Socrates thought of himself as an intellectual midwife because _______

CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

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CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

F o u r t e e n t h E d i t i o n

Edited by Robert J. Mulvaney University of South Carolina

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p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN-13: 978-0-205-09680-0 ISBN-10: 0-205-09680-8 1. Philosophy—Introductions. I. Mulvaney, Robert J. BD21.C594 2012 100—dc23

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For my granddaughters, Emma, Molly and Annie

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CONTENTS

Preface xi

Part 1 Socrates and the Nature of Philosophy 1

What Is Philosophy?

1 THE EUTHYPHRO: DEFINING PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS 2

2 THE APOLOGY: SOCRATES’ TRIAL AND DEFENSE 13

3 THE CRITO: SOCRATES’ REFUSAL TO ESCAPE 32

4 THE PHAEDO: VIRTUE AND SOCRATES’ VIEW OF DEATH 36

Part 2 Philosophy of Religion 41

Can We Prove That God Exists?

5 ST. ANSELM: THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 42

6 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 47

7 WILLIAM PALEY: THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 53

8 BLAISE PASCAL: IT IS BETTER TO BELIEVE IN GOD’S EXISTENCE THAN TO DENY IT 58

Does the Idea of a Good God Exclude Evil?

9 BOETHIUS: GOD CAN ALLOW SOME EVIL 64

10 DAVID HUME: A GOOD GOD WOULD EXCLUDE EVIL 70

11 JOHN HICK: EVIL, HUMAN FREEDOM, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 77

Part 3 Ethics 85

Are Ethics Relative?

12 RUTH BENEDICT: ETHICS ARE RELATIVE 86

13 W. T. STACE: ETHICS ARE NOT RELATIVE 93

Are Humans Always Selfish?

14 HUMANS ARE ALWAYS SELFISH: GLAUCON’S CHALLENGE TO SOCRATES 104

15 JAMES RACHELS: HUMANS ARE NOT ALWAYS SELFISH 108

vii

Which Is Basic in Ethics: Happiness or Obligation?

16 ARISTOTLE: HAPPINESS IS LIVING VIRTUOUSLY 119

17 JEREMY BENTHAM: HAPPINESS IS SEEKING THE GREATEST PLEASURE FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE 127

18 IMMANUEL KANT: DUTY IS PRIOR TO HAPPINESS 135

19 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: HAPPINESS IS HAVING POWER 148

20 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 156

21 VIRGINIA HELD: FEMINIST ETHICS ARE DIFFERENT 165

Part 4 Knowledge 175

What Is Knowledge?

22 PLATO: KNOWLEDGE IS “WARRANTED TRUE BELIEF” 176

What Method Is Best for Acquiring Knowledge?

23 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: FOUR APPROACHES TO PHILOSOPHY 185

How Do We Acquire Knowledge?

24 RENÉ DESCARTES: KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ULTIMATELY SENSE KNOWLEDGE 195

25 JOHN LOCKE: KNOWLEDGE IS ULTIMATELY SENSED 206

26 IMMANUEL KANT: KNOWLEDGE IS BOTH RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL 217

How Is Truth Established?

27 BERTRAND RUSSELL: TRUTH IS ESTABLISHED BY CORRESPONDENCE 226

28 BRAND BLANSHARD: TRUTH MEANS COHERENCE 233

29 WILLIAM JAMES: TRUTH IS ESTABLISHED BY PRAGMATIC MEANS 238

Can We Know the Nature of Causal Relations?

30 DAVID HUME: CAUSE MEANS REGULAR ASSOCIATION 245

31 DAVID HUME: THERE ARE NO POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR INDUCTION 251

Part 5 Metaphysics 261

Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?

32 PARMENIDES: BEING IS UNCAUSED 262

33 LAO-TZU: NON-BEING IS THE SOURCE OF BEING 267

viii Contents

Is Reality General or Particular?

34 PLATO: UNIVERSALS ARE REAL 273

35 DAVID HUME: PARTICULARS ARE REAL 283

Of What Does Reality Consist?

36 RENÉ DESCARTES: REALITY CONSISTS OF MIND AND MATTER 288

37 PAUL CHURCHLAND: REALITY CONSISTS OF MATTER 295

38 GEORGE BERKELEY: REALITY CONSISTS OF IDEAS 302

39 JOHN DEWEY: REALITY CONSISTS OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL QUALITIES 315

Are Humans Free?

40 HOLBACH: HUMANS ARE DETERMINED 322

41 JOHN STUART MILL: DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM ARE COMPATIBLE 331

42 RICHARD TAYLOR: HUMANS ARE FREE 337

Do Humans Have an Identical Self?

43 JOHN LOCKE: HUMAN BEINGS HAVE AN IDENTICAL SELF 342

44 DAVID HUME: HUMAN BEINGS HAVE NO IDENTICAL SELF 349

Is There Life After Death?

45 PLATO: THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL AND IMPERISHABLE 355

46 JOSEPH BUTLER: HUMAN BEINGS SURVIVE DEATH 363

47 DAVID HUME: LIFE AFTER DEATH IS PHILOSOPHICALLY UNPROVABLE 369

Part 6 Social and Political Philosophy 375

What is Liberty?

48 FYODOR DOSTOEVSKI: LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY 376

49 JOHN STUART MILL: LIBERTY IS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE MAJORITY’S TYRANNY 387

50 MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.: LIBERTY AND RACIAL PREJUDICE 397

51 ROSEMARIE TONG: FEMINISM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 407

Which Government Is Best?

52 THOMAS HOBBES: MONARCHY IS BEST 421

53 JOHN LOCKE: DEMOCRACY IS BEST 428

54 KARL MARX: COMMUNISM AND NONALIENATED LABOR IS BEST 435

55 BENJAMIN BARBER: “STRONG DEMOCRACY” IS BEST 450

Contents ix

Part 7 Aesthetics 455

What Constitutes the Experience of Beauty?

56 PLOTINUS: BEAUTY, SENSUOUS, AND IDEAL 456

What Is the Function of Art?

57 ARISTOTLE: THE NATURE OF TRAGEDY 466

58 HENRI BERGSON: THE NATURE OF COMEDY 473

Part 8 Philosophy and the Good Life 483

Two Classic Views of the Good Life

59 EPICURUS AND THE PLEASANT LIFE 484

60 EPICTETUS AND THE LIFE OF SELF-CONTROL 492

What Gives Life Meaning?

61 LEO TOLSTOY: FAITH PROVIDES LIFE’S MEANING 499

62 ALBERT CAMUS: LIFE’S MEANING IS DETERMINED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL 509

What Is the Value of Philosophy?

63 BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY TO INDIVIDUAL LIFE 519

64 JOHN DEWEY: THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIETY 525

Glossary 529

x Contents

PREFACE

The first edition of Classic Philosophical Questions was published in 1971, just forty years ago. Since then there have been many changes in content, while the basic struc- ture and aims of each edition have remained the same. The sectional divisions are largely intact, and the order of topics is likewise unchanged. The independence of the general headings remains, so that instructors and readers can begin at virtually any point. The book continues to be intended for a wide spectrum of students, especially undergraduates in colleges and universities, but including advanced secondary school students as well.

The issues covered in the text include fundamental philosophical problems of in- terest to such students and are drawn from ancient, modern, and contemporary sources. None of the material is excessively technical. Introductions and study ques- tions precede the readings and alert students to ideas that are important to grasp. At the end of each reading, the unique “To Think About” quotations provide material for classroom dialogue or for written assignments. Also at the end of each selection is a reading list that can be used for writing assignments and term papers. At the end of the book, there is a glossary of philosophical terms. The guiding principle of provid- ing opposing positions on each topic remains the same. Generally at least two essays are devoted to each issue in order to offer affirmative and negative responses to the various topics. Where this is not explicitly done, individual readings are chosen that present both sides of a given issue.

In response to general acclaim and wide use, this latest edition has included new material and old standbys. Those using this book once again will recognize some of their favorite readings, and hopefully find the new material exciting. Some of the new material includes:

• Additional pages from Plato’s Phaedo, developing the general psychological and moral profile of Socrates in its relationship to his most fundamental philosophical positions.

• A reading on the problem of evil drawn from Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy, considered by many the first formal theodicy or argument for the justice of God.

• An expanded section on free will, including a reading by John Stuart Mill defending a compatibilist position and balancing the traditional determinist and free will positions found in earlier editions of this book.

• A new section devoted to issues of personal identity and their relation to the problem of immortality, with pages from Plato, Joseph Butler, and David Hume.

• Readings from Rosemarie Tong on women’s liberation, Benjamin Barber on the nature of democracy, and Brand Blanshard on the criterion of truth.

• A concluding brief reading by John Dewey underscoring the necessary employ- ment of philosophical discourse in the maintenance of educational and political growth.

xi

In addition, a number of changes have been made in biographical sketches, introductions, and new material in the “think abouts”—producing a volume faithful to its traditional intent but including changes that will attract new readers as well as old.

Many individuals have been helpful in the improvement of this book, some in the choice of material, others in the all-important correction of errors. It would be impossible to include everyone, but here are some of those who have helped, beginning with the reviewers chosen by the editors. The care and thoroughness of their reviews are greatly appreciated:

Irene McMullin, The University of Arkansas

Rob Hull, West Virginia Wesleyan College

Barbara Conner, University of Louisiana at Lafayette

Dexter Christian, Georgia Perimeter College

Michael Strawser, University of Central Florida

Brian Neufeld

I wish to recognize two individuals who uncovered important errors in the last edition: my former student Chloe Greene, and Prof. Kathleen Wider of the University of Michigan–Dearborn. Colleagues of mine in the United States and Canada have made recommendations that have been useful in improving the choice of material. I wish also to acknowledge especially the advice of two members of the faculty of the University of Western Ontario: Prof. John Thorp and Prof. Michael T. Fox. Prof. Andrew Irvine of the University of British Columbia has provided a detailed and comprehensive review of the anthology, for which I am very grateful. Finally I appreciate the support of my colleagues at the University of South Carolina, especially the chair of the department of philosophy, Prof. Anne Bezuidenhout, and Professors Martin Donougho and Jeremiah Hackett.

Of singular importance in the production of this anthology has been the staff of Pearson whose names appear after the title page. I wish to give special recognition to Kate Fernandes, project manager, whose exemplary professionalism was evident at every step in the construction of this book. Added to this was what may seem simple and expected, but in my experience rare: she answered every e-mail of mine promptly and often immediately. I am very grateful for what clearly is her policy. I also want to recognize the contribution of Sarah Holle, project manager of the last edition of this book, who expertly prepared the list of reviewers for this edition and organized their critical remarks in a fashion that made their contributions very helpful in the develop- ment of the contents.

Finally, I am extremely pleased with the cover of the new edition. I wanted to use the Vedder mosaic before now, but problems emerged making its use impossible. At last the present designer, Suzanne Duda, has found a way to incorporate the image, title, and editor in a very attractive fashion. I am grateful for her skillful work.

I dedicate this book to my three granddaughters. The place of women in politics, business, science, the arts, and philosophy, too, has developed enormously since the first edition of Classic Philosophical Questions. This should come as no surprise. The

xii Preface

goddess Minerva, depicted on the cover of this book, epitomizes the legendary con- nection between wisdom and the female. Unfortunately, by virtue of its orientation to mostly ancient, medieval, and early modern thinkers, this book has been dominated by males. It is my wish that all young women will find the impetus in these pages to think deeply about themselves, to draw support from philosophical achievements in the past and thus create opportunities for their future growth. To my granddaughters especially, and the new generation they represent, I dedicate this book with hopeful- ness, eager anticipation, and a renewed commitment to the values shared by men and women in a world common to them both.

Robert J. Mulvaney

Preface xiii

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CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

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PART

1 � � �

Socrates and the Nature of Philosophy

1

1

The figure of Socrates dominates the subject of philosophy so much that we must begin with a consideration of his personality and character as much as his contribution to the history and problems of philosophical inquiry. In no fewer than four sections of this anthology, Part 1 on Socrates’ basic intellectual and moral position, Part 3 on ethics, Part 4 on knowledge, and Part 5 on metaphysics, we find him as both reported by Plato, his student, and used by Plato to act as the character representing Plato’s own unique point of view. But what kind of person was Socrates? What are the elements of his psychological profile? Here we begin a sketch of the kind of person he was, and the relationship between his personality and some basic features of his philosophical position. We start with his obvious insistence that correct thinking involves clarity of conceptualization in the definition of terms. Euthyphro is an individual who, in a spectacularly grave decision, the prosecution of his own father for murder, seems radically unsure of the terms involved in his thinking. Socrates tries, ultimately unsuccessfully, to help him clear his mind. In our second reading, Socrates’ famous defense of himself before the citizens of Athens, he explains more fully how his search for wisdom dominates his personal life and teaching. In our third reading, we see a person of great courage refusing to escape his punishment as he expresses a commitment to his country and its laws. And in the fourth reading, one we shall revisit later, he outlines the basic moral values that have governed his life and made his death meaningful and unintimidating.

2

From Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito. trans. by F. J. Church. Copyright © 1956. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Plato (427?–347 B.C.), one of the great Greek philosophers, has exerted more influence on the development of Western philosophy than any other writer. Plato established the Academy in Athens, the first of the major schools of ancient Greece. His works, written in dialogue form and featuring his teacher Socrates (469–399 B.C.) as the principal figure, have continued to be widely read not only for their intellectual content but also for their literary merit. Among his writings are Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philebus.

The Euthyphro: Defining Philosophical Terms

Reading 1 • The Euthyphro: Defining Philosophical Terms 3

TO STUDY 1. For what is Socrates being prosecuted?

2. For what is Euthyphro prosecuting his father? How did the idea of impiety arise?

3. What is the first definition of piety offered? What is Socrates’ objection to it?

4. What is the second definition of piety? What is Socrates’ objection to it?

5. What definition of piety does Socrates himself offer? What is his own refutation of this?

6. What problem regarding piety finally remains?

CHARACTERS Socrates and Euthyphro SCENE The Hall of Justice

EUTHYPHRO: What in the world are you doing here in the king’s hall, Socrates? Why have you left your haunts in the Lyceum? You surely cannot have a suit before him, as I have.

SOCRATES: The Athenians, Euthyphro, call it an indictment, not a suit.

EUTH: What? Do you mean that someone is prosecuting you? I cannot believe that you are prosecuting anyone yourself.

SOCR: Certainly I am not.

EUTH: Then is someone prosecuting you?

SOCR: Yes.

EUTH: Who is he?

SOCR: I scarcely know him myself, Euthyphro; I think he must be some unknown young man. His name, however, is Meletus, and his district Pitthis.

EUTH: I don’t know him, Socrates. But tell me, what is he prosecuting you for?

SOCR: What for? Not on trivial grounds, I think. It is no small thing for so young a man to have formed an opinion on such an important matter. For he, he says, knows how the young are corrupted, and who are their corrupters. He must be a wise man who, observing my igno- rance, is going to accuse me to the state, as his mother, of corrupting his friends. I think that he is the only one who begins at the right point in his political reforms; for his first care is to make the young men as good as possible, just as a good farmer will take care of his young plants first, and, after he has done that, of the others. And so Meletus, I suppose, is first clearing us away who, as he says, corrupt the young men growing up; and then, when he has done that, of course he will turn his attention to the older men, and so become a very great public benefactor . . . .

EUTH: I hope it may be so, Socrates, but I fear the opposite. It seems to me that in trying to injure you, he is really setting to work by striking a blow at the foundation of the state. But how, tell me, does he say that you corrupt the youth?

4 Part 1 • What Is Philosophy?

SOCR: In a way which sounds absurd at first, my friend. He says that I am a maker of gods; and so he is prosecuting me, he says, for inventing new gods and for not believing in the old ones.

EUTH: I understand, Socrates. It is because you say that you always have a divine guide. So he is prosecuting you for introducing religious reforms; and he is going into court to arouse prejudice against you, knowing that the multi- tude are easily prejudiced about such matters . . . . Well, Socrates, I dare say that nothing will come of it. Very likely you will be successful in your trial, and I think that I shall be in mine.

SOCR: And what is this suit of yours, Euthyphro? Are you suing, or being sued?

EUTH: I am suing.

SOCR: Whom?

EUTH: A man whom people think I must be mad to prosecute.

SOCR: What? Has he wings to fly away with?

EUTH: He is far enough from flying; he is a very old man.

SOCR: Who is he?

EUTH: He is my father.

SOCR: Your father, my good man?

EUTH: He is indeed.

SOCR: What are you prosecuting him for? What is the accusation?

EUTH: Murder, Socrates.

SOCR: Good heavens, Euthyphro! Surely the multitude are ignorant of what is right. I take it that it is not everyone who could rightly do what you are doing; only a man who was already well advanced in wisdom.

EUTH: That is quite true, Socrates.

SOCR: Was the man whom your father killed a relative of yours? But, of course, he was. You would never have prosecuted your father for the murder of a stranger?

EUTH: You amuse me, Socrates. What difference does it make whether the mur- dered man were a relative or a stranger? The only question that you have to ask is, did the murderer kill justly or not? . . . In the present case the mur- dered man was a poor laborer of mine, who worked for us on our farm in Naxos. While drunk he got angry with one of our slaves and killed him. My father therefore bound the man hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, while he sent to Athens to ask the priest what he should do. While the messenger was gone, he entirely neglected the man, thinking that he was a murderer, and that it would be no great matter, even if he were to die. And that was exactly what happened; hunger and cold and his bonds killed him before the messenger returned. And now my father and the rest of my family are indignant with me because I am prosecuting my father for the murder of this murderer. They assert that he did not kill the man at all; and they say that, even if he had killed him over and over again, the man

Reading 1 • The Euthyphro: Defining Philosophical Terms 5

himself was a murderer, and that I ought not to concern myself about such a person because it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. So little, Socrates, do they know the divine law of piety and impiety.

SOCR: And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you understand divine things and piety and impiety so accurately that, in such a case as you have stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself may be doing something impious?

EUTH: If I did not understand all these matters accurately, Socrates, I should not be worth much . . . .

SOCR: Then, my dear Euthyphro, I cannot do better than become your pupil and challenge Meletus on this very point before the trial begins. I should say that I had always thought it very important to have knowledge about divine things; and that now, when he says that I offend by speaking carelessly about them, and by introducing reforms, I have become your pupil. And I should say, “Meletus, if you acknowledge Euthyphro to be wise in these matters and to hold the correct belief, then think the same of me and do not put me on trial; but if you do not, then bring a suit, not against me, but against my master, for corrupting his elders—namely, myself whom he corrupts by his teaching, and his own father whom he corrupts by admon- ishing and punishing him.” And if I did not succeed in persuading him to release me from the suit or to indict you in my place, then I could repeat my challenge in court.

EUTH: Yes, by Zeus! Socrates, I think I should find out his weak points if he were to try to indict me. I should have a good deal to say about him in court long before I spoke about myself.

SOCR: Yes, my dear friend, and knowing this I am anxious to become your pupil. I see that Meletus here, and others too, seem not to notice you at all, but he sees through me without difficulty and at once prosecutes me for impiety. Now, therefore, please explain to me what you were so confident just now that you knew. Tell me what are righteousness and sacrilege with respect to murder and everything else. I suppose that piety is the same in all actions, and that impiety is always the opposite of piety, and retains its identity, and that, as impiety, it always has the same character, which will be found in whatever is impious.

EUTH: Certainly, Socrates, I suppose so.

SOCR: Tell me, then, what is piety and what is impiety?

EUTH: Well, then, I say that piety means prosecuting the unjust individual who has committed murder or sacrilege, or any other such crime, as I am doing now, whether he is your father or your mother or whoever he is; and I say that impiety means not prosecuting him. And observe, Socrates, I will give you a clear proof, which I have already given to others, that it is so, and that doing right means not letting off unpunished the sacrile- gious man, whosoever he may be. Men hold Zeus to be the best and the most just of the gods; and they admit that Zeus bound his own father, Cronos, for wrongfully devouring his children; and that Cronos, in his

6 Part 1 • What Is Philosophy?

turn, castrated his father for similar reasons. And yet these same men are incensed with me because I proceed against my father for doing wrong. So, you see, they say one thing in the case of the gods and quite another in mine.

SOCR: Is not that why I am being prosecuted, Euthyphro? I mean, because I find it hard to accept such stories people tell about the gods? I expect that I shall be found at fault because I doubt those stories. Now if you who understand all these matters so well agree in holding all those tales true, then I suppose that I must yield to your authority. What could I say when I admit myself that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of friendship, do you really believe that these things have actually happened?

EUTH: Yes, and more amazing things too, Socrates, which the multitude do not know of.

SOCR: Then you really believe that there is war among the gods, and bitter hatreds, and battles, such as the poets tell of . . . .

EUTH: Yes, Socrates, and more besides. As I was saying, I will report to you many other stories about divine matters, if you like, which I am sure will astonish you when you hear them.

SOCR: I dare say. You shall report them to me at your leisure another time. At present please try to give a more definite answer to the question which I asked you just now. What I asked you, my friend, was, What is piety? and you have not explained it to me to my satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for murder, is a pious act.

EUTH: Well, that is true, Socrates.

SOCR: Very likely. But many other actions are pious, are they not, Euthyphro?

EUTH: Certainly.

SOCR: Remember, then, I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many pious actions that there are; I want to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious. You said, I think, that there is one characteristic which makes all pious actions pious, and another characteristic which makes all impious actions impious. Do you not remember?

EUTH: I do.

SOCR: Well, then, explain to me what is this characteristic, that I may have it to turn to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions and those of other men, and be able to say that whatever action resembles it is pious, and whatever does not, is not pious.

EUTH: Yes, I will tell you that if you wish. Socrates . . . . What is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to them is impious.

SOCR: Fine, Euthyphro. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted. Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet. But, of course, you will go on to prove that it is true.

EUTH: Certainly.

Reading 1 • The Euthyphro: Defining Philosophical Terms 7

SOCR: Come, then, let us examine our statement. The things and the men that are pleasing to the gods are pious, and the things and the men that are displeasing to the gods are impious. But piety and impiety are not the same; they are as opposite as possible—was not that what he said?

EUTH: Certainly . . . .

SOCR: Have we not also said, Euthyphro, that there are quarrels and disagreements and hatreds among the gods?

EUTH: We have.

SOCR: But what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and anger? Let us look at the matter thus. If you and I were to disagree as to whether one number were more than another, would that make us angry and enemies? Should we not settle such a dispute at once by counting?

EUTH: Of course.

SOCR: And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them and put an end to the disagreement at once, should we not? . . . And should we not settle a question about the relative weight of two things by weighing them?

EUTH: Of course.

SOCR: Then what is the question which would make us angry and enemies if we disagreed about it, and could not come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not an answer ready; but listen to mine. Is it not the question of the just and unjust, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of the good and the bad? Is it not questions about these matters which make you and me and everyone else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory agreement?

EUTH: Yes. Socrates, it is disagreements about these matters.

SOCR: Well, Euthyphro, the gods will quarrel over these things if they quarrel at all, will they not?

EUTH: Necessarily.

SOCR: Then, my good Euthyphro, you say that some of the gods think one thing just, the others, another; and that what some of them hold to be honorable or good, others hold to be dishonorable or evil. For there would not have been quarrels among them if they had not disagreed on these points, would there?

EUTH: You are right.

SOCR: And each of them loves what he thinks honorable, and good, and just; and hates the opposite, does he not?