Nonconsequentialists like ross believe that

3.1: Act Nonconsequentialist Theories

1. 3.1 Outline the major assumption of the act nonconsequentialist theories

Just as utilitarianism falls into two categories (act and rule), so too do nonconsequentialist theories. Remember, however, that the main difference between act and rule utilitarianism and act and rule nonconsequentialism is that the former are based on consequences, whereas the latter are not. Nevertheless, some of the problems and disadvantages of the theories are similar, as we shall see.

Act nonconsequentialists make the major assumption that there are no general moral rules or theories at all, but only particular actions, situations, and people about which we cannot generalize. Accordingly, one must approach each situation individually as one of a kind and somehow decide what is the right action to take in that situation. It is the “how we decide” in this theory that is most interesting. Decisions for the act nonconsequentialist are “intuitionistic.” That is, what a person decides in a particular situation, because he or she cannot use any rules or standards, is based upon what he or she believes or feels or intuits to be the right action to take. This type of theory, then, is highly individualistic—individuals must decide what they feel is the right thing to do, and then do it. They are not concerned with consequences—and certainly not with the consequences of other situations, or with people not immediately involved in this particular situation—but they must do what they feel is right given this particular situation and the people involved in it.

This theory is characterized by two popular slogans of the 1960s: If it feels good—do it and Do your own thing. It also has a more traditional basis in intuitionistic, emotive, and noncognitive theories of morality. What these theories seem to stress is that morality in thought, language, and deed is not based upon reason. Some of these theories even suggest that morality cannot be rationalized because it isn’t based upon reason in the same way as scientific experimentation and factual statements about reality are.

The “emotive theory,” for example, states that ethical words and sentences really do only two things:

1. Express people’s feelings and attitudes

2. Evoke or generate certain feelings and attitudes in others

Journal: Moral Decisions in Act Nonconsequentalist Theory

The act nonconsequentialist theory allows one greater freedom in making moral decisions than other theories because it leaves moral decisions completely up to each individual’s own feelings. How free do you think individuals should be in their moral decision-making? Do you think this theory appeals to you and to what extent?

3.1.1: Intuitionism
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
In Right and Reason, Austin Fagothey (1901–1975) lists some general reasons for accepting or rejecting intuition as a basis for morality.1 The general reasons supporting moral intuitionism include the following:

1. Any well-meaning person seems to have an immediate sense of right and wrong

2. Human beings had moral ideas and convictions long before philosophers created ethics as a formal study

3. Our reasoning upon moral matters usually is used to confirm our more direct perceptions or “intuitions”

4. Our reasoning can go wrong in relation to moral issues as well as others, and then we must fall back upon our moral insights and intuitions. Thus these arguments present intuition as a higher form of reasoning indicating humans have deep moral insights which have values in themselves.

Arguments Against Intuitionism
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
There are at least four strong arguments against moral intuitionism. First, some people have described intuition as “hunches,” “wild guesses,” “irrational inspirations,” and “clairvoyance,” among other meanings lacking in scientific and philosophical respectability. It is, in short, difficult to define intuition, and it is more difficult still to prove its existence. Second, there is no proof that we have any inborn, or innate, set of moral rules with which we can compare our acts to see whether or not they are moral. Third, intuition is immune to objective criticism because it applies only to its possessor and because intuitions differ from one person to the next. Fourth, human beings who do not possess moral intuitions either have no ethics or have to establish their ethics on other grounds.

Journal: Role of Emotions in a Moral System

Analyze whether emotions or feelings play an important role in a moral system. How do they relate to morality?

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3.1.2: Criticisms of Act Nonconsequentialism
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
The greatest problem for act nonconsequentialism would seem to be the third argument listed in the foregoing paragraph, for if intuitions differ from person to person, how can conflicts between opposing intuitions be resolved? All we can say is that we disagree with another person’s intuitions; we have no logical basis for saying, “Your intuition is wrong, whereas mine is right.” Intuitions simply cannot be arbitrated, as reasons and judgments of evidence can; therefore, any theory of morality based upon intuitions alone, such as act nonconsequentialism, is highly questionable.

Other criticisms of act nonconsequentialism are these:

1. How do we know that what we intuit—with nothing else to guide us—will be morally correct?

2. How can we know when we have sufficient facts to make a moral decision?

3. With morality so highly individualized, how can we be sure we are doing the best thing for anyone else involved in the situation?

4. Can we really rely upon nothing more than our momentary intuitions to help us make our moral decisions?

5. How will we be able to justify our actions except by saying, “Well, I had an intuition that it was the right thing for me to do”?

It would seem to be very difficult to establish a morality of any social applicability here because anyone’s intuitions can justify any action he or she might take. An angry person might kill the one who made him angry and then justify the murder by saying, “I had an intuition that I should kill her.” But how do we arbitrate the conflict between the killer’s intuition and the intense feeling of the victim’s family and friends that the act was wrong? This is moral relativism of the highest degree, and absolutely no settlement is possible when the only things we have to go on are the intuitions of a given individual at a particular time.

Another criticism of act nonconsequentialism, similar to the criticism of act utilitarianism, focuses on the questionable assumption that all situations and people are completely different, with none of them having anything in common.

There are, of course, some highly unique situations for which no rules can be set up in advance, but there are many other situations containing enough similarities so that rules, perhaps with some appended exceptions or qualifications, can be stated quite effectively. For example, all situations in which someone is murdered have at least the similarity of there being a killer and a victim; because human life is considered to be essentially valuable in itself, rules governing when killing is or is not justified are not difficult to set up. Our legal system, with its different degree charges of murder and manslaughter, is a good example of rules fraught with moral import. These generally work quite satisfactorily by condemning immoral acts while at the same time recognizing extenuating circumstances, thereby attaining a significant degree of justice and fairness for all concerned.

These two criticisms—that each act’s being completely dissimilar from every other is simply a false empirical statement and the difficulty of relying solely upon one’s individual intuitions—make act nonconsequentialism a questionable ethical system. Even an active “situationist,” Joseph Fletcher (1905–1991), author of Situation Ethics, claims that in all ethical actions there should be at least one unifying factor, namely, Christian love. Because of his religious belief, he should probably be classified as an act utilitarian rather than an act nonconsequentialist.

3.2: Rule Nonconsequentialist Theories
1. 3.2 Analyze the way various rule nonconsequentialist theories differ from each other

LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Rule nonconsequentialists believe that there are or can be rules that are the only basis for morality and that consequences do not matter. It is the following of the rules (which are right moral commands) that is moral, and the concept of morality cannot be applied to the consequences that ensue when one follows the rules. The main way in which the various rule nonconsequentialist theories differ is in their methods of establishing the rules.

3.3: Divine Command Theory
1. 3.3 Evaluate divine command theory with respect to morality

LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
As described earlier, the Divine Command Theory states that morality is based not upon the consequences of actions or rules, nor upon self-interest or other-interestedness, but rather upon something “higher” than these mere mundane events of the imperfect human or natural worlds. It is based upon the existence of an all-good being or beings who are supernatural and who have communicated to human beings what they should and should not do in a moral sense. To be moral, human beings must follow the commands and prohibitions of such a being or beings to the letter without concerning themselves with consequences, self-interest, or anything else.

3.3.1: Criticisms of Divine Command Theory
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
The difficulties of the Divine Command Theory are inherent in the lack of rational foundation for the existence of some sort of supernatural being or beings and the further lack of proof that the support of such a being or beings is enough to make rational and useful the ethical system in question.

Even if one could prove conclusively the existence of the supernatural, how could one prove that any supernatural being is morally trustworthy? The rules themselves might be morally valid, but the justification for following them regardless of the consequences is weak indeed. Furthermore, of what validity are the rules if a person does not believe in any kind of supernatural existence? And even if we were to accept the existence of this supernatural being and its commandments, how could we be sure we were interpreting them correctly? Interpretations of the Ten Commandments vary and often conflict.2 Must there not be some clearer and generally more acceptable basis for rules than the existence of the supernatural?

Journal: Divine Command Theory

To what extend do you believe that Jews, Christians, and Muslims use the “Divine Command Theory” approach rather than egoism or act or rule utilitarianism as a basis for their ethical systems?

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3.4: Kant’s Duty Ethics
1. 3.4 Examine the ethical principles of Kant’s duty ethics

LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Another famous rule nonconsequentialist theory, often called “ Duty Ethics ,” was formulated by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and contains several ethical principles:

1. The Good Will

2. Establishing Morality by Reasoning Alone

3. The Categorical Imperative

4. The Practical Imperative

5. Duty Rather than Inclination

3.4.1: The Good Will
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Kant believed that nothing was good in itself except a good will, and he defined will as the unique human ability to act in accordance with moral rules, laws, or principles regardless of interests or consequences.

3.4.2: Establishing Morality by Reasoning Alone
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
After establishing good will as the most important human attribute, Kant then argued that reason was the second most important human attribute. Therefore, it was possible to set up valid absolute moral rules on the basis of reason alone, not by reference to any supernatural being or by empirical evidence but by the same kind of logical reasoning that establishes such indisputable truths in mathematics and logic as 2 + 2 = 4, “No circles are squares,” and “All triangles are three-sided.”

Kant’s first requirement for an absolute moral truth is that it must be logically consistent ; that is, it cannot be self-contradictory as the statement “A circle is a square” would be. Second, the truth must be universalizable; that is, it must be able to be stated so as to apply to everything without exception, not just to some or perhaps even most things. This is exemplified by the statement “All triangles are three-sided,” for which there are no exceptions. Triangles may be of different sizes and shapes, but they are by definition indisputably and universally three-sided. If moral rules could indeed be established in this same manner, as Kant thought, then they too would be indisputable and therefore logically and morally binding upon all human beings. Of course, some people might disobey these rules, but we could clearly brand such people as immoral.

In some ways, Kant’s ideas were brilliant. For example, he could establish the fact that living parasitically would be immoral because it would also be illogical. He could say that the commandment “Always be a parasite, living off of someone else” is illogical because if all people lived like parasites, then off whom could they live? It is easy to see that it is in conflict with the principle of universalizability that causes the inconsistency here. Obviously some people can be parasites, but not all. Now, if one could find such moral absolutes, then a completely irrefutable system of ethics could be established, and the obeying of the rules of this system would be what is moral, regardless of the consequences to self or others. The major way that Kant gave us to discover these moral absolutes was by means of his Categorical Imperative.

3.4.3: The Categorical Imperative
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
The Categorical Imperative may be stated in several ways, but basically it asserts that an act is immoral if the rule that would authorize it cannot be made into a rule for all human beings to follow.3 This means that whenever someone is about to make a moral decision, he or she must, according to Kant, ask first, “What is the rule authorizing this act I am about to perform?” and, second, “Can it become a universal rule for all human beings to follow?” For example, if a lazy person is thinking, “Why should I work hard in order to live; why don’t I just steal from everyone else?” and if this person is aware of Kant’s requirement, he or she will have to ask himself or herself what the rule is for this contemplated action. The rule would have to be, “I shall never work, but steal what I need from other human beings.” If the person attempts to universalize this statement, then it will read: “No human being should ever work, but all human beings should steal what they need from each other.” But if no one worked, there would be nothing to steal. How then would human beings live? Who would there be to steal from? It is obvious that some human beings can steal from others, but that not all human beings can do so. According to Kant, stealing must therefore be immoral because it cannot be applied to all human beings.

Another, more crucial, example of Kant’s Categorical Imperative concerns killing another human being. Kant argued that one could not kill another human being without violating a moral absolute because in order to do so one would have to establish a rule that would be self-contradictory : “Everyone must kill everyone else.” Because the meaning of life is to live, everyone killing everyone else would contradict that meaning and would therefore violate the Categorical Imperative and fail to universalize. Killing, then, is immoral, and one should not kill.

3.4.4: The Practical Imperative
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Another important principle in Kant’s ethical system is that no human being should be thought of or used merely as a means for someone else’s end, that each human being is a unique end in himself or herself, morally speaking at least. This principle sometimes is referred to as Kant’s “ Practical Imperative .” It certainly seems to be an important principle if we consider fairness and equal treatment to be necessary attributes of any moral system. Incidentally, this principle also can operate as an antidote to the “cost–benefit analysis,” or “end-justifies-the-means,” problem found in connection with both forms of utilitarianism.

Let’s take an example of how this Practical Imperative might work in practice from the field of medical ethics in the area of human experimentation. Kant would oppose using a human being for experimental purposes “for the good of humanity” or for any other reason that would lead us to look upon a human being as merely a “means” to an “end.” Thus, in the case of experimentation on 100 babies now to save 10 million children’s lives in the future, Kant definitely would brand such experimentation as immoral. On the other hand, if an experimental procedure were the only way to save a child’s life and it also would furnish doctors with information that might well save lives in the future, Kant probably would allow it because in this case a human being would not merely be used as a means to an end but considered an end in himself or herself. That is, the experimental procedure would be therapeutic for the human being involved—in this case, the child.

3.4.5: Duty Rather Than Inclination
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Kant next spoke about obeying such rules out of a sense of duty. He said that each human being is inclined to act in certain ways. That is, each of us is inclined to do a variety of things such as give to the poor, stay in bed rather than go to work, rape someone, or be gentle to children. Because inclinations , according to Kant, are irrational and emotional and because we seem to be operating upon a basis of whim rather than reason when we follow them, people must force themselves to do what is moral out of a sense of duty. In other words, we have many inclinations of various sorts, some of which are moral and others immoral. If we are to act morally, however, we must rely on our reason and our will and act out of a sense of duty.

Kant even went so far as to say that an act simply is not fully moral unless duty rather than inclination is the motive behind it. A person who is merely inclined to be kind and generous to others is not to be considered moral in the fullest sense in which Kant uses the word. Only if this person, perhaps because of some unexpected tragedy in his life, no longer is inclined to be kind and generous toward others, but now forces himself to be so out of a sense of duty, only then is he acting in a fully moral manner. This strikes most people as being a very harsh approach, but it does reveal Kant’s emphasis on his concept of duty as it pertains to following clearly established and absolute moral rules. Kant believed that he had established moral absolutes, and it seemed obvious to him that to be moral one should obey them out of a sense of duty.

Journal: Duty and Morality

How much importance do you think duty ought to have in relation to morality?

3.4.6: Summary and Illustration of Kant’s System
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
With the last point established, it appears we finally have an airtight moral system, one that cannot be successfully attacked in any way. We have “proved” that there are absolute moral rules that can be established irrefutably by reason, that one should obey them out of a sense of duty in order to be moral, and that all persons must be considered to be unique individuals who are never to be used for anyone else’s purposes or ends. But let us continue.

In order to show how Kant carried his theory into practice, it is important to present here one of his several “illustrations.” Kant describes a man who, in despair yet still in possession of his reason, is contemplating suicide. Using Kant’s system, the man must discover whether a maxim of his action could be made into a universal law for all human beings, so he frames the maxim as follows: “From self-love I should end my life whenever not ending it is likely to bring more bad than good.” Kant then states that this cannot be universalized because it is contradictory to end life by the very feeling (self-love) that impels one to improve it. Therefore, the maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law for all human beings because it is wholly inconsistent in itself and with the Categorical Imperative.

It also violates Kant’s Practical Imperative—that every human being is an end in himself or herself—because if the man destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain tolerable conditions up to the end of his life. However, Kant maintains that people are neither things nor means for anyone else’s ends but are ends in themselves; therefore, the suicidal man cannot destroy a person (whether it be himself or another) without violating this principle.4

3.5: Criticisms of Kant’s Duty Ethics

1. 3.5 Analyze the criticisms of Kant's concept of absolute rules

LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:

Consistency and Conflicts of Duties

As you might suspect, there are several significant criticisms of Kant’s system. He did show that some rules, when made universal, would become inconsistent and, therefore, could be said to be immoral because of their inconsistency. However, this does not tell us which rules are morally valid. Kant promulgated several Ten Commandment–like moral prohibitions based upon his moral system, such as “Do not murder,” “Do not steal,” and “Do not break promises.”

He argued, for example, that one should not break a promise because it would be inconsistent to state, “I promise that I will repay you in 30 days, but I don’t intend to keep my promise.” Also, Kant reasoned, you cannot universalize the rule “Never break promises except when it is inconvenient for you to keep them,” because promises then would have no meaning—or at least we wouldn’t know when they did or did not. Kant asked what meaning a contractual agreement would have if after having said, “I promise to do 1, 2, 3, and 4,” clause 5 read, “But I can break this agreement any time at my convenience.”

Suppose, however, that not breaking a promise would result in someone being seriously injured or even killed. According to Kant, we have to keep the promise, and because consequences do not matter, an innocent person would simply have to be hurt or killed. But which is, in fact, more important: keeping a promise or preventing an innocent person from being injured or killed? One of the problems here is that Kant never tells us how to choose between conflicting duties so as to obey different but equally absolute rules. We have a duty not to kill and a duty not to break promises, but which takes precedence when the two duties conflict?

Another criticism of universalizability and consistency, as criteria of morality, is that many rules of questionable moral value can be universalized without inconsistency. For example, is there anything inconsistent or nonuniversalizable about “Never help anyone in need?” If a society were made up of fairly self-sufficient individuals, there would be nothing immoral about not helping anyone. But even if there were people in need, what would establish the necessity of helping them? If 100 people in a group were self-sufficient and 15 were in need, would it be inconsistent or nonuniversal for the 100 to keep what they had and survive, allowing the other 15 to die? It might not be moral under some other kind of rules or principles, but it would not be inconsistent to state such a rule.

Journal: Consistency in a Moral Code

Rule nonconsequentialist theories stress consistency in their moral systems and codes, whereas the act nonconsequentialist theory seems to imply variety and inconsistency. Is consistency in a moral system or code, or for a person important?

3.5.1: The Reversibility Criterion
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Kant answered this type of criticism by introducing the criterion of reversibility; that is, if an action were reversed, would a person want it to be done to him? This is otherwise known as “the Golden Rule concept.” For instance, Kant would ask of the rule “Never help anyone in need,” what would you want done to or for you if you were in need? You would want to be helped; therefore such a rule, although universalizable, would not be morally universalizable, because it would not meet the reversibility (would-you-want-this-done-to-you) criterion. This criterion helps to eliminate further what seem to be immoral rules, but isn’t it a rather cagey way of smuggling in consequences? Isn’t Kant really saying that although “Never help anyone in need” is universalizable, it isn’t morally acceptable because the consequences of such a rule might backfire on the person stating it? This of course is no problem for the consequentialist (the rule utilitarian who would be the closest to Kant’s theory were it not for the fact that the utilitarian considers consequences important), but Kant has said that absolute moral rules, not consequences, are the basis of morality. Isn’t it inconsistent of him—especially because he has made such an issue of consistency—to allow consequences to creep into his theory?

3.5.2: Qualifying a Rule versus Making Exceptions to It
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Another criticism of the concept of absolute rules is that it leaves open to question whether a qualified rule is any less universalizable than one that is unqualified. Kant never distinguished between making an exception to a rule and qualifying that rule. For example, if the rule is stated, “Do not break promises, but I believe that I can break them any time I want to,” I would be making an unfair exception of myself to the rule. Kant felt that one should not make an exception to a general rule and certainly not for one’s self alone. However, what if the rule is qualified so that it applies to everyone: “Do not break promises except when not breaking a promise would seriously harm or kill someone”? Here the exception applies to the rule itself rather than to some individual or individuals. Kant certainly had a strong point to make about not making exceptions; after all, what good is a rule if one can make an exception of one’s self at any time one wants to? However, “Do not kill except in self-defense” is not any less universalizable than “Do not murder,” and the former rule would seem to relate to the history of human values and also to a doctrine of fairness much better than the latter.

Journal: Moral Absolutes

The rule nonconsequentialist theories essentially state that there are certain moral absolutes that should never be violated (e.g., rules against killing, mutilating, stealing, and breaking promises). To what extent do you agree or disagree with this idea? Are there certain do’s and don’ts to which human beings should always adhere and what are they? Why should they adhere to these moral principles, and what are the reasons behind this view of yours?

3.5.3: Duties versus Inclinations
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
There is still another criticism having to do with the inclination–duties conflict that Kant described, and that is, what happens when your inclinations and duties are the same? For example, what if you are inclined not to kill people, a tendency that fits well with Kant’s rule “Do not kill,” which it is your duty to obey. Does this mean that because you are not inclined to kill, you are not a moral person because your duty is not pulling you away from your inclinations? Many moralists disagree with the idea that people are not moral merely because they are inclined to be good rather than always struggling with themselves to be so. Kant did not believe that a person who acts morally from inclination is immoral, but he did believe that such a person is not moral in the truest sense of the word.

It is true that on many occasions the real test of personal morality comes when human beings must decide whether to fight against their inclinations (e.g., to steal money when no one can catch them) and act out of a sense of duty (they should not steal because it is wrong or because they would not want someone else to steal from them). But is this any reason to consider people as being not fully moral if they lead a good life, do no harm to others because they do not want to, and also think it is their duty not to? Which type of person would you feel safer with, the person who is inclined not to harm or kill others or the person who has a strong inclination to kill others but restrains himself merely out of a sense of duty? It would seem that society has a better chance of being moral if most people in it have become inclined to be moral through some sort of moral education. One other inconsistency in Kant’s Duty Ethics is that he was strongly against killing and yet he was in favor of capital punishment.

3.6: Ross’s Prima Facie Duties
1. 3.6 Analyze the positives and negatives of Ross's prima facie duties

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Sir William David Ross (1877–1940) agreed with Kant that morality basically should not rest on consequences, but he disagreed with the unyielding absolutism of Kant’s theories. One might place Ross somewhere in between Kant and the rule utilitarians, in that he believed that we have certain prima facie duties that we must always adhere to unless serious circumstances or reasons tell us to do otherwise. In such exceptional circumstances an individual’s actual duty might be different from one’s prima facie duty. In other words, he did not believe that consequences make an action right or wrong, but he did think that it is necessary to consider consequences when we are making our moral choices.

Prima Facie Duties
The term prima facie literally means “at first glance” or “on the surface of things.” A prima facie duty, then, is one that all human beings must obey in a general way before any other considerations enter into the picture. Table 3.1 describes some of Ross’s Prima Facie Duties.

Table 3.1: Ross’s Prima Facie Duties
Thus, Ross, like Kant, thought that there are rules all human beings should adhere to because it is their moral obligation to do so. He also improved on Kant a great deal in the area of what to do when duties (especially Prima Facie Duties) conflict.

Principles to Resolve Conflicting Duties
Ross established two principles that we may call upon when attempting to deal with the conflict of Prima Facie Duties:

1. Always do that act in accord with the stronger prima facie duty.

2. Always do that act that has the greatest degree of prima facie rightness over prima facie wrongness.6

3.6.1: Criticisms of Ross’s Theories
LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
Clearly, there are some prima facie problems with Ross’s theories.

Selecting Prima Facie Duties
How are we to decide which duties are indeed prima facie? Ross did list some of these duties for us, but on what basis did he do so, and what justification in either evidence or reasoning has he given us? When confronted with questions as to how we should select prima facie duties, Ross said that he was claiming that we know them to be true.

To me it seems as self-evident as anything could be, that to make a promise, for instance, is to create a moral claim on us in someone else. Many readers will perhaps say that they do not know this to be true. If so I certainly cannot prove it to them. I can only ask them to reflect again, in the hope that they will ultimately agree that they also know it to be true.7

What Ross actually is basing this selection of such duties on, then, is intuition. That is, there is no logic or evidence to justify his choices, but we are to accept what he says on the basis of intuition. If we do not have the same intuitions as he, then we are to keep trying until we do! This, of course, is both highly speculative and vague in its application with all of the attendant problems we encountered when discussing and evaluating the intuitive basis for act nonconsequentialism.

Deciding Which Prima Facie Duty Takes Precedence
A second problem arises when we look at the way in which Ross tries to resolve the decision-making difficulty of choosing the correct prima facie duty when it conflicts with another. Both of Ross’s principles are difficult to apply. He does not really tell us how we are to determine when one obligation is stronger than the other. Further, he does not give us a clear rule for determining the “balance” of prima facie rightness over wrongness. Therefore, there seems to be no clear criteria either for choosing which duties are prima facie or for deciding how we are to distinguish among them after they have been established.

Journal: Ranking Morals in Order of Importance

Do you think it is important to rank moral rules in order of importance (e.g., Ross’s Prima Facie Duties)? How will you rank your own ethical rules or those of any other system of which you are aware?

3.7: General Criticisms of Nonconsequentialist Theories
1. 3.7 Evaluate the general criticisms of the nonconsequentialist theories

LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:
The criticism of nonconsequentialist theories in general is this: Can we, and indeed, should we really avoid consequences when we are trying to set up a moral system? In addition, rule nonconsequentialist theories raise the following problems.

1. Why should we follow rules if the consequences of following them could be bad even for a few, but also, in some cases, for all concerned?
2. How can we resolve conflicts among rules that are all equally and absolutely binding?
3. Is there such a thing as a moral rule with absolutely no exceptions, given the complexities of human behavior and experience? If so, what is it?
A good example of this type of dead-end reasoning is the antiabortionist argument that under no circumstances may a life be taken and that life begins at conception. How can one argue for the saving of the mother’s life, or consider the kind of life either mother or baby will live if such absolutes already have been established? On the other side of the coin, how can one argue for the value of the life of a fetus if the prochoice advocate has taken as an absolute a woman’s right over her own body, regardless of what that body contains? What justification can either arguer give for the validity of these absolutes and for why there can be no exceptions to them under any circumstances?

When people are arguing consequences, they may at least be able to show that one action will have more good consequences than another, but when they are merely presenting “absolutes,” there can be no counterarguments made that will serve to justify exceptions. If we simply adopt an arbitrary, nonconsequentialist, absolute moral rule, then all arguments both from consequentialists and others are simply excluded. Closing off debate in this fashion is destructive to the search for truth and understanding in other areas, such as science, but it is disastrous in the sphere of morality, where the need to arrive at right answers is more crucial than in any other area of human experience.

Journal: Consequences in Moral Systems

Assess whether consideration of consequences can be safely eliminated from any moral system? Why do you think so?

4.1: Virtue Ethics Definitions
1. 4.1 List the key terms associated with virtue ethics

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The dictionary defines virtue as “the quality of moral excellence, righteousness, and responsibility . . . a specific type of moral excellence or other exemplary quality considered meritorious; a worthy practice or ideal.”1 It further lists the “cardinal” or “natural” virtues as “justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance.”2

A dictionary of philosophy describes the term virtue as it is employed in Aristotle’s philosophy as being

“That state of a thing which constitutes its peculiar excellence and enables it to perform its function well . . . in man [it is] the activity of reason and of rationally ordered habits.”3

As you can see, the emphasis is on the good or virtuous character of human beings themselves, rather than on their acts or the consequences of their acts, or feelings, or rules. In other words, it is the development of the good or virtuous person that is important in this moral theory, not abstract rules or consequences of acts or rules except as they derive from a good or virtuous person or cause that person to be good or virtuous.

4.2: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

1. 4.2 Examine the teleological character of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

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Virtue Ethics derives from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (named for his son, Nicomachus). Such ethics are teleological in character (i.e., aim toward some end or purpose). As Aristotle put it,

“Every art and every inquiry, every action and choice, seems to aim at some good . . . [and] the good has rightly been defined as that at which all things aim.”4

For example, a doctor’s art aims at health, seamanship aims at a safe voyage, and economy aims at wealth. He goes on to say that the end of human life is happiness, and the basic activity of human beings is to reason—a virtuous activity; therefore, the aim of human beings, according to Aristotle, is to reason well for a whole or complete life.

Journal: Human Beings as Teleological

Do you believe that human beings are teleological, which means they have a purpose? Explain why or why not.

4.2.1: Emphasis on Goodness of Character
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Aristotle is concerned with action, not as being right or good in itself, but as it is conducive to human good. In ethics, he starts from the actual moral judgments of human beings and says that by comparing, contrasting, and sifting them, we come to the formulation of general principles. Notice how this differs from the Divine Command Theory and the theories of Kant and Ross, as to the way in which principles are established. In the latter three theories, ethical principles are objective to, or outside of, human beings and are established by the supernatural or by abstract reason itself. Aristotle presupposes that there are natural ethical tendencies implanted in human beings and that to follow them with a general attitude of consistent harmony and proportion constitutes an ethical life.

4.2.2: Development of the Good or Virtuous Human Being
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Aristotle describes his ethical system as being eminently commonsense based, for the most part, founded as it is on the moral judgments of the ideal human being who, based upon reason, is considered good and virtuous. He states that humans begin with a capacity for goodness, which has to be developed by practice. He says we start by doing acts that are objectively virtuous, without a knowledge that the acts are good and without actively or rationally choosing them ourselves. As we practice these acts, we come to realize that the virtue is good in and of itself. For example, a child is taught to tell the truth (objectively a virtue) by her parents, and she does so because they have taught her she should. Eventually she recognizes that truth telling is a virtue in and of itself, and she continues to tell the truth because she knows that it is virtuous to do so.

This process would seem to be circular, except that Aristotle makes a distinction between those acts that create a good disposition (e.g., telling the truth without knowing this to be a virtue) and those that flow from the good disposition once it has been created (e.g., telling the truth because a person has come to know it to be a virtue). Aristotle further states that virtue itself is a disposition that has been developed out of a capacity by the proper exercise of that capacity.

Journal: Human Beings as Virtuous

Do you know anyone whom you think is an “ideal, virtuous person”? Describe that person’s character and explain why you think about him or her in that manner.

4.2.3: What Is Virtue and How Does It Relate to Vice?
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According to Aristotle, virtue is a mean between two extremes, both of which are vices—either excess or deficiency (or defect). Moral virtue, then, is defined by Aristotle as being “a disposition to choose by a rule . . . which a practically wise man would determine” to be the mean between the two extremes of excess or deficiency.5 And, according to Aristotle, practical wisdom is the ability to see what is the right thing to do in any circumstance. Therefore, a person must determine what a “practically wise, virtuous man” would choose in any circumstance calling for moral choice and then do the right thing. Obviously, Aristotle attaches much more importance to an enlightened conscience than to prior theoretical rules (again differing from the Divine Command theorist, Kant, or Ross).

4.2.4: How to Determine the Proper Mean?
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What is the mean between excess and deficiency, and how does one determine it?
Some examples of means between two extremes, established by Aristotle and tabulated by Sir William David Ross (who established the ethical theory of Prima Facie Duties), are in the following table. This partial list will give you some idea of what Aristotle means by the mean between two extremes, but it doesn’t really show what the mean “relative to us” would actually be. It does, however, provide us with some general guidelines that we can refer to as we attempt to determine the mean “relative to us.”