Pastoral Practice 4 [1980]: 5, 8). See also Richard G. Fisher, A Study in Evolving Fadism: The Dangerous Leanings of Bill Gothard's Teachings (St. Louis: Personal Freedom Outreach, 1996). Another exam- ple is John Murray, who describes the betrothal view as "untenable" and a "facile

70 BiBLiOTHECA SACRA / January-March 2008

authors find the position to be at least a credible interpretation, even if they do not favor it. For example Instone-Brewer writes, "This is a very plausible explanation,"6 and Ryrie notes that the betrothal view "is quite defensible and easily harmonizes with Paul's summary of the Lord's teaching."7 However, many inter- preters who reference this view do not describe it in detail,8 often- times even leveling critiques against the position that betray a general misunderstanding of the view.9 Regarding this phenome-

interpretation" that is not worthy of serious academic engagement (Divorce [Phil- lipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1953], 34 n. 4). 6 David Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 276. 7 Charles C. Ryrie, "Biblical Teaching on Divorce and Remarriage," Grace Theo- logical Journal 3 (fall 1982): 188. Also Wenham and Heth write, "It is possible that the divorce which Jesus permits in Matthew's exception clause is . . . divorce for betrothal unfaithfulness [It is] a definite possibility and should not be dismissed lightly" (Jesus and Divorce, 174, 177). Likewise, although not an advocate of the position, William F. Luck writes, "The betrothal view seems to be correct in arguing that betrothal unfaithfulness is intended by porneia" (Divorce and Remarriage: Re- covering the Biblical View [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987], 95). 8 Examples of such superficial discussion of the betrothal view in the divorce and remarriage literature abound. Some examples are Raymond F. Collins, Divorce in the New Testament (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1992), 204, 321 n. 124; Jacques DuPont, Mariage et Divorce dans L'Evangile: Matthieu 19, 3-12 et parallèles (Ab- baye de Saint-André: Desclee de Brouwer, 1959), 108 n. 3; Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 276-77; Craig S. Keener, And Marries Another (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), 152 n. 42; Luck, Divorce and Remarriage, 94-95; and R. Stanton Norman, "Biblical, Theological, and Pastoral Reflections on Divorce, Remarriage, and the Seminary Professor: A Modest Proposal," Journal for Baptist Theology and Ministry 1 (spring 2003): 82-83.

See also the discussions of the betrothal view in D. A. Carson, "Matthew," in The Expositor's Bible Commentary, vol. 8 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1985), 414; John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World (Wheaton, IL: Cross- way, 1993), 306-7, 328; and Charles C. Ryrie, You Mean the Bible Teaches That? (Chicago: Moody, 1974), 48-49. An example of a nonadvocate of the betrothal view who nevertheless has attempted to engage the position intelligently is Andreas J. Köstenberger, "Marriage and Family in the New Testament/' in Marriage and Fam- ily in the Biblical World, ed. Ken M. Campbell (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003), 256-64; and idem with David W. Jones, God, Marriage, and Family: Rebuild- ing the Biblical Foundation (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004), 239-44. Other fairly balanced treatments of the betrothal view by nonadvocates include J. Carl Laney, The Divorce Myth: A Biblical Examination of Divorce and Remarriage (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1981), 69-70; and Wenham and Heth, Jesus and Divorce, 169-78. 9 For example Wenham and Heth note that "H. Montefiore's criticisms of the be- trothal view either betray his misunderstanding of the authoritative presentation of the view or that he has not read it" (Jesus and Divorce, 278 n. 1). The text to which they are referring is H. Montefiore, "Jesus on Divorce and Remarriage," in Mar- riage, Divorce and the Church: The Report of a Commission Appointed by the Arch- bishop of Canterbury to Prepare a Statement on the Christian Doctrine of Marriage, ed. The Church of England (London: SPCK, 1971), 86.

In another work William Heth writes, "It is clear from Edgar's discussion of the

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 71

non Wenham and Heth observe, "This view is often summarily dismissed and considered impossible,"10 and Chase notes, "This interpretation is generally put aside as unworthy of serious consid- eration."11 Difficulty in interacting with the betrothal view is per- haps understandable, for there is no locus classicus for this inter- pretation,12 and the view has attracted its share of "fringe" advo- cates who have arguably distorted the position,13 while even some

betrothal view that he has not understood the view" ("Response [to Thomas R. Ed- gar]," in Divorce and Remarriage: Four Christian Views, éd. H. Wayne House [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1990], 209).

A specific example of a misunderstanding of the betrothal view is that some critics classify the position as a modern-day interpretation, including Collins, who describes it as "novel" (Divorce in the New Testament, 321 n. 124). Frederic Henry Chase also mentions that this is a common error among interpreters. 'It is said to be not an ancient but a modern interpretation" (What Did Christ Teach about Di- vorce? [London: SPCK, 1921], 27).

While it has never been the majority position of the church, the betrothal view has been present in Christian divorce and remarriage literature for centuries. For example in his remarks on the exception clause, seventeenth-century Puritan writer Matthew Henry noted, "Dr. [Daniel] Whitby understands this, not of adultery, but— because our Saviour uses the word πορνεία (fornication)—of uncleanness committed before marriage, but discovered afterward; because, if it were committed after, it was a capital crime, and there needed [be] no divorce. Jesus disallows it in all other cases, 'Whosoever puts away his wife, except for fornication, and marries another, commits adultery.' This is a direct answer to the Pharisees' query, that it is not lawful" (Matthew Henry's Commentary on the Whole Bible [London: Marshall, 1706- 29; reprint (6 vols, in 1), Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1961], 5:270).

Allon Maxwell notes, "The betrothal view . . . is really the early church view, dressed up in a slightly different way" ("Divorce and Remarriage: Sorting Out the Confusion of the Many Conflicting Theories," Bible Digest 42 [March 1994]: n.p.). And Walker Gwynne suggests that this interpretation was the view of the early church, or at least that it is compatible with the patristic view. He wrote that the exception clause "was never meant to contradict three other witnesses [i.e., Mark, Luke, and Paul] to Christ's teaching. . . . We know that the whole primitive Church understood [this]" (Holy Matrimony and Common Sense [London: Longmans, Green, 1930], 133; cf. 144-46). 1 0 Wenham and Heth, Jesus and Divorce, 169. 1 1 Chase, What Did Christ Teach about Divorce? 27. 1 2 The work by Abel Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, trans. Neil Tomkinson with Jean Gray (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1965), is considered by many to be the most competent statement of the betrothal view. Wenham and Heth refer to Isaksson's book as "the authoritative presentation of the view" and the "most authoritative defense" of the view (Jesus and Divorce, 278 n. 1, 169). More­ over, Luck writes, "The most able defender of this view is A. Isaksson, who did a noteworthy linguistic study of porneid* (Divorce and Remarriage, 94). Yet as Wen­ ham and Heth themselves lament, "Evangelicals appear to be largely unaware of Isaksson's book and though many reviews of it have appeared, we have found none in traditionally evangelical journals" (Jesus and Divorce, 278 n. 2). 1 3 Advocates of the betrothal view who fall into this category include controversial Bible teacher Bill Gothard (Supplementary Alumni Book [Oak Brook, IL: Institute in Basic Youth Conflicts, 1978-1979], 5:8-9; idem, Rebuilder's Guide [Oak Brook,

72 BiBLiOTHECA SACRA / January-March 2008

of its more competent proponents have not presented it thor­ oughly.14 Therefore this interpretation can be difficult to compre­ hend and articulate, especially when compared with some of the more common ethics of divorce and remarriage. In light of current misunderstandings surrounding the betrothal view, the purpose of this article is to set forth a clear presentation of the betrothal view in hopes that it can serve as a touchstone for understanding this interpretation.

THE PRACTICE OF BETROTHAL

As noted, what separates the majority of divorce and remarriage views is their interpretation of the so-called "exception clause" in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 and more specifically their understanding

IL: Institute in Basic Youth Conflicts, 1982], 55-66); individuals who have produced low-quality self-publications promoting the betrothal view such as Dirk Ε. T. Evenhuis (Holy Matrimony [Smithton, Australia: Circular Head Chronicle, 1997], 50-55) and Joseph A. Webb (Till Death Do Us Part [Longwood, FL: Webb Minis­ tries, 1999]), and numerous individuals who have poorly championed the betrothal view on Internet websites. 1 4 While there are a fair number of competent writing proponents of the betrothal view on both a popular and an academic level, it is surprising that in their works so few authors interact with each other. Perhaps this can be explained by noting that many advocates of the betrothal view indicate that they have generated this inter­ pretation themselves, through personal Bible study, as opposed to learning it from someone else. For example in 1927 F. S. Stooke-Vaughn of St. John's College (UK) published a booklet that carried endorsements from numerous Anglican divines, in which he presented the betrothal view. In the preface to the second edition of this work he wrote, "It was only when Father Bull, of Mirfield, published his little book on 'Marriage and Divorce' that the author of this pamphlet knew anyone else had suggested the same solution of 'except for fornication.' Father Bull stated that Dr. Döllinger had the same interpretation" (The Solution of St. Matthew v. 31, 32, and xix. 3-9, 2nd ed. [Exeter, UK: Eland Bros., 1927], 3). The work by Bull is Paul B. Bull, Marriage and Divorce (London: SPCK, 1924), and the work by Döllinger is Johann Joseph Ignaz von Döllinger, The First Age of Christianity and the Church, trans. Henry Nutcombe Oxenham (London: Allen, 1866). Similar to Stooke-Vaughn, John Piper writes, "Since I first wrote this exposition of Matthew 19:9 I have discov- ered other people who hold this view." Piper then mentions Isaksson's text and the summary of the betrothal view presented by Wenham and Heth ("Divorce and Re- marriage: A Position Paper" [Minneapolis: Desiring God Ministries, 1986], par. 11.2; cf. idem, "On Divorce and Remarriage in the Event of Adultery" [Minneapolis: De- siring God Ministries, 1986]).

Yet another example of an autonomous presentation of the betrothal view is William Fisher-Hunter, The Divorce Problem: Fully Discussed and α Scriptural Solution (Waynesboro, PA: MacNeish, 1952). He concludes his book, which is a good exegetical defense of the betrothal view within a traditional dispensational frame­ work, with thanksgiving to "our Savior God and Father who by the Holy Spirit exer­ cised and enabled me to produce this written ministry" (ibid., 170). He does not interact with other advocates of the betrothal view in his 173-page work.

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 73

of the term πορνεία in this clause.1 5 That this is the defining char­ acteristic of most views of divorce and remarriage is not surprising, for this clause is an apparent exception to the ostensible injunc­ tions against divorce and remarriage throughout the Scriptures, especially in the corresponding Gospel accounts in Mark 10:2-12 and Luke 16:18.

The burden then is to interpret the exception clause in a man­ ner consistent with other passages on divorce and remarriage— either by demonstrating the clause's legitimacy and assumption elsewhere in Scripture, or by showing that the clause does not con­ stitute an actual exception, thereby making the Matthean divorce pericopes compatible with other biblical passages that seemingly prohibit the practice of divorce and remarriage. Advocates of the betrothal view adopt this latter approach, holding that the excep­ tion clause refers to a facet of the Jewish practice of betrothal.

Wight gives the following explanation of this nuptial custom.

A promise of marriage among the Jews of Bible times might mean an engagement without anything definite. There could be a number of engagements broken off. It was the betrothal that was binding, rather than a mere promise of marriage. The promise might be set aside, but a betrothal entered into was considered as final. Among the ancient Hebrews the betrothal was a spoken covenant. . . . The Jewish be­ trothal in Christ's time was conducted thus: The families of the bride and groom met, with some others to serve as witnesses. The young man would give the young woman either a gold ring, or some article of value, or simply a document in which he promised to marry her. Then he would say: "See by this ring [or this token] thou art set apart for me, according to the law of Moses and of Israel/' The betrothal was not the same as the wedding. At least a whole year elapsed between the betrothal and the actual wedding. These two events must not be confused.16

Aside from the betrothal view, two perspectives on divorce and remarriage that rest on a particular interpretation of πορνεία are the unlawful marriage view (also known as the rabbinic view or the consanguinity view) and the majority view (also known as the Erasmian view or the Protestant view). The unlawful marriage view understands πορνεία as a reference either to incest or to interspiritual marriage (F. F. Bruce, New Testament History [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969], 287-88; and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "Matthean Divorce Texts and Some New Palestinian Evidence," Theological Studies 37 [June 1976]: 210).

The majority view, held by many contemporary evangelical scholars, interprets πορνεία as a reference to adultery. This position, which is present in most modern treatments of divorce and remarriage, has been ably defended by John Murray in Divorce. This position is present in most Protestant confessions of faith that address divorce and remarriage, such as the 1646 Westminster Confession of Faith, 24.5-6. 1 6 Fred Wight, Manners and Customs of Bible Lands (Moody: Chicago, 1953), 129- 30. See also Alfred Edersheim, Sketches of Jewish Social Life (London: Religious

74 BiBLlOTHECA SACRA / January-March 2008

Heimbach further explains this distinction. "In Semitic prac­ tice, the moral and legal obligations of marriage began at betrothal, something that took place before the wedding and before a couple started having a sexual relationship. But betrothal meant a lot more than getting engaged. Engaged couples are not married. They plan to get married but definitely are not married yet. By contrast, a betrothed couple in Bible times was morally and legally married. They already were husband and wife in legal and moral terms.,,17

In summary the practice of betrothal involved a time period, usually twelve months in length,18 during which a couple was con­ sidered morally and legally married, even though they had not yet consummated their relationship. Jewish civil laws that regulated this nuptial custom are recorded iii Exodus 21:8-9; Leviticus 19:20-22; Deuteronomy 20:7; 22:23-27, and in the Talmud.19 Ex­ amples of betrothal abound in Scripture, including Lot's daughters and their husbands (Gen. 19:8, 14), Isaac and Rebekah (24:50-67), Jacob and Rachel (29:18-21), Samson and his Philistine wife (Judg. 14:1-20), David and Michal (1 Sam. 18:27; 2 Sam. 3:14), Joseph and Mary (Matt. 1:18; Luke 1:27), God and Israel figuratively (Isa. 54:5; Jer. 3:14; Hos. 2:19-20), as well as the figurative "betrothal"

Tract Society, 1876), 148-52; idem, The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah (Lon­ don: Longmans, Green, 1883), 353-54; Edmond Stapfer, Palestine in the Time of Christ, trans. Annie Harwood Holm de η (New York: A. C. Armstrong, 1885), 160-62; George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), 2:121-22; Joachim Jeremías, Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 367-76; Ralph Gower, The New Manners and Customs of Bible Times (Chicago: Moody, 1987), 65; and Victor H. Matthews, Manners and Customs in the Bible, 3rd ed. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2006), 120-21. Reg Harcus gives a good overview of the practice of betrothal in both ancient and modern times ("The Case for Betrothal," in Celebrating Christian Mar- riage, ed. Adrian Thatcher [Edinburgh: Clark, 2002], 41-54).

Daniel R. Heimbach, True Sexual Morality: Recovering Biblical Standards for a Culture in Crisis (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004), 146 (italics his); cf. 205.

1 8 Scholars disagree on the exact length of the betrothal period in Jewish practice. While Wight claims that it was "at least a whole year" (Manners and Customs of Bible Lands, 130), Edershiem says that betrothal was "a period . . . not exceeding a twelvemonth" (The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah, 353). It seems safe to con- clude that most betrothals were about a year in length. This is the time frame iden- tified by Jeremías, who writes that it was "ordinarily . . . one year" (Jerusalem in the Times of Jesus, 368), and by Gower, who notes that "betrothal lasted for about twelve months" (Gower, The New Manners and Customs of Bible Times, 65).

Stooke-Vaughn cites several passages from the Babylonian Talmud that men- tion the practice of betrothal (The Solution of St. Matthew v. 31, 32, and xix. 3-9, 14-15). See also the references to the Talmud in Bull, Marriage and Divorce, 8; and in E. G. Selwyn, "Christ's Teachings on Marriage and Divorce: A Reply to Dr. Char- les," Theology 15 (July-December 1927): 98.

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 75

of Christ and the church (Matt. 9:15; 2 Cor. 11:2; Eph. 5:25-27; Rev. 19:7; 21:9).20

Reasons for the practice of betrothal include allowing the bride and groom time to get better acquainted—a necessity in a culture of arranged marriages—and to give the participating families time to prepare for the ensuing wedding ceremony. However, one of the major reasons for the betrothal period, if not the main reason, was to confirm the bride's chastity.21 This was an important component of the betrothal process, for a bride's chastity was viewed as an in- dicator of her commitment to the marriage that was in the process of being realized.

In Jewish practice infidelity in the betrothal period was cause for dissolution of the relationship. It is important to note, however, that while a betrothed couple was considered married for moral and legal purposes, the termination of such a relationship on ac- count of unfaithfulness was not regarded as a divorce as such, but rather as an annulment of the marriage itself. In other words infi- delity during the betrothal period was not viewed as an act that could end a marriage, but rather as an event that demonstrated that there had never been a legitimate marriage in the first place. Isaksson comments on this practice of dissolving a betrothal.

A husband's divorcing such a wife [i.e., one who has been unfaithful during the betrothal period] can equally well be described as the an- nulment of an unfulfilled contract of sale as a divorce. . . . Although

Regarding the relationship between Christ and the church, Isaksson makes the following often overlooked observation: "The marriage symbolism we encounter in the New Testament is not really a marriage symbolism but a betrothal symbolism. In this world the Church is only betrothed to Christ: the marriage will be consum- mated in the world to come" (Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 137). On the importance of the symbolism between the husband/wife relationship and the Christ/church or God/Israel relationship see David J. Engelsma, Marriage, the Mys- tery of Christ and the Church: The Covenant-Bond in Scripture and History, rev. ed. (Grandville, MI: Reformed Free, 1998). 2 1 John K. Tarwater, apparently following Isaksson, notes that the practice of be- trothal "rests upon two key truths: the importance of a man not having sexual rela- tions with his wife after she has had sex with another man and the importance of a bride's virginity" (Marriage as Covenant: Considering God's Design at Creation and the Contemporary Moral Consequences [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006], 113). In Isakseon's discussion of this concept he makes the interesting obser- vation that Old Testament priests, those positionally closest to God under the sacri- ficial system, were explicitly forbidden from marrying prostitutes, defiled women, or divorcees, "for the priest is holy to his God" (Lev. 21:7; cf. Ezek. 44:22), and the high priest, who most clearly represented God, could not marry a prostitute, a defiled woman, a divorcee, or even a widow. Rather, the high priest had to marry a virgin in accord with Leviticus 21:14. Isaksson finds this significant for the church in light of the fact that New Testament believers are described as "a royal priesthood" in 1 Peter 2:9 (Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 23-25).

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the term divorce was used in these cases, it is more accurate to say that it was a matter of cancelling an unfulfilled contract of sale, be­ cause one of the parties had tricked the other as to the nature of the goods. . . . The word divorce is used even when a man divorces his wife because of her premarital unchastity. Actually he does not di­ vorce his wife but is himself relieved by a court order of the need to fulfull his obligations under the marriage contract, since it has been established that the other party has deceived him.22

Gwynn writes, "A divorce granted under such circumstances [i.e.,

infidelity of one of the parties] would be the equivalent of a decla­

ration that there had never been a true marriage."23 Advocates of

the betrothal view assert that this practice of nullifying an uncon-

summated marriage during the betrothal period because of un­

faithfulness is the event in view in the Matthean exception clause.

EVIDENCE FOR THE BETROTHAL VIEW

In general, proponents of the betrothal view have supported their

position with two key arguments, the first of which focuses on the

context of Matthew's Gospel.

THE JEWISH CONTEXT OF MATTHEW

Since πορνεία, the pivotal word in the exception clause, is a general

term for sexual sin,2 4 its exact meaning must be informed by the

Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 137, 140. 2 3 Gwynn, Holy Matrimony and Common Sense, 136. Similarly J. Dwight Pente­ cost writes that this procedure involved the "cancellation of a marriage contract. . . before the marriage had been completed" (The Words and Works of Jesus Christ: A Study of the Life of Christ [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981], 358). Wenham and Heth note, "This is not actually a divorce, though a legal bill of divorce was required by the Jews in such cases" (Jesus and Divorce, 170). Ryrie explains that dissolving a betrothal on account of infidelity "is actually not a divorce . . . [but] cancelling an unfulfilled contract" ("Biblical Teaching on Divorce and Remarriage," 187). And Chase writes, "If a woman was proved guilty of premarital unchastity, the marriage, as we should say, might be regarded as void ab inition (What Did Christ Teach about Divorce? 28).

2 4 While the standard Greek lexicons and concordances agree that the term πορ­ νεία is an ambiguous word that can refer to all types of sexual sin, Bruce Malina concludes that the meaning of πορνεία is not as broad as some scholars have thought. "What makes a given Une of conduct porneia, hence unlawful, is that it is expressly prohibited by Torah." While this sounds plausible, Malina then claims, "It would appear that in no case is pre-betrothal, non-commercial, non-cultic hetero­ sexual intercourse (what is commonly called 'fornication' today) prohibited!" ("Does Porneia Mean Fornication?" Novum Testamentum 14 [January 1972]: 15). Malina's conclusions were challenged in Joseph Jensen, "Does Porneia Mean Fornication? A Critique of Bruce Malina," Novum Testamentum 20 (July 1978): 161-84. The term πορνεία occurs twenty-six times in the New Testament in twelve books (Matt. 5:32;

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 77

context. Advocates of the betrothal view contend that it is not just the proximate context of the exception clause that gives the word πορνεία its meaning, but rather the milieu of the entire Book of Matthew. Since Matthew's Gospel is widely recognized as written for a Jewish audience,25 champions of the betrothal view suggest that it is reasonable to understand the Matthean exception clause as a reference to infidelity during the betrothal period. For example Grant supports the betrothal view with this observation: "Mark 10:11-12 represents an attempt to formulate our Lord's teaching as law under Gentile conditions. . . . Matt. 19:9 represents a parallel attempt to formulate it as law under Jewish conditions. . . . This is entirely within the Jewish-Christian horizon; the motivation is Christian, and the conditions presupposed are Jewish."26

An appeal to the Jewish context of Matthew's Gospel is made by the majority of advocates of the betrothal view.27 This is not sur­ prising, for as Labosier notes, "It is the context of Matthew 5 and 19 that provides the strongest evidence for this interpretation of

15:19; 19:9; Mark 7:21; John 8:41; Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; Rom. 1:29; 1 Cor.x5:l [twice]; 6:13, 18; 7:2; 2 Cor. 12:21; Gal. 5:19; Eph. 5:3; Col. 3:5; 1 Thess. 4:3; Rev. 2:21; 9:21; 14:8; 17:2, 4; 18:3; 19:2). A review of these passages supports Jensen's conclusions, not Malina's.

2 5 Cf. Stanley D. Toussaint, Behold the King: A Study of Matthew (Portland, OR: Multnomah, 1980); Andrew J. Overman, Matthew's Gospel and Formative Judaism: The Social World of the Matthean Community (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990); An­ thony J. Saldarmi, Matthew's Christian-Jewish Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Donald Senior, "Between Two Worlds: Gentiles and Jew­ ish Christians in Matthew's Gospel," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 61 (January 1999): 1-23.

2 6 Fredrick C. Grant, "The Proposed Marriage Canon," Anglican Theological Re­ view 22 (July 1940): 172-73 (italics his). When commenting on the exception clause in another work Grant wrote, "Porneia is simply not adultery but fornication. . . . Of course such a situation could only arise in a conservative Jewish Christian milieu, where the Mosaic code was still in force; and such a milieu is presupposed by much of the material in the Gospel of Matthew" ("The Mind of Christ on Marriage," in Five Essays on Marriage, ed. Burton Scott Easton [Louisville: Cloister, 1946], 36).

Cf. Coblentz, What the Bible Says about Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 34- $5; Döllinger, The First Age of Christianity and the Church, 372; Evenhuis, Holy Matrimony, 50-55; Mark Geldard, "Jesus' Teaching on Divorce: Thoughts on the Meaning of Porneia in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9," Churchman 92 (1978): 141; Gothard, Supplementary Alumni Handbook, 5:8; Gwynn, Holy Matrimony and Common Sense, 135-39; Heimbach, True Sexual Morality, 205-6; Isaksson, Mar- riage and Ministry in the New Temple, 131, 139-41; Labosier, "Matthew's Exception Clause," 201; Pentecost, The Words and Works of Jesus Christ, 357-58; Arne Rud- vin, "What Jesus Said about Divorce and Remarriage," Dagen (1994): 7-8; Selwyn, "Christ's Teachings on Divorce and Remarriage," 99; Stooke-Vaughn, The Solution of St. Matthew v. 31, 32, and xix. 3-9, 10; and Tarwater, Marriage as Covenant, 119-21.

78 BlBLiOTHECA SACRA / January-March 2008

of πορνβία as referring to such things as . . . betrothal unfaithful- ness."28 In fact many proponents of the betrothal view not only un­ derstand the exception clause to be a reference to the annulment of marriage during the betrothal period, but also suggest that this was an exception that Jesus had to make for His Jewish listeners "if he did not wish to side with the swindler instead of the person swindled."29 In their explanation of the betrothal view Steele and Ryrie observe that "for Christ to not address Himself to this possi­ bility would have opened the way to misunderstanding and shut the door on [the possibility of the dissolution of a betrothal]."30

This, of course, would have put Jesus in the awkward position of teaching contrary to Old Testament law and Jewish tradition, as well as ostensibly endorsing injustice.

A piece of evidence cited by many proponents of the betrothal view to corroborate the contextual support for this interpretation is the betrothal of Mary and Joseph.31 Advocates of the betrothal view note that only Matthew, in his Jewish-oriented Gospel, men­ tioned Joseph's intent to divorce Mary on account of her apparent unfaithfulness during their betrothal period.32 Given Matthew's

8 Labosier, "Matthew's Exception Clause," 239. Labosier also notes that the Jew­ ish nature of Matthew's Gospel is an "advantage of this interpretation," and that "the key to interpreting the meaning of πορνεία as it is used in the Matthean excep­ tion clause lies in appreciating its context" (ibid., 201, 248).

Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 140. In their explanation of the betrothal view Wenham and Heth likewise note, "If Jesus had not made this exception to His teaching of 'no divorce,' the Pharisees could have accused him of siding with . . . the swindler" (Jesus and Divorce, 170). 3 0 Steele and Ryrie, Meant to Last, 91. 3 1 Cf. James Montgomery Boice, "The Biblical View of Divorce," Eternity, Decem­ ber 1970, 20; James Montgomery Boice, The Sermon on the Mount (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972), 138-39; Bull, Marriage and Divorce, 8; Coblentz, What the Bible Says about Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 35; Döllinger, The First Age of Christianity and the Church, 373-74; Evenhuis, Holy Matrimony, 50-55; Geldard, "Jesus' Teaching on Divorce," 139; Gothard, Rebuilders Guide, 55; idem, Supplemen- tary Alumni Handbook, 5:8; Gwynn, Holy Matrimony and Common Sense, 139-43; Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 138-39; Labosier, "Matthew's Exception Clause," 217, 238; Noah Lathrop, "The Holy Scriptures and Divorce," Bibliotheca Sacra 56 (April-June 1899): 271; I. Howard Marshall, "Divorce," in New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. Colin Brown (Grand Rap- ids: Zondervan, 1975), 1:506; Pentecost, The Words and Works of Jesus Christ, 357; Piper, "Divorce and Remarriage: A Position Paper," par. 11.2; Rudvin, "What Jesus Said about Divorce and Remarriage," 8; Stooke-Vaughn, The Solution of St. Mat- thew v. 31, 32, and xix. 3-9, 16-18; and Tarwater, Marriage as Covenant, 120-21.

Of the fourteen references to Joseph in the New Testament, half occur in Mat- thew's Gospel (1:16, 18-20, 24; 2:13, 19), five are in Luke (1:27; 2:4, 16, 23-24), and two are in the Gospel of John (1:45; 6:42).

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 79

description of Joseph as a "just man" (Matt. 1:19), champions of this interpretation suggest that it was necessary for Matthew to publish Jesus' teaching on divorce and remarriage in a format that would vindicate, not implicate, Joseph for his previously reported intent to divorce Mary. As Pentecost suggests, 'It was in light of this context that Christ granted the exception."33 And Isaksson notes the following.

It is very unlikely that it would be related of him [Joseph] that he de­ cided to do something which clearly conflicted with the teaching that Jesus gave, according to the account later in the Gospel, concerning a man's right to divorce his wife. We may assume that, when it is re­ lated that Joseph thought of divorcing Mary because he believed she was guilty of unchastity (πορνεία), what he planned to do is not to be understood as being at variance with what Mary's son later taught, according to Mt. 19.9, since this teaching also permitted divorce on the ground of πορνεία. The word πορνεία in this clause should be un­ derstood as referring to the same kind of unchastity as that [which] Joseph suspected Mary of, i.e. premarital unchastity.34

Few critics of the betrothal view have noted the contextual support advanced by its proponents. Most interpreters, however, agree that the exception clause at least incorporates divorce on ac­ count of betrothal unfaithfulness. An exception, however, is Laney, who, perhaps misjudging the significance of betrothal in a Jewish context, writes, "The most obvious objection to the betrothal thesis is that Jesus and the Pharisees were not discussing betrothal but marriage.,,35 Yet Laney seems to sense a weakness in this objec-

dà Pentecost, The Words and Works of Jesus Christ, 357. 3 4 Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 139. Stooke-Vaughn simi- larly notes, "We are not surprised to find this [the account of Mary and Joseph] so explicitly given in S. Matthew concerning divorce of betrothed for fornication.... To sum this up we see why 'except for fornication* is in S. Matthew's Gospel and not in S. Mark or S. Luke, because S. Matthew's Gospel was written for Jews who had the ceremony of 'betrothal/ when even before the actual marriage had taken place the 'betrothed' were regarded as man and wife. Divorce was permitted for 'fornication' of the betrothed as we see in the same Gospel of S. Matthew, in the case of Joseph and Mary 'before they came together' " (The Solution of St. Matthew v. 31, 32, and xix. 3- 9, 17-18). 3 5 Laney, The Divorce Myth, 70. Similarly Crater writes, "Jesus made clear he was talking about consummated marriages when He gave His rule. . . . The betrothal idea is simply foreign to the text. . . . By the admission of all, the teaching of Mat- thew 19 was directed against the capricious breakup of consummated marriages" ("Bill Gothard's View of the Exception Clause," 7-8). Likewise Feinberg and Fein- berg object, saying that "nothing in Matthew 19 suggests that Jesus speaks of sex during the betrothal period" (Ethics for a Brave New World, 328). Moreover, con- cerning the betrothal interpretation of the exception clause Murray notes, "In the preceding context of both passages (Matt. 5:31; 19:7, 8; cf. Mark 10:3-5) explicit reference is made to the provisions of Deuteronomy 24:1-4, where the wife in ques-

80 BiBLiOTHECA SACRA / January-March 2008

tion, for he qualifies his claim with the caveat, "It could be argued

that the binding nature of betrothal among the Jews was

unique."36 In response to Laney's criticism, Luck, who is not an ad­

vocate of the betrothal view, remarks, "I am not impressed with

Laney's objection that Jesus and the Pharisees are not discussing

betrothal but rather marriage in Matt. 19. . . . [It] misses the point

that the Jewish mind would have seen betrothal unfaithfulness as

a foregone conclusion had the discussion become more specific."37

LEXICAL SUPPORT FOR THE BETROTHAL VIEW

A second argument employed by advocates of the betrothal view

marshals lexical support for interpreting Tropveia as infidelity dur­

ing the betrothal period. One way this has been done is to show

that TTopveia is used in Scripture, aside from the exception clause,

to denote betrothal unfaithfulness.38 An example, cited by propo-

tion cannot he simply a betrothed woman. Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 were spoken in direct reference to the question posed by Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and hence the rela­ tionship expressed by the word 'wife' in Matthew 19:9 cannot be different from that supplied by verses 7 and 8 and the wife of verse 9, then the subject of discourse would have been abruptly changed and the contrast between our Lord's provision and the Mosaic permission would be eliminated. The terms of the contrast initiated by the formula, 'But I say unto you' require us to regard the relationship expressed by the word 'wife* as the same in both cases" (Divorce, 34 n. 4).

A second argument Laney advances against the Jewish context to which propo­ nents of the betrothal view appeal is that the Greeks and Romans also practiced betrothal. "This interpretation of porneia [i.e., the betrothal view] would not account for the absence of the exception in Mark and Luke, for both the Greeks and Romans, as well as the Jews, had such a betrothal period to which the exception would apply" (The Divorce Myth, 70). Yet the very articles to which Laney appeals in The Oxford Classical Dictionary in order to justify his critique invalidate his argument; for the one on Greek betrothal notes that the practice had been superseded by the second century B.C., and the one on Roman betrothal notes that the practice of betrothal was nothing more than "an informal agreement to marry, voidable at will" (The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed. [1970], 166). Although not critiquing Laney by name, Wenham and Heth note, "Mark and Luke, writing to largely Gentile audi­ ences, had no need to record such an exception relating to binding betrothal agree­ ments. In Roman law, bride-money to guarantee that a betrothal agreement would be honored was only introduced in Byzantine times" (Jesus and Divorce, 171).

3 6 Laney, The Divorce Myth, 69-70.

3 7 Luck, Divorce and Remarriage, 285-86 n. 33.

In his exhaustive study of πορνεία Isaksson concludes that not only is betrothal unfaithfulness a possible meaning of πορνεία, but also that it is the dominant mean­ ing of the term. "Linguistically speaking, the most probable meaning of πορνεία, when used in a statement of a legal nature about a married woman's crime, is un­ doubtedly premarital unchastity" (Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 140). Even some nonadvocates of the betrothal view seem to have conceded this point. For example in their critique of the betrothal view Feinberg and Feinberg write, "Even if premarital sex is the most common meaning of porneia, it is not the only possible meaning" (Ethics for a Brave New World, 328). Similarly in their discussion of the betrothal view Wenham and Heth refer to πορνεία and "its usual meaning of pre-

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 81

nents of the betrothal view, is the Septuagint rendering of Deuter­ onomy 22:13-21. In regard to this passage Chase writes,

Now I venture to say that, when a Jew read the exceptive clause in St. Matthew, a passage in Deuteronomy would at once have come into his mind. It is there (Deut. xxii. 13-21) provided that, if a man mar­ ries and after marriage discovers that the woman is not a virgin, he may make his accusation against her known. If, according to the evi­ dence prescribed, "this thing be true," then the woman shall be stoned "because she hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the harlot in her fa­ ther's house (έκπορνεϋσαι τον οίκον του πατρός αύτή )̂." It will be ob­ served that the verb used here in the LXX (έκπορνεϋσαι) corresponds to the Greek substantive πορνεία (fornication) used in St. Matthew.39

Another verse appealed to by advocates of the betrothal view is John 8:41. In this passage Jesus informed the Pharisees that Abraham was not their father, and they responded with the back­ handed claim, "We were not born of fornication [πορνεία]; we have one Father: God." As Piper explains, in this verse the Jewish lead­ ers "indirectly accuse Jesus of being born of porneia. In other words, since they don't accept the virgin birth, they assume that Mary had committed fornication and Jesus was the result of this act."40 Although Wenham and Heth object to making the use of πορνεία in this verse a precedent for delimiting the meaning of the term, they nevertheless conclude, "The term porneia is clearly ap­ propriate [in John 8:41] for such an unlawful act if the illegitimate birth is the intended reference."41 This verse along with Deuteron­ omy 22:13-21 seems to show that πορνεία was used in the Scrip-

marital or radically unlawful sexual intercourse" (Jesus and Divorce, 170). 3 9 Chase, What Did Christ Teach about Divorce? 27-28. Regarding this same pas­ sage Rudvin writes, "Some theologians . . . reject [the view] that 'porneia' means sexual relations with others before marriage or betrothal, because they cannot find the word used this way. But they have overlooked that it is exactly this word which is used in Deuteronomy 22:21, where it says that the girl has committed 'ze- notTporneia' in, or 'against,' her father's house" ("What Jesus Said about Divorce and Remarriage," 8). See also Bull, Marriage and Divorce, 8-9; and Isaksson, Mar­ riage and Ministry in the New Temple, 135, 139. 4 0 Piper, "Divorce and Remarriage: A Position Paper," par. 11.2. Raymond Brown writes, "Jesus has been talking about his heavenly Father and about their father, but were there not rumors about his own birth? Was there not some question of whether he was really the son of Joseph? . . . The Jews may be saying, 'We were not born illegitimate [but you were].' There is an early witness to Jewish attacks on the legitimacy of Jesus' birth in Origen Against Celsus I 28 (GCS 2:79); and the Acts of Pilate II 3, has the Jews charging Jesus: 'You were born of fornication' " (The Gospel according to John [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970], 1:357). See also Döllinger, The First Age of Christianity and the Church, 434; and Ryrie, "Biblical Teaching on Divorce and Remarriage," 187.

Wenham and Heth, Jesus and Divorce, 175.

82 BlBLiOTHECA SACRA / January-March 2008

tures to refer to infidelity during the betrothal period.42

An additional means of lexical support advanced by propo­ nents of the betrothal view is to argue that the contextual referent of πορνεία is betrothal unfaithfulness. When the Pharisees asked Jesus to give His interpretation of the Mosaic divorce legislation, in all likelihood they were inquiring about the meaning of the phrase "some indecency" (ΊΙΠ rniJJ) in Deuteronomy 24:1, which was a topic of debate among the Jewish religious leaders. In view of the Pharisees' question some proponents of the betrothal view have argued that Jesus' reference to πορνεία in the exception clause cor­ relates to 131 rtylS) in Deuteronomy 24:1, which they understand to be a law allowing for divorce on account of betrothal unfaithful­ ness. For instance Boice writes, "The natural implication of Mat­ thew 5:32 [and 19:9] is that . . . a man may divorce a woman im­ mediately after marriage if he finds her not to be a virgin, in which case he was allowed by the law to remarry and was not to be called an adulterer—Deut. 24:1-4.. . . [The exception clause] is in essence an explanation of Deuteronomy 24:l-4."43 While a link between

Another argument employed by some proponents of this interpretation is that πορνεία is not used in reference to other sexual sins, especially the sin of adultery. For example Döllinger claims that πορεία "is always applied to the sin of an un­ married person, not to unfaithfulness in a wife, which is constantly described by another word (μοιχεία) both in the Old and New Testaments. . . . πορνεία always means incontinence in the unmarried, never, either in the New Testament or in the Septuagint or in the profane authors adultery" (The First Age of Christianity and the Church, 373, 434). Similarly Rudvin writes, "Even though it is often claimed in superficial commentaries, it cannot be clearly shown that 'porneia' is used as a ge­ neric term. . . . Neither can it be shown that 'zenut'/'porneia' is used with the direct meaning 'adultery' in the Old or the New Testament" ("What Jesus Said about Di­ vorce and Remarriage," 7). Likewise Isaksson notes, "We cannot get away from the fact that the distinction between what was regarded as πορνεία and what was to be regarded as μοιχεία was very strictly maintained in pre-Christian Jewish literature and in the N.T. Πορνεία may, of course, denote different forms of forbidden sexual relations, but we can find no unequivocal examples of the use of this word to denote a wife's adultery" (Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, 134). Cf. Chase, What Did Christ Teach about Divorce?, 61-64. Lathrop writes, "The Greek word used by Christ [πορνεία] is, so far as I can ascertain, never used in the LXX, the New Testa­ ment Greek, nor in classic Greek to mean adultery" ("The Holy Scriptures and Di­ vorce," 271). In a contrasting view Instone-Brewer writes, "It is undeniable that porneia is sometimes used as a synonym of moicheia, and that this is the more natural meaning in the context of Jesus' debate with the Pharisees" (Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 277). Yet Instone-Brewer fails to offer any evidence for the connection between πορνεία and μοιχεία. 4 3 Boice, T7ie Sermon on the Mount, 137. Likewise Tarwater notes, "Whatever the nature of the 'uncleanness' [""Ol ΠΠΰ], it cannot include adultery or fornication. Con­ sequently, this has led numerous theologians to conclude the betrothal period is the proper context in which Deuteronomy twenty-four must be understood. . . . Accord­ ing to the betrothal argument, Deuteronomy twenty-four allows for the dissolution of a betrothed couple, as long as the relationship had not been consummated. . . .

The Betrothal View of Divorce and Remarriage 83

πορνεία and Ί31 r\)lu has been suggested by both advocates and nonadvocates of the betrothal view,44 since this connection, as well as the identification of ΊΙΠ nritf with betrothal unfaithfulness is less than sure, not all proponents of the betrothal view have ar­ gued along these lines.45 Yet if this connection and identification