Plato apology five dialogues pdf

Five Dialogues

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PLATO

Five Dialogues

Second Edition

Euthyphro Apology Crito Meno Phaedo

Translated by G. M. A. GRUBE

Revised by JOHN M. COOPER

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge

Copyright © 2002 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Plato.

[Dialogues. English. Selections] Five Dialogues / Plato ; translated by G.M.A. Grube.—2nd ed. / revised

by John M. Cooper. p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references. Contents: Euthyphro—Apology—Crito—Meno—Phaedo. ISBN 0-87220-633-5 (pbk.)—ISBN 0-87220-634-3 (cloth) 1. Philosophy, Ancient. I. Grube, G.M.A. (George Maximilian

Anthony) II. Title. B358.G7813 2002 184—dc21 2002022754

ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-634-2 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-633-5 (pbk.)

e-ISBN: 978-1-60384-226-6 (Adobe e-book)

www.hackettpublishing.com
CONTENTS

Preface to the Second Edition vii

Introduction ix

Euthyphro 1

Apology 21

Crito 45

Meno 58

Phaedo 93

Suggestions for Further Reading 155

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The translations of Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, and Phaedo presented here are taken from Hackett Publishing Company’s epoch- making Plato, Complete Works (third printing, 2001), prepared under my editorship. In the revised form in which George Grube’s distin- guished translations appear here, they present Plato’s wonderfully vivid and moving—as well as challenging—portrayal of Socrates, and of the philosophic life, in clear, contemporary, down-to-earth English that nonetheless preserves and accurately conveys the nuances of Plato’s and Socrates’ philosophical ideas. For this new edition I have added a number of new footnotes explaining various places and events in Athens, features of Greek mythology, and the like, to which Socrates and his interlocutors make reference. At a number of places I have introduced further revisions in the translations.

John M. Cooper

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INTRODUCTION

At the time of his trial and execution in 399 b.c., Socrates was seventy years of age. He had lived through the Periclean age when Athens was at the pinnacle of her imperial power and her cultural ascendancy, then through twenty-five years of war with Sparta and the final defeat of Athens in 404, the oligarchic revolution that followed, and, finally, the restoration of democracy. For most of this time he was a well-known character, expounding his philosophy of life in the streets of Athens to anyone who cared to listen. His “mission,” which he explains in the Apology, was to expose the ignorance of those who thought themselves wise and to try to convince his fellow citizens that every man is responsi- ble for his own moral attitudes. The early dialogues of Plato, of which Euthyphro is a good example, show him seeking to define ethical terms and asking awkward questions. There is no reason to suppose that these questions were restricted to the life of the individual. Indeed, if he questioned the basic principles of democracy and adopted towards it anything like the attitude Plato attributes to him, it is no wonder that the restored democracy should consider him to have a bad influence on the young.

With the development of democracy and in the intellectual ferment of the fifth century, a need was felt for higher education. To satisfy it, there arose a number of traveling teachers who were called the Sophists. All of them taught rhetoric, the art of public speaking, which was a powerful weapon, since all the important decisions were made by the assemblies of adult male citizens or in the courts with very large juries. It is not surprising that Socrates was often confused with these Sophists in the public mind, for both of them were apt to question established and inherited values. But their differences were vital: the Sophists professed to put men on the road to success, whereas Socrates disclaimed that he taught anything; his conversations aimed at discovering the truth, at acquiring that knowledge and understanding of life and its values that he thought were the very basis of the good life and of philosophy, to him a moral as well as an intellectual pursuit. Hence his celebrated paradox that virtue is knowledge and that when men do wrong, it is only because they do not know any better. We are often told that in this theory Socrates ignored the will, but that is in part a misconception. The aim is not to choose the right but to become the sort of person who cannot choose the wrong and who no longer has

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x INTRODUCTION

any choice in the matter. This is what he sometimes expresses as becoming like a god, for the gods, as he puts it in Euthyphro (10d), love the pious (and so, the right) because it is right; they cannot do otherwise and no longer have any choice at all, and they cannot be the cause of evil.

The translations in this volume give the full Platonic account of the drama of Socrates’ trial and death and provide vivid presentations of Socrates’ discussions with his friends and younger contemporaries on the nature of piety, the justice of obedience to state authority, the relation between philosophical knowledge and human virtue, and the wonders, as well as the demands, of the life devoted to philosophy. The references to the coming trial and its charges in Euthyphro are a kind of introduction to this drama. The Apology is Plato’s version of Socrates’ speech to the jury in his own defense. In Crito we find Socrates refusing to save his life by escaping into exile. Meno shows Socrates debating in his characteristic way with Meno on the nature and teachability of human virtue (goodness), and also examining Meno’s slave-boy on a question of geometry, in order to prove the preexistence of our souls and our ability to learn (“recollect”) truths by rigorously examining our own opinions. Phaedo gives an account of his discussion with his friends in prison on the last day of his life, mostly on the question of the immortality of the soul.

The influence of Socrates on his contemporaries can hardly be exaggerated, especially on Plato but not on Plato alone, for a number of authors wrote on Socrates in the early fourth century b.c. And his influence on later philosophers, largely through Plato, was also very great. This impact, on his contemporaries at least, was due not only to his theories but in large measure to his character and personality, that serenely self-confident personality that emerges so vividly from Plato’s writings, and in particular from his account of Socrates’ trial, imprison- ment, and execution.

NOTE: With few exceptions, this translation follows Burnet’s Oxford text.

G. M. A. Grube

EUTHYPHRO

Euthyphro is surprised to meet Socrates near the king-archon’s court, for Socrates is not the kind of man to have business with courts of justice. Socrates explains that he is under indictment by one Meletus for corrupting the young and for not believing in the gods in whom the city believes. After a brief discussion of this, Socrates inquires about Euthyphro’s business at court and is told that he is prosecuting his own father for the murder of a laborer who is himself a murderer. His family and friends believe his course of action to be impious, but Euthyphro explains that in this they are mistaken and reveal their ignorance of the nature of piety. This naturally leads Socrates to ask, What is piety? And the rest of the dialogue is devoted to a search for a definition of piety, illustrating the Socratic search for universal definitions of ethical terms, to which a number of early Platonic dialogues are devoted. As usual, no definition is found that satisfies Socrates.

The Greek term hosion means, in the first instance, the knowledge of the proper ritual in prayer and sacrifice and of course its performance (as Euthyphro himself defines it in 14b). But obviously Euthyphro uses it in the much wider sense of pious conduct generally (e.g., his own), and in that sense the word is practically equivalent to righteousness (the justice of the Republic), the transition being by way of conduct pleasing to the gods.

Besides being an excellent example of the early, so-called Socratic dialogues, Euthyphro contains several passages with important philosophical implications. These include those in which Socrates speaks of the one Form, presented by all the actions that we call pious (5d), as well as the one in which we are told that the gods love what is pious because it is pious; it is not pious because the gods love it (10d). Another passage clarifies the difference between genus and species (11e–12d).

G.M.A.G.

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Euthyphro:1 What’s new, Socrates, to make you leave your usual2 haunts in the Lyceum and spend your time here by the king-archon’s court?2 Surely you are not prosecuting anyone before the king-archon as I am?

Socrates: The Athenians do not call this a prosecution but an indictment, Euthyphro.

Euthyphro: What is this you say? Someone must have indicted you,b for you are not going to tell me that you have indicted someone else.

Socrates: No indeed. Euthyphro: But someone else has indicted you? Socrates: Quite so. Euthyphro: Who is he? Socrates: I do not really know him myself, Euthyphro. He is appar-

ently young and unknown. They call him Meletus, I believe. He belongs to the Pitthean deme,3 if you know anyone from that deme called Meletus, with long hair, not much of a beard, and a rather aquiline nose.

Euthyphro: I don’t know him, Socrates. What charge does he bring against you?

1. We know nothing about Euthyphro except what we can gather from this dialogue. He is obviously a professional priest who considers himself an expert on ritual and on piety generally and, it seems, is generally so considered. One Euthyphro is mentioned in Plato’s Cratylus (396d) who is given to enthousi- asmos, inspiration or possession, but we cannot be sure that it is the same person. 2. The Lyceum was an outdoor gymnasium, just outside the walls of Athens, where teenage young men engaged in exercises and athletic competitions. Socrates and other intellectuals carried on discussions with them there and exhibited their skills. See the beginnings of Plato’s Euthydemus and Lysis, and the last paragraph of Symposium. The king-archon, one of the nine principal magistrates of Athens, had the responsibility to oversee religious rituals and purifications, and as such had oversight of legal cases involving alleged offenses against the Olympian gods, whose worship was a civic function—it was regarded as a serious offense to offend them. 3. A deme was, in effect, one of the constituent villages of Attica, the territory whose center was the city of Athens (though Athens itself was divided into demes, too). Athenian citizens had first of all to be enrolled and recognized as citizens in their demes.

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EUTHYPHRO 3

Socrates: What charge? A not ignoble one I think, for it is no small c thing for a young man to have knowledge of such an important subject. He says he knows how our young men are corrupted and who corrupts them. He is likely to be wise, and when he sees my ignorance corrupting his contemporaries, he proceeds to accuse me to the city as to their mother. I think he is the only one of our public men to start out the d right way, for it is right to care first that the young should be as good as possible, just as a good farmer is likely to take care of the young plants first, and of the others later. So, too, Meletus first gets rid of us who corrupt the young shoots, as he says, and then afterwards he will 3 obviously take care of the older ones and become a source of great blessings for the city, as seems likely to happen to one who started out this way.

Euthyphro: I could wish this were true, Socrates, but I fear the opposite may happen. He seems to me to start out by harming the very heart of the city by attempting to wrong you. Tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the young?

Socrates: Strange things, to hear him tell it, for he says that I am b a maker of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it.

Euthyphro: I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you.4 So he has written this indictment against you as one who makes innovations in religious matters, and he comes to court to slander you, knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the crowd. The same is true in my case. Whenever c I speak of divine matters in the assembly5 and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. Nevertheless, they envy all of us who do this. One need not worry about them, but meet them head-on.

Socrates: My dear Euthyphro, to be laughed at does not matter perhaps, for the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as

4. In Plato, Socrates always speaks of his divine sign or voice as intervening to prevent him from doing or saying something (e.g., Apology 31d), but never positively. The popular view was that it enabled him to foretell the future, and Euthyphro here represents that view. Note, however, that Socrates dissociates himself from “you prophets” (3e). 5. The assembly was the final decision-making body of the Athenian democracy. All adult males could attend and vote.

4 PLATO

long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy,d as you say, or for some other reason.

Euthyphro: I have certainly no desire to test their feelings towards me in this matter.

Socrates: Perhaps you seem to make yourself but rarely available, and not be willing to teach your own wisdom, but I’m afraid that my liking for people makes them think that I pour out to anybody anything I have to say, not only without charging a fee but even glad to reward anyone who is willing to listen. If then they were intending to laugh at me, as you say they laugh at you, there would be nothing unpleasante in their spending their time in court laughing and jesting, but if they are going to be serious, the outcome is not clear except to you prophets.

Euthyphro: Perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, and you will fight your case as you think best, as I think I will mine.

Socrates: What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you the defendant or the prosecutor?

Euthyphro: The prosecutor. Socrates: Whom do you prosecute?

Euthyphro: One whom I am thought crazy to prosecute.4 Socrates: Are you pursuing someone who will easily escape you? Euthyphro: Far from it, for he is quite old. Socrates: Who is it? Euthyphro: My father. Socrates: My dear sir! Your own father? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: What is the charge? What is the case about? Euthyphro: Murder, Socrates. Socrates: Good heavens! Certainly, Euthyphro, most men would

not know how they could do this and be right. It is not the part ofb anyone to do this, but of one who is far advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so. Socrates: Is then the man your father killed one of your relatives?

Or is that obvious, for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

EUTHYPHRO 5

Euthyphro: It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer c shares your hearth and table. The pollution is the same if you knowingly keep company with such a man and do not cleanse yourself and him by bringing him to justice. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a servant of ours.6 He killed one of our household slaves in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot and threw him in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire from the priest what should be done. During that time he gave d no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer. Both my father and my other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer when he hadn’t even killed him, they say, and even if he had, the dead man does not deserve a thought, since he was a killer. For, they say, it is impious for a son to prosecute e his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety are wrong, Socrates.

Socrates: Whereas, by Zeus, Euthyphro, you think that your knowl- edge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial?

Euthyphro: I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men, if I did not have accurate 5 knowledge of all such things.

Socrates: It is indeed most important, my admirable Euthyphro, that I should become your pupil, and as regards this indictment, chal- lenge Meletus about these very things and say to him: that in the past too I considered knowledge about the divine to be most important, and that now that he says that I am guilty of improvising and innovating about the gods I have become your pupil. I would say to him: “If, Meletus, you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, consider b me, too, to have the right beliefs and do not bring me to trial. If you

6. Naxos is a large island in the Aegean Sea southeast of Athens, where Athens had appropriated land and settled many of its citizens under its imperial rule in the mid–fifth century B.C.

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do not think so, then prosecute that teacher of mine, not me, for corrupting the older men, me and his own father, by teaching me and by exhorting and punishing him.” If he is not convinced, and does not discharge me or indict you instead of me, I shall repeat the same challenge in court.

Euthyphro: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and, if he should try to indict me, I think I would find his weak spots and the talk in court would bec about him rather than about me.

Socrates: It is because I realize this that I am eager to become your pupil, my dear friend. I know that other people as well as this Meletus do not even seem to notice you, whereas he sees me so sharply and clearly that he indicts me for ungodliness. So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder andd other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form7 or appearance insofar as it is impious?

Euthyphro: Most certainly, Socrates. Socrates: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious,

do you say? Euthyphro: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to

prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother ore anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can cite powerful evidence that the law is so. I have already said to others that such actions are right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father because6

7. This is the kind of passage that makes it easier for us to follow the transition from Socrates’ universal definitions to the Platonic theory of separately existent eternal universal Forms. The words eidos and idea, the technical terms for the Platonic Forms, commonly mean physical stature or bodily appearance. As we apply a common epithet, in this case pious, to different actions or things, these must have a common characteristic, present a common appearance or form, to justify the use of the same term, but in the early dialogues, as here, it seems to be thought of as immanent in the particulars and without separate existence. The same is true of 6d where the word “form” is also used.

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EUTHYPHRO 7

he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates: Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defen- dant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong. Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge of such things, share their opinions, then we must agree with them, too, it b would seem. For what are we to say, we who agree that we ourselves have no knowledge of them? Tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe these things are true?

Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, and so are even more surprising things, of which the majority has no knowledge.

Socrates: And do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other such things as are told by the poets, and other sacred stories such as are embroidered by good writers and by representations of which the robe of the goddess c is adorned when it is carried up to the Acropolis?8 Are we to say these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro: Not only these, Socrates, but, as I was saying just now, I will, if you wish, relate many other things about the gods which I know will amaze you.

Socrates: I should not be surprised, but you will tell me these at leisure some other time. For now, try to tell me more clearly what I was asking just now, for, my friend, you did not teach me adequately d when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, in prosecuting your father for murder, is pious.

Euthyphro: And I told the truth, Socrates. Socrates: Perhaps. You agree, however, that there are many other

pious actions. Euthyphro: There are.

8. The Acropolis is the huge rocky outcropping in the center of Athens that served as the citadel for Attica, and also the center of its religious life. Major temples to the gods were there, including the Parthenon, the temple of Athena, the city’s protectress. Every four years in an elaborate festival in her honor maidens brought up the ceremonial robe referred to here, in which to clothe her statue.

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Socrates: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don’t you remember?e

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look

upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.

Euthyphro: If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will tell you.

Socrates: That is what I want. Euthyphro: Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is7

not is impious. Socrates: Splendid, Euthyphro! You have now answered in the way

I wanted. Whether your answer is true I do not know yet, but you will obviously show me that what you say is true.

Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: Come then, let us examine what we mean. An action or

a man dear to the gods is pious, but an action or a man hated by the gods is impious. They are not the same, but quite opposite, the pious and the impious. Is that not so?

Euthyphro: It is indeed. Socrates: And that seems to be a good statement? Euthyphro: I think so, Socrates.b Socrates: We have also stated that the gods are in a state of discord,

that they are at odds with each other, Euthyphro, and that they are at enmity with each other. Has that, too, been said?

Euthyphro: It has. Socrates: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and

anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this?c

Euthyphro: We would certainly do so. Socrates: Again, if we differed about the larger and the smaller,

we would turn to measurement and soon cease to differ. Euthyphro: That is so.

EUTHYPHRO 9

Socrates: And about the heavier and the lighter, we would resort to weighing and be reconciled.

Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: What subject of difference would make us angry and

hostile to each other if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether d these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do?

Euthyphro: That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects. Socrates: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If indeed they have

differences, will it not be about these same subjects? Euthyphro: It certainly must be so. Socrates: Then according to your argument, my good Euthyphro, e

different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad, for they would not be at odds with one another unless they differed about these subjects, would they?

Euthyphro: You are right. Socrates: And they like what each of them considers beautiful,

good, and just, and hate the opposites of these? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: But you say that the same things are considered just by

some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things 8 they are at odds and at war with each other. Is that not so?

Euthyphro: It is. Socrates: The same things then are loved by the gods and hated

by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated. Euthyphro: It seems likely. Socrates: And the same things would be both pious and impious,

according to this argument? Euthyphro: I’m afraid so. Socrates: So you did not answer my question, you surprising man.

I did not ask you what same thing is both pious and impious, and it appears that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it is b in no way surprising if your present action, namely punishing your

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father, may be pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Cronus and Uranus,9

pleasing to Hephaestus but displeasing to Hera, and so with any other gods who differ from each other on this subject.

Euthyphro: I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty.

Socrates: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any manc maintaining that one who has killed or done anything else unjustly should not pay the penalty?

Euthyphro: They never cease to dispute on this subject, both else- where and in the courts, for when they have committed many wrongs they do and say anything to avoid the penalty.

Socrates: Do they agree they have done wrong, Euthyphro, and in spite of so agreeing do they nevertheless say they should not be pun- ished?

Euthyphro: No, they do not agree on that point. Socrates: So they do not say or do just anything. For they do not

venture to say this, or dispute that they must not pay the penalty if they have done wrong, but I think they deny doing wrong. Is that not so?d

Euthyphro: That is true. Socrates: Then they do not dispute that the wrongdoer must be

punished, but they may disagree as to who the wrongdoer is, what he did, and when.

Euthyphro: You are right. Socrates: Do not the gods have the same experience, if indeed

they are at odds with each other about the just and the unjust, as your argument maintains? Some assert that they wrong one another, while others deny it, but no one among gods or men ventures to say that thee wrongdoer must not be punished.

Euthyphro: Yes, that is true, Socrates, as to the main point. Socrates: And those who disagree, whether men or gods, dispute

about each action, if indeed the gods disagree. Some say it is done justly, others unjustly. Is that not so?

9. Zeus’ father, whom he fought and defeated (see 6a), was Cronus; Cronus, in turn, had castrated his own father Uranus. The story of Hephaestus and his mother Hera, mentioned next, similarly involves a son punishing his parent.

EUTHYPHRO 11

Euthyphro: Yes, indeed. Socrates: Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me, too, that I may 9

become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods consider that man to have been killed unjustly who became a murderer while in your service, was bound by the master of his victim, and died in his bonds before the one who bound him found out from the seers what was to be done with him, and that it is right for a son to denounce and to prosecute his father on behalf of such a man. Come, try to show me a clear sign that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. b If you can give me adequate proof of this, I shall never cease to extol your wisdom.

Euthyphro: This is perhaps no light task, Socrates, though I could show you very clearly.

Socrates: I understand that you think me more dull-witted than the jury, as you will obviously show them that these actions were unjust and that all the gods hate such actions.

Euthyphro: I will show it to them clearly, Socrates, if only they will listen to me.

Socrates: They will listen if they think you show them well. But c this thought came to me as you were speaking, and I am examining it, saying to myself: “If Euthyphro shows me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust, to what greater extent have I learned from him the nature of piety and impiety? This action would then, it seems, be hated by the gods, but the pious and the impious were not thereby now defined, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them.” So I will not insist on this point; let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate d it. However, is this the correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that what some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety and impiety?

Euthyphro: What prevents us from doing so, Socrates? Socrates: For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether

on your part this proposal will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised.

Euthyphro: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods e love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.

Socrates: Then let us again examine whether that is a sound state- ment, or do we let it pass, and if one of us, or someone else, merely

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says that something is so, do we accept that it is so? Or should we examine what the speaker means?

Euthyphro: We must examine it, but I certainly think that this is now a fine statement.

Socrates: We shall soon know better whether it is. Consider this:10 Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?

Euthyphro: I don’t know what you mean, Socrates. Socrates: I shall try to explain more clearly: we speak of something

carried and something carrying, of something led and something lead- ing, of something seen and something seeing, and you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ?

Euthyphro: I think I do. Socrates: So there is also something loved and—a different thing—

something loving. Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: Tell me then whether the thing carried is a carried thingb

because it is being carried, or for some other reason? Euthyphro: No, that is the reason. Socrates: And the thing led is so because it is being led, and the

thing seen because it is being seen? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: It is not being seen because it is a thing seen but on the

contrary it is a thing seen because it is being seen; nor is it because it is something led that it is being led but because it is being led that it is something led; nor is something being carried because it is something carried, but it is something carried because it is being carried. Is what I want to say clear, Euthyphro? I want to say this, namely, that ifc anything is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not being changed because it is something changed, but rather it is some- thing changed because it is being changed; nor is it being affected because it is something affected, but it is something affected because it is being affected.10 Or do you not agree?

10. Here Socrates gives the general principle under which, he says, the specific cases already examined—those of leading, carrying, and seeing—all fall. It is by being changed by something that changes it (e.g., by carrying it somewhere) that anything is a changed thing—not vice versa: it is not by something’s being a changed thing that something else then changes it so that it comes to be

EUTHYPHRO 13

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Is something loved either something changed or some-

thing affected by something? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: So it is in the same case as the things just mentioned; it

is not being loved by those who love it because it is something loved, but it is something loved because it is being loved by them?

Euthyphro: Necessarily. Socrates: What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Surely d

that it is being loved by all the gods, according to what you say? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Is it being loved because it is pious, or for some other

reason? Euthyphro: For no other reason. Socrates: It is being loved then because it is pious, but it is not

pious because it is being loved? Euthyphro: Apparently. Socrates: And yet it is something loved and god-loved because it

is being loved by the gods? Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthy-

phro, nor the pious the same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.

Euthyphro: How so, Socrates? e Socrates: Because we agree that the pious is being loved for this

reason, that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved. Is that not so?

Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: And that the god-loved, on the other hand, is so because

it is being loved by the gods, by the very fact of being loved, but it is not being loved because it is god-loved.

Euthyphro: True.

being changed (e.g., by carrying it somewhere). Likewise for “affections” such as being seen by someone: it is by being “affected” by something that “affects” it that anything is an “affected” thing, not vice versa. It is not by being an “affected” thing (e.g., a thing seen) that something else then “affects” it.

14 PLATO

Socrates: But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious was being loved because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being loved because it was god-loved; and11 if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods. But now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is such as to be loved because it is being loved, the other is being loved because it is such as to be loved. I’m afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to me, but you told me an affect or a quality of it, that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is. Now, if you will,b do not hide things from me but tell me again from the beginning what piety is, whether being loved by the gods or having some other quality— we shall not quarrel about that—but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are.

Euthyphro: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it.

Socrates: Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ances- tor, Daedalus.11 If I were stating them and putting them forward, youc would perhaps be making fun of me and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions are yours, however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say yourself.

Euthyphro: I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not the one who makes them go around and not remain in the same place; it is you who are the Daedalus; for as far as I amd concerned they would remain as they were.

Socrates: It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill, my friend, insofar as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, but I can make other people’s things move as well as my own. And the smartest part of my skill is that I am clever without wanting to be, for I would rather have your statements to me remain unmoved than possess the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness ofe Daedalus. But enough of this. Since I think you are making unnecessary

11. Socrates may have been a stonemason, as his father was. In Greek mythology Daedalus’ statues (made of wood) could move themselves.

EUTHYPHRO 15

difficulties, I am as eager as you are to find a way to teach me about piety, and do not give up before you do. See whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.

Euthyphro: I think so. Socrates: And is then all that is just pious? Or is all that is pious

just, but not all that is just pious, but some of it is and some is not? 12 Euthyphro: I do not follow what you are saying, Socrates. Socrates: Yet you are younger than I by as much as you are wiser.

As I say, you are making difficulties because of your wealth of wisdom. Pull yourself together, my dear sir, what I am saying is not difficult to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what the poet said who wrote:

You do not wish to name Zeus, who had done it, and who made all things grow, for where there is fear there is also shame.12 b

I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why? Euthyphro: Please do. Socrates: I do not think that “where there is fear there is also

shame,” for I think that many people who fear disease and poverty and many other such things feel fear, but are not ashamed of the things they fear. Do you not think so?

Euthyphro: I do indeed. Socrates: But where there is shame there is also fear. For is there

anyone who, in feeling shame and embarrassment at anything, does c not also at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?

Euthyphro: He is certainly afraid. Socrates: It is then not right to say “where there is fear there is

also shame,” but that where there is shame there is also fear, for fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is a part of fear just as odd is a part of number, with the result that it is not true that where there is number there is also oddness, but that where there is oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?

Euthyphro: Surely. Socrates: This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether

where there is piety there is also justice, but where there is justice there d is not always piety, for the pious is a part of justice. Shall we say that, or do you think otherwise?

12. Author unknown.

16 PLATO

Euthyphro: No, but like that, for what you say appears to be right. Socrates: See what comes next: if the pious is a part of the just,

we must, it seems, find out what part of the just it is. Now if you asked me something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of number is the even, and what number that is, I would say it is the number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts. Or do you not think so?

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Try in this way to tell me what part of the just the piouse

is, in order to tell Meletus not to wrong us any more and not to indict me for ungodliness, since I have learned from you sufficiently what is godly and pious and what is not.

Euthyphro: I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.

Socrates: You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of information. I do not know yet what you mean by care, for you13 do not mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things, as, for example, we say, don’t we, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, but the horse breeder does.

Euthyphro: Yes, I do mean it that way. Socrates: So horse breeding is the care of horses. Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Nor does everyone know how to care for dogs, but the

hunter does. Euthyphro: That is so. Socrates: So hunting is the care of dogs. Euthyphro: Yes.b Socrates: And cattle raising is the care of cattle. Euthyphro: Quite so. Socrates: While piety and godliness is the care of the gods, Euthy-

phro. Is that what you mean? Euthyphro: It is. Socrates: Now care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the

good and the benefit of the object cared for, as you can see that horses cared for by horse breeders are benefited and become better. Or do you not think so?

EUTHYPHRO 17

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle

raising, and so with all the others. Or do you think that care aims to c harm the object of its care?

Euthyphro: By Zeus, no. Socrates: It aims to benefit the object of its care? Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: Is piety then, which is the care of the gods, also to benefit

the gods and make them better? Would you agree that when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better?

Euthyphro: By Zeus, no. Socrates: Nor do I think that this is what you mean—far from it—

but that is why I asked you what you meant by the care of gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care. d

Euthyphro: Quite right, Socrates, that is not the kind of care I mean. Socrates: Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would

piety be? Euthyphro: The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their

masters. Socrates: I understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods. Euthyphro: Quite so. Socrates: Could you tell me to the achievement of what goal service

to doctors tends? Is it not, do you think, to achieving health? Euthyphro: I think so. Socrates: What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement e

is it directed? Euthyphro: Clearly, Socrates, to the building of a ship. Socrates: And service to housebuilders to the building of a house? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Tell me then, my good sir, to the achievement of what

aim does service to the gods tend? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the best knowledge of the divine.

Euthyphro: And I am telling the truth, Socrates. Socrates: Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent aim that

the gods achieve, using us as their servants? Euthyphro: Many fine things, Socrates.

18 PLATO

Socrates: So do generals, my friend. Nevertheless you could easily14 tell me their main concern, which is to achieve victory in war, is it not?

Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: The farmers, too, I think, achieve many fine things, but

the main point of their efforts is to produce food from the earth. Euthyphro: Quite so. Socrates: Well then, how would you sum up the many fine things

that the gods achieve? Euthyphro: I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a

considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but,b to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state. The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything.

Socrates: You could tell me in far fewer words, if you were willing, the sum of what I asked, Euthyphro, but you are not keen to teach me,c that is clear. You were on the point of doing so, but you turned away. If you had given that answer, I should now have acquired from you sufficient knowledge of the nature of piety. As it is, the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him. Once more then, what do you say that piety and the pious are? Are they a knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray?

Euthyphro: They are. Socrates: To sacrifice is to make a gift to the gods, whereas to pray

is to beg from the gods? Euthyphro: Definitely, Socrates. Socrates: It would follow from this statement that piety would bed

a knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods. Euthyphro: You understood what I said very well, Socrates. Socrates: That is because I am so desirous of your wisdom, and I

concentrate my mind on it, so that no word of yours may fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it is to beg from them and to give to them?

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: And to beg correctly would be to ask from them things

that we need? Euthyphro: What else?

EUTHYPHRO 19

Socrates: And to give correctly is to give them what they need from e us, for it would not be skillful to bring gifts to anyone that are in no way needed.

Euthyphro: True, Socrates. Socrates: Piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods

and men? Euthyphro: Trading yes, if you prefer to call it that. Socrates: I prefer nothing, unless it is true. But tell me, what benefit

do the gods derive from the gifts they receive from us? What they give us is obvious to all. There is for us no good that we do not receive from 15 them, but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Or do we have such an advantage over them in the trade that we receive all our blessings from them and they receive nothing from us?

Euthyphro: Do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socrates: What could those gifts from us to the gods be, Euthyphro? Euthyphro: What else, do you think, than honor, reverence, and

what I mentioned just now, to please them? Socrates: The pious is then, Euthyphro, pleasing to the gods, but b

not beneficial or dear to them? Euthyphro: I think it is of all things most dear to them. Socrates: So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods. Euthyphro: Most certainly. Socrates: When you say this, will you be surprised if your arguments

seem to move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful than Daedalus and make them go around in a circle? Or do you not realize that our argument has moved around and come again to the same place? You surely remember that earlier the pious c and the god-loved were shown not to be the same but different from each other. Or do you not remember?

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Do you then not realize now that you are saying that

what is dear to the gods is the pious? Is this not the same as the god- loved? Or is it not?

Euthyphro: It certainly is.

20 PLATO

Socrates: Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

Euthyphro: That seems to be so. Socrates: So we must investigate again from the beginning what

piety is, as I shall not willingly give up before I learn this. Do not think me unworthy, but concentrate your attention and tell the truth. Ford you know it, if any man does, and I must not let you go, like Proteus,13

before you tell me. If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men, but now I know well that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety. So tell me, my goode Euthyphro, and do not hide what you think it is.

Euthyphro: Some other time, Socrates, for I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go.

Socrates: What a thing to do, my friend! By going you have cast me down from a great hope I had, that I would learn from you the nature of the pious and the impious and so escape Meletus’ indictment by showing him that I had acquired wisdom in divine matters from16 Euthyphro, and my ignorance would no longer cause me to be careless and inventive about such things, and that I would be better for the rest of my life.

13. In Greek mythology Proteus was a sort of old man of the sea, who could keep on changing his form and so escape being questioned. See Homer, Odyssey iv.382 ff.

APOLOGY

The Apology1 professes to be a record of the actual speech that Socrates delivered in his own defense at the trial. This claim makes the question of its historicity more acute than in the dialogues in which the conversations themselves are mostly fictional and the question of historicity is concerned only with how far the theories that Socrates is represented as expressing were those of the historical Socrates. Here, however, we are dealing with a speech that Socrates made as a matter of history. How far is Plato’s account accurate? We should always remember that the ancients did not expect historical accuracy in the way we do. On the other hand, Plato makes it clear that he was present at the trial (34a, 38b). Moreover, if, as is generally believed, the Apology was written not long after the event, many Athenians would remember the actual speech, and it would be a poor way to vindicate the Master, which is the obvious intent, to put a completely different speech into his mouth. Some liberties could no doubt be allowed, but the main arguments and the general tone of the defense must surely be faithful to the original. The beauty of language and style is certainly Plato’s, but the serene spiritual and moral beauty of character belongs to Socrates. It is a powerful combination.

Athenian juries were very large, in this case 501, and they combined the duties of jury and judge as we know them by both convicting and sentencing. Obviously, it would have been virtually impossible for so large a body to discuss various penalties and decide on one. The problem was resolved rather neatly, however, by having the prosecutor, after conviction, assess the penalty he thought appropriate, followed by a counter-assessment by the defendant. The jury would then decide between the two. This procedure generally made for moderation on both sides.

Thus the Apology is in three parts. The first and major part is the main speech (17a–35d), followed by the counter-assessment (35e–38b),

1. The word apology is a transliteration, not a translation, of the Greek apologia, which means defense. There is certainly nothing apologetic about the speech.

21

22 PLATO

and finally, last words to the jury (38c–42a), both to those who voted for the death sentence and those who voted for acquittal.

G.M.A.G.

I do not know, men of Athens,2 how my accusers affected you; as for17 me, I was almost carried away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, hardly anything of what they said is true. Of the many lies they told, one in particular surprised me, namely that you should be careful not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker like me. That they were not ashamed to be immediately proved wrong byb the facts, when I show myself not to be an accomplished speaker at all, that I thought was most shameless on their part—unless indeed they call an accomplished speaker the man who speaks the truth. If they mean that, I would agree that I am an orator, but not after their manner, for indeed, as I say, practically nothing they said was true. From me you will hear the whole truth, though not, by Zeus, gentlemen, expressed in embroidered and stylized phrases like theirs, but thingsc spoken at random and expressed in the first words that come to mind, for I put my trust in the justice of what I say, and let none of you expect anything else. It would not be fitting at my age, as it might be for a young man, to toy with words when I appear before you.

One thing I do ask and beg of you, gentlemen: if you hear me making my defense in the same kind of language as I am accustomed to use in the marketplace by the bankers’ tables,3 where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not be surprised or create a distur-d

2. Jurors were selected by lot from all the male citizens thirty years of age or older who offered themselves on the given day for service. They thus functioned as representatives of the Athenian people and the Athenian democracy. In cases like Socrates’, they judged on behalf of the whole citizen body whether or not their interests had been undermined by the accused’s behavior. Hence Socrates can address them as if he were addressing the people of Athens at large, and in particular the partisans of the democracy against its oligarchic opponents (see, for example, 21a, 32d). Socrates addresses the jury as “men of Athens” rather than employing the usual mode of address, “gentlemen of the jury” (as Meletus does at 26d). At 40a he explains that only those who voted to acquit him deserved that honor. 3. The bankers or money-changers had their counters in the marketplace. It seems that this was a favorite place for gossip.

APOLOGY 23

bance on that account. The position is this: This is my first appearance in a lawcourt, at the age of seventy; I am therefore simply a stranger to the manner of speaking here. Just as if I were really a stranger, you would certainly excuse me if I spoke in that dialect and manner in which I had been brought up, so too my present request seems a just 18 one, for you to pay no attention to my manner of speech—be it better or worse—but to concentrate your attention on whether what I say is just or not, for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that of a speaker lies in telling the truth.

It is right for me, gentlemen, to defend myself first against the first lying accusations made against me and my first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. There have been many who have accused me to you for many years now, and none of b their accusations are true. These I fear much more than I fear Anytus and his friends, though they too are formidable. These earlier ones, however, are more so, gentlemen; they got hold of most of you from childhood, persuaded you and accused me quite falsely, saying that there is a man called Socrates, a wise man, a student of all things in the sky and below the earth, who makes the worse argument the stronger. Those who spread that rumor, gentlemen, are my dangerous c accusers, for their hearers believe that those who study these things do not even believe in the gods. Moreover, these accusers are numerous, and have been at it a long time; also, they spoke to you at an age when you would most readily believe them, some of you being children and adolescents, and they won their case by default, as there was no defense.

What is most absurd in all this is that one cannot even know or mention their names unless one of them is a writer of comedies.4 Those d who maliciously and slanderously persuaded you—who also, when persuaded themselves then persuaded others—all those are most diffi- cult to deal with: one cannot bring one of them into court or refute him; one must simply fight with shadows, as it were, in making one’s defense, and cross-examine when no one answers. I want you to realize too that my accusers are of two kinds: those who have accused me recently, and the old ones I mention; and to think that I must first defend myself against the latter, for you have also heard their accusations e first, and to a much greater extent than the more recent.

4. This is Aristophanes. Socrates refers below (19c) to the character Socrates in his Clouds (225 ff.), first produced in 423 B.C.

24 PLATO

Very well then, men of Athens. I must surely defend myself and attempt to uproot from your minds in so short a time the slander that19 has resided there so long. I wish this may happen, if it is in any way better for you and me, and that my defense may be successful, but I think this is very difficult and I am fully aware of how difficult it is. Even so, let the matter proceed as the god may wish, but I must obey the law and make my defense.

Let us then take up the case from its beginning. What is the accusa- tion from which arose the slander in which Meletus trusted when heb wrote out the charge against me? What did they say when they slandered me? I must, as if they were my actual prosecutors, read the affidavit they would have sworn. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the earth; he makes the worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these same things to others. You have seen this yourself inc the comedy of Aristophanes, a Socrates swinging about there, saying he was walking on air and talking a lot of other nonsense about things of which I know nothing at all. I do not speak in contempt of such knowledge, if someone is wise in these things—lest Meletus bring more cases against me—but, gentlemen, I have no part in it, and on this point I call upon the majority of you as witnesses. I think it right that all those of you who have heard me conversing, and many of you have,d should tell each other if any one of you has ever heard me discussing such subjects to any extent at all. From this you will learn that the other things said about me by the majority are of the same kind.

Not one of them is true. And if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and charge a fee for it, that is not true either. Yet I think it a fine thing to be able to teach people as Gorgias ofe Leontini does, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis.5 Each of these men can go to any city and persuade the young, who can keep company with any one of their own fellow citizens they want without paying, to leave the company of these, to join with themselves, pay20

5. These were all well-known Sophists. Gorgias, after whom Plato named one of his dialogues, was a celebrated rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric. He came to Athens in 427 B.C., and his rhetorical tricks took the city by storm. Two dialogues, the authenticity of which has been doubted, are named after Hippias, whose knowledge was encyclopedic. Prodicus was known for his insistence on the precise meaning of words. Both he and Hippias are characters in Protagoras (named after another famous Sophist).

APOLOGY 25

them a fee, and be grateful to them besides. Indeed, I learned that there is another wise man from Paros who is visiting us, for I met a man who has spent more money on sophists than everybody else put together, Callias, the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him—he has two sons—“Callias,” I said, “if your sons were colts or calves, we could find and engage a supervisor for them who would make them excel in their proper qualities, some horse breeder or farmer. Now since they are b men, whom do you have in mind to supervise them? Who is an expert in this kind of excellence, the human and social kind? I think you must have given thought to this since you have sons. Is there such a person,” I asked, “or is there not?” “Certainly there is,” he said. “Who is he?” I asked. “What is his name, where is he from? And what is his fee?” “His name, Socrates, is Evenus, he comes from Paros, and his fee is five minas.”6 I thought Evenus a happy man, if he really possesses this art, and teaches for so moderate a fee. Certainly I would pride and preen c myself if I had this knowledge, but I do not have it, gentlemen.

One of you might perhaps interrupt me and say: “But Socrates, what is your occupation? From where have these slanders come? For surely if you did not busy yourself with something out of the common, all these rumors and talk would not have arisen unless you did something other than most people. Tell us what it is, that we may not speak inadvisedly about you.” Anyone who says that seems to be right, and I d will try to show you what has caused this reputation and slander. Listen then. Perhaps some of you will think I am jesting, but be sure that all that I shall say is true. What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom I men- tioned just now are wise with a wisdom more than human; else I cannot e explain it, for I certainly do not possess it, and whoever says I do is lying and speaks to slander me. Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen, even if you think I am boasting, for the story I shall tell does not originate with me, but I will refer you to a trustworthy source. I shall call upon the god at Delphi as witness to the existence and nature of 21 my wisdom, if it be such.7 You know Chaerephon. He was my friend from youth, and the friend of most of you, as he shared your exile and

6. A mina equaled 100 drachmas. In Socrates’ time one drachma was the daily wage of a day-laborer. So Evenus’ fee was a considerable sum. 7. The god Apollo had a very famous shrine at Delphi, where his oracles were delivered through the mouth of a priestess, the “Pythian.”

26 PLATO

your return. You surely know the kind of man he was, how impulsive in any course of action. He went to Delphi at one time and ventured to ask the oracle—as I say, gentlemen, do not create a disturbance— he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser. Chaerephon is dead, but his brother will testify to you about this.

Consider that I tell you this because I would inform you about theb origin of the slander. When I heard of this reply I asked myself: “What- ever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate for him to do so.” For a long time I was at a loss as to his meaning; then I very reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this; I went to one of those reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and sayc to it: “This man is wiser than I, but you said I was.” Then, when I examined this man—there is no need for me to tell you his name, he was one of our public men—my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise,d but that he was not. As a result he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders. So I withdrew and thought to myself: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know.” After this I approached another man, one of those thought to be wisere than he, and I thought the same thing, and so I came to be disliked both by him and by many others.

After that I proceeded systematically. I realized, to my sorrow and alarm, that I was getting unpopular, but I thought that I must attach the greatest importance to the god’s oracle, so I must go to all those who had any reputation for knowledge to examine its meaning. And by the dog,8 men of Athens—for I must tell you the truth—I experienced22 something like this: In my investigation in the service of the god I found that those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more knowledgeable. I must give you an account of my journeyings as if they

8. A curious oath, occasionally used by Socrates, it appears in a longer form in Gorgias (482b) as “by the dog, the god of the Egyptians.”

APOLOGY 27

were labors I had undertaken to prove the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets, the writers of tragedies and dithyrambs and the others, intending in their case to catch myself being more b ignorant than they. So I took up those poems with which they seemed to have taken most trouble and asked them what they meant, in order that I might at the same time learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen, but I must. Almost all the bystanders might have explained the poems better than their authors could. I soon realized that poets do not compose their poems with knowledge, but c by some inborn talent and by inspiration, like seers and prophets who also say many fine things without any understanding of what they say. The poets seemed to me to have had a similar experience. At the same time I saw that, because of their poetry, they thought themselves very wise men in other respects, which they were not. So there again I withdrew, thinking that I had the same advantage over them as I had over the politicians.

Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowl- d edge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets: each of them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this error of e theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to be as I am, with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both. The answer I gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage to be as I am.

As a result of this investigation, men of Athens, I acquired much unpopularity, of a kind that is hard to deal with and is a heavy burden; 23 many slanders came from these people and a reputation for wisdom, for in each case the bystanders thought that I myself possessed the wisdom that I proved that my interlocutor did not have. What is proba- ble, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, b as if he said: “This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless.” So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me—and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise.

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Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in great poverty because of my service to the god.

Furthermore, the young men who follow me around of their ownc free will, those who have most leisure, the sons of the very rich, take pleasure in hearing people questioned; they themselves often imitate me and try to question others. I think they find an abundance of men who believe they have some knowledge but know little or nothing. The result is that those whom they question are angry, not with themselves but with me. They say: “That man Socrates is a pestilential fellow whod corrupts the young.” If one asks them what he does and what he teaches to corrupt them, they are silent, as they do not know, but, so as not to appear at a loss, they mention those accusations that are available against all philosophers, about “things in the sky and things below the earth,” about “not believing in the gods” and “making the worse the stronger argument”; they would not want to tell the truth, I’m sure, that they have been proved to lay claim to knowledge when they know nothing. These people are ambitious, violent, and numerous; they are continuallye and convincingly talking about me; they have been filling your ears for a long time with vehement slanders against me. From them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus being vexed on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and the politicians, Lycon on behalf of the orators, so that, as I started out by saying, I24 should be surprised if I could rid you of so much slander in so short a time. That, men of Athens, is the truth for you. I have hidden or disguised nothing. I know well enough that this very conduct makes me unpopular, and this is proof that what I say is true, that such is theb slander against me, and that such are its causes. If you look into this either now or later, this is what you will find.

Let this suffice as a defense against the charges of my earlier accusers. After this I shall try to defend myself against Meletus, that good and patriotic man, as he says he is, and my later accusers. As these are a different lot of accusers, let us again take up their sworn deposition. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and of not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual things. Such is their charge. Let us examine it pointc by point.

He says that I am guilty of corrupting the young, but I say that Meletus is guilty of dealing frivolously with serious matters, of irresponsi- bly bringing people into court, and of professing to be seriously con-

APOLOGY 29

cerned with things about none of which he has ever cared, and I shall try to prove that this is so. Come here and tell me, Meletus. Surely d you consider it of the greatest importance that our young men be as good as possible?9 — Indeed I do.

Come then, tell these men who improves them. You obviously know, in view of your concern. You say you have discovered the one who corrupts them, namely me, and you bring me here and accuse me to these men. Come, inform these men and tell them who it is who improves them. You see, Meletus, that you are silent and know not what to say. Does this not seem shameful to you and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have not been concerned with any of this? Tell me, my good sir, who improves our young men? — The laws. e

That is not what I am asking, but what person who has knowledge of the laws to begin with? — These jurymen, Socrates.

How do you mean, Meletus? Are these able to educate the young and improve them? — Certainly.

All of them, or some but not others? — All of them. Very good, by Hera. You mention a great abundance of benefactors. 25

But what about the audience? Do they improve the young or not? — They do, too.

What about the members of Council?10 — The Councillors, also. But, Meletus, what about the assembly? Do members of the assembly

corrupt the young, or do they all improve them? — They improve them. All the Athenians, it seems, make the young into fine good men,

except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is that what you mean? — That is most definitely what I mean.

You condemn me to a great misfortune. Tell me: does this also apply b to horses, do you think? That all men improve them and one individual corrupts them? Or is quite the contrary true, one individual is able to improve them, or very few, namely, the horse breeders, whereas the majority, if they have horses and use them, corrupt them? Is that not the case, Meletus, both with horses and all other animals? Of course

9. Socrates here drops into his usual method of discussion by question and answer. This, no doubt, is what Plato had in mind, at least in part, when he made him ask the indulgence of the jury if he spoke “in his usual manner.” 10. The Council was a body of 500 men, elected annually by lot, that prepared the agenda for meetings of the assembly and together with the magistrates conducted the public business of Athens. (On the assembly, see note to Euthy- phro 3c.)

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it is, whether you and Anytus say so or not. It would be a very happy state of affairs if only one person corrupted our youth, while the others improved them.

You have made it sufficiently obvious, Meletus, that you have neverc had any concern for our youth; you show your indifference clearly; that you have given no thought to the subjects about which you bring me to trial.

And by Zeus, Meletus, tell us also whether it is better for a man to live among good or wicked fellow citizens. Answer, my good man, for I am not asking a difficult question. Do not the wicked do some harm to those who are ever closest to them, whereas good people benefit them? — Certainly.

And does the man exist who would rather be harmed than benefitedd by his associates? Answer, my good sir, for the law orders you to answer. Is there any man who wants to be harmed? — Of course not.

Come now, do you accuse me here of corrupting the young and making them worse deliberately or unwillingly? — Deliberately.

What follows, Meletus? Are you so much wiser at your age than I am at mine that you understand that wicked people always do some harm to their closest neighbors while good people do them good, bute I have reached such a pitch of ignorance that I do not realize this, namely that if I make one of my associates wicked I run the risk of being harmed by him so that I do such a great evil deliberately, as you say? I do not believe you, Meletus, and I do not think anyone else will. Either I do not corrupt the young or, if I do, it is unwillingly, and you26 are lying in either case. Now if I corrupt them unwillingly, the law does not require you to bring people to court for such unwilling wrong- doings, but to get hold of them privately, to instruct them and exhort them; for clearly, if I learn better, I shall cease to do what I am doing unwillingly. You, however, have avoided my company and were unwill- ing to instruct me, but you bring me here, where the law requires one to bring those who are in need of punishment, not of instruction.

And so, men of Athens, what I said is clearly true: Meletus has neverb been at all concerned with these matters. Nonetheless tell us, Meletus, how you say that I corrupt the young; or is it obvious from your deposition that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes but in other new spiritual things? Is this not what you say I teach and so corrupt them? — That is most certainly what I do say.

Then by those very gods about whom we are talking, Meletus, makec this clearer to me and to these men: I cannot be sure whether you

APOLOGY 31

mean that I teach the belief that there are some gods—and therefore I myself believe that there are gods and am not altogether an atheist, nor am I guilty of that—not, however, the gods in whom the city believes, but others, and that this is the charge against me, that they are others. Or whether you mean that I do not believe in gods at all, and that this is what I teach to others. — This is what I mean, that you do not believe in gods at all.

You are a strange fellow, Meletus. Why do you say this? Do I not d believe, as other men do, that the sun and the moon are gods? — No, by Zeus, gentlemen of the jury, for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

My dear Meletus, do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras? Are you so contemptuous of these men and think them so ignorant of letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras11 of Clazomenae are full of those theories, and further, that the young men learn from me what they can buy from time to time for a drachma, at most, in e the bookshops, and ridicule Socrates if he pretends that these theories are his own, especially as they are so absurd? Is that, by Zeus, what you think of me, Meletus, that I do not believe that there are any gods? — That is what I say, that you do not believe in the gods at all.

You cannot be believed, Meletus, even, I think, by yourself. The man appears to me, men of Athens, highly insolent and uncontrolled. He seems to have made this deposition out of insolence, violence, and 27 youthful zeal. He is like one who composed a riddle and is trying it out: “Will the wise Socrates realize that I am jesting and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and others?” I think he contradicts himself in the affidavit, as if he said: “Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods but believing in gods,” and surely that is the part of a jester!

Examine with me, gentlemen, how he appears to contradict himself, b and you, Meletus, answer us. Remember, gentlemen, what I asked you when I began, not to create a disturbance if I proceed in my usual manner.

Does any man, Meletus, believe in human activities who does not believe in humans? Make him answer, and not again and again create

11. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, born about the beginning of the fifth century B.C., came to Athens as a young man and spent his time in the pursuit of natural philosophy. He claimed that the universe was directed by Nous (Mind) and that matter was indestructible but always combining in various ways. He left Athens after being prosecuted for impiety.

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a disturbance. Does any man who does not believe in horses believe in horsemen’s activities? Or in flute-playing activities but not in flute- players? No, my good sir, no man could. If you are not willing to answer, I will tell you and these men. Answer the next question, how- ever. Does any man believe in spiritual activities who does not believec in spirits? — No one.

Thank you for answering, if reluctantly, when these gentlemen made you. Now you say that I believe in spiritual things and teach about them, whether new or old, but at any rate spiritual things according to what you say, and to this you have sworn in your deposition. But if I believe in spiritual things I must quite inevitably believe in spirits. Is that not so? It is indeed. I shall assume that you agree, as you do not answer. Do we not believe spirits to be either gods or the children ofd gods? Yes or no? — Of course.

Then since I do believe in spirits, as you admit, if spirits are gods, this is what I mean when I say you speak in riddles and in jest, as you state that I do not believe in gods and then again that I do, since I do believe in spirits. If, on the other hand, the spirits are children of the gods, bastard children of the gods by nymphs or some other mothers, as they are said to be, what man would believe children of the gods to exist, but not gods? That would be just as absurd as to believe the young of horses and asses, namely mules, to exist, but not to believe in thee existence of horses and asses. You must have made this deposition, Meletus, either to test us or because you were at a loss to find any true wrongdoing of which to accuse me. There is no way in which you could persuade anyone of even small intelligence that it is possible for one and the same man to believe in spiritual but not also in divine things, and then again for that same man to believe neither in spirits28 nor in gods nor in heroes.

I do not think, men of Athens, that it requires a prolonged defense to prove that I am not guilty of the charges in Meletus’ deposition, but this is sufficient. On the other hand, you know that what I said earlier is true, that I am very unpopular with many people. This will be my undoing, if I am undone, not Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of many people. This has destroyed many other good men andb will, I think, continue to do so. There is no danger that it will stop at me.

Someone might say: “Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have fol- lowed the kind of occupation that has led to your being now in danger of death?” However, I should be right to reply to him: “You are wrong, sir, if you think that a man who is any good at all should take into account the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his

APOLOGY 33

actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or a bad man.” According to your view, all the heroes who c died at Troy were inferior people, especially the son of Thetis who was so contemptuous of danger compared with disgrace.12 When he was eager to kill Hector, his goddess mother warned him, as I believe, in some such words as these: “My child, if you avenge the death of your comrade, Patroclus, and you kill Hector, you will die yourself, for your death is to follow immediately after Hector’s.” Hearing this, he despised death and danger and was much more afraid to live a coward who did d not avenge his friends. “Let me die at once,” he said, “when once I have given the wrongdoer his deserts, rather than remain here, a laughingstock by the curved ships, a burden upon the earth.” Do you think he gave thought to death and danger?

This is the truth of the matter, men of Athens: wherever a man has taken a position that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his commander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for death or anything else, rather than disgrace. It would have e been a dreadful way to behave, men of Athens, if, at Potidaea, Amphipo- lis, and Delium, I had, at the risk of death, like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me, and then, when the god ordered me, as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself and others, I had abandoned my post for fear of death or anything else. That would have been a 29 dreadful thing, and then I might truly have justly been brought here for not believing that there are gods, disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not. To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And surely it is the most blameworthy b ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have. I do know, however, that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one’s superior, be he god or man. I shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know, whether they may not be good rather than things that c

12. The scene between Thetis and Achilles is from the Iliad xviii.94 ff.

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I know to be bad. Even if you acquitted me now and did not believe Anytus, who said to you that either I should not have been brought here in the first place, or that now I am here, you cannot avoid executing me, for if I should be acquitted, your sons would practice the teachings of Socrates and all be thoroughly corrupted; if you said to me in this regard: “Socrates, we do not believe Anytus now; we acquit you, but only on condition that you spend no more time on this investigation and do not practice philosophy, and if you are caught doing so you will die”; if, as I say, you were to acquit me on those terms, I would say to you: “Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet: ‘Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?’ Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him, and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things. I shall treat in this way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because you are more kindred to me. Be sure that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than my service to the god. For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you: Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively.”13

Now if by saying this I corrupt the young, this advice must be harmful, but if anyone says that I give different advice, he is talking nonsense. On this point I would say to you, men of Athens: “Whether you believe Anytus or not, whether you acquit me or not, do so on the understanding that this is my course of action, even if I am to face

13. Alternatively, this sentence could be translated: “Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence brings about wealth and all other public and private blessings for men.”

d

e

30

b

c

APOLOGY 35

death many times.” Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen, but abide by my request not to cry out at what I say but to listen, for I think it will be to your advantage to listen, and I am about to say other things at which you will perhaps cry out. By no means do this. Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man d be harmed by a worse; certainly he might kill me, or perhaps banish or disfranchise me, which he and maybe others think to be great harm, but I do not think so. I think he is doing himself much greater harm doing what he is doing now, attempting to have a man executed unjustly. Indeed, men of Athens, I am far from making a defense now on my own behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god’s gift to you by condemning me; e for if you kill me you will not easily find another like me. I was attached to this city by the god—though it seems a ridiculous thing to say—as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. It is to fulfill some such function that I believe the god has placed me in the city. I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company. 31

Another such man will not easily come to be among you, gentlemen, and if you believe me you will spare me. You might easily be annoyed with me as people are when they are aroused from a doze, and strike out at me; if convinced by Anytus you could easily kill me, and then you could sleep on for the rest of your days, unless the god, in his care for you, sent you someone else. That I am the kind of person to be a gift of the god to the city you might realize from the fact that it does not seem like human nature for me to have neglected all my own affairs b and to have tolerated this neglect now for so many years while I was always concerned with you, approaching each one of you like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue. Now if I profited from this by charging a fee for my advice, there would be some sense to it, but you can see for yourselves that, for all their shameless accusa- tions, my accusers have not been able in their impudence to bring forward a witness to say that I have ever received a fee or ever asked c for one. I, on the other hand, have a convincing witness that I speak the truth, my poverty.

It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. You have heard me give the reason

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for this in many places. I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletusd has ridiculed in his deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, men of Athens, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, ande benefited neither you nor myself. Do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; no man will survive who genuinely opposes you or any other crowd and prevents the occurrence of many unjust and illegal32 happenings in the city. A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time.

I shall give you great proofs of this, not words but what you esteem, deeds. Listen to what happened to me, that you may know that I will not yield to any man contrary to what is right, for fear of death, even if I should die at once for not yielding. The things I shall tell you are commonplace and smack of the lawcourts, but they are true. I have never held any other office in the city, but I served as a member of theb Council, and our tribe Antiochis was presiding at the time when you wanted to try as a body the ten generals who had failed to pick up the survivors of the naval battle.14 This was illegal, as you all recognized later. I was the only member of the presiding committee to oppose your doing something contrary to the laws, and I voted against it. The orators were ready to prosecute me and take me away, and your shouts were egging them on, but I thought I should run any risk on the side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, whenc you were engaged in an unjust course.

This happened when the city was still a democracy. When the oligarchy was established, the Thirty15 summoned me to the Hall, along

14. This was the battle of Arginusae (south of Lesbos) in 406 B.C., the last Athenian victory of the war. A violent storm prevented the Athenian generals from rescuing their survivors. For this they were tried in Athens and sentenced to death by the assembly. They were tried in a body, and it is this to which Socrates objected in the Council’s presiding committee which prepared the business of the assembly. He obstinately persisted in his opposition, in which he stood alone, and was overruled by the majority. Six generals who were in Athens were executed. 15. This was the harsh oligarchy that was set up after the final defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C. and that ruled Athens for some nine months in 404–3 before the democracy was restored.

APOLOGY 37

with four others, and ordered us to bring Leon from Salamis, that he might be executed. They gave many such orders to many people, in order to implicate as many as possible in their guilt. Then I showed again, not in words but in action, that, if it were not rather vulgar to d say so, death is something I couldn’t care less about, but that my whole concern is not to do anything unjust or impious. That government, powerful as it was, did not frighten me into any wrongdoing. When we left the Hall, the other four went to Salamis and brought in Leon, but I went home. I might have been put to death for this, had not the government fallen shortly afterwards. There are many who will witness e to these events.

Do you think I would have survived all these years if I were engaged in public affairs and, acting as a good man must, came to the help of justice and considered this the most important thing? Far from it, men of Athens, nor would any other man. Throughout my life, in any public 33 activity I may have engaged in, I am the same man as I am in private life. I have never come to an agreement with anyone to act unjustly, neither with anyone else nor with any one of those who they slanderously say are my pupils. I have never been anyone’s teacher. If anyone, young or old, desires to listen to me when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have never begrudged this to anyone, but I do not converse when I receive a fee and not when I do not. I am equally b ready to question the rich and the poor if anyone is willing to answer my questions and listen to what I say. And I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of these people, as I never promised to teach them anything and have not done so. If anyone says that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth.

Why then do some people enjoy spending considerable time in my c company? You have heard why, men of Athens; I have told you the whole truth. They enjoy hearing those being questioned who think they are wise, but are not. And this is not unpleasant. To do this has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever ordered a man to do anything. This is true, gentlemen, and can easily be established.

If I corrupt some young men and have corrupted others, then surely d some of them who have grown older and realized that I gave them bad advice when they were young should now themselves come up here to accuse me and avenge themselves. If they were unwilling to do so themselves, then some of their kindred, their fathers or brothers or

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other relations should recall it now if their family had been harmed by me. I see many of these present here, first Crito, my contemporary and fellow demesman, the father of Critobulus here; next Lysanias ofe Sphettus, the father of Aeschines here; also Antiphon the Cephisian, the father of Epigenes; and others whose brothers spent their time in this way; Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus, and Theodotus has died so he could not influence him; Paralius here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; there is Adeimantus, son of Ariston, brother of Plato here; Aeantodorus, brother of Apollo-34 dorus here.

I could mention many others, some one of whom surely Meletus should have brought in as witness in his own speech. If he forgot to do so, then let him do it now; I will yield time if he has anything of the kind to say. You will find quite the contrary, gentlemen. These men are all ready to come to the help of the corruptor, the man who has harmed their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those whob were corrupted might well have reason to help me, but the uncorrupted, their kindred who are older men, have no reason to help me except the right and proper one, that they know that Meletus is lying and that I am telling the truth.

Very well, gentlemen. This, and maybe other similar things, is what I have to say in my defense. Perhaps one of you might be angry as hec recalls that when he himself stood trial on a less dangerous charge, he begged and implored the jurymen with many tears, that he brought his children and many of his friends and family into court to arouse as much pity as he could, but that I do none of these things, even though I may seem to be running the ultimate risk. Thinking of this,d he might feel resentful towards me and, angry about this, cast his vote in anger. If there is such a one among you—I do not deem there is, but if there is—I think it would be right to say in reply: My good sir, I too have a household and, in Homer’s phrase, I am not born “from oak or rock” but from men, so that I have a family, indeed three sons, men of Athens, of whom one is an adolescent while two are children. Nevertheless, I will not beg you to acquit me by bringing them here. Why do I do none of these things? Not through arrogance, gentlemen,e nor through lack of respect for you. Whether I am brave in the face of death is another matter, but with regard to my reputation and yours and that of the whole city, it does not seem right to me to do these things, especially at my age and with my reputation. For it is generally believed, whether it be true or false, that in certain respects Socrates is35

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superior to the majority of men. Now if those of you who are considered superior, be it in wisdom or courage or whatever other virtue makes them so, are seen behaving like that, it would be a disgrace. Yet I have often seen them do this sort of thing when standing trial, men who are thought to be somebody, doing amazing things as if they thought it a terrible thing to die, and as if they were to be immortal if you did not execute them. I think these men bring shame upon the city so that a b stranger, too, would assume that those who are outstanding in virtue among the Athenians, whom they themselves select from themselves to fill offices of state and receive other honors, are in no way better than women. You should not act like that, men of Athens, those of you who have any reputation at all, and if we do, you should not allow it. You should make it very clear that you will more readily convict a man who performs these pitiful dramatics in court and so makes the city a laughingstock, than a man who keeps quiet.

Quite apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I do not think it right to supplicate the jury and to be acquitted because of this, c but to teach and persuade them. It is not the purpose of a juryman’s office to give justice as a favor to whoever seems good to him, but to judge according to law, and this he has sworn to do. We should not accustom you to perjure yourselves, nor should you make a habit of it. This is irreverent conduct for either of us.

Do not deem it right for me, men of Athens, that I should act towards d you in a way that I do not consider to be good or just or pious, especially, by Zeus, as I am being prosecuted by Meletus here for impiety; clearly, if I convinced you by my supplication to do violence to your oath of office, I would be teaching you not to believe that there are gods, and my defense would convict me of not believing in them. This is far from being the case, gentlemen, for I do believe in them as none of my accusers do. I leave it to you and the god to judge me in the way that will be best for me and for you.

[The jury now gives its verdict of guilty, and Meletus asks for the penalty of death.]

There are many other reasons for my not being angry with you for e 36convicting me, men of Athens, and what happened was not unexpected.

I am much more surprised at the number of votes cast on each side, for I did not think the decision would be by so few votes but by a great many. As it is, a switch of only thirty votes would have acquitted me. I think myself that I have been cleared of Meletus’ charges, and not b

40 PLATO

only this, but it is clear to all that, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him in accusing me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes.

He assesses the penalty at death. So be it. What counter-assessment should I propose to you, men of Athens? Clearly it should be a penalty I deserve, and what do I deserve to suffer or to pay because I have deliberately not led a quiet life but have neglected what occupies most people: wealth, household affairs, the position of general or public orator or the other offices, the political clubs and factions that exist in the city? I thought myself too honest to survive if I occupied myself with those things. I did not follow that path that would have made mec of no use either to you or to myself, but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the city’s possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way. What do I deserve for being such a man? Somed good, men of Athens, if I must truly make an assessment according to my deserts, and something suitable. What is suitable for a poor benefac- tor who needs leisure to exhort you? Nothing is more suitable, gentle- men, than for such a man to be fed in the Prytaneum16—much more suitable for him than for any one of you who has won a victory at Olympia with a pair or a team of horses. The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy. Besides, he does note need food, but I do. So if I must make a just assessment of what I deserve, I assess it as this: free meals in the Prytaneum.37

When I say this you may think, as when I spoke of appeals to pity and entreaties, that I speak arrogantly, but that is not the case, men of Athens; rather it is like this: I am convinced that I never willingly wrong anyone, but I am not convincing you of this, for we have talked together but a short time. If it were the law with us, as it is elsewhere, that ab trial for life should not last one but many days, you would be convinced, but now it is not easy to dispel great slanders in a short time. Since I am convinced that I wrong no one, I am not likely to wrong myself, to say that I deserve some evil and to make some such assessment against myself. What should I fear? That I should suffer the penalty

16. The Prytaneum was the magistrates’ hall or town hall of Athens in which public entertainments were given, particularly to Olympian victors on their return home.

APOLOGY 41

Meletus has assessed against me, of which I say I do not know whether it is good or bad? Am I then to choose in preference to this something that I know very well to be an evil and assess the penalty at that? c Imprisonment? Why should I live in prison, always subjected to the ruling magistrates, the Eleven? A fine, and imprisonment until I pay it? That would be the same thing for me, as I have no money. Exile? For perhaps you might accept that assessment.

I should have to be inordinately fond of life, men of Athens, to be so unreasonable as to suppose that other men will easily tolerate my company and conversation when you, my fellow citizens, have been d unable to endure them, but found them a burden and resented them so that you are now seeking to get rid of them. Far from it, gentlemen. It would be a fine life at my age to be driven out of one city after another, for I know very well that wherever I go the young men will listen to my talk as they do here. If I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out; if I do not drive them away, their e fathers and relations will drive me out on their behalf.

Perhaps someone might say: But Socrates, if you leave us will you not be able to live quietly, without talking? Now this is the most difficult point on which to convince some of you. If I say that it is impossible 38 for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god, you will not believe me and will think I am being ironical. On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less.

What I say is true, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. At the same time, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve any penalty. If I had money, I would assess the penalty at the amount I could pay, b for that would not hurt me, but I have none, unless you are willing to set the penalty at the amount I can pay, and perhaps I could pay you one mina of silver. So that is my assessment.

Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus bid me put the penalty at thirty minas, and they will stand surety for the money. Well then, that is my assessment, and they will be sufficient guarantee of payment.

[The jury now votes again and sentences Socrates to death.]

It is for the sake of a short time, men of Athens, that you will acquire c the reputation and the guilt, in the eyes of those who want to denigrate

42 PLATO

the city, of having killed Socrates, a wise man, for they who want to revile you will say that I am wise even if I am not. If you had waited but a little while, this would have happened of its own accord. You see my age, that I am already advanced in years and close to death. I amd saying this not to all of you but to those who condemned me to death, and to these same ones I say: Perhaps you think that I was convicted for lack of such words as might have convinced you, if I thought I should say or do all I could to avoid my sentence. Far from it. I was convicted because I lacked not words but boldness and shamelessness and the willingness to say to you what you would most gladly have heard from me, lamentations and tears and my saying and doing manye things that I say are unworthy of me but that you are accustomed to hear from others. I did not think then that the danger I ran should make me do anything mean, nor do I now regret the nature of my defense. I would much rather die after this kind of defense than live after making the other kind. Neither I nor any other man should, on trial or in war, contrive to avoid death at any cost. Indeed it is often39 obvious in battle that one could escape death by throwing away one’s weapons and by turning to supplicate one’s pursuers, and there are many ways to avoid death in every kind of danger if one will venture to do or say anything to avoid it. It is not difficult to avoid death, gentlemen; it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runsb faster than death. Slow and elderly as I am, I have been caught by the slower pursuer, whereas my accusers, being clever and sharp, have been caught by the quicker, wickedness. I leave you now, condemned to death by you, but they are condemned by truth to wickedness and injustice. So I maintain my assessment, and they maintain theirs. This perhaps had to happen, and I think it is as it should be.

Now I want to prophesy to those who convicted me, for I am at thec point when men prophesy most, when they are about to die. I say, gentlemen, to those who voted to kill me, that vengeance will come upon you immediately after my death, a vengeance much harder to bear than that which you took in killing me. You did this in the belief that you would avoid giving an account of your life, but I maintain that quite the opposite will happen to you. There will be more people to test you, whom I now held back, but you did not notice it. Theyd will be more difficult to deal with as they will be younger and you will resent them more. You are wrong if you believe that by killing people you will prevent anyone from reproaching you for not living in the right way. To escape such tests is neither possible nor good, but it is

APOLOGY 43

best and easiest not to discredit others but to prepare oneself to be as good as possible. With this prophecy to you who convicted me, I part from you.

I should be glad to discuss what has happened with those who voted e for my acquittal during the time that the officers of the court are busy and I do not yet have to depart to my death. So, gentlemen, stay with me awhile, for nothing prevents us from talking to each other while it is allowed. To you, as being my friends, I want to show the meaning 40 of what has occurred. A surprising thing has happened to me, jurymen— you I would rightly call jurymen. At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation, frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do something wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, my divine sign has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn, or b when I came into court, or at any time that I was about to say something during my speech. Yet in other talks it often held me back in the middle of my speaking, but now it has opposed no word or deed of mine. What do I think is the reason for this? I will tell you. What has happened to me may well be a good thing, and those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this, for it is c impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right.

Let us reflect in this way, too, that there is good hope that death is a blessing, for it is one of two things: either the dead are nothing and have no perception of anything, or it is, as we are told, a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another place. If it is complete d lack of perception, like a dreamless sleep, then death would be a great advantage. For I think that if one had to pick out that night during which a man slept soundly and did not dream, put beside it the other nights and days of his life, and then see how many days and nights had been better and more pleasant than that night, not only a private person but the great king would find them easy to count compared with the e other days and nights. If death is like this I say it is an advantage, for all eternity would then seem to be no more than a single night. If, on the other hand, death is a change from here to another place, and what we are told is true and all who have died are there, what greater blessing could there be, gentlemen of the jury? If anyone arriving in Hades will 41 have escaped from those who call themselves jurymen here, and will find those true jurymen who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos

44 PLATO

and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and the other demi- gods who have been upright in their own life, would that be a poor kind of change? Again, what would one of you give to keep company with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times if that is true. It would be a wonderful way for me to spend my time whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon,b and any other of the men of old who died through an unjust conviction, to compare my experience with theirs. I think it would be pleasant. Most important, I could spend my time testing and examining people there, as I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not.

What would one not give, gentlemen of the jury, for the opportunity to examine the man who led the great expedition against Troy, orc Odysseus, or Sisyphus, and innumerable other men and women one could mention? It would be an extraordinary happiness to talk with them, to keep company with them and examine them. In any case, they would certainly not put one to death for doing so. They are happier there than we are here in other respects, and for the rest of time they are deathless, if indeed what we are told is true.

You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglectedd by the gods. What has happened to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and to escape from trouble. That is why my divine sign did not oppose me at any point. So I am certainly not angry with those who convicted me, or with my accusers. Of course that was not their purpose when they accused and convicted me, but they thought they were hurting me, and for this they deserve blame. This much I ask from them: Whene my sons grow up, avenge yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you, if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are nobody. Reproach them as I reproach you, that they do not care for the right things and think they are worthy when they are not worthy of anything. If you do this, I shall have been justly treated42 by you, and my sons also.

Now the hour to part has come. I go to die, you go to live. Which of us goes to the better lot is known to no one, except the god.

CRITO

About the time of Socrates’ trial, a state galley had set out on an annual religious mission to the small Aegean island of Delos, sacred to Apollo, and while it was away, no execution was allowed to take place. So it was that Socrates was kept in prison for a month after the trial. The ship has now arrived at Cape Sunium in Attica and is thus expected at the Piraeus, Athens’ port, momentarily. So Socrates’ old and faithful friend, Crito, makes one last effort to persuade him to escape into exile, and all arrangements for this plan have been made. It is this conversation between the two old friends that Plato professes to report in this dialogue. It is, as Crito plainly tells him, his last chance, but Socrates will not take it, and he gives his reasons for his refusal. Whether this conversation took place at this particular time is not important, for there is every reason to believe that Socrates’ friends tried to plan his escape and that he refused. Plato more than hints that the authorities would not have minded much, as long as he left the country.

G.M.A.G.

Socrates: Why have you come so early, Crito? Or is it not still early? 43 Crito: It certainly is. Socrates: How early? Crito: Early dawn. Socrates: I am surprised that the warder was willing to listen to you. Crito: He is quite friendly to me by now, Socrates. I have been

here often and I have given him something. Socrates: Have you just come, or have you been here for some time? Crito: A fair time. Socrates: Then why did you not wake me right away but sit there b

in silence? Crito: By Zeus no, Socrates. I would not myself want to be in

distress and awake so long. I have been surprised to see you so peacefully asleep. It was on purpose that I did not wake you, so that you should

45

46 PLATO

spend your time most agreeably. Often in the past throughout my life, I have considered the way you live happy, and especially so now that you bear your present misfortune so easily and lightly.

Socrates: It would not be fitting at my age to resent the fact that I must die now.

Crito: Other men of your age are caught in such misfortunes, butc their age does not prevent them resenting their fate.

Socrates: That is so. Why have you come so early? Crito: I bring bad news, Socrates, not for you, apparently, but for

me and all your friends the news is bad and hard to bear. Indeed, I would count it among the hardest.

Socrates: What is it? Or has the ship arrived from Delos, at the arrival of which I must die?d

Crito: It has not arrived yet, but it will, I believe, arrive today, according to a message some men brought from Sunium, where they left it. This makes it obvious that it will come today, and that your life must end tomorrow.

Socrates: May it be for the best. If it so please the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will arrive today.

Crito: What indication have you of this?44 Socrates: I will tell you. I must die the day after the ship arrives. Crito: That is what those in authority say. Socrates: Then I do not think it will arrive on this coming day,

but on the next. I take to witness of this a dream I had a little earlier during this night. It looks as if it was the right time for you not to wake me.

Crito: What was your dream? Socrates: I thought that a beautiful and comely woman dressed in

white approached me. She called me and said: “Socrates, may you arrive at fertile Phthia1 on the third day.”b

Crito: A strange dream, Socrates.

1. A quotation from the ninth book of the Iliad (363). Achilles has rejected all the presents of Agamemnon for him to return to the battle and threatens to go home. He says his ships will sail in the morning, and with good weather he might arrive on the third day “in fertile Phthia” (which is his home). Socrates takes the dream to mean that he will die, and his soul will find its home, on the third day. As always, counting the first member of a series, the third day is the day after tomorrow.

CRITO 47

Socrates: But it seems clear enough to me, Crito. Crito: Too clear it seems, my dear Socrates, but listen to me even

now and be saved. If you die, it will not be a single misfortune for me. Not only will I be deprived of a friend, the like of whom I shall never find again, but many people who do not know you or me very well will think that I could have saved you if I were willing to spend money, c but that I did not care to do so. Surely there can be no worse reputation than to be thought to value money more highly than one’s friends, for the majority will not believe that you yourself were not willing to leave prison while we were eager for you to do so.

Socrates: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think? The most reasonable people, to whom one should pay more attention, will believe that things were done as they were done.

Crito: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the d opinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clear that the majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils if one is slandered among them.

Socrates: Would that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would be fine, but now they cannot do either. They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly.

Crito: That may be so. But tell me this, Socrates, are you anticipating e that I and your other friends would have trouble with the informers if you escape from here, as having stolen you away, and that we should be compelled to lose all our property or pay heavy fines and suffer other punishment besides? If you have any such fear, forget it. We would be 45 justified in running this risk to save you, and worse, if necessary. Do follow my advice, and do not act differently.

Socrates: I do have these things in mind, Crito, and also many others.

Crito: Have no such fear. It is not much money that some people require to save you and get you out of here. Further, do you not see that those informers are cheap, and that not much money would be needed to deal with them? My money is available and is, I think, b sufficient. If, because of your affection for me, you feel you should not spend any of mine, there are those strangers here ready to spend money. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought enough for this very purpose. Cebes, too, and a good many others. So, as I say, do not let this fear make you hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in

48 PLATO

court trouble you, that you would not know what to do with yourself if you left Athens, for you would be welcomed in many places to whichc you might go. If you want to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will greatly appreciate you and keep you safe, so that no one in Thessaly will harm you.

Besides, Socrates, I do not think that what you are doing is just, to give up your life when you can save it, and to hasten your fate as your enemies would hasten it, and indeed have hastened it in their wish to destroy you. Moreover, I think you are betraying your sons by going away and leaving them, when you could bring them up and educated them. You thus show no concern for what their fate may be. They will probably have the usual fate of orphans. Either one should not have children, or one should share with them to the end the toil of upbringing and education. You seem to me to choose the easiest path, whereas one should choose the path a good and courageous man would choose, particularly when one claims throughout one’s life to care for virtue.

I feel ashamed on your behalf and on behalf of us, your friends, leste all that has happened to you be thought due to cowardice on our part: the fact that your trial came to court when it need not have done so, the handling of the trial itself, and now this absurd ending which will be thought to have got beyond our control through some cowardice and unmanliness on our part, since we did not save you, or you save46 yourself, when it was possible and could be done if we had been of the slightest use. Consider, Socrates, whether this is not only evil, but shameful, both for you and for us. Take counsel with yourself, or rather the time for counsel is past and the decision should have been taken, and there is no further opportunity, for this whole business must be ended tonight. If we delay now, then it will no longer be possible; it will be too late. Let me persuade you on every count, Socrates, and do not act otherwise.

Socrates: My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth much if it shouldb have some right aim; if not, then the greater your keenness the more difficult it is to deal with. We must therefore examine whether we should act in this way or not, as not only now but at all times I am the kind of man who listens to nothing within me but the argument that on reflection seems best to me. I cannot, now that this fate has come upon me, discard the arguments I used; they seem to me much thec same. I value and respect the same principles as before, and if we have no better arguments to bring up at this moment, be sure that I shall not agree with you, not even if the power of the majority were to

CRITO 49

frighten us with more bogeys, as if we were children, with threats of incarcerations and executions and confiscation of property. How should we examine this matter most reasonably? Would it be by taking up first your argument about the opinions of men, whether it is sound in every d case that one should pay attention to some opinions, but not to others? Or was that well-spoken before the necessity to die came upon me, but now it is clear that this was said in vain for the sake of argument, that it was in truth play and nonsense? I am eager to examine together with you, Crito, whether this argument will appear in any way different to me in my present circumstances, or whether it remains the same, whether we are to abandon it or believe it. It was said on every occasion by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, as I have just now e been speaking, that one should greatly value some people’s opinions, but not others. Does that seem to you a sound statement?

You, as far as a human being can tell, are exempt from the likelihood of dying tomorrow, so the present misfortune is not likely to lead you 47 astray. Consider then, do you not think it a sound statement that one must not value all the opinions of men, but some and not others, nor the opinions of all men, but those of some and not of others? What do you say? Is this not well said?

Crito: It is. Socrates: One should value the good opinions, and not the bad

ones? Crito: Yes. Socrates: The good opinions are those of wise men, the bad ones

those of foolish men? Crito: Of course. Socrates: Come then, what of statements such as this: Should a

man professionally engaged in physical training pay attention to the b praise and blame and opinion of any man, or to those of one man only, namely a doctor or trainer?

Crito: To those of one only. Socrates: He should therefore fear the blame and welcome the

praise of that one man, and not those of the many? Crito: Obviously. Socrates: He must then act and exercise, eat and drink in the way

the one, the trainer and the one who knows, thinks right, not all the others?

50 PLATO

Crito: That is so. Socrates: Very well. And if he disobeys the one, disregards hisc

opinion and his praises while valuing those of the many who have no knowledge, will he not suffer harm?

Crito: Of course. Socrates: What is that harm, where does it tend, and what part of

the man who disobeys does it affect? Crito: Obviously the harm is to his body, which it ruins. Socrates: Well said. So with other matters, not to enumerate them

all, and certainly with actions just and unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating, should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is oned who has knowledge of these things and before whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others? If we do not follow his directions, we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions. Or is there nothing in this?

Crito: I think there certainly is, Socrates. Socrates: Come now, if we ruin that which is improved by health

and corrupted by disease by not following the opinions of those who know, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is thee body, is it not?

Crito: Yes. Socrates: And is life worth living with a body that is corrupted and

in bad condition? Crito: In no way. Socrates: And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted

that unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to the body?48

Crito: Not at all. Socrates: It is more valuable? Crito: Much more. Socrates: We should not then think so much of what the majority

will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself. So that, in the first place, you were wrong to believe that we should care for the opinion of the

CRITO 51

many about what is just, beautiful, good, and their opposites. “But,” someone might say, “the many are able to put us to death.”

Crito: That too is obvious, Socrates, and someone might well say so. b

Socrates: And, my admirable friend, that argument that we have gone through remains, I think, as before. Examine the following state- ment in turn as to whether it stays the same or not, that the most important thing is not life, but the good life.

Crito: It stays the same.

Socrates: And that the good life, the beautiful life, and the just life are the same; does that still hold, or not?

Crito: It does hold.

Socrates: As we have agreed so far, we must examine next whether it is just for me to try to get out of here when the Athenians have not acquitted me. If it is seen to be just, we will try to do so; if it is not, c we will abandon the idea. As for those questions you raise about money, reputation, the upbringing of children, Crito, those considerations in truth belong to those people who easily put men to death and would bring them to life again if they could, without thinking; I mean the majority of men. For us, however, since our argument leads to this, the only valid consideration, as we were saying just now, is whether we should be acting rightly in giving money and gratitude to those who d will lead me out of here, and ourselves helping with the escape, or whether in truth we shall do wrong in doing all this. If it appears that we shall be acting unjustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we stay here and keep quiet, or suffer in another way, rather than do wrong.

Crito: I think you put that beautifully, Socrates, but see what we should do.

Socrates: Let us examine the question together, my dear friend, e and if you can make any objection while I am speaking, make it and I will listen to you, but if you have no objection to make, my dear Crito, then stop now from saying the same thing so often, that I must leave here against the will of the Athenians. I think it important to persuade you before I act, and not to act against your wishes. See whether the start of our inquiry is adequately stated, and try to answer 49 what I ask you in the way you think best.

Crito: I shall try.

52 PLATO

Socrates: Do we say that one must never in any way do wrong willingly, or must one do wrong in one way and not in another? Is to do wrong never good or admirable, as we have agreed in the past, or have all these former agreements been washed out during the last few days? Have we at our age failed to notice for some time that in ourb serious discussions we were no different from children? Above all, is the truth such as we used to say it was, whether the majority agree or not, and whether we must still suffer worse things than we do now, or will be treated more gently, that, nonetheless, wrongdoing or injustice is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer? Do we say so or not?

Crito: We do. Socrates: So one must never do wrong. Crito: Certainly not. Socrates: Nor must one, when wronged, inflict wrong in return,

as the majority believe, since one must never do wrong. Crito: That seems to be the case.c Socrates: Come now, should one do harm to anyone or not, Crito? Crito: One must never do so. Socrates: Well then, if one is oneself done harm, is it right, as the

majority say, to do harm in return, or is it not? Crito: It is never right. Socrates: Doing people harm is no different from wrongdoing. Crito: That is true. Socrates: One should never do wrong in return, nor do any man

harm, no matter what he may have done to you. And Crito, see that you do not agree to this, contrary to your belief. For I know that onlyd a few people hold this view or will hold it, and there is no common ground between those who hold this view and those who do not, but they inevitably despise each other’s views. So then consider very care- fully whether we have this view in common, and whether you agree, and let this be the basis of our deliberation, that neither to do wrong nor to return a wrong is ever correct, nor is doing harm in return for harm done. Or do you disagree and do not share this view as a basis for discussion? I have held it for a long time and still hold it now, bute if you think otherwise, tell me now. If, however, you stick to our former opinion, then listen to the next point.

CRITO 53

Crito: I stick to it and agree with you. So say on. Socrates: Then I state the next point, or rather I ask you: when

one has come to an agreement that is just with someone, should one fulfill it or cheat on it?

Crito: One should fulfill it. Socrates: See what follows from this: if we leave here without the

city’s permission, are we harming people whom we should least do 50 harm to? And are we sticking to a just agreement, or not?

Crito: I cannot answer your question, Socrates. I do not know. Socrates: Look at it this way. If, as we were planning to run away

from here, or whatever one should call it, the laws and the state came and confronted us and asked: “Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned? b Or do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no force but are nullified and set at naught by private individuals?” What shall we answer to this and other such arguments? For many things could be said, especially by an orator on behalf of this law we are destroying, which orders that the judgments of the courts shall be carried out. Shall we say in answer, “The city wronged me, c and its decision was not right.” Shall we say that, or what?

Crito: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is our answer. Socrates: Then what if the laws said: “Was that the agreement

between us, Socrates, or was it to respect the judgments that the city came to?” And if we wondered at their words, they would perhaps add: “Socrates, do not wonder at what we say but answer, since you are accustomed to proceed by question and answer. Come now, what accusation do you bring against us and the city, that you should try to d destroy us? Did we not, first, bring you to birth, and was it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Tell us, do you find anything to criticize in those of us who are concerned with marriage?” And I would say that I do not criticize them. “Or in those of us concerned with the nurture of babies and the education that you too received? Were those assigned to that subject not right to instruct your father to educate you in the arts and in physical culture?” And I e would say that they were right. “Very well,” they would continue, “and after you were born and nurtured and educated, could you, in the first place, deny that you are our offspring and servant, both you and your forefathers? If that is so, do you think that we are on an equal footing

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as regards the right, and that whatever we do to you it is right for you to do to us? You were not on an equal footing with your father as regards the right, nor with your master if you had one, so as to retaliate for anything they did to you, to revile them if they reviled you, to beat51 them if they beat you, and so with many other things. Do you think you have this right to retaliation against your country and its laws? That if we undertake to destroy you and think it right to do so, you can undertake to destroy us, as far as you can, in return? And will you say that you are right to do so, you who truly care for virtue? Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored more than your mother, your father, and all your ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more among the godsb and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it, and placate its anger more than your father’s? You must either persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey. To do so is right, and one must not give way or retreat or leave one’s post, but both in war and in courts and everywhere else, one must obey the commands of one’s city and country, or persuadec it as to the nature of justice. It is impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father; it is much more so to use it against your country.” What shall we say in reply, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

Crito: I think they do. Socrates: “Reflect now, Socrates,” the laws might say, “that if what

we say is true, you are not treating us rightly by planning to do what you are planning. We have given you birth, nurtured you, educated you; we have given you and all other citizens a share of all the goodd things we could. Even so, by giving every Athenian the opportunity, once arrived at voting age and having observed the affairs of the city and us the laws, we proclaim that if we do not please him, he can take his possessions and go wherever he pleases. Not one of our laws raises any obstacle or forbids him, if he is not satisfied with us or the city, if one of you wants to go and live in a colony or wants to go anywhere else, and keep his property. We say, however, that whoever of youe remains, when he sees how we conduct our trials and manage the city in other ways, has in fact come to an agreement with us to obey our instructions. We say that the one who disobeys does wrong in three ways, first because in us he disobeys his parents, also those who brought him up, and because, in spite of his agreement, he neither obeys us

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nor, if we do something wrong, does he try to persuade us to do better. Yet we only propose things, we do not issue savage commands to do 52 whatever we order; we give two alternatives, either to persuade us or to do what we say. He does neither. We do say that you too, Socrates, are open to those charges if you do what you have in mind; you would be among, not the least, but the most guilty of the Athenians.” And if I should say “Why so?” they might well be right to upbraid me and say that I am among the Athenians who most definitely came to that agreement with them. They might well say: “Socrates, we have convinc- b ing proofs that we and the city were congenial to you. You would not have dwelt here most consistently of all the Athenians if the city had not been exceedingly pleasing to you. You have never left the city, even to see a festival, nor for any other reason except military service; you have never gone to stay in any other city, as people do; you have had no desire to know another city or other laws; we and our city satisfied you. c

“So decisively did you choose us and agree to be a citizen under us. Also, you have had children in this city, thus showing that it was congenial to you. Then at your trial you could have assessed your penalty at exile if you wished, and you are now attempting to do against the city’s wishes what you could then have done with her consent. Then you prided yourself that you did not resent death, but you chose, as you said, death in preference to exile. Now, however, those words do not make you ashamed, and you pay no heed to us, the laws, as you plan to destroy us, and you act like the meanest type of slave by d trying to run away, contrary to your commitments and your agreement to live as a citizen under us. First then, answer us on this very point, whether we speak the truth when we say that you agreed, not only in words but by your deeds, to live in accordance with us.” What are we to say to that, Crito? Must we not agree?

Crito: We must, Socrates. Socrates: “Surely,” they might say, “you are breaking the commit-

ments and agreements that you made with us without compulsion or e deceit, and under no pressure of time for deliberation. You have had seventy years during which you could have gone away if you did not like us, and if you thought our agreements unjust. You did not choose to go to Sparta or to Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor to any other city, Greek or foreign. You have been away 53 from Athens less than the lame or the blind or other handicapped people. It is clear that the city has been outstandingly more congenial to you than to other Athenians, and so have we, the laws, for what city

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can please without laws? Will you then not now stick to our agreements? You will, Socrates, if we can persuade you, and not make yourself a laughingstock by leaving the city.

“For consider what good you will do yourself or your friends by breaking our agreements and committing such a wrong. It is pretty obvious that your friends will themselves be in danger of exile, disfran- chisement, and loss of property. As for yourself, if you go to one of theb nearby cities—Thebes or Megara, both are well governed—you will arrive as an enemy to their government; all who care for their city will look on you with suspicion, as a destroyer of the laws. You will also strengthen the conviction of the jury that they passed the right sentence on you, for anyone who destroys the laws could easily be thought toc corrupt the young and the ignorant. Or will you avoid cities that are well governed and men who are civilized? If you do this, will your life be worth living? Will you have social intercourse with them and not be ashamed to talk to them? And what will you say? The same as you did here, that virtue and justice are man’s most precious possession, along with lawful behavior and the laws? Do you not think that Socratesd would appear to be an unseemly kind of person? One must think so. Or will you leave those places and go to Crito’s friends in Thessaly? There you will find the greatest license and disorder, and they may enjoy hearing from you how absurdly you escaped from prison in some disguise, in a leather jerkin or some other things in which escapees wrap themselves, thus altering your appearance. Will there be no one to say that you, likely to live but a short time more, were so greedy for life that you transgressed the most important laws? Possibly, Socrates,e if you do not annoy anyone, but if you do, many disgraceful things will be said about you.

“You will spend your time ingratiating yourself with all men, and be at their beck and call. What will you do in Thessaly but feast, as if you had gone to a banquet in Thessaly? As for those conversations of yours about justice and the rest of virtue, where will they be? You say you want54 to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them. How so? Will you bring them up and educate them by taking them to Thessaly and making strangers of them, that they may enjoy that too? Or not so, but they will be better brought up and educated here, while you are alive, though absent? Yes, your friends will look after them. Will they look after them if you go and live in Thessaly, but not if you go away to the underworld? If those who profess themselves your friends are any good at all, one must assume that they will.b

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“Be persuaded by us who have brought you up, Socrates. Do not value either your children or your life or anything else more than goodness, in order that when you arrive in Hades you may have all this as your defense before the rulers there. If you do this deed, you will not think it better or more just or more pious here, nor will any one of your friends, nor will it be better for you when you arrive yonder. As it is, you depart, if you depart, after being wronged not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you depart after shamefully returning wrong c for wrong and mistreatment for mistreatment, after breaking your agree- ments and commitments with us, after mistreating those you should mistreat least—yourself, your friends, your country, and us—we shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and our brothers, the laws of the underworld, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you tried to destroy us as far as you could. Do not let Crito persuade you, rather than us, to do what he says.” d

Crito, my dear friend, be assured that these are the words I seem to hear, as the Corybants seem to hear the music of their flutes, and the echo of these words resounds in me, and makes it impossible for me to hear anything else. As far as my present beliefs go, if you speak in opposition to them, you will speak in vain. However, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

Crito: I have nothing to say, Socrates. Socrates: Let it be then, Crito, and let us act in this way, since e

this is the way the god is leading us.

MENO

Meno’s is one of the leading aristocratic families of Thessaly—whose capital was Larissa—traditionally friendly to Athens and Athenian interests. Here he is a young man, about to embark on an unscrupulous military and political career, leading to an early death at the hands of the Persian king. To his aristocratic “virtue” (Plato’s ancient readers would know what that ultimately came to) he adds an admiration for ideas on the subject he has learned from the rhetorician Gorgias (about whom we learn more in the dialogue named after him). What brings Meno to Athens we are not told. His family’s local sponsor is the democratic politician Anytus, one of Socrates’ accusers at his trial, and apparently Anytus is Meno’s host. The dialogue begins abruptly, without stage-setting preliminaries of the sort we find in the “Socratic” dialogues, and with no context of any kind being provided for the conversation. Meno wants to know Socrates’ position on the then much-debated question whether virtue can be taught, or whether it comes rather by practice, or else is acquired by one’s birth and nature, or in some other way. Socrates and Meno pursue that question, and the preliminary one of what virtue indeed is, straight through to the inconclusive conclusion characteristic of “Socratic” dialogues. (Anytus joins the conversation briefly. He bristles when, to support his doubts that virtue can be taught, Socrates points to the failure of famous Athenian leaders to pass their own virtue on to their sons, and he issues a veiled threat of the likely consequences to Socrates of such “slanderous” attacks.)

The dialogue is best remembered, however, for the interlude in which Socrates questions Meno’s slave about a problem in geometry— how to find a square double in area to any given square. Having determined that Meno does not know what virtue is, and recognizing that he himself does not know either, Socrates has proposed to Meno that they inquire into this together. Meno protests that that is impossible, challenging Socrates with the “paradox” that one logically cannot inquire productively into what one does not already know—nor of course into what one already does! Guided by Socrates’ questions, the slave (who has never studied geometry before) comes to see for himself, to recognize, what the right answer to the geometrical problem

58

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must be. Socrates argues that this confirms something he has heard from certain wise priests and priestesses—that the soul is immortal and that at our birth we already possess all theoretical knowledge (he includes here not just mathematical theory but moral knowledge as well). Prodded by Socrates’ questions, the slave was “recollecting” this prior knowledge, not drawing new conclusions from data being presented to him for the first time. So in moral inquiry, as well, there is hope that, if we question ourselves rightly, “recollection” can progressively improve our understanding of moral truth and eventually lead us to full knowledge of it.

The examination of the slave assuages Meno’s doubt about the possibility of such inquiry. He and Socrates proceed to inquire together what virtue is—but now they follow a new method of “hypothesis” introduced by Socrates again by analogy with procedures in geometry. Socrates no longer asks Meno for his views and criticizes those. Among other “hypotheses” that he now works with, he advances and argues for a hypothesis of his own, that virtue is knowledge (in which case it must be teachable). But he also considers weaknesses in his own argument, leading to the alternative possible hypothesis, that virtue is god-granted right opinion (and so, not teachable). In the second half of the dialogue we thus see a new Socrates, with new methods of argument and inquiry, not envisioned in such “Socratic” dialogues as Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides. Meno points forward to Phaedo, where the thesis that theoretical knowledge comes by recollection is discussed again, with a clear reference back to Meno, but now expanded by the addition of Platonic Forms as objects of recollection and knowledge.

J.M.C.

Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not 70 teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?

Socrates: Before now, Meno, Thessalians had a high reputation among the Greeks and were admired for their horsemanship and their wealth, but now, it seems to me, they are also admired for their wisdom, b not least the fellow citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa. The responsibility for this reputation of yours lies with Gorgias, for when he came to your city he found that the leading Aleuadae, your lover

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Aristippus among them, loved him for his wisdom, and so did the other leading Thessalians. In particular, he accustomed you to give a bold and grand answer to any question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do. Indeed, he himself was ready to answer any Greek whoc wished to question him, and every question was answered. But here in Athens, my dear Meno, the opposite is the case, as if there were a dearth of wisdom, and wisdom seems to have departed hence to go to you. If then you want to ask one of us that sort of question, everyone71 will laugh and say: “Good stranger, you must think me happy indeed if you think I know whether virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is.”

I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens in this matter, andb I blame myself for my complete ignorance about virtue. If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it possesses? Or do you think that someone who does not know at all who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or well-born, or the opposite of these? Do you think that is possible?

Meno: I do not; but, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? Are we to report this to the folk back home about you?c

Socrates: Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have never yet met anyone else who did know.

Meno: How so? Did you not meet Gorgias when he was here? Socrates: I did. Meno: Did you then not think that he knew? Socrates: I do not altogether remember, Meno, so that I cannot

tell you now what I thought then. Perhaps he does know; you know what he used to say, so you remind me of what he said. You tell med yourself, if you are willing, for surely you share his views. — I do.

Socrates: Let us leave Gorgias out of it, since he is not here. But Meno, by the gods, what do you yourself say that virtue is? Speak and do not begrudge us, so that I may have spoken a most unfortunate untruth when I said that I had never met anyone who knew, if you and Gorgias are shown to know.

Meno: It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, if you want thee virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if

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you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free man or a slave. And there are very many other virtues, so 72 that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us—and, Socrates, the same is true for wickedness.

Socrates: I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, I have found you to have a whole swarm of them. But, Meno, to follow up the image of swarms, if I were asking you what is b the nature of bees, and you said that they are many and of all kinds, what would you answer if I asked you: “Do you mean that they are many and varied and different from one another insofar as they are bees? Or are they no different in that regard, but in some other respect, in their beauty, for example, or their size or in some other such way?” Tell me, what would you answer if thus questioned?

Meno: I would say that they do not differ from one another in being bees.

Socrates: If I went on to say: “Tell me, what is this very thing, Meno, in which they are all the same and do not differ from one c another?” Would you be able to tell me?

Meno: I would. Socrates: The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even if they

are many and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is. Or do you not understand what I mean? d

Meno: I think I understand, but I certainly do not grasp the meaning of the question as fully as I want to.

Socrates: I am asking whether you think it is only in the case of virtue that there is one for man, another for woman, and so on, or is the same true in the case of health and size and strength? Do you think that there is one health for man and another for woman? Or, if it is health, does it have the same form everywhere, whether in man or in e anything else whatever?

Meno: The health of a man seems to me the same as that of a woman. Socrates: And so with size and strength? If a woman is strong, that

strength will be the same and have the same form, for by “the same”

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I mean that strength is no different as far as being strength, whether in a man or a woman. Or do you think there is a difference?

Meno: I do not think so. Socrates: And will there be any difference in the case of virtue, as

far as being virtue is concerned, whether it be in a child or an old man,73 in a woman or in a man?

Meno: I think, Socrates, that somehow this is no longer like those other cases.

Socrates: How so? Did you not say that the virtue of a man consists of managing the city well, and that of a woman of managing the household? — I did.

Socrates: Is it possible to manage a city well, or a household, or anything else, while not managing it moderately and justly? — Certainly not.

Socrates: Then if they manage justly and moderately, they mustb do so with justice and moderation? — Necessarily.

Socrates: So both the man and the woman, if they are to be good, need the same things, justice and moderation. — So it seems.

Socrates: What about a child and an old man? Can they possibly be good if they are intemperate and unjust? — Certainly not.

Socrates: But if they are moderate and just? — Yes. Socrates: So all human beings are good in the same way, for theyc

become good by acquiring the same qualities. — It seems so. Socrates: And they would not be good in the same way if they did

not have the same virtue. — They certainly would not be. Socrates: Since then the virtue of all is the same, try to tell me

and to remember what Gorgias, and you with him, said that that same thing is.

Meno: What else but to be able to rule over people, if you ared seeking one description to fit them all.

Socrates: That is indeed what I am seeking, but, Meno, is virtue the same in the case of a child or a slave, namely, for them to be able to rule over a master, and do you think that he who rules is still a slave? — I do not think so at all, Socrates.

Socrates: It is not likely, my good man. Consider this further point: you say that virtue is to be able to rule. Shall we not add to this justly and not unjustly?

Meno: I think so, Socrates, for justice is virtue.

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Socrates: Is it virtue, Meno, or a virtue? — What do you mean? e Socrates: As with anything else. For example, if you wish, take

roundness, about which I would say that it is a shape, but not simply that it is shape. I would not so speak of it because there are other shapes.

Meno: You are quite right. So I too say that not only justice is a virtue but there are many other virtues.

Socrates: What are they? Tell me, as I could mention other shapes 74 to you if you bade me do so, so do you mention other virtues.

Meno: I think courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very many others.

Socrates: We are having the same trouble again, Meno, though in another way; we have found many virtues while looking for one, but we cannot find the one which covers all the others.

Meno: I cannot yet find, Socrates, what you are looking for, one b virtue for them all, as in the other cases.

Socrates: That is likely, but I am eager, if I can, that we should make progress, for you understand that the same applies to everything. If someone asked you what I mentioned just now: “What is shape, Meno?” and you told him that it was roundness, and if then he said to you what I did: “Is roundness shape or a shape?” you would surely tell him that it is a shape? — I certainly would.

Socrates: That would be because there are other shapes? — Yes. c Socrates: And if he asked you further what they were, you would

tell him? — I would. Socrates: So too, if he asked you what color is, and you said it is

white, and your questioner interrupted you, “Is white color or a color?” you would say that it is a color, because there are also other colors? — I would.

Socrates: And if he bade you mention other colors, you would mention others that are no less colors than white is? — Yes. d

Socrates: Then if he pursued the argument as I did and said: “We always arrive at the many; do not talk to me in that way, but since you call all these many by one name, and say that no one of them is not a shape even though they are opposites, tell me what this is which applies as much to the round as to the straight and which you call e shape, as you say the round is as much a shape as the straight.” Do you not say that? — I do.

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Socrates: When you speak like that, do you assert that the round is no more round than it is straight, and that the straight is no more straight than it is round?

Meno: Certainly not, Socrates. Socrates: Yet you say that the round is no more a shape than the

straight is, nor the one more than the other. — That is true. Socrates: What then is this to which the name shape applies? Try

to tell me. If then you answered the man who was questioning about shape or color: “I do not understand what you want, my man, nor what75 you mean,” he would probably wonder and say: “You do not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in all these cases?” Would you still have nothing to say, Meno, if one asked you: “What is this which applies to the round and the straight and the other things which you call shapes and which is the same in them all?” Try to say, that you may practice for your answer about virtue.

Meno: No, Socrates, but you tell me.b Socrates: Do you want me to do you this favor? Meno: I certainly do. Socrates: And you will then be willing to tell me about virtue? Meno: I will. Socrates: We must certainly press on. The subject is worth it. Meno: It surely is. Socrates: Come then, let us try to tell you what shape is. See

whether you will accept that it is this: Let us say that shape is that which alone of existing things always follows color. Is that satisfactory to you, or do you look for it in some other way? I should be satisfiedc if you defined virtue in this way.

Meno: But that is foolish, Socrates. Socrates: How do you mean? Meno: That shape, you say, always follows color. Well then, if

someone were to say that he did not know what color is, but that he had the same difficulty as he had about shape, what do you think your answer would be?

Socrates: A true one, surely, and if my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious debaters, I would say to him: “I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it.” But if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answerd

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in a manner more gentle and more proper to discussion. By this I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms admittedly known to the questioner. I too will try to speak in these terms. Do you call something “the end”? I mean such a thing as a limit or boundary, for e all those are, I say, the same thing. Prodicus1 might disagree with us, but you surely call something “finished” or “completed”—that is what I want to express, nothing elaborate.

Meno: I do, and I think I understand what you mean. Socrates: Further, you call something a plane, and something else 76

a solid, as in geometry? Meno: I do. Socrates: From this you may understand what I mean by shape,

for I say this of every shape, that a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid.

Meno: And what do you say color is, Socrates? Socrates: You are outrageous, Meno. You bother an old man to

answer questions, but you yourself are not willing to recall and to tell b me what Gorgias says that virtue is.

Meno: After you have answered this, Socrates, I will tell you. Socrates: Even someone who was blindfolded would know from

your conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers. Meno: Why so? Socrates: Because you are forever giving orders in a discussion, as

spoiled people do, who behave like tyrants as long as they are young. And perhaps you have recognized that I am at a disadvantage with c handsome people, so I will do you the favor of an answer.

Meno: By all means do me that favor. Socrates: Do you want me to answer after the manner of Gorgias,

which you would most easily follow? Meno: Of course I want that. Socrates: Do you both say there are effluvia of things, as Empe-

docles2 does? — Certainly.

1. Prodicus was a well-known Sophist who was especially keen on the exact meaning of words. 2. Empedocles (c. 493–433 b.c.) of Acragas in Sicily was a philosopher famous for his theories about the world of nature and natural phenomena (including sense-perception).

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Socrates: And that there are channels through which the effluvia make their way? — Definitely.

Socrates: And some effluvia fit some of the channels, while othersd are too small or too big? — That is so.

Socrates: And there is something which you call sight? — There is. Socrates: From this, “comprehend what I state,” as Pindar said;3

for color is an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived. Meno: That seems to me to be an excellent answer, Socrates. Socrates: Perhaps it was given in the manner to which you are

accustomed. At the same time I think that you can deduce from this answer what sound is, and smell, and many such things. — Quite so.e

Socrates: It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than that about shape. — It does.

Socrates: It is not better, son of Alexidemus, but I am convinced that the other is, and I think you would agree, if you did not have to go away before the mysteries as you told me yesterday, but could remain and be initiated.

Meno: I would stay, Socrates, if you could tell me many things like these.77

Socrates: I shall certainly not be lacking in eagerness to tell you such things, both for your sake and my own, but I may not be able to tell you many. Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me and tell me the nature of virtue as a whole and stop making many out of one, as jokers say whenever someone breaks something; but allow virtue to remain whole and sound, and tell me what it is, for I haveb given you examples.

Meno: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, “to find joy in beautiful things and have power.” So I say that virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.

Socrates: Do you mean that the man who desires beautiful things desires good things? — Most certainly.

Socrates: Do you assume that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Do you not think, my goodc man, that all men desire good things?

3. Frg. 105 (Snell).

MENO 67

Meno: I do not. Socrates: But some desire bad things? — Yes. Socrates: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good,

or that they know they are bad and nevertheless desire them? — I think there are both kinds.

Socrates: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless desires them? — I certainly do.

Socrates: What do you mean by desiring? Is it to secure for one- self? — What else?

Socrates: Does he think that the bad things benefit him who pos- d sesses them, or does he know they harm him?

Meno: There are some who believe that the bad things benefit them, others who know that the bad things harm them.

Socrates: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know that they are bad?

Meno: No, that I cannot altogether believe. Socrates: It is clear then that those who do not know things to be

bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they e believe to be good but that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge of these things and believe them to be good clearly desire good things. Is that not so? — It is likely.

Socrates: Well then, those who you say desire bad things, believing that bad things harm their possessor, know that they will be harmed by them? — Necessarily.

Socrates: And do they not think that those who are harmed are 78 miserable to the extent that they are harmed? — That too is inevitable.

Socrates: And that those who are miserable are unhappy? — I think so.

Socrates: Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy? — I do not think so, Socrates.

Socrates: No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such. For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them?

Meno: You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants what b is bad.

Socrates: Were you not saying just now that virtue is to desire good things and have the power to secure them? — Yes, I was.

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Socrates: The desiring part of this statement is common to every- body, and one man is no better than another in this? — So it appears.

Socrates: Clearly then, if one man is better than another, he must be better at securing them. — Quite so.

Socrates: This then is virtue according to your argument, the power of securing good things.c

Meno: I think, Socrates, that the case is altogether as you now understand it.

Socrates: Let us see then whether what you say is true, for you may well be right. You say that the capacity to acquire good things is virtue? — I do.

Socrates: And by good things you mean, for example, health and wealth?

Meno: Yes, and also to acquire gold and silver, also honors and offices in the city.

Socrates: By good things you do not mean other goods than these? Meno: No, but I mean all things of this kind. Socrates: Very well. According to Meno, the hereditary guest friendd

of the Great King, virtue is the acquisition of gold and silver. Do you add to this acquiring, Meno, the words justly and piously, or does it make no difference to you but even if one secures these things unjustly, you call it virtue nonetheless?

Meno: Certainly not, Socrates. Socrates: You would then call it wickedness? — Indeed I would. Socrates: It seems then that the acquisition must be accompanied

by justice or moderation or piety or some other part of virtue; if it ise not, it will not be virtue, even though it provides good things.

Meno: How could there be virtue without these? Socrates: Then failing to secure gold and silver, whenever it would

not be just to do so, either for oneself or another, is not this failure to secure them also virtue?

Meno: So it seems. Socrates: Then to provide these goods would not be virtue any

more than not to provide them, but apparently whatever is done with79 justice will be virtue, and what is done without anything of the kind is wickedness.

Meno: I think it must necessarily be as you say.

MENO 69

Socrates: We said a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue, namely, justice and moderation and all such things? — Yes.

Socrates: Then you are playing with me, Meno. — How so, Soc- rates?

Socrates: Because I begged you just now not to break up or fragment virtue, and I gave examples of how you should answer. You paid no attention, but you tell me that virtue is to be able to secure good things b with justice, and justice, you say, is a part of virtue.

Meno: I do. Socrates: It follows then from what you agree to, that to act in

whatever you do with a part of virtue is virtue, for you say that justice is a part of virtue, as are all such qualities. Why do I say this? Because when I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you are far from telling me what it is. Rather, you say that every action is virtue if it is performed with a part of virtue, as if you had said what virtue is as a c whole, so I would already know that, even if you fragment it into parts. I think you must face the same question from the beginning, my dear Meno, namely, what is virtue, if every action performed with a part of virtue is virtue? For that is what one is saying when he says that every action performed with justice is virtue. Do you not think you should face the same question again, or do you think one knows what a part of virtue is if one does not know virtue itself? — I do not think so.

Socrates: If you remember, when I was answering you about shape, d we rejected the kind of answer that tried to answer in terms still being the subject of inquiry and not yet agreed upon. — And we were right to reject them.

Socrates: Then surely, my good sir, you must not think, while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry, that by answering in terms of the parts of virtue you can make its nature clear to anyone or make anything else clear by speaking in this way, but only that the same question must be put to you again—what do you take the nature e of virtue to be when you say what you say? Or do you think there is no point in what I am saying? — I think what you say is right.

Socrates: Answer me again then from the beginning: What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

Meno: Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are 80 always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same

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state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind ofb effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. Yet I have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is. I think you are wise not to sail away from Athens to go and stay elsewhere, for if you were to behave like this as a stranger in another city, you would be driven away for practicing sorcery.

Socrates: You are a rascal, Meno, and you nearly deceived me. Meno: Why so particularly, Socrates? Socrates: I know why you drew this image of me.c Meno: Why do you think I did? Socrates: So that I should draw an image of you in return. I know

that all handsome men rejoice in images of themselves; it is to their advantage, for I think that the images of beautiful people are also beautiful, but I will draw no image of you in turn. Now if the torpedo fish is itself numb and so makes others numb, then I resemble it, but not otherwise, for I myself do not have the answer when I perplex others, but I am more perplexed than anyone when I cause perplexity in others. So now I do not know what virtue is; perhaps you knew before you contacted me, but now you are certainly like one who doesd not know. Nevertheless, I want to examine and seek together with you what it may be.

Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?

Socrates: I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize whate a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.

Meno: Does that argument not seem sound to you, Socrates?81

MENO 71

Socrates: Not to me. Meno: Can you tell me why? Socrates: I can. I have heard wise men and women talk about

divine matters . . . Meno: What did they say? Socrates: What was, I thought, both true and beautiful. Meno: What was it, and who were they? Socrates: The speakers were among the priests and priestesses whose

care it is to be able to give an account of their practices. Pindar too b says it, and many others of the divine among our poets. What they say is this; see whether you think they speak the truth: They say that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which they call dying; at times it is reborn, but it is never destroyed, and one must therefore live one’s life as piously as possible:

Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year the souls of those from whom she will exact punishment for old miseries, and from these come noble kings, c mighty in strength and greatest in wisdom, and for the rest of time men will call them sacred heroes.4

As the soul is immortal, has been born often, and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before, both about virtue and other things. As the whole of nature is d akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection. We must, therefore, not believe that debater’s argument, for it would make us idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it, whereas my argument makes e them energetic and keen on the search. I trust that this is true, and I want to inquire along with you into the nature of virtue.

Meno: Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that this is so?

4. Frg. 133 (Snell).

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Socrates: As I said just now, Meno, you are a rascal. You now ask me if I can teach you, when I say there is no teaching but recollection,82 in order to show me up at once as contradicting myself.

Meno: No, by Zeus, Socrates, that was not my intention when I spoke, but just a habit. If you can somehow show me that things are as you say, please do so.

Socrates: It is not easy, but I am nevertheless willing to do my best for your sake. Call one of these many attendants of yours, whicheverb you like, that I may prove it to you in his case.

Meno: Certainly. You there come forward. Socrates: Is he a Greek? Does he speak Greek? Meno: Very much so. He was born in our household. Socrates: Pay attention then whether you think he is recollecting

or learning from me. Meno: I will pay attention. Socrates: Tell me now, boy, you know that a square figure is like

this? — I do. Socrates: A square then is a figure in which all these four sidesc

are equal? — Yes indeed. Socrates: And it also has these lines through the middle

equal?5—Yes.

5. Socrates draws a square ABCD. The “lines through the middle” are the lines joining the middle of these sides, which also go through the center of the square, namely EF and GH.

A 1 ft. G 1 ft. B

1 ft.

E F

1 ft.

D H C

MENO 73

Socrates: And such a figure could be larger or smaller? — Certainly. Socrates: If then this side were two feet, and this other side two

feet, how many feet would the whole be? Consider it this way: If it were two feet this way, and only one foot that way, the figure would be once two feet? — Yes.

Socrates: But if it is two feet also that way, it would surely be twice d two feet? — Yes.

Socrates: How many feet is twice two feet? Work it out and tell me. — Four, Socrates.

Socrates: Now we could have another figure twice the size of this one, with the four sides equal like this one. — Yes.

Socrates: How many feet will that be? — Eight. Socrates: Come now, try to tell me how long each side of this will

be. The side of this is two feet. What about each side of the one which e is its double? — Obviously, Socrates, it will be twice the length.

Socrates: You see, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but all I do is question him. And now he thinks he knows the length of the line on which an eight-foot figure is based. Do you agree?

Meno: I do. Socrates: And does he know? Meno: Certainly not. Socrates: He thinks it is a line twice the length? Meno: Yes. Socrates: Watch him now recollecting things in order, as one must

recollect. Tell me, boy, do you say that a figure double the size is based on a line double the length? Now I mean such a figure as this, not 83 long on one side and short on the other, but equal in every direction like this one, and double the size, that is, eight feet. See whether you still believe that it will be based on a line double the length. — I do.

Socrates: Now the line becomes double its length if we add another of the same length here? — Yes indeed.

Socrates: And the eight-foot square will be based on it, if there are four lines of that length? — Yes.

Socrates: Well, let us draw from it four equal lines, and surely that b is what you say is the eight-foot square? — Certainly.

Socrates: And within this figure are four squares, each of which is equal to the four-foot square? — Yes.

Socrates: How big is it then? Is it not four times as big? — Of course.

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Socrates: Is this square then, which is four times as big, its dou- ble? — No, by Zeus.

Socrates: How many times bigger is it? — Four times. Socrates: Then, my boy, the figure based on a line twice the lengthc

is not double but four times as big? — You are right. Socrates: And four times four is sixteen, is it not? — Yes. Socrates: On how long a line should the eight-foot square be based?

On this line we have a square that is four times bigger, do we not? — Yes. Socrates: Now this four-foot square is based on this line here, half

the length? — Yes. Socrates: Very well. Is the eight-foot square not double this one

and half that one?6 — Yes. Socrates: Will it not be based on a line longer than this one and

shorter than that one? Is that not so? — I think so.d Socrates: Good, you answer what you think. And tell me, was this

one not two-feet long, and that one four feet? — Yes. Socrates: The line on which the eight-foot square is based must

then be longer than this one of two feet, and shorter than that one of four feet? — It must be.

Socrates: Try to tell me then how long a line you say it is.e — Three feet.

Socrates: Then if it is three feet, let us add the half of this one, and it will be three feet? For these are two feet, and the other is one. And here, similarly, these are two feet and that one is one foot, and so the figure you mention comes to be? — Yes.

Socrates: Now if it is three feet this way and three feet that way, will the whole figure be three times three feet? — So it seems.

Socrates: How much is three times three feet? — Nine feet. Socrates: And the double square was to be how many feet? — Eight. Socrates: So the eight-foot figure cannot be based on the three-

foot line? — Clearly not.

6. I.e., the eight-foot square is double the four-foot square and half the sixteen- foot square—double the square based on a line two feet long and half the square based on a four-foot side.

MENO 75

Socrates: But on how long a line? Try to tell us exactly, and if you 84 do not want to work it out, show me from what line. — By Zeus, Socrates, I do not know.

Socrates: You realize, Meno, what point he has reached in his recollection. At first he did not know what the basic line of the eight- foot square was; even now he does not yet know, but then he thought he knew, and answered confidently as if he did know, and he did not think himself at a loss, but now he does think himself at a loss, and as he does not know, neither does he think he knows. b

Meno: That is true. Socrates: So he is now in a better position with regard to the matter

he does not know? Meno: I agree with that too. Socrates: Have we done him any harm by making him perplexed

and numb as the torpedo fish does? Meno: I do not think so. Socrates: Indeed, we have probably achieved something relevant

to finding out how matters stand, for now, as he does not know, he would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could easily make many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double c size and said that it must have a base twice as long.

Meno: So it seems. Socrates: Do you think that before he would have tried to find out

that which he thought he knew though he did not, before he fell into perplexity and realized he did not know and longed to know?

Meno: I do not think so, Socrates. Socrates: Has he then benefited from being numbed? Meno: I think so. Socrates: Look then how he will come out of his perplexity while

searching along with me. I shall do nothing more than ask questions and not teach him. Watch whether you find me teaching and explaining d things to him instead of asking for his opinion.

Socrates: You tell me, is this not a four-foot figure? You under- stand? — I do.

Socrates: We add to it this figure which is equal to it? — Yes. Socrates: And we add this third figure equal to each of them? — Yes.

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Socrates: Could we then fill in the space in the corner? — Cer- tainly.7

Socrates: So we have these four equal figures? — Yes. Socrates: Well then, how many times is the whole figure largere

than this one?8 — Four times. Socrates: But we should have had one that was twice as large, or

do you not remember? — I certainly do. Socrates: Does not this line from one corner to the other cut each85

of these figures in two?9 — Yes.

7. Socrates now builds up his sixteen-foot square by joining two four-foot squares, then a third, like this:

2 ft.

2 ft.

2 ft. 2 ft.

Filling “the space in the corner” will give another four-foot square, which completes the sixteen-foot square containing four four-foot squares. 8. “This one” is any one of the inside squares of four feet. 9. Socrates now draws the diagonals of the four inside squares, namely, FH, HE, EG, and GF, which together form the square GFHE.

A 2 ft. G 2 ft. B

2 ft.

E F

2 ft.

D H C

MENO 77

Socrates: So these are four equal lines which enclose this fig- ure?10 — They are.

Socrates: Consider now: How large is the figure? — I do not under- stand.

Socrates: Within these four figures, each line cuts off half of each, does it not? — Yes.

Socrates: How many of this size are there in this figure?11 — Four. Socrates: How many in this?12 — Two. Socrates: What is the relation of four to two? — Double. b Socrates: How many feet in this?13 — Eight. Socrates: Based on what line? — This one. Socrates: That is, on the line that stretches from corner to corner

of the four-foot figure? — Yes. — Clever men call this the diagonal, so that if diagonal is its name, you say that the double figure would be that based on the diagonal? — Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates: What do you think, Meno? Has he, in his answers, ex- pressed any opinion that was not his own? c

Meno: No, they were all his own. Socrates: And yet, as we said a short time ago, he did not know?

— That is true. Socrates: So these opinions were in him, were they not? — Yes. Socrates: So the man who does not know has within himself true

opinions about the things that he does not know? — So it appears. Socrates: These opinions have now just been stirred up like a

dream, but if he were repeatedly asked about these same things in various ways, you know that in the end his knowledge about these d things would be as accurate as anyone’s. — It is likely.

Socrates: And he will know it without having been taught but only questioned, and find the knowledge within himself? — Yes.

Socrates: And is not finding knowledge within oneself recollec- tion? — Certainly.

10. I.e., GFHE. 11. Again, GFHE: Socrates is asking how many of the triangles “cut off from inside” there are inside GFHE. 12. I.e., any of the interior squares. 13. GFHE again.

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Socrates: Must he not either have at some time acquired the knowl- edge he now possesses, or else have always possessed it? — Yes.

Socrates: If he always had it, he would always have known. If he acquired it, he cannot have done so in his present life. Or has someonee taught him geometry? For he will perform in the same way about all geometry, and all other knowledge. Has someone taught him every- thing? You should know, especially as he has been born and brought up in your house.

Meno: But I know that no one has taught him. Socrates: Yet he has these opinions, or doesn’t he? Meno: That seems indisputable, Socrates. Socrates: If he has not acquired them in his present life, is it not86

clear that he had them and had learned them at some other time? — It seems so.

Socrates: Then that was the time when he was not a human being? — Yes.

Socrates: If then, during the time he exists and is not a human being he will have true opinions which, when stirred by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have learned during all time? For it is clear that during all time he exists, either as a man or not. — So it seems.

Socrates: Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, theb soul would be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present—that is, what you do not recollect?

Meno: Somehow, Socrates, I think that what you say is right. Socrates: I think so too, Meno. I do not insist that my argument

is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs in both word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out whatc we do not know and that we must not look for it.

Meno: In this too I think you are right, Socrates. Socrates: Since we are of one mind that one should seek to find

out what one does not know, shall we try to find out together what virtue is?

Meno: Certainly. But Socrates, I should be most pleased to investi- gate and hear your answer to my original question, whether we should

MENO 79

try to find out on the assumption that virtue is something teachable, d or is a natural gift, or in whatever way it comes to men.

Socrates: If I were directing you, Meno, and not only myself, we would not investigate whether virtue is teachable or not before we investigated what virtue itself is. But because you do not even attempt to rule yourself, in order that you may be free, but you try to rule me and do so, I will agree with you—for what can I do? So we must, it appears, inquire into the qualities of something the nature of which e we do not yet know. However, please relax your rule a little bit for me and agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis. I mean the way geometers often carry on their investigations. For example, if they are asked whether a specific area can be inscribed 87 in the form of a triangle within a given circle, one of them might say: “I do not yet know whether that area has that property, but I think I have, as it were, a hypothesis that is of use for the problem, namely this: If that area is such that when one has applied it as a rectangle to the given straight line in the circle, it is deficient by a figure similar b to the very figure which is applied, then I think one alternative results, whereas another results if it is impossible for this to happen. So, by using this hypothesis, I am willing to tell you what results with regard to inscribing it in the circle—that is, whether it is impossible or not.”14

So let us speak about virtue also, since we do not know either what it is or what qualities it possesses, and let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis, and say this: Among the things existing in the soul, of what sort is virtue, that it should be teachable or not? First, if it is another sort than knowledge, is it teachable or not, or, as we were just saying, recollectable? Let it make no difference c to us which term we use: Is it teachable? Or is it plain to anyone that men cannot be taught anything but knowledge? — I think so.

Socrates: But, if virtue is a kind of knowledge, it is clear that it could be taught. — Of course.

Socrates: We have dealt with that question quickly, that if it is of one kind it can be taught; if it is of a different kind, it cannot. — We have indeed.

Socrates: The next point to consider seems to be whether virtue is knowledge or something else. — That does seem to be the next point d to consider.

14. The translation here follows the interpretation of T. L. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), vol. I, pp. 298 ff.

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Socrates: Well now, do we say that virtue is itself something good, and will this hypothesis stand firm for us, that it is something good? — Of course.

Socrates: If then there is anything else good that is different and separate from knowledge, virtue might well not be a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that knowledge does not encompass, we would be right to suspect that it is a kind of knowledge. — That is so.

Socrates: Surely virtue makes us good? — Yes.e Socrates: And if we are good, we are beneficent, for all that is good

is beneficial. Is that not so? — Yes. Socrates: So virtue is something beneficial? Meno: That necessarily follows from what has been agreed. Socrates: Let us then examine what kinds of things benefit us,

taking them up one by one: health, we say, and strength, and beauty, and also wealth. We say that these things, and others of the same kind, benefit us, do we not? — We do.

Socrates: Yet we say that these same things also sometimes harm one. Do you agree or not? — I do.88

Socrates: Look then, what directing factor determines in each case whether these things benefit or harm us? Is it not the right use of them that benefits us, and the wrong use that harms us? — Certainly.